

Overcoming the boundaries: strategies of cooperation among Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian diaspora groups in response to the Ukrainian crisis. The comparison of Canada and Turkey

by Milana Nikolko and Fethi Kurtiy Şahin

This article analyzes the dynamics of diasporas' boundaries with a focus on the cooperation between Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diaspora groups in Canada and Turkey. The comparison draws on representative examples of diaspora groups' reactions and collective actions during the unfolding of the Ukrainian Crisis 2014-2016. Starting with the study of the diaspora groups' history in Turkey and Canada during the 20th -21st centuries, we argue that the complicated ornament of ethnic collective traumas, both caused by Tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union, and the recent crisis compel diasporas to recalculate their separate goals and to proceed with a common agenda.

Keywords: Diaspora, identities, Ukrainian diaspora groups, Crimean Tatar diaspora groups, positionality, cooperation, Canada, Turkey, Ukraine, Ukrainian Crisis.

The state of the problem

Crises are devastating. They have ruined familiar orders, spilled over borders, and spread chaos, devastation, and trauma. Yet when crises end and bring revolutionary changes, they create new prospects for mobilization, engaging novel ideas and pursuing new alliances established on a new structure.

The Euromaidan (November 2013 – February 2014), the Revolution of Dignity and the Ukraine crisis (February 2014–February 2016) vibrated throughout Ukrainian communities all over the world. A crisis occurred after Ukraine's President Yanukovich reversed his initiatives for deeper Ukrainian integration with the European Union at the end of November 2013. This act provoked the pro-European part of Ukrainian society to launch a broad wave of protests. The confrontation reached its apex in February 2014 with mass killings of protesters in Kyiv. The full-blown crisis started when President Yanukovich fled Ukraine in late February 2014, while the following occupation and annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in March 2014 were accompanied by insurgencies in different regions of Ukraine. It resulted in severe military conflict in Donbas.¹ During the conflict, more than 13,000 people lost their lives and over 1.6 million fled their homes.

From the very beginning of the crisis, diaspora mobilization was a significant

factor in developing an international agenda for Ukraine and an effective mechanism for rapid response to the changing situation on the ground. Along with Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars have remained united in their response to Russian aggression. Today, Crimean Tatars, the indigenous people of Crimea (Ukraine), are in the position of a minority in their motherland. This is the result of hundreds of years of migration from their homeland, caused by bloody wars in the region and the demographic policies of the Russian Empire after the collapse of their historical state – the Crimean Khanate.² The annexation of Crimea resulted in the unembellished persecution of Crimean Tatar activists in Crimea and triggered activism of Crimean Tatar diaspora groups all over the world.³

In this article, we address the question when and why Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diaspora groups in Canada and Turkey started to collaborate and coordinate common activities. How do these different groups synchronize their activism by bridging their resources? In order to reveal our findings on the proposed questions, we must first provide a description of major terms. To do so, we used Vertovec's ideas of multidimensional specifics of diaspora groups: "diaspora combines the characteristics of structural, conscious, and non-conscious factors in reconstructing and reproducing identities and socio-cultural institutions among groups outside some place of origin."⁴ Following these considerations, we can identify connections between individual and collective identities, personal choices of individuals to join the diaspora group and institutional collective forms of diasporas.

Dealing with diasporas, which have existed for hundreds of years far from their country of origin, we evidence the convolution of personal choices: a condition of subjectivity as a reason for becoming a part of diaspora is a very common discussion among second and third generations of diaspora.⁵ This specific condition of subjectivity is often triggered by the strong emotional reconnection with the country of ancestry. Yet we also observe the sustainability of diaspora institutions, carrying out collective actions and constant work to preserve and reproduce their group identity. The following definition by Adamson and Demetriou supports our research, because it emphasizes social collectivity existing across state borders that has succeeded over time to:

- 1) sustain a collective national, cultural, or religious identity through a sense of internal cohesion and sustained ties with a real or imagined homeland and
- 2) display an ability to address the collective interests of members of the social collectivity through a developed internal organizational framework and transnational links.⁶

As argued by Koinova, if a country's foreign policy is closed towards the sovereignty goal, but diaspora perceive themselves as having relatively strong positionality vis-à-vis the host-state, they are likely to pursue homeland-oriented

claims through state-based channels. If the foreign policy stance is closed towards the sovereignty goal and entrepreneurs consider their positionality relatively weak towards the host state, they will engage predominantly through transnational channels.⁷ The term diaspora positionality refers to diaspora networks with different social weight and influence to affect host state and homeland politics.

The contrasting and varying levels of knowledge and interests of diaspora regarding the home state situation raise the likelihood that diaspora has a far greater advantage than positionality alone would suggest. Strategically there may be an incentive for the diaspora to operate outside institutionalized forms of cooperation, by concealing or distorting information for personal or group gain. The fungibility of remittances directed towards the informal economy is a case in point.⁸ Indeed, diaspora bargaining power is contingent on exploiting the advantages of informational asymmetries. In conventional institutional arrangements, rules and guidelines are in place regarding how NGOs, aid agencies and diplomats engage in conflicts abroad. But a diaspora does not typically face the same kind of institutional limitations and oversight, except in extreme instances such as support for listed terrorist organizations, large financial flows, and carefully orchestrated state-driven migrant labour initiatives and refugee programs.

Diaspora strategies are designed to take full advantage of information asymmetries through unwritten and sometimes imprecise ground rules, which guide behaviour outside institutional frameworks and cover everything from mechanisms to tactics and fundraising. Thus, Ukraine's Canadian diaspora enjoys solid positionality.⁹ Its diaspora efforts are wide-ranging and comprehensive, including political (for example lobbying), economic (remittances, investment or money circulation), humanitarian (such as the promotion of human and other rights of the transnational groups within divided societies) and cultural (media production, the creation of subcultures)¹⁰ and even legal activities, such as transitional justice and memory-oriented work.

From our perspective, an effective and sustainable diaspora structure, which secures the efficiency of the group in the host country and its relations with the international community and country of origin, includes the following three substantial levels:




Figure 1. Milana Nikolko and Fethi Kurtiy Sahin©, 2020.

History of Diaspora groups in Canada and Turkey

Canada: Ukrainians

The study of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada has involved different types of texts: personal memoirs, diaspora literature, folklore, government statistics, archive materials and a broad spectrum of academic publications.¹¹ Academic reflection on Ukrainians in Canada can be systemized by a few categories, among them are detailed historical analyses of diaspora organizations and development¹², comparisons with other ethnic groups within Canadian society¹³, the influence of diaspora agents¹⁴, the study of culture and education in the broader spectrum of Canadian multiculturalism and most recently the new dynamics in the community in response to ongoing turbulence in the home country.¹⁵

For over 120 years, Ukrainians coming to Canada have included different segments of society: peasants, wage labourers, members of the clergy, intellectuals, professionals, government officials, soldiers, and dissidents. The majority of researchers argue that Canada's Ukrainian diaspora is comprised of four 'waves of migration,' each a mixture of labour migrants and political refugees. The first migrants from the Ukrainian region¹⁶ (the modern part of Western Ukraine before it was an independent state) landed in Canada at the end of the 19th century. That first wave, which took place roughly between 1891 and 1914, consisted mainly

of labour migrants. They were a classic labour diaspora trying to escape poor economic conditions and almost exclusively in search of affordable land and wage labour. Many of the people who left Ukrainian territory at the turn of the century did not have a clear sense of distinct Ukrainian identity when they moved abroad, in fact many first-wave migrants became “Ukrainian” in the diaspora.¹⁷

The second wave occurred between 1914 and 1930 and included a combination of labour migrants and political refugees. Around seventy thousand new Ukrainian migrants landed in Canada. During this period most fraternities and business associations and cultural societies of Ukrainian origin were founded.¹⁸

The third wave occurred between 1940 and 1954 and consisted of political refugees, displaced persons and war veterans. Between 1945 and 1955, about a quarter of a million eastern and western Ukrainians emigrated to North and South America, Australia and various parts of Europe. The arrival of approximately thirty-four thousand Ukrainians to Canada brought a much more diverse population than before, consisting of people of different age and gender. The new emigres settled primarily in Ontario; most of them were driven to the West by fear of the Soviets. For years, information regarding the life of Ukrainians in the Soviet Union was contentious, but debates about Soviet Ukraine continued and remained central to diaspora identity. With this post-war wave of Ukrainians, diaspora gained new educated, ambitious and driven migrants, who brought “firsthand” pieces of evidence of the untold tragic story of Soviet life. Above all, new migrants brought evidence of the Holodomor (Famine in Ukrainian) of 1932-33. After WWII, Ukrainians in Canada introduced a powerful political agenda to its diasporic discourse consisting of eyewitnesses accounts of a “Great Terror” and oral evidence of famine committed against the Ukrainian peoples. Indeed, since the beginning of the 1930s, Ukrainians in the West focused on gathering information about Stalin’s Ukraine, in particular, manmade episodes of starvation. Although some information could be found in ethnic Ukrainian media during the interwar period, more reliable and detailed evidence only came out during post-war emigration. These migrants of the third wave brought with them details of massive repression and numerous episodes of famine. We argue that this collective trauma of mass starvation in Soviet Ukraine in 1932-33 became a symbolic center and moral compass for the diaspora.

Diaspora institutions play a vital role in the sustainability of Ukrainian communities in Canada. Mokrushina¹⁹ emphasizes that the Ukrainian diaspora’s success in Canada is due to its deep-rooted and geographically distributed organizations. The most notable among these institutions is the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (CUC/UCC). Established in 1940, the Congress serves as an umbrella organization for all Ukrainian organizations in Canada and represents many different organizations. Ukrainians played a significant role in designing the Canadian model of multiculturalism. During the open debates in the 1960s Senator

Paul Yuzyk was a primary advocate of the Canadian model of multiculturalism and called for equal opportunities, security and rights of different minorities in Canada. De facto, Canadian multiculturalism was designed and promoted by prominent activists of the Ukrainian Canadian community.

The 1980s was a turning point for Canada's Ukrainian diaspora. Group solidarity manifested itself through the search of truths about the Holodomor, putting the Ukrainian diaspora on the same path as the Jewish diaspora in recognition of the Holocaust. The centralization of diaspora organizations in Canada was completed close to the end of the 1980s when the collapse of the Socialist block and late dissolution of the USSR caused the moral degradation of communist ideas among left-wing migrants. Nowadays, the Ukrainian Canadian Congress includes more than 1000 organizations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ukraine) and has become a significant patron for the Ukrainian World Congress (UWC).²⁰

The fourth wave began in the late 1980s with the collapse of the Soviet Union and continues to this day. Most fourth-wave emigrants are high-skilled migrants, although some refugees can also be found within this wave. So far, it is a smaller migration wave, consisting of approximately forty thousand people. These new migrants brought to Canada a mix of Soviet internationalism, Soviet nostalgia, and sense of liminality and the bitter taste of the personal experience and economic hardship during the break-up of the Soviet Union.²¹ Ivan Kozatchenko's research²² on democratic ideals and revision of the image of Ukraine, brought by new migrants are useful here. Within the first, second and third-generation Ukrainian diaspora there is unity around the basic ethnolinguistic characteristics of nationalism in response to Soviet "occupation" with less emphasis on cosmopolitan and global values. For the newer migrants from the post-Soviet period, there is a more multicultural and multilinguistic understanding of Ukraine as an independent nation free of Soviet rule. Canada hosts the second largest Ukrainian diaspora communities with more than 1.3 million people of Ukrainian descent.²³

We argue that Canada's Ukrainian diaspora developed a strong network of institutions and a unique mentality whereby dominant narratives of Holodomor (famine, orchestrated by Soviets in 1932-33 in Soviet Ukraine) were keeping diaspora active and united for generations. Enjoying (and creating) a favorable climate of multiculturalism, Ukrainians secure their positions in all spheres of society and politics, both Liberal and Conservative camps, from the municipal to the federal level²⁴. The recent tragic events in Ukraine re-actualized, reinforced and articulated these connections, and engaged more migrants in existing diaspora institutions. This process of re-actualization of the trauma is what binds different generations of diaspora together.

Crimean Tatars

Canada is a relatively new center for Crimean Tatar migration. Some of the persons displaced by WWII went to Western Europe and the United States²⁵, where few well-organized communities were established, but in general, the population is very small in comparison with the diaspora in Turkey. For Canada, migration mostly happened after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and was sustained by people migrating to find jobs or proceeding the educational purposes and settled in Canada. Today we have two Crimean Tatar associations in Canada named “Canadian Association of Crimean Tatars” and “Canada Crimea Cultural Committee”. The president of the Canadian Association of Crimean Tatars, Mr. Rustem Irsay, underlines that a few hundred (maximum of 300) Crimean Tatars have connections with these institutions. This group has strong human capital thanks to the migration motivations; yet, a comparison with Ukrainian organizations in Canada would be unjust considering the long history and large population of the Ukrainian diaspora in the country. However, the increasing collaboration with Ukrainian diaspora provides a good platform for common activism. Additionally, the importance of Canada in international politics gives the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Canada greater influence compared to its size.

Turkey: Crimean Tatars

Nowadays, Crimean Tatars have significant diaspora communities in sixteen different countries - Turkey, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Russia, Uzbekistan, Poland, Lithuania, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the USA, Canada, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Turkey hosts the largest Crimean Tatar community in the world. There is no official data from the Turkish authorities related to the Crimean Tatar population living in Turkey; yet, it is estimated that 1.8 million Crimeans migrated to the Ottoman territories between 1783 and 1922.²⁶ Kırımli’s research²⁷ on the Crimean Tatar and Noghai settlements in Turkey recorded 299 village settlements (excluding neighborhoods in the city centers) in Turkey established by the émigrés coming from the lands of the Crimean Khanate.²⁸

It is known that even before 1783, Crimea and the other lands of the Crimean Khanate had deep relationships with Anatolia and mutual migration movements occurred at different times. These migration movements can be traced back to the 14th century.²⁹ However, the first mass migration movement from Crimea happened in 1792-1793. This was followed by many other uninterrupted migration movements in 1802-1803, 1812-1813, 1828-1829, the 1830s, 1860-1861, 1874, 1890 and 1902. The most significant migration wave was seen during and after the Crimean War (1853-1856). It is estimated that almost 300,000 Crimean Tatars left their homeland and migrated to the Ottoman lands between 1859 and 1865. After this date, Crimean Tatars became a minority in Crimea for the first time in

their history.³⁰

During the Russian Revolution, Crimean Tatars aimed to establish their independence in the Crimean Peninsula. However, it was terminated with the bloody Bolshevik intervention and the chaos of the civil war. Between 1917 and 1920, many Crimean Tatars fled from the peninsula and the violence of the war. Between 1921 and 1922, Crimean Tatars faced the devastating effect of the hunger occurring in the region. Approximately three thousand Crimean Tatars took refuge in Turkey where the Turkish War of Independence was still going on.³¹ The last Crimean Tatar migration to Turkey happened after the WWII in the last days of the 1940s, as Crimean Tatars left Crimea to escape from the Soviet regime. Those captured as prisoners of war while serving in the Soviet Army and/or in the partisan groups ended up in German camps sought refugee as displaced persons. Approximately one thousand Crimean Tatars were accepted by Turkey.³² This group was the last wave reaching Turkey directly from Crimea before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As a result of these uninterrupted waves of migration, Turkey became the most important center for the Crimean Tatar diaspora.

At this point, it is important to underline the pushing factors for the Crimean Tatars. Years of devastating wars and Russian policies aiming to redesign the demography of the region together were the most important factors for all migration movements from the peninsula. Crimean Tatars living under Muslim law in the Crimean Khanate became landless and secondary under the Russian Empire, which was ruled by Christian law. Moreover, Russian authorities came to the point that this strategic region must be a true part of the motherland³³, and as an important step for this policy, the peninsula was attached to the newly established Tavrida Oblast. The other parts of this oblast did not have a good ethnic and economic relationship with the peninsula, and Moscow tried to change this condition through forced migration to Crimea. This situation created an oppressive atmosphere for Crimean Tatars. The period between 1783 and 1883³⁴ is accepted as the “dark age” for Crimean Tatars, because there was no literary production in the Crimean Tatar language for a century. Under these circumstances, Crimean Tatar migration to Ottoman lands aimed at protecting Turkic-Tatar and Muslim culture, together with their way of life in a friendly and welcoming country.

The most important turning point for the nationalism of Crimean Tatars in Crimea and in the diaspora is the *Yaş Tatar* (Young Tatar) movement.³⁵ Leaders of this movement formulated the Crimean Tatar nationalist arguments and the motherland concept was reshaped with discourse on political modernization. Prominent figures of this movement like Abdürreşid Mehdi, Noman Çelebicihan, Cafer Seydahmet Kırmir and others founded the first Crimean Tatar nationalist organizations in Istanbul and Crimea. They led the 1st Kurultai (*Qurultay*) of the Crimean Tatar People of 1917 and attempted to establish an independent state.

The *Qurultay* tradition is important for many different reasons. First, today,

the demands of the Crimean Tatars related to their autonomous state are put forward by the *Qurultay*. The self-governmental institutions of Crimean Tatars established after their return to Crimea accepted all decisions of the 1st *Qurultay* and declared itself as the follower of first one.³⁶ Photographs of the 1917 *Qurultay* are kept in the homes of émigré Crimean Tatars, who fled the peninsula in the years that followed, as relics of their homeland and adored state. The charismatic leadership of Noman Çelebicihan, the poet and the author of the national anthem of Crimean Tatars, is still present in collective memories of the people. He and other leaders are addressed with respect by the people, and their movement and methods influenced the formation of the Crimean Tatar National Movement.³⁷ Moreover, Cafer Seydahmet Kirimer, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and War of the 1st *Qurultay*, came to Turkey after the Bolshevik intervention to the *Qurultay* and brought the emerging discourse of the Crimean Tatar nationalism in Crimea to the diaspora. Today, Crimean Tatar diaspora leaders in Turkey proudly underline their direct connection to the 1st *Qurultay* thanks to Kirimer. Relations with the new wave of migrants who left Crimea after 1917 were an important turning point for the Crimean Tatar diaspora and shaped the future of activism.³⁸

We know that before the 1980s, Crimean Tatar activism in Turkey was sustained by a closed and an elite group.³⁹ For long years, the masses agreed to leave Crimean Tatar politics to a small group of émigré leaders.⁴⁰ It is related to the political structure in Turkey and the balances of the Cold War. Yet, after the 1980s we monitored a significant change. The 1980s were a period in which the diaspora elite living in Turkey decided to enlarge their scope and aimed to strengthen their grassroots-level activism. The following breaking point was post-1990s and due to the increased level of education, mobility, and urbanization Crimean Tatars saw a danger of assimilation and pre-conditions for nationalism.⁴¹ This was a period when many Crimean Tatar diaspora associations and foundations popped up in Turkey. These diaspora institutions worked very actively for the return of the Crimean Tatars from their deportation lands to their motherland Crimea. The leaders in Turkey exchanged letters with the leaders in the deportation lands and tried to sound their demands in the international arena⁴² and the communication between Crimean Tatar leaders in Crimea and diaspora activists expanded.⁴³ Yet at the same time Tatar leadership in the Crimea realized that “Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey lacked both the resources and the stomach” to proceed with the radical demand for national Crimean Tatar sovereignty.⁴⁴ It is very important to note that after the return⁴⁵, Crimean Tatar diaspora institutions accepted the authority of the 2nd *Qurultay* of the Crimean Tatar People, which was established in 1991 as a self-governmental institution in Crimea, the only institution representing the will of all Crimean Tatar people. As a result, decisions of the *Qurultay* constituted a framework for the activities of the diaspora institutions. When the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People was established as the executive body of the *Qurultay*,

diaspora institutions and activists offered their political and financial aid for the activities of the Mejlis. Moreover, they tried to work as a lobby for the activists in Crimea. However, internal debates and institutional inabilities posed an obstacle to the coordination of these efforts for years.

Crimean Tatar discourse on Soviet Trauma: in Ukraine and abroad

Despite the apparent complexity of the issue within the Ukrainian-Crimean political discourse between 1991 and 2014, deportation narratives were always present in the Crimean political agenda as one of the dominant themes. During this period, we evidenced the mobilization of Crimean Tatars around this shared trauma, particularly around the commemoration of the deportation of May 18. Starting in 1993, this day was marked in the calendar not only as a commemoration date of the deportation, but also as an event to exchange political ideas and express economic concerns. On May 18, thousands of Crimean Tatars marched to Simferopol (Aqmescit in Crimean Tatar), the administrative capital of Crimea, to express their political and economic demands, and to reunite with people from different parts of Crimea. The memory of physical and emotional injury gave a powerful impetus to the consolidation. Although the Crimean Tatar diaspora was excluded from the massive international awareness campaign on the genocidal nature of forced deportation in 1994, they share trauma narratives and commemorated this traumatic event as a symbol of the sufferings of the Crimean Tatar transnational community. It was underlined as a point of reference of the Russian oppression of Crimean Tatars and the last hit from the “enemy” to erase Crimean Tatar identity from the peninsula where the Crimean Tatars were a minority in 1944 as a result of the migration waves underlined above. Moreover, the diaspora elite believed that their migration from the peninsula and the deportation are the results of Moscow’s policies targeting a single aim.

The shared trauma memories could be observed in political activism as well. In the early 2000s, the regional political elite of Crimea was constituted by parties with a strong pro-Russian stance, communists (also affiliated with the pro-Russian agenda), situational pro-Ukrainian parties and the ethnic bloc of Mejlis. The latter, being an informal assembly representing Crimean Tatar interests, has never been registered as a political party in Ukraine. Although Mejlis’ formal position was not clear, its influence on the Crimean Tatar community was tremendous. Based on the ethnic principle, Mejlis sustain the executive mechanism of Qurultay (all people assembly of Crimean Tatar) and projected the decisions of Qurultay in political activism. Mustafa Dzhemilev, who headed the organization from the very beginning until 2013, played a special role in the strong political mobilisation of Mejlis. Dzhemilev is a veteran of the democratic movement from the late USSR; he was an open critic of the Soviet system and a political prisoner for his efforts

to persuade Crimean Tatars to return to Crimea. Even after Russian authorities declined his entry to Crimea (2014), he continued to be the principal figure in the ongoing discussion regarding the restoration of justice regarding deportation. His charisma and reputation as a non-compromising Soviet dissident continue to be well respected among diaspora communities.

His support of Revolution of Dignity and the post-Euromaidan reform process is an important factor in the good perception of Ukraine and Ukrainian diaspora in the eyes of the Crimean Tatar diaspora. The established relations between Mejlis and Ukrainian authorities gave way to a new framework for the relationship among the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian diaspora communities in Turkey.

Ukrainians in Turkey

According to Aybak and Antonova-Ünl, Sağın-Şimşek, Ateşman, Lozovska⁴⁶, the Black Sea region became a new transport, trade and migration hub with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The business partnership, transborder trade, and cross-border investments became significant factors in the 90s, the period of post-Soviet transition for Ukraine, Russia and Georgia. People, money and goods were circulating in the region, but among new migrants from the former Soviet Union, one group stood out. It was “exotic” and visually dominated - young women who married Turkish men. Coming from different parts of the former USSR, these women were not accommodated by existing diaspora groups. Tunc Aybak characterised their attitude as liminality, disorientation, thus a specific stage, where personal goals are not clear, and the only obtainable reality is a situation of transition. Using generic “Russian women” as characteristic of women from different countries and of different ethnic origin, Aybak recreated the romantic situation of the Russian émigré wave of the early 1920s, triggered by the Russian revolution and civil war. That previous wave brought to Istanbul Russian chic, extravaganza and soon was gone, because most of the émigrés continued their journey to Europe.

The reality of new migrants was much different, because for many of these female migrants Turkey became a new home. This group can be characterized in terms of post-Soviet diasporas: Russian speaking, with some nostalgic feelings towards the USSR and consuming information about their home country from Russian media. It can be argued that the ones who migrated to Turkey in the early years of the independence (1990s and 2000s) had weak connections and little interest in the process of nation-building at home. They did not carry the heritage of the years that brought about the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan. The graphic below summarizes the power distribution and inter-diaspora connections before 2014 in Canada and Turkey. We can conclude that prior to 2013 Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian diasporas were moving separately following their trajectories.




Figure 2. Milana Nikolko and Fethi Kurtiy Sahin©, 2020.

Post-Euromaidan change, alliances and common projects

Ukraine's struggle for nationhood and sovereignty accelerated in 2014 during the Euromaidan and following that the annexation of Crimea and violent conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Following Koinova⁴⁷, the Ukrainian crisis has all the reasons to be characterized as a critical juncture for Ukraine and Ukrainian diaspora. The critical juncture is an event of high amplitude that changes social practices and creates new meanings, but often comes with devastating consequences, such as changing state structures and influencing regional and international order.⁴⁸ The critical event affected diaspora as much as the homeland and produced long lasting effects.

In Canada, with the start of Euromaidan, Ukrainian diaspora mobilized quickly and effectively: from November 2013 to February 20, peaceful protests in support of Euromaidan rippled through Canada.⁴⁹ The Ukrainian Canadian Congress organized political demonstrations across the country to raise money and bring even more attention to the dramatic events in Ukraine, the money transfers, remittances and aid to the home country grew by 30 to 50%. Between 2014 and April 2015 more than a half of all respondents spent at least one day volunteering for Ukraine in their host state while 20% indicated they did volunteer work in Ukraine.⁵⁰ About 30% of interviewees supported Ukrainian Canadian organizations and participated in events, relating to the crisis in Ukraine. Many respondents also

mentioned a changing pattern in their financial support to the families back in Ukraine. For example, they spent more money on remitting to Ukraine than before and the destination of these remittances also changed. Diaspora of the fourth generation are now sending more money to help those relatives, who hadn't receive support before, but needed it during the crisis. For all Ukrainian diaspora, regardless of generational differences, social networks became a major arena for healthy debate, discussions, fundraising and information exchange. Emerging from that was sporadic collaboration, and new models of support were converted into sustainable projects, including support for the Ukrainian army in 2014, multiple humanitarian projects and support with online research and investigation on Russian aggression and common human rights initiatives. For the very first time we observe active diaspora collaboration with Ukrainian embassies, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other governmental organizations.⁵¹

Diaspora participation included a considerably wide spectrum of support to Ukraine and institutional support to Crimean Tatar organizations. Starting in 2016 a few attempts were made in the Canadian Parliament to pass Bill 306 "An Act to establish Crimean Tatar Deportation (*Sürgünlük*) Memorial Day and to recognize the mass deportation of the Crimea Tatars in 1944 as an act of genocide". This common project of "Ukrainian parliament group", political activists and Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diasporas is still ongoing and is one of many common initiatives. In Turkey, February 2014 was a breaking point in the history of the Crimean Tatars and caused deviations in the diaspora. Before the Russian annexation, the diaspora concentrated on strengthening ties with the Mejlis and Kurultai, while solving the problems of the returnees from the deportation lands. As mentioned before, decisions and activities of the institutions in Crimea and Ukraine constituted a political framework for the diaspora communities. However, because of the oppression of self-government institutions in Crimea, the Russian annexation enforced the diaspora institutions to be more engaged in the Crimean Tatar politics on the peninsula.

As a result, they have started to work on improving relations with the Ukrainian authorities and Ukrainian diaspora.⁵² On the very day of February 26, 2014, we witnessed incidents that changed the relations between Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians, which also reflected on the diasporas. On that day, Crimean Tatar self-government institutions invited Crimean Tatars and all Crimeans to resist any kind of separatist movement. Thousands of people gathered in front of the parliament of the autonomous republic with the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian flags. While the groups supporting a secession and unification with Russia shouted "Russia!", Crimean Tatars shouted "Ukraine!" in response.

At the beginning of March 2014, the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People's headquarters was the last building on which the Ukrainian flag was flying in Crimea. During and after the annexation, Crimean Tatar leaders called on all their people in

Crimea, Ukraine and all over the world to back the Ukrainian state and support the territorial integrity of Ukraine. This position of the Crimean Tatar leaders became a crucial factor in the new relations between both sides. In return, Ukraine granted a special status for Crimean Tatars and the Poroshenko administration worked to improve relations with Crimean Tatars and well-being of the people. Although many people criticized Ukraine for being very late and slow to rehabilitate the rights of Crimean Tatars, this situation created a very important chance for improving cooperation and common projects. Under these circumstances, observers argue that there is a change in the framing of Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians towards each other and as a result of the traumatic event and they started to perceive each other differently.⁵³

One of the most important reactions in the diaspora was the founding of the organization of “The Platform of Crimean Tatar Organizations” in Turkey on February 8, 2015.⁵⁴ 42 Crimean Tatar diaspora institutions in Turkey gathered and established this de facto platform to declare their support to the *Mejlis* and the *Qurultay*⁵⁵. They declared that all Crimean Tatar institutions recognizing the authority of the *Qurultay* and the *Mejlis* are welcomed in this platform and they aim to work to free Crimea from the occupation of the Russian Federation and to protect the rights of the Crimean Tatar people. Naturally, these arguments go parallel with the protection of the territorial integrity of Ukraine. This umbrella institution representing the overwhelming majority of the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey, which is the largest in the world, worked with the leaders of the *Mejlis* and called the 2nd World Congress of Crimean Tatars. During the meeting, perhaps for the first time in Crimean Tatar history, the diaspora willingly took on significant responsibility for the political side of the movement by establishing a trans-national institution defending the rights of the Crimean Tatar people in the international arena and backing the leaders of the Kurultai and the *Mejlis*. The occupation facilitated the unification of the diaspora organizations.⁵⁶

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine – Pavlo Klimkin – participated the event in the name of the President of Ukraine – Petro Poroshenko, and read the letter of President Poroshenko asking for an apology from the Crimean Tatar people for not trusting them before the occupation and officially promising for the establishment of a Crimean Tatar autonomous state in Ukraine by linking Crimean autonomy with Crimean Tatar indigeneity.

An important marker of a change in the relations between Ukraine and the Crimean Diaspora is the usage of Ukrainian in official and everyday practices. Most of the members of the Crimean Tatar diaspora living in Canada were citizens of Ukraine when they arrived in Canada, and they often used the Ukrainian flag. However, for the Crimean Tatars living in Turkey, it was a new and uneasy move.

For years, leaders of the Crimean Tatar Diaspora had conflictive relations with Ukrainian authorities due to Ukraine’s inability to prevent the suffering of

Crimean Tatars after the return and because of the oppressive policies of Crimean authorities towards new Crimean Tatar communities. On May 18 (Commemoration of Deportation 1944), ceremonies organized in Turkey were addressed by Ukrainian authorities and the officials. They were underlined as the causes of the sufferings of Crimean Tatars. It can be argued that as a result of the post-Soviet atmosphere and the lack of knowledge about Ukrainian politics, Crimean Tatars targeted Ukraine as the source of the problems. The very first attempt (2013) to combine the Ukrainian flag with the Turkish and Crimean Tatar flag was the concert of a Crimean Tatar ensemble. It caused serious debates among the leaders of the organizations. As a result, it took a long time, approximately until the second half of the 2010s when the co-occurrence of two flags become a normal practice. Appeals by Mustafa Jemilev, Mejlis and the stance of the leaders of the Crimean Associations changed the traditional practice. In addition to this significant change, Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian diaspora organizations started to attend each other's organizations and demonstrations. Events devoted to May 18, or Holodomor, Vyshyvanka Day (celebration of Ukrainian ethnic embroidered top), the tragic day of the Crimean occupation became unified practices for all organizations. Crimean Tatar organizations now include the Ukrainian anthem in their ceremonies and the Crimean Tatar anthem is also used at versa events sponsored by the Ukrainian Embassy. Nowadays, the Ukrainian community in Turkey is engaged in Crimean Tatar activism 'the 100th anniversary of the 1st Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar People was celebrated by an event organized by the Crimean Associations with the participation of the Ukrainian ambassador and Ukrainian community,' where Ukrainian, Crimean Tatar and Turkish flags were hoisted together. The very source of the Crimean Tatar demands and the justification of their political activism was recently unified with the Ukrainian symbols in the diaspora following the changes in the homeland.

Another example of collaborative legitimate procedures is granting the Ukrainian diaspora ID cards (*Posvidchennya zokordonnohya Ukrayintsya*) for Crimean Tatars.⁵⁷ With this act, Crimean Tatars are officially accepted as a part of the Ukrainian diaspora, although there is no constitutional or legal framework regarding the indigeneity of Crimean Tatars apart from a Ukrainian Parliamentary resolution. This inclusion was implemented in another symbolic and institutional move, on April 8, 2017, with the support of the Ukrainian Embassy in Turkey, Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar associations established a coordination platform by signing a common declaration.⁵⁸ This is the first official institution covering Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian diasporas and that is why it can be accepted as a start of a new term in the diaspora histories.

It must be understood that this kind of political preferences is mostly expressed by the elite and leaders of the diaspora communities. In the daily lives of the diaspora members, cultural and daily activities are still shaped by old habits.

Moreover, religion and language differences are important factors that cannot be excluded from the picture. Yet, there is an increasing tendency to invite the other to the organizations and share the events among the diaspora associations in Turkey.

Ukrainians in Turkey

The Ukrainian activists and heads of Ukrainian diaspora organizations whom we interviewed characterized the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 as a situation of “awakeness”, when the ethnic origin and the destiny of the motherland obtain the new value for Ukrainian migrants. They consider that migration from Ukraine at the end of the twentieth century was accompanied by some troublesome stories about exploitation and ethnic tension (for example the import sex trafficking channels). The home country crisis responded in a new wave of volunteering, mobilization and pushed Ukrainians to seek institutional and legitimate recognition of their identity. Most of the Ukrainian diaspora groups in Turkey were established after 2014.

With about 40,000 Ukrainian migrants living in Turkey, there are about 10-12 diaspora organizations, which mostly operate in the sphere of culture and education. According to our interviews, Ukrainian diasporas very much relied on help from the Ukrainian embassy, including consulting, coordination of activities and grant support. During the series of interviews, conducted with Ukrainian organisations in Turkey, all of the respondents expressed deep appreciation for the lasting support of Turkish officials, local municipalities and communities. With their main focus on education, promotion of culture and restoration and preservation of the history of the country, Ukrainian diaspora groups are reluctant to engage in political activism and prefer to stay in a safe zone of cultural diplomacy. At the same time, we evidenced multiple episodes of continued collaboration between Crimean Tatar activists and Ukrainians.

By 2016 we observed “the exodus” of Ukrainian migrants from the liminality of post- Soviet Diaspora and the formation and institutionalization of Ukrainian diaspora groups in Turkey, which plan their activity with consideration of Crimean Tatar groups and with the strong support of the Ukrainian embassy.

In Canada, the crisis stimulated the formation of the Crimean Tatar diaspora and strong engagement of the last wave of Ukrainian migrants with long existing diaspora organizations. The critical reflection and reconsideration of the Soviet past could be observed in all groups of research. We can conclude that the critical juncture in the home country affected diaspora groups by eliminating post-Soviet nostalgia, facilitating critical reflection on Soviet history, re-actualizing trauma narratives and creating new inter-diaspora alliances. The findings are graphically illustrated below:

Diaspora relations in host country AFTER 2014




Figure 3. Milana Nikolko and Fethi Kurtiy Şahin©, 2020.

Conclusions: overcoming the differences

The comparison between Ukrainian diaspora in Canada and Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey showed that both played a significant role in nation-building in their host countries. In Canada, Ukrainian diaspora intellectuals and politicians brought and legitimized the idea of multiculturalism as a new model for Canadian Identity and in Turkey Crimean Tatar activists played a crucial role in shaping modern Turkish society from the beginning of Ataturk’s era of modernization. The recent conflict in Ukraine fits neatly into this pre-existing environment of achievements by Crimean Tatar and Canadian diasporas: the pursuit of freedom from Russia, where long standing memories of trauma and victimhood have become a trans-regional and transnational idea, that unites all members of ethnic group in their response to ongoing oppression. Our findings suggest an intergenerational and interethnic juxtaposition of different diaspora groups in the framing of the home state crisis. Recent challenges in their home country pushed diaspora groups to unite their front and to bridge their institutions with the uprising communities. Ukrainian diaspora in Canadian Crimean Tatar diaspora synchronized their political agendas. The Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey helps Ukrainian diaspora to influence Turkish public opinion. We found evidence that regardless of the differences, all diaspora representatives were motivated to switch their modes of engagement with the homeland and pursue new models of cooperation with other

ethnic groups in a desire to achieve common goals. In our interviews in Canada and Turkey, we identified mass mobilization by means of volunteering initiatives, multiple examples of synchronized activities between different diaspora groups and the joint promotion of Ukraine via transnational networks. The Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey is working synchronically with newly established Ukrainian groups to preserve the national history of the country of origin and to attract international attention to the situation in occupied Crimea. Ukrainians in Canada strongly supported the parliament's discussion on the genocidal nature of the Crimean Tatar Deportation 1944 (*Sürgünlük*).

The complicated ornament of ethnic collective traumas, both caused by Tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union, and modern Russia, are compelling the diasporas to reassess their separate goals and proceed with the common agenda.

About the authors

Milana Nikolko, PhD, is an adjunct professor at the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Carleton University (Canada). From 2005 to 2014 Nikolko was associate Professor of Political Science at V. Vernadsky Taurida National University (Ukraine). She was a visiting professor at the Political Science Department of Valdosta State University (USA) in 2008, and at the Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa from 2009 to 2010 (Canada). Her main publications include the co-edited volume *Post-Soviet Migration and Diasporas. From Global Perspectives to Everyday Practices*. Editors: Nikolko, Milana, Carment, David (Eds.). Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. *Diaspora Mobilisation and the Ukraine Crisis: Old Traumas and New Strategies*, 2019, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (DOI: 10.1080/01419870.2019.1569703). Her current research focuses on nation-building processes, political narratives of victimization, migration and diaspora groups in Europe and Canada.

Fethi Kurtiy Şahin is a PhD Candidate in Area Studies and a research assistant at Middle East Technical University (ODTÜ), Turkey. Şahin received an award from the Mustafa N. Parlar Foundation in 2016 for his master thesis entitled "Crimean Tatar Factor and Euromaidan in Ukraine's Nation Building Efforts: Novelties and Changes after 2014." His latest article with Filiz Tutku Aydin "The Politics of Recognition of Crimean Tatar Collective Rights: With Special Attention to Annexation of Crimea" is published in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* (Vol. 52, Issue 1) in March 2019. His recent research focuses on the post-Soviet space, nationalism, Ukraine and Crimean Tatars. He has also volunteered in Crimean associations in Turkey.

Endnotes

- 1 Bild. 2016. "How Russia finances the Ukrainian rebel territories." Accessed September 4, 2019. <http://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/ukraine-konflikt/russia-finances-donbass-44151166.bild.html>
- 2 Approximately in the 6th century, Turkic peoples started to populate the vast Kipchak Steppe including southern Ukraine and Crimea. Kipchaks settled in this area in the 11th Century and soon became subjects of the Golden Horde, mixed together with Turkic and Muslim groups coming from Anatolia and southern Balkans and created an authentic identity, which resulted in the establishment of the Crimean Khanate in the first half of the 15th century after the collapse of the Golden Horde. Turkic speaking and Muslim people bearing this identity are called Crimean Tatars. The Crimean Khanate ruled most of the southern Ukraine, the northern Caucasus, today's Moldova and the Crimean Peninsula. It was one of the most important regional powers until its collapse in 1783. Details can be found in Hakan Kırımlı, *Türkiye'deki Kırım Tatar ve Nogay Köy Yerleşimleri*. Ankara: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2012.
- 3 UHHRU. 2019. Recommendations to Russia to ensure observance of civil and political rights in occupied Crimea (Accessed August 28, 2019) <https://helsinki.org.ua/en/articles/recommendations-to-russia-to-ensure-observance-of-civil-and-political-rights-in-occupied-crimea/>
- 4 Vertovec, Steven. 1997. "Three Meanings of "Diaspora," exemplified among South Asian Religions in Diaspora." *Journal of Transnational Studies* 6 (3). P. 277.
- 5 Cho, Lily. 2007. "The Turn to Diaspora". *TOPIA: The Canadian Journal of Cultural Studies*, 17, 11-30.
- 6 Adamson Fiona and M. Demetriou. 2007. "Remapping the Boundaries of the 'State' and 'National Identity': Incorporating Diasporas into IR Theorizing." *European Journal of International Relations*, 13(4), 497.
- 7 Koinova, Maria. 2014. "Why Do Conflict-generated Diasporas Pursue Sovereignty-based Claims through State-based or Transnational Channels? Armenian, Albanian, and Palestinian Diasporas in the UK Compared." *European Journal of International Relations*, vol 20 no. 4, 1043-1071.
- 8 Adamson, Fiona B. 2005. "Globalization, Transnational Political Mobilization, and Networks of Violence." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, (18) 1, 35-53.
- 9 Nikolko, Milana. 2016. *Political narratives of victimisation among Canadian Ukrainian Diaspora in Diaspora as Cultures of Cooperation: Global and Local Perspectives*. Edited by Ariane Sajed and David Carment. Palgrave Macmillan, 131-149.
- 10 Carment, David & Calleja, Rachael. 2017. "Diasporas and Fragile states – beyond remittances assessing the theoretical and policy linkages." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. 44, 1-19. 10.1080/1369183X.2017.1354157.
- 11 Lupul, Manoly R. 2005. *The politics of multiculturalism: a Ukrainian-Canadian memoir*. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Study press; Yuzyk, Paul Jan. 1967. *Ukrainian Canadians: Their Place and Role in Canadian Life*. Toronto: Ukrainian Canadian Business and Professional Federation.
- 12 V. Satzewich. 2002. *The Ukrainian Diaspora*. London: Routledge; Himka, John-Paul. 2016. "A Central European Diaspora under the Shadow of World War II: The Galician Ukrainians in North America." In *Austrian History Yearbook* 37, 17-31; Frank Sysyn. 1997. "The Ukrainian Famine of 1932-33: The Role of Ukrainian Diaspora in Research and Public Discussion" in *Problems of Genocide: Proceedings of the International Conference on "Problems of Genocide"*. Cambridge, MA; Toronto: Zoryan Institute, 74–117.
- 13 Fujiwara, Aya. 2012. *Ethnic Elites and Canadian Identity: Japanese, Ukrainians, and Scots, 1919–1971*. Edmonton: University of Manitoba press; Carment, David. 2015. "Diaspora Politics: When domestic votes trump foreign policy" in *Open Canada* (Accessed February 28, 2018) <https://www.opencanada.org/features/diaspora-politics-when-domestic-votes-trump-foreign-policy/>; Kozachuk,

- Oleh. 2017. "Ukraine in Canadian Foreign Policy After 2014." *TransCanadiana. Polish Journal of Canadian Studies*, 305-21.
- 14 Udovyk, Oksana. 2017. "Beyond the Conflict and Weak Civil Society; Stories from Ukraine: Cases of Grassroots Initiatives for Sustainable Development." *East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies* Vol 4, No 2, 187-210; Mokrushyna, Halyna. 2013. "Is the classic diaspora transnational and hybrid? The case of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress." *Nations and Nationalism* 19 (4): 799–818; Nikolko, Milana. 2016; Marples, David. 2007. *Heroes and Villains: Constructing National History in Contemporary Ukraine*. Budapest, Hungary and New York: Central European University Press. 383pp
- 15 Kozatchenko, Ivan. 2017a. "Retelling Old Stories with New Media: National Identity and Transnationalism in the "Russian Spring" Popular Uprisings." *East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies* Vol 4, No 1: 137-158.
- 16 Most of the Ukrainians who emigrated westward during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries came from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in particular, the provinces of Bukovyna and Galicia, along with Carpatho-Ukraine.
- 17 Isajiw, Wsevolod. 2010. "The Ukrainian Diaspora." In *The Call of the Homeland: Diaspora Nationalisms, Past and Present*, edited by A. Gal, A.S. Leoussi, and A.D. Smith. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
- 18 A large part of political and business organizations of Ukrainian Canadians were established in that period, among them: the Ukrainian War Veterans' Association, deeply associated with the Ukrainian nationalist movement (OUN -UWVA), Sich (a youth movement), and Ukrainian leftists (ULFTO).
- 19 Mokrushyna, Halyna. 2013. Is the classic diaspora transnational and hybrid? The case of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress. *Nations and Nationalism*. 19. 10.1111/nana.12032.
- 20 The recent structure of UWC leadership shows the dominance of Ukrainian Canadians, where 50 % of the executive committee was occupied by Canadians.
- 21 Aybak, Tunc. 2017. "Russian speaking diaspora in Turkey: the geopolitics of migration in the Black Sea region". In: *Post-Soviet Migration and Diasporas: From Global Perspectives to Everyday Practices*. Nikolko, Milana and Carment, David , eds. Migration, Diaspora and Citizenship . Palgrave Macmillan, UK, pp. 127-142.
- 22 Kozatchenko, Ivan. 2017b. "Homeland from afar: the Ukrainian diaspora after Euromaidan." Open lecture at Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, Edmonton. May 1, 2017. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HyF6elhdzQI>
- 23 Census profile, Census 2016. (Accessed February 28, 2018) http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/dp-pd/prof/details/page_cfm?Lang=E&Geo1=PR&Code1=01&Geo2=PR&Code2=01&Data=Count&SearchText=Canada&SearchType=Begins&SearchPR=01&B1=Language&TABID=1
- 24 See details in Nikolko, 2016
- 25 Williams, Brian. G. 2001. *The Crimean Tatars: the diaspora experience and the forging of a nation*. Leiden; Boston; Koln: Brill. P. 257.
- 26 Karpat, Kemal. 1985. *Ottoman Population, 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics*. Madison-Wisconsin, P. 66.
- 27 Kırımlı, Hakan. 2012. *Türkiye'deki Kırım Tatar ve Nogay Köy Yerleşimleri*. Ankara: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, v-xiii.
- 28 Ibid. The author underlines that many other settlements are lost or could not be found because of the re-settlements, urbanization, name changes and some other reasons.
- 29 Ibid. P 5-10.

- 30 Ibid. P11-12.
- 31 Ibid p.923.
- 32 Geray, Cevat. 1962. Türkiye’den ve Türkiye’ye Göçler ve Göçmenlerin İskânı (1923-1961). Ankara. (cited in Kırımlı, Türkiye’deki Kırım Tatar ve Nogay Köy Yerleşimleri, 13). 9.
- 33 Kırımlı 2010, 7.
- 34 Gaspıralı İsmail Bey (Ismail Gasprinskii) published his famous newspaper Tercüman.
- 35 See Hakan Kırımlı. 1993. “The Young “Tatar” movement in the Crimea, 1905-1909”, Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique, 34(4), (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales), 529-560.
- 36 This is why the 1991 Qurultay was named as the 2nd Qurultay.
- 37 Şahin, Fethi Kurtiy. 2016. “Crimean Tatar Factor and Euromaidan in Ukraine’s Nation Building Efforts: Novelities and Changes after 2014.” MA. Thesis. Middle East Technical University, 62.
- 38 For a detailed discussion on this process, see; Filiz Tutku Aydın, “Comparative Cases in Long-Distance Nationalism: Explaining the Émigré, Exile, Diaspora and Transnational Movements of the Crimean Tatars” (PhD Dissertation, University of Toronto, 2012), 237-262.
- 39 Şahin, Fethi Kurtiy. 2018. “A Bridge Between Ukraine And Turkey: Crimean Tatar Diaspora” in 25 Years of Turkey-Ukraine Diplomatic Relations: Regional Developments and Prospects for Enhanced Cooperation (AVİM (Center for Eurasian Studies) Conference Book No: 22), edited by Turgut Kerem Tuncel & Ayşegül Aydıngün. Ankara, 64-65.
- 40 Aydın, Filiz Tutku. 2012. “Comparative Cases in Long-Distance Nationalism: Explaining the Émigré, Exile, Diaspora and Transnational Movements of the Crimean Tatars.” PhD Dissertation. University of Toronto, 371-72.
- 41 Aydın. 2012, 372.
- 42 One can see the campaigns organized in the late 1980s in the Emel Journal archives. Emel Journal is the most important publication for the diaspora, it served as a platform for intellectuals and a school for the younger generations for a long time.
- 43 Williams. 2001, 263.
- 44 Williams. 2001, 268.
- 45 The mass return of Crimean Tatars deported in 1944 back to Crimea was rather chaotic and badly managed by new Ukrainian government.
- 46 See detailed analysis in Aybak 2016; Antonova-Ünlü, Elena; Sağın-Şimşek, Çiğdem; Ateşman, Ender; Lozovska, Anna. 2015. “Russian Immigrant Diaspora in Turkey: Language Use, Preference and Attitudes” Turkish Studies, Volume 16, Issue 3, 391-410.
- 47 Koinova, Maria. 2018. “Critical junctures and transformative events in diaspora mobilization for Kosovo and Palestinian statehood”. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 44:8, 1289-1308, DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2017.1354158
- 48 Koinova. 2018, 7.
- 49 Hopkins, Andrea and Rod Nickel. 2014. Ukrainians in Canada send money, shed tears for Kiev. February 20, 2014. (Accessed February 28, 2018) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-diaspora/ukrainians-in-canada-send-money-shed-tears-for-kiev-idUSBREA1J28H20140220>
- 50 Ukrainian diaspora investment studies. 2015. 20.
- 51 Ukrainian Canadian aid went through the UCC channels, as well as the Friends of Ukrainian Defense Forces Fund (FUDF), Patriot Defense, Ambulances for Ukraine and the Canadian Ukrainian Surgical mission.
- 52 Because of the conflictive character of the relations between Crimean Tatar self-government

institutions and the Ukrainian and Crimean authorities, the image of 'Ukraine' was a not an image of an 'ally' in the minds of Crimean Tatar diaspora. Moreover, security concerns of Ukraine related to the Peninsula with the demands of the Crimean Tatar national movement caused frictions between both sides. As a result, we did not observe cooperation until 2014. See; Fethi Kurtiy Şahin, "A Bridge Between Ukraine And Turkey: Crimean Tatar Diaspora" in 25 Years of Turkey-Ukraine Diplomatic Relations: Regional Developments and Prospects for Enhanced Cooperation (AVİM (Center for Eurasian Studies) Conference Book No: 22), edited by Turgut Kerem Tuncel & Ayşegül Aydıngün, (Ankara, July 2018), 66.

- 53 Aydin, Filiz Tutku & Sahin, Fethi Kurtiy. 2019. "The Politics of Recognition of Crimean Tatar Collective Rights in the Post-Soviet Period: With Special Attention to the Russian Annexation of Crimea." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 52, 39-50.
- 54 Kırım Haber. 2015. "Türkiye'de bulunan 42 Kırım Tatar teşkilatından tarihi karar." Accessed September 12, 2019 http://www.vatankirim.net/kirimhaber/haber/haber_detay.asp?HaberID=102.
- 55 Kırım Derneği. 2015. "Kırım Tatar Teşkilatları Platformu'ndan Tarihi Karar." Accessed September 12, 2019. <http://www.kirimderneği.org.tr/haberler/462-kirim-tatar-teskilatlari-platformu-ndan-tarihi-karar>
- 56 Şahin. 2018.
- 57 The first two people obtained their documents on February 4, 2017.
- 58 QHA. 2017. "Ukrayna ve Kırım Tatar Derneklerinin Koordinasyon Grubu Kuruldu." Accessed September 12, 2019. <http://old.qha.com.ua/tr/toplum/ukrayna-ve-kirim-tatar-derneklerinin-koordinasyon-grubu-kuruldu/154462/>