Euxeinos

Governance and Culture in the Black Sea Region

Volume 10 / Issue 30/ December 2020

Crossing Borders: Representations of Ukrainian Diasporas

Guest editor: Tetyana Ostapchuk

Online Open Access Journal of the Center for Governance and Culture in Europe
University of St. Gallen
URL: www.gce.unisg.ch, www.euxeinos.ch
ISSN 2296-0708

Last Update 26 June 2021

LANDIS & GYR STIFTUNG

Center for Governance and Culture in Europe
University of St.Gallen

Table of Contents

Editorial

Crossing Borders: Representations of Ukrainian Diasporas

In writing about Ukrainians on the move, Yuriy Bilan argued that "In Ukraine, external migration is not a situational phenomenon, but a historical and traditional one." [1] The first migrants started to cross the borders of their land for different economic, political, social, and cultural reasons. They all have had to adapt to new surroundings and simultaneously deal with their past: either manifesting it or silencing, transforming or forgetting it. In this issue, we claim that once an emigrant crosses a border of his or her native land he or she is engaged in a permanent process of ordering his or her former or new identities, experiences, and memories. Speaking about an immigrant as a mirror phenomenon, we will concentrate on processes of othering and negotiating differences. When a border(s) is crossed, it stays inside the minds and bodies of migrants.

This volume of papers aims to tackle Ukrainian Diaspora while applying Cultural Border Studies lenses toward problems of representing Ukrainian experiences in new cultural, political, and economic environments. As is known, representation is a term to designate the ways in which texts of culture structure images of the world. Its constructivist nature was developed by structuralists in the 1970s and led to the creation of so called typical images of the group. Ann Rigney noted that "'representing the group' through language is not only a (more or less) accurate reflection of existing states of affairs, but also a way calling that group's identity into being."[2] That is precisely what is happening to groups of Ukrainian migrants abroad: only through representation of their experience of crossing borders they can create the connectedness with the homeland and with the similar experience of migrants from other countries. This process not only creates the feeling of being a part of a globalized world but also helps to identify new types of discursive mixed identities such as the Ukrainian diasporic identity.

Later, post-structuralists placed emphasis on the 'limits of representation' noting that "experience continuously escapes the discursive forms that try to structure it" and that "the power of representation is limited by experience itself."[3] This idea helps to digest the problematic nature of narrating Ukrainian migrants' experience of crossing the borders. Even if migrants do this voluntarily, the decision to leave the homeland is always controversial. Moreover, in historical perspective, leaving the home country is more often forced by external factors such as war conflicts, pressure from totalitarian regimes, persecutions of different nature, religious and gender issues, etc.

Immigration is not just a simple change of dwelling, but it is associated with disorientation, feeling of loss, and trauma. It explains that crossing a border is not a momentum event but a permanent process of re-thinking and re-representing a migrant's past, present and future. At this point, we will look at a border as a constitutive element of the migrant's self.

In a traditional way, borders divide states and nations and they have been depicted as separating lines on maps. For ages these territorial lines were treated as more or less static divisions marked with specific material objects: natural, such as rivers, oceans, mountains, etc.; and/ or manmade – walls, fences, trenches, etc. But at the end of the 20th century, the new discipline Border Studies shifted the attention from "actual borderline, its geography, its delimitations and demarcations, to cover a variety of forms and types of social boundaries, both in their material and symbolic dimension."[4] Nowadays, scholars interpret borders from a dynamic perspective rather as bordering, an ongoing process of emergence, becoming, crossing, waiting, and in Robert J. Kaiser's words "in many ways event-driven."[5] Borders are understood as liminal zones that "should also be considered as a location of contact, the negotiation of cultural values and of relational identity."[6] All in all, an event of crossing a border legitimizes a border itself but also leads to re-approaching old and new socio-cultural norms, codes, patterns of behavior, and re-negotiating a migrant's identity which functions as a space of encounter and intersections. In this process of bordering and ordering different signifiers, a migrant has to re-approach among other aspects the very performativity of their own minds and bodies and establish a permanently updating set of repetitive practices through which those signifiers can materialize as things in the world and can cause changes. In other words, a migrant needs a language that would function as a form of social action.

Questions concerning Ukrainian migrants have already been at the center of global scholarly attention. Thus, to name just a few milestones, in 1988, Dmytro Blažejovskyj started to analyze religious aspects of the Ukrainian Catholic Diaspora;[7] in 1995, Ann Lencyk Pawliczko shifted the focus to demographic and sociological aspects of the homeland and its Ukrainian Diaspora; [8] in 2003, Vic Satzewich analyzed historical aspects in his classical monograph *Ukrainian Diaspora;*[9] in 2008, Lindy Anne Ledohowski published the outcomes of her PhD research in Ukrainian-Canadian literature;[10] in 2015, Natalia Khanenko-Friesen explored folk traditions developed in the Ukrainian Diaspora and in Ukraine in the 20th century,[11] etc. These academic publications have chosen the Ukrainian Diasporas as a main subject of their inquiry while only sporadically looking at themes concerning borders and border crossings.

In order to shed more light on numerous connections between migration and bordering, our publications argue that in those diverse representations which Ukrainian Diasporas have developed through centuries a border(s) has stayed

visible on different levels and often the border itself has contributed to the creation of specific language practices and strategies of their representations. Our volume identifies such encounters, making visible the instances and moments of cultural exchange between Ukrainian Diasporas, Ukraine and those countries which Ukrainian migrants have chosen as their new homes. Thus, the main contribution of our volume to the field is a bordercrossing vector of analyzing cultural representations/limits of representations of Ukrainian migrants in diachronic and synchronic perspectives. For the future we need a better understanding of the role of Ukrainian Diasporas in cultural exchange processes between the west and the east, the north and the south. It would be very productive to trace the blends between migrants' past socio-spatial norms and future space which is always "an open potentiality"[12] and borders are always "events of becoming."[13]

The six articles compiled in this volume are arranged in two sections which highlight different thematic aspects. The first includes essays in which the imagery of a Ukrainian woman migrant intersects with established stereotypes, old and new cultural norms, expectations of both migrants and communities they left as well as those they entered. The second part consists of three papers in which authors give insights into the lives of Ukrainian Diaspora communities in Georgia, Germany, and Canada.

The first section of the volume explores challenges of migration through the eyes of women artists belonging to different waves and generations of migrants. Marina Lewycka and Marusya Bociurkiw were born in the families of Ukrainian refugees after World War II. They represent Ukrainian Diasporas in British and Canadian literatures and cultures respectively. In contrast, Anna Kosarewska and Lia Dostlieva are two faces of the present day flow of Ukrainian migrants to the West, but if the first follows the patterns of 'a nomadic-becoming woman,' the second was displaced from her home in the Donbas region and positions herself and her works as 'Others' in European cultural discourse.

The contributors working with these personalities and their artistic representations of the selves (most of analyzed works include transparent autobiographical references) and cultural representations of Ukrainians actually prove that "every perception of national identity is implicitly or explicitly gendered."[14] Thus, in the opening essay "Marina Lewycka, Women's Work, and the Figure of the Ukrainian Woman as Economic Migrant," Heather Fielding uses Anca Parvulescu's ideas about east-west economic migration as a "traffic in women's work" to analyze stereotypes about the Ukrainian woman as hypersexual and hyper-materialist in Marina Lewycka's two novels *Short History of Tractors in Ukrainian* and *Various Pets Alive and Dead.* The researcher claims that these novels connect the stereotype of the Ukrainian woman migrant to anxieties about contemporary global capitalism after the financial collapse of 2008.

In her essay "Ukrainian Canadian B/Orders: Culinary Remembrances and Queer

Bordercrossings in Marusya Bociurkiw's *Food Was Her Country*" Astrid Fellner discusses narratives by Ukrainian Canadian queer writer Marusya Bociurkiw, showing that culinary remembrances in her texts figure as powerful symbols of ethnicity, crossing various borders of nationality, ethnic belonging, and sexuality. Zooming in on her most recent work *Food Was Her Country: The Memoir of a Queer Daughter* (2018), she argues that Bociurkiw's ethnic culinary narratives can be read as queer border narratives, which engage the complex narratives of home, belonging, and crossing boundaries. Astrid Fellner places this Ukrainian Canadian writer both within the tradition of ethnic Canadian writings and also transcultural queer writings.

Furthermore, Iuliia Lashchuk's essay "Bord(h)ers. Why gender matters in migration and art?" is an attempt at dialogue with Heather Fielding on the representation of contemporary Ukrainian female migrants only as 'hypersexual and hyper-materialist' workers and European established stereotypes of Ukrainian women as clearing and caring staff. The scholar analyzes the pull and push factors behind the migration of Ukrainian female artists to Europe, Poland to be precise. She identifies contradictions and proves the ambiguity of Ukrainian women representations abroad. Among artistic self-representations, the researcher distinguishes two types. The first type is those who are migrating by their own will and for whom bordercrossing is simply a style of life. In their performances and art projects this choice is represented as a specific type of enriching experience that connects them to global problems and makes them citizens of the world. One such artist is Anna Kosarewska. Another pattern of border thinking is found in artistic projects by Lia Dostlieva as reactions to her forced loss of the homeland. She explores different types of borders among which is a conventional border between human and animal bodies as a metaphor of constant transformation. In the second part of her paper Iuliia Lashchuk presents her own art-research project *Bord(h)ers* in which she maps Ukrainian female migration aims, roots and languages they develop to become heard and visible in multi-voiced European socio-cultural discourse.

All in all, three papers explore women's writings and strategies of representing women's experiences in exile. These voices challenge the established stereotypes about Ukrainian women migrants. They also look for specific discursive potential of their artistic languages to overcome the limits of representations. All the cases illustrate well the transgressive nature of border literature and art.

The following three papers mainly deal with temporal-spatial aspects of Ukrainian migration while applying several key ideas from Border Studies theory. Thus, the term *contact zone* was coined in works of Mary Louise Pratt,

> *Contact zone refer(s) to the space of colonial encounters, the space in which people geographically and historically separated come into contact with each other and establish ongoing relations, usually evolving conditions of coercion,*

> *radical inequality, and intractable conflict… By using the term "contact", I aim to foreground the interactive, improvisational dimensions of colonial encounters [which] … emphasizes how subjects are constituted in and by their relations to each other.*[15]

Ultimately, the relations of power in contact zones are asymmetrical, so marginal ethnical groups / groups of immigrants have to find ways to legitimize their past and negotiate their present hybrid culture and identities mainly through interaction and improvisation. Alongside this, the result of prolonged contact may be characterized with the help of the term "borderland" offered by Gloria Anzaldúa, who writes that

> *borders are set up to define the places that are safe and unsafe, to distinguish us from them. A border is a dividing line, a narrow strip along a steep edge. A borderland is a vague and undetermined place created by emotional residue of an unnatural boundary. It is a constant state of transition.*[16]

Within years the idea of borderlands has become very productive, and borderlands are treated widely as "zones of cultural overlap characterized by a mixing of cultural styles."[17]

With attention to above-mentioned theories Olga Dorokhina's paper "Borderlands of Georgian Ukrainians" both clarifies those concepts and also introduces an idea of "cultural borderlands"as a type of third hybrid culture created by communities of migrants. She traces historical routes, reasons and waves of mass migration of Ukrainians to Georgia since the 18th century. The researcher identifies the ways in which Georgian Ukrainians manifest their ancestry, how this community is integrated into modern Georgian society, and which institutional structures are promoting Ukrainian culture. Comparatively, Kateryna Kobchenko presents an overview of Ukrainian emigration in West Germany in its development after WWII during two periods – first as *Displaced Persons* (1945-early 1950s) and then as the exile group in the Federal Republic of Germany. Her contribution focuses on the Ukrainian transnational community's cultural self-representation as well as the peculiarities of Germany as a country of residence. She claims that the Ukrainian community's existence was centered on political activities, and the cultural and intellectual aspects of its life in exile formed the basic precondition for its self-identification as a national group. In the last essay "Overcoming the boundaries: strategies of cooperation among Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian diaspora groups in responding to Ukrainian crisis. Case of Canada and Turkey" Milana Nikolko and Fethi Kurtiy Şahin examine the dynamics and fluctuations of the Diaspora's symbolic boundaries by studying the cooperation between Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diaspora groups in Canada and Turkey. The comparison draws on representative examples of Diaspora reactions and collective actions during the unfolding of the Ukrainian Crisis in 2014-2016.

They argue that the complicated ornament of ethnic collective traumas, caused by Tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union and the recent crisis, fuel Diasporas efforts to recalculate their separate goals and to proceed, even temporarily, with a common agenda.The authors conclude that by overcoming traditional boundaries, Diaspora groups are devising new collective strategies to achieve common goals as a response to the crisis in the homeland.

By and large, this volume has carved out just a few cases of theoretical and practical interaction between Ukrainian Diaspora representations and bordercrossings as one of the constituent factors of migration itself. We do hope it will pave way for further interdisciplinary research on the problem and facilitate the ordering of the Ukrainian experience constituted in and by its relations to old and new homelands, other states, and other Diaspora groups.

This volume is the outcome of interactions between members of different countries. Based on a collaborative project between the Center for Governance and Culture in Europe at the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland, and Petro Mohyla Black Sea National University, Ukraine, these articles are the results of an international workshop that took place in May 2019. During this workshop, participants from Ukraine, Georgia, Germany, Poland, Italy, Great Britain, and Canada discussed a wide range of questions. The essays included here are selected papers of this workshop. The editors of this volume would like to thank contributors for their collaboration and their willingness to make revisions. Our thanks also go to our publisher *Euxeinos* and to the editors of the journal series for including this volume in their series. Our volume of essays is the product of yet another fruitful cross-university research project, which continues to be a testimony to the importance of transanational collaboration between Ukrainian Diasporas, their old and new homelands.

by Tetiana Ostapchuk

Endnotes

1 Bilan, Yuriy. 2017. *Migration of the Ukrainian population: economic, institutional andsociocultural factors*. http://proxy.cm.umoncton.ca/login?url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/j.ctv3t5qrg.

2 Beller, Manfred and Leerssen, Joep, ed. 2007. *Imagology. The cultural construction and literary representations of national characters.* Amsterdam, New York, NY: Rodopi, p.416.

3 Ibid., p.416.

4 Sevastianov, Sergei V., Line, Jussi P., and Kireev, Anton A., ed. 2015. *Introduction to Border Studies.* Valdivostok: Dlanauka, p. 7.

5 Kaise, Robert J. *Preformativity and the Eventfulness of Bordering Practices*. In: *A Companion to Border Studies.* Ed. by Thomas M. Wilson and Hastings Donnan. 2012. Blackwell Publishing, p. 523.

6 Rosello, Mireille and Wolfe, Stephen F. *Introduction*. In: Schimanski, Johan, ed. 2017. *Border aesthetics: concepts and intersections.* New York: Berghahn, p. 11.

7 Blažejovskyj, Dmytro. 1988. *Ukrainian Catholic clergy in diaspora (1751-1988): annotated list of priests who served outside of Ukraine*. Rome: Nakladom avtora.

8 Pawliczko, Ann Lencyk. 1995. *Ukraine and Ukrainians throughout the world: a demographic and sociological guide to the homeland and its diaspora*. Toronto: University Toronto Press.

9 Satzewich, Vic. 2003. *Ukrainian Diaspora*. Routledge.

10 Ledohowski, Lindy Anne. 2008. *Canadian Cossacks: Finding Ukraine in fifty years of Ukrainian-Canadian literature in English*. Toronto: University of Toronto.

11 Khanenko-Friesen, Natalia. 2015. *Ukrainian otherlands: diaspora, homeland, and folk imagination in the twentieth century*. University of Wisconsin Press.

12 Kaise, Robert J. *Preformativity*, p. 523.

13 Ibid., p. 524.

14 Beller, Manfred and Leerssen, Joep, ed. 2007. *Imagology,* p. 330.

15 Brady, Mary Pat. 2002. *Extinct Lands, Temporal Geographies: Chicana Literature and the Urgency of Space*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, pp. 6 – 7.

16 Anzaldua, Gloria. 1987. *Borderlands: The new mestiza = La frontera*. San Francisco. Aunt Lute Books, p. 5.

17 Donnan, H. 2015. *Anthropology of Borders.* In: *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences.* Elsevier. Amsterdam, p. 1290.

Marina Lewycka, Women's Work, and the Figure of the Ukrainian Woman as Economic Migrant

by Heather Fielding

Marina Lewycka's Short History of Tractors in Ukrainian is the most prominent portrayal of Ukrainians in contemporary British fiction, but it relies heavily on stereotypes about the Ukrainian woman as hypersexual and hypermaterialist. This article uses Anca Parvulescu's ideas about east-west economic migration as a "traffic in women's work" to analyze this stereotype in Lewycka's fiction. Valentina, who immigrates to the UK to marry an elderly man, is threatening because she refuses the fiction that she is part of the family, instead insisting that she is a working for pay, in labor ranging from cooking to sex. She is also dangerous because she is motivated entirely by consumer desire, and leaves her husband to buy things in the west. The novel imagines her as bringing these shallow economic motives, which leach care and affection out of social bonds, into the British family. A later novel, Various Pets Alive and Dead, reimagines Valentina as Maroushka, an alluring but dangerous financial analyst. Lewycka takes the logic of Valentina to its extreme: Maroushka shows this same flattening of social and affective bonds into a compulsion for money, but this time at a macroeconomic level, as she develops a new hedge fund designed to profit from the collapse of the housing market. Here, Lewycka imagines the Ukrainian woman as a figure for a "gangster" capitalism that threatens to ravage the British economy. These novels connect the stereotype of the Ukrainian woman to anxieties about contemporary global capitalism after the financial collapse of 2008.

Keywords: economic migration, women's work, Ukrainian diaspora literature, British-Ukrainian literature

In 2005, for the first time, a British-Ukrainian writer, writing about Ukrainian characters, broke into the mainstream literary fiction market in the UK. The novelist was Marina Lewycka, a university lecturer from Sheffield who was already in her fifties by the time she started writing. The daughter of Ukrainian displaced persons who immigrated to the UK after World War Two, Lewycka made her name with *A Short History of Tractors in Ukrainian,* a quasi-autobiographical novel about a character modeled on Lewycka's elderly father. The novel is a family chronicle, as Nikolai struggles to tell the story of his family's tragic experiences during the Holodomor and World War Two to his daughter, who was born after their exile. But *Short History* is also what some reviewers described as a "classic Viagra comedy," a farce about Nikolai's marriage to Valentina, a much younger Ukrainian woman who is transparently using him for his money and a visa.[1]

Short History became a bestseller and a candidate for the big literary prizes of 2005-the novel was long-listed for the Booker Prize, the most important honor in the British literary world, and short-listed for the Orange Prize for the best book

by a UK-based female writer. Lewycka became, and continues to be, a mainstream writer, whose work has not been pigeon-holed as "ethnic fiction." In these terms, her first novel is particularly significant: it constitutes the most widely received literary discussion of Ukraine and Ukrainians in contemporary British fiction, for better or for worse.[2]

Lewycka's first novel likely rose to popularity in the UK in part due to its timing. *Short History* came out just after the Orange Revolution, when Ukraine's troubled path toward western democracy was in the news. The novel's appearance also coincided with the eastern expansion of the European Union in 2004. While her Ukrainian characters would not become EU citizens as part of that expansion, nonetheless her work tapped into larger ideological concerns about economic migration from east to west within Europe, about people from poorer postsocialist countries moving en masse to the more developed economies of western Europe, not to flee oppression but to seek better economic conditions.

In her first novel, these issues converge around the figure of the Ukrainian woman who migrates to the UK for economic opportunity through marriage. Her portrayal of Valentina, a crass, hypersexualized, hypermaterialistic gold-digger who marries an infirm elderly man, earned her negative attention in Ukraine, and Ukrainian writer Andrey Kurkov-an important voice on Ukrainian issues in the British press-accused her of trading in damaging stereotypes.[3] Indeed, Valentina is a deeply problematic character, especially because she is one of so few Ukrainian characters to have a major role in a mainstream work of British literary fiction. But Lewycka is a British writer, writing for British audiences; we should not turn to her work for realistic, culturally sensitive portrayals of Ukraine or Ukrainians.

Rather than simply condemning Lewycka for her portrayal of Valentina, though, this article is interested in analyzing how the stereotype of the Ukrainian woman migrant functions in the novel, and in using the novel to explore the cultural and political logic of these stereotypes. Anca Parvulescu's work provides a useful frame for beginning to understand Valentina's role in Lewycka's novel.[4] In her far-reaching study of gender and east-west immigration in contemporary European cinema, Parvulescu argues that the figure of the woman from Eastern Europe plays a particularly charged role in the discourse around economic migration. She is often imagined as a sex worker, as a nanny or cleaner, or as a wife, someone using marriage to improve her economic situation across national lines. Parvulescu argues that these roles form part of a continuum: the woman from Eastern Europe is a worker, who performs "tasks historically performed by a wife."[5]

In moving to western Europe to pursue this work, she "participates in a symbolic exchange program": her movement across borders functions to integrate a Europe that is often imagined as a family.[6] This is a contemporary, transnational version of the structure Levi-Strauss called "the traffic in women," the process through which cultural bonds are maintained by the circulation of women between kinshipgroups.

This "trade" of women helps to create and maintain Europe, facilitating exchange and continuity between its western and eastern halves. As Parvulescu puts it, after the fall of the Soviet Union, Eastern European nations were not rich in cultural or consumer goods that could be exported to the west, but "what the countries of East Europe did have in the wake of 1989 were women."[7]

Western European countries, in turn, need Eastern European women's labor, which fulfills an economic need that has emerged with women's increased participation in the labor force: the unpaid labor women traditionally performed in the home is increasingly rationalized into components and outsourced beyond the family. As they participate in this exchange, women migrants from Eastern Europe come to be described, though stereotypes, as particularly well-suited for these roles: they might be hypersexualized, described as looking like models, or imagined as old-fashioned. With all of these characteristics, as Parvulescu puts it, these women are imagined as "embodiments of a nostalgic past untainted by feminism in which women presumably knew and enjoyed staying in their place."[8]

Parvulescu sees the traffic in women as "a critical lens through which to conceptualize the legal and illegal circulation of women as women internationally."[9] This lens seems particularly useful as a way to understand Valentina, who circulates between Ukraine and the UK as part of this traffic in women. She exemplifies the tricky position of women in this exchange: their position is socially charged because it turns on payment for the household labor of women, which has historically been unpaid. This labor takes place at the intersection between paid employment and just being part of the family. What is most interesting about Lewycka's portrayal of Valentina is that the character is conscious about the role she is playing in this transnational economy.She self-consciously uses her sexuality to extract profit, and demands to be seen as a worker who deserves to be paid. She refuses to participate in the polite fiction that she is a member of the family who loves the man she married. Stylistically, Lewycka emphasizes this dynamic by narrating her from a distance, keeping her emotionally opaque to the novel and its narrator: she cannot be redeemed as an object of sympathy. Valentina is dangerous, in the novel, precisely because she knows her role and acts in her own economic interests. She can be contained and recuperated only when she is removed from the traffic in women, from this economic exchange: her Ukrainian husband reappears at the end of the novel, returning her to a relationship that is primarily affective, rather than economic.

Valentina is threatening because she reveals the raw capitalist function of what might otherwise seem like a familial relationship. But Lewycka also goes one step further. For most of the novel, Valentina is driven by an economic desire that is insatiable, compulsive, and all-consuming. It makes her willing to give up affective and familial bonds-the marriage in Ukraine to which she returns at the end. In these terms, the novel presents Valentina as an allegory for Ukraine at the moment

of its independence, when what the novel calls an unrestrained "gangster stage" of capitalism emerged to take advantage of the change in socio-economic systems.[10]

In her 2012 novel, *Various Pets Alive and Dead*, Lewycka further develops this allegory. That novel's Ukrainian female character is a financial analyst who colludes with investors who were making massive profits off of the financial collapse of 2008. The novel describes her in terms that recall Valentina, and locates her in the sphere of the traffic in women: her empty financial speculation that aims to do nothing but produce more money is compared to prostitution. Like Valentina, Maroushka is not a victim, and does not need to be saved. In fact, the British economy needs to be saved from her.

When her novels push this dynamic to its logical conclusion, women migrants from contemporary Ukraine ultimately come to embody global finance capitalism, conceived of as an uprooting force of shallowness and promiscuous growth that crosses borders to strip away depth, history, and care. These novels imagine them as pure materialism and self-interest, excluded from familial relationships. The lens of the traffic in women helps us to see the ideological work this figure does in Lewycka's novels: the idea of the Ukrainian woman migrant comes to stand in for anxieties about what late-stage, transnational finance capitalism does to the family.

Women's Work and the Intersection of Family and Wage Labor

Short History is particularly interested in the fuzzy line between familial care and economic labor, a line that Valentina crosses. In Parvulescu's analysis, "the traffic in women produces a new extended family (nannies, domestics, and care workers are figured as 'one of the family') within which the old tasks of reproduction are performed."[11] This woman is figuratively situated within the family, although she is also a worker, someone who is economically compensated for her labor. This idea of the European family crosses discursive contexts: as Parvulescu shows, the image was often used by EU officials and by the media to describe European integration following the fall of the Soviet Union.[12] Before considering this allegorical level, this article will examine how that discourse plays out within the novel's fictional family.

In Lewycka's novel, Valentina emerges as a threatening figure in part because she is so easily imaginable as part of the narrator's British family when she comes from Ukraine to marry Nikolai. The novel emphasizes her compatibility with the family by presenting an almost all-Ukrainian cast of characters; nearly everyone in this novel's version of the UK has Ukrainian roots. Valentina is not, then, actually an exotic foreigner but someone who is already familiar, a Ukrainian woman entering a Ukrainian-British family in a diaspora neighborhood, where everyone speaks both Ukrainian and English. Against this background, her purely economic motive becomes dangerous: she looks like a member of the family, but she actually

is not. There is a simulacrum of care backed up by nothing but a desire for money: Valentina could not possibly actually love this elderly man, who she mocks and abuses as soon as she realizes he has no money. We see her exploit this appearance of family when, for example, Nikolai calls the police to report her abuse. In front of them, she calls to him in terms of endearment: "come, holubchik, my little pigeon."[13] The simulacrum is convincing enough to the policemen: they think, "not all old people are so lucky as to have a loving wife to care for them."[14]

Valentina's role in the family is all the more significant because Nikolai and his family need her and her labor. Parvulescu argues that jobs in affective care become available for foreigners because labor in the European family has been broken down, rationalized, and "Americanized": the various roles once performed by female relatives, who are now working themselves, must be repackaged and allotted to hired workers.[15] That is indeed what seems to happen in the novel-the family is no longer capable of keeping itself going on its own. Nikolai is an elderly widower; there is no one to perform his wife's work, and his daughters are both married mothers with careers. The novel's opening conflict is that Nadia's sister realizes that Nikolai can no longer take care of himself: "The house is filthy. He eats off newspaper. He eats nothing but apples."[16] Valentina's labor is actually quite necessary-it helps Nikolai to stay on his own rather than going into sheltered housing, which he must do at the novel's end when Valentina leaves. Nadia comes to visit her father, finding him naked, with his pants in a pile on the floor, having defecated on himself. Valentina's response is to tell Nadia, "you clean up pappa shit," as she begins to reject the role of caregiver, to turn that role back over to Nadia.[17] When Valentina stops performing her duties, it manifests as neglect. Without her, Nikolai's daughters have to confront the fact that they are not able to take care of him on their own, in the context of western middle-class life.

Part of the scandal surrounding Valentina's role is that all of the wife's activities are expected of her. Those tasks include everything considered "women's work": from sex to cleaning and cooking and eldercare. These are all activities that we see Nikolai requesting or being unable to do for himself in the novel. Nikolai's daughters are angered when Valentina stops cleaning. And Nikolai is angered when Valentina withholds sex: "You no good woman shut husband out of bedroom."[18] The state, in turn, sides with Nikolai: she is refused a visa, despite her marriage, because the inspector "found no evidence of a genuine marriage"-because she keeps him out of her bedroom.[19]Parvulscu asks us to see these roles in affective labor on a continuum from sex work to marriage-that is a continuity that the frame of "women's work" helps to make visible.

One of the reasons that Valentina becomes such a negative figure in the novel is that all of this work-from sex with elderly Nikolai to cooking his meals-is work to her, and she expects to be paid for it. She demands money for these roles that Nikolai's wife, according to the fiction of the family, did for free. She gets a

job and stops cleaning the house when she is no longer being paid: "I too much working. No time house working […] Your father-he no give me money."[20] Nadia, the narrator and Nikolai's youngest daughter, tries to reason with Valentina as a contributing, real member of the family: "Why should my father pay for your cars? For your telephone bills? You have work. You earn money. You should contribute something to the household."[21] But Valentina refuses this logic, insisting that Nikolai must pay her 20,000 pounds when she becomes pregnant-a plan that fails only because elderly, impotent Nikolai, who she repeatedly refers to as "squishy squashy flippy floppy," is clearly not capable of having impregnated her.[22] Valentina understands this economy and does not buy into the lie that her relationship to this family is anything but an economic transaction. This is one key reason why she is dangerous: not only because she is a subject in this economy but because she refuses to participate in the fiction that her work is really about being part of the familywomen's work is *work* to her. She reveals this exploitative economy in which Lewycka's good liberal British protagonists, who need her work, are complicit.

Valentina's sexuality is her greatest tool for making money, and she sexualizes herself at every turn. She wears fluffy pink stiletto slippers around the house, puts on too much makeup, gets Nikolai to pay for her breast enhancement surgery, and flirts not just with Nikolai but with every man in their community. A neighbor describes her as "all fur coat and no knickers," after revealing her suspicions that Valentina is sleeping with other men.[23] This sexuality is not a segue to love-there's little sign that she cares about anyone-but an instrument for obtaining money and a visa. She threatens Nadia that she will tell Nikolai's doctor about his sexual proclivities, embarrassing the entire family, if she does not convince Nikolai to support her visa application: "I will tell her eighty-four-year husband want make oralsex. Squishy squashy husband want make oralsex."[24] After giving birth to her baby, she refuses to breastfeed: "Valentina's superior breasts are evidently for display purposes only."[25] Here, her breasts- "bursting like twin warheads out of an underwired, ribbon-strapped Lycra-panelled lace-trimmed green satin rocket launcher of a bra"-explicitly become sexual tools to secure economic mobility, to the exclusion of any duty of care.[26]

Valentina would be a very different character if the novel portrayed her as a victim-a desperate woman from a poor country, doing her best under unfortunate circumstances. But Valentina refuses to be a victim, choosing instead to exert power and reject helplessness. She takes Nikolai to a psychiatrist, and to court, twice; she gets a Dictaphone and a copy machine so she can collect incriminating evidence against him; she puts a baby monitor in his bedroom so she can hear what he says on the phone; she manipulates the police through flirtation; she recruits allies among the Ukrainian community, in part through sex. She wants a British passport and an income and she uses all the tools at her disposal to get them. She is described with epithets that suggest ruthless determination and belligerent

aggression-her formidable "twin warheads." She is even physically aggressive with frail, elderly Nikolai. When Nikolai gets mad, tells her to go back to Ukraine, and pushes her, "she pushes him back. She is bigger than he is."[27] "You dog-eaten -brain old bent stick, you go in room and shut up," she screams at him, shoving him again.[28] At another point, we see Nikolai, naked and cowering in a corner as she chases him with a wet towel; she is angry that he does not have as much money as she expected. Her aggressiveness and independence are threats: although she's been made part of the family, she's a lone wolf, a predator acting only for herself.

Perhaps the novel's most offensive move is that it doesn't give us a deep reason why Valentina wants to be in the UK, beyond the fact that she wants money. It refuses almost every opportunity to give us Valentina's point of view, or to provide a realist, sympathetic account of her motivations-a narrative decision that makes the character seem like a stereotype. There is little sense of interiority behind Valentina's desire for money; she remains a flat object of comedy who we view from the outside. The novel simply does not fill in Valentina's back story-why she divorced her Ukrainian husband and came to the UK. Was she fleeing some dangerous situation? Did she want a career she couldn't have in her home town of Ternopil? The other characters in the novel become fully fleshed out as their family stories come to light, but Valentina is notably excluded from these dynamics. There is a sense of emptiness around her, "a gaping void in which questions wheeled around like startled birds."[29]

This narrative decision is all the more noticeable because in her second novel, *Two Caravans*, Lewycka would draw another female Ukrainian character, but with a very different method. That character, Irina has also immigrated to the UK to work-but Lewycka portrays the character much more fully, narrating from her first-person point of view so that we learn her complex reasons for immigrating. Those reasons are not primarily economic: she wants to improve her language, and to experience a nostalgic, romantic England she knows from novels. Irina insists in particular that "I'm not one of those awful Ukrainian girls who come to England only to ensnare a husband."[30] Irina comes to England as a strawberry picker, not a domestic laborer, and throughout the novel defines her against the stereotype of the female economic migrant. When her Ukrainian boyfriend is searching for her, he asks a store clerk if he has seen a Ukrainian girl: "Ah, Ukrainian girls also we have plenty. Every night you see them on street and on beach making sex for money."[31] "Not this girl," responds Andriy.[32]

Both in characterization and in the literary techniques she uses to depict the character, Lewycka defines complex Irina against flat Valentina. Perhaps surprisingly, Valentina is ultimately recuperated at the end of the novel-something that is possible because she exits the economy of the transnational traffic in women. In the novel's last section, she leaves the UK and returns to Ukraine with her Ukrainian husband, leaving Nikolai and his daughters alone. The presence

of her husband is crucial to redeeming Valentina. He functions to contain her sexuality, certainly, but to return to Parvulescu's framework, it becomes clear that he plays another role as well. Her husband and Nikolai "get on like a house on fire" and Nikolai invites him to move into his house, indeed into the room recently vacated by Valentina when she moves out.[33] They are both engineers and have a lot in common. He becomes a sort of surrogate son for Nikolai, the only person who is actually interested in the history of the tractor that he spends his time writing.

His entrance onto the scene transforms Valentina into an object whose role is to facilitate homosocial, quasi-kinship bonds between men. Her relationship with Nikolai's family is suddenly not about sex or money. Instead it is routed through her husband, and now that relationship is about kinship between different generations of Ukrainian families, and between Ukraine and Europe. The traffic in women has turned out to be so threatening that the project of European integration it promotes, in Parvulescu's analysis, can only be completed homosocially, between men. Valentina's presence no longer reveals the family's complicity in an economy that recruits Eastern European women to perform domestic and affective labor in Europe. Valentina, in turn, is resocialized, tied down to the Ukrainian family, no longer this roving, too-independent, transnational agent of economic desire.

Something similar happens in *Two Caravans*. Irina, the serious girl who refuses to fall into the stereotypes about Ukrainian women in the UK, longs for romance-but rather than have her fall for a British man, something that would invite the stereotype, instead the novel has her fall in love with another Ukrainian migrant, Andriy. Late in the novel, she finds herself in trouble when a human trafficker pursues her, aiming to sell her into a life of sexual slavery. She is rescued by Andriy, in an ending that resonates with Dubov's return at the end of *Short History*: in both cases, a Ukrainian woman is rescued from some version of the traffic in women by a good Ukrainian man who will be, or is, her husband. The only way out of this economy of exploitation is for them to be tied back into a heterosexual relationship that is outside of this transnational circuit of women's work.

Women's Work and Gangster Capitalism

Valentina is dangerous because she will not abide by the fiction that she is a member of the family, and insists on defining herself as a worker who must be paid. This section explores another layer of the threat: the novel links Valentina's role, in which she reveals the transnational money-generating reality of what seem like affective social relationships, to a broader macroeconomic concern. Valentina comes to embody an aggressive American capitalism that uproots people and threatens affective and social bonds. Valentina is both the not-very-successful agent of this economy and its subject. This form of capitalism spreads, through the traffic in women, even into an average family, far outside the financial capital

of London. In *Various Pets Alive and Dead*, the threat will become broader: in that novel, the Ukrainian woman as an economic migrant embodies this unproductive, flattening, destructive economy-now specifically imagined in financial terms-that threatens to take down the British economy.

Valentina is motivated by an obsessive economic desire that bulldozes through social relationships: she leaves her apparently loving husband in Ukraine to come to the UK so she can make money to buy things. She is not really trying to create a career, or to help her son take advantage of educational opportunities that will improve his future in the long term-he is flunking out. Her economic desire is thus not productive: she is not trying to build anything, to use that money for long-term improvements. Instead, her desire is consumerist and immediate: she wants to buy things now. Her consumer desires are farcical, substanceless, impractical, and insatiable: she wants a Rolls Royce, even if the only one she can afford does not run. She wants only store-bought modern convenience food-disgusting boil-in-bag concoctions, TV dinners of stringy meat. She insists on a new, higher tech vacuum cleaner, and a stove that must be brown in color-even though they already have a vacuum and a stove that work. When Nikolai will not buy her what she wants-"No car! No jewel! No clothes!...No cosmetic! No undercloth-es!"-she gets another job to enable more consumption.[34] Nadia inspects Valentina's bedroom, and finds a hoard of stuff she has bought from mail order catalogues: "there is a chaos of […] hairbrushes, beauty appliances, toothbrushes, stockings, packets of biscuits, jewellery, photographs, sweet wrappers, knickknacks…"[35]

With an identity driven by consumerism, Valentina resembles no one so much as the heroine of an American naturalist novel from the era known as the Gilded Age, at the turn of the twentieth century. Novels like Theodore Dreiser's *Sister Carrie* showed the working woman of the 1890s as a "deluded consumer, chasing after manufactured dreams of ideal happiness that she will never attain."[36] Rita Felski argues that in the naturalist novel, women's consumer desire is structured as a compulsion, which means that it is insatiable and endless: "there is no objective need that is being addressed; rather the commodity comes to stand in for an imaginary fulfillment that remains necessarily unattainable."[37] All she wants is stuff, more stuff, and there is no end to her desire-thus her sense of disappointment. "I always working hard. Too much hard," Valentina complains-and still she does not have the things she wants, and is embarrassed when her family comes to visit.[38] This is Valentina's vision of life in the west, what the aphorism of "more opportunity" becomes in this sort of dystopian vision: the opportunity to do ever more shopping, without the possibility that it will ever be enough. The cycle can only be completed by her exit from the UK and the possibility of consumer paradise in the west, by her return to Ukraine with a husband who fixes her car rather than buying a new one.

It is her husband, Dubov, who most explicitly turns Valentina into an allegory

for Ukraine at the moment of independence, because of her economic desire. He argues that at that moment, in the early days of the 2000s, Ukraine was subject to a "Wild West" form of capitalism that does indeed seem to come from the age of the naturalist novel: "the rapacious type of early American capitalism," the "gangster stage" of a market economy that we might associate with the Gilded Age.[39] This, Dubov tells us, is an economic system with no restraining social safeguards, no developed civil society to temper the rapacious desire to leach the profit out of everything in society: no longer are "predatory instincts…held in check by the fabric of civil society, [and] once that fabric is torn asunder, why, they flourish like weeds in a newly ploughed field."[40] This, Dubov tells us, is a specifically American form of capitalism that lets the profit motive run wild, and he opposes it to a Scandinavian version of capitalism that preserves social safeguards through the welfare state.

Valentina's path from Ukraine to the UK through marriage for economic reasons exemplifies what this stage of capitalism has done to Ukraine, according to Dubov's theory

> *Once we were a nation of farmers and engineers. We were not rich, but we had enough…Now racketeers prey on our industries, while our educated youth fly westwards in search of wealth. Our national export is the sale of our beautiful young women into prostitution to feed the monstrous appetites of the western male.*[41]

Valentina is the exemplary subject of this form of capitalism, which uproots families and disrupts social bonds. On one hand, she is trying hard to be a gangster capitalist herself, having rejected a loving family in Ukraine to bilk an elderly man out of his pension: "Yes, she is greedy, predatory, outrageous," Nadia observes, comparing her to the robber barons Dubov describes.[42] On the other hand, she is, as Nadia points out, "a victim too. A source of cheap labor" on the global market, someone who will both work in a nursing home and perform elder care for Nikolai, while being naïve enough not to realize that he does not have enough money to make it worth her while.[43]

This "gangster capitalism" also flattens society in another way as well: it evacuates historical complexity, reducing the nation to its economy. That is what has happened to Valentina's Ukraine, in the novel's vision. It is a presentist nation, without historical grounding, something the novel calls "new Russia" and invokes whenever it needs to reference Valentina's materialism: a place where the slate of history has been wiped clean, as with Valentina, who has no backstory.[44] Nikolai's Ukraine is a different nation. It is shaped by its twentieth-century history-the Holodomor, the Holocaust, World War Two, and Soviet oppression-and continually reshaped as its history is told and retold and understood by new generations. As a native of this Ukraine, Nikolai has complex motives that the novel spends much time unpacking-how did he behave during the war? How did he cope afterwards?

We do not learn any parallel information about Valentina, who does not need to have a historical reckoning with her family's past, so far does she live in a flat present of consumer desire.

The Ukrainian woman economic migrant becomes a figure for gangster capitalism most explicitly in one of Lewycka's later novels, *Various Pets Alive and Dead*, which pushes the logic of *Short History*'s portrayal of Valentina to its end. Set just at the moment of the 2008 financial collapse, the novel tells the story of a young man, Serge, who grew up on a commune with his radical leftist family. He is supposed to be doing a mathematics PhD at Cambridge, but has abandoned his dissertation to pursue a career as a quantitative analyst at an investment bank in London. Serge has not yet revealed his new path to his family, still living as they do in what the novel describes as a "preconsumerist" lifestyle. *Various Pets* is an explicitly political novel that stages a contest between the aggressive financial capitalism of London and the hippie socialism of Serge's past.

For the purposes of this article's argument, the most interesting part of the novel is a secondary character: Maroushka is a young, beautiful Ukrainian woman who also works as a quantitative analyst at Serge's bank, where she is more competent and less ethical than he is. Serge, of course, falls for her. He is not entirely comfortable in his role in risk analysis, in which he makes profit off of the collapse of sectors of the economy, but Maroushka excels. His attraction to her mirrors his attraction to the world of finance: he wants it, but feels kind of horrified about wanting it. With Maroushka, the novel expresses his sense of guilt by repeatedly describing her as both attractive and disgusting: her perfume "borders on the repellent but is in fact incredibly arousing"; a loose bra strap "looks grubby, but strangely sexy."[45] In the most provocative moment of the novel, Serge thinks to himself that he wants to save her from an "empty life of statistical prostitution."[46] Figuratively, the novel here positions Maroushka on the continuum of the kind of women's work that Eastern European immigrants are asked to do.

Maroushka becomes a revealing new version of Valentina from *Short History*, despite the massive difference between their level of education and choice of profession. Valentina is independent and aggressive and laser-focused on the goal of making money. All of that repeats in the figure of Maroushka, who manipulates Serge to better position herself and who equates wealth with intelligence: "In my country, Sergei, rich is everything.Now we have rich elite. These persons are more intelligent. I am also am intelligent. So why not me?"[47] And in both cases, these women are driven by a compulsive desire for money that has no end: Valentina will never be happy with what she has, and the novel compares finance capital's vision of growth to the uncontrollable reproduction of rabbits. Neither will ever be satisfied, but will always need more.

Like Valentina, Maroushka is willing to sacrifice personal relationships for money, as she pursues her "empty life." Serge had been making illegal private

trades, and Maroushka finds out. When she rejects him, at the end of the novel, she sells him out to their boss, who is willing to sponsor her permanent visa, if she uses her math skills to help him at his new hedge fund. More broadly as well, Maroushka makes money from uprooting social bonds. Their new hedge fund bets against the failure of the housing and mortgage markets: they plan to make money from uprooting people.[48] Serge is complicit as well, but he leaves this profession at novel's end, while Maroushka only moves ever higher up the ladder.

Maroushka, like Valentina, is also a native of "new Russia," that ahistorical, flattened version of Ukraine. She is a member of "this beautiful young high-flying free-floating no-baggage global elite, whose title is wealth, whose passport is brains, whose only nation is money."[49] She is not tied down to any nation, shaped by historical traumas or ethnic loyalties. Having no baggage also means, here, having no roots. She is empty, shallow, nothing but desire for money itself.

Short History had already linked the Ukrainian woman migrant to a kind of gangster capitalism, but *Various Pets* goes so far as to put this associative argument into fully allegorical terms: these Ukrainian female characters represent a gangster-stage of finance capitalism coming home to attack the UK. This becomes most explicit when Serge Googles Maroushka's home town, Zhytomyr. He feels a rush of familiarity when, using Google Earth, he sees the town's Lenin statute and recognizes it from the textbooks of his own leftist schooling. The novel draws a tenuous figurative link between the British welfare state capitalism of the period known as "postwar consensus" and the Soviet Union. It is this version of capitalism, the welfare state, that is under threat in the novel's diagnosis of the moment of the financial collapse of 2008. Serge's father, an economist and this novel's version of Dubov, theorizes the moment: "We have moved away from the post-war vision of a society based on shared prosperity, to a society based on grotesque accumulation of personal wealth on one hand, and increasing insecurity on the other."[50]

Even more explicitly, Serge's unrepentant boss describes the 2008 collapse in these terms: "Think Russia. End of Communism. Unlimited opportunity."[51] As he and his allies "firm up the Government's commitment to the role of the financial sector in the national economy," he foresees the full-scale routing of the public institutions that are the hallmark of the welfare state, as the government sells off its assets: "Schools. Universities. Prisons. Hospitals. Sheltered housing. Residential homes. Think of the business opportunities."[52] This collapse is opportunity, if you are able to be one of the gangster capitalists. Maroushka is: her new hedge fund is designed to profit exactly from this kind of market collapse. In this sense, Maroushka is simply historically advanced, already evolved to be able to deal with this new reality. It turns out that she does not need to be saved by Serge. She becomes a kind of new oligarch, come to feast on the remains of the British economy.

Like Valentina, Maroushka is early-independence gangster capitalism,

capitalism without care or ethics, money that can only function to create more money. But while Valentina will only bring her economic compulsion into one family, Maroushka will use hers to help destroy the British welfare state for her own personal profit.[53]

Valentina, in *Short History*, is threatening when she refuses to buy into the fiction of women's work. Maroushka does away with that fiction entirely, and through her Lewycka argues that this traffic in women's work increasingly defines the entire economy and all of social life: that care and family are simulacra, and there's nothing underneath any of it but self-interested actors seeking profit without producing anything. And this is, ultimately, where the figure of the Ukrainian female economic migrant goes in Lewycka's fiction: she embodies contemporary finance capitalism. She is anything but a victim; she is powerful, and smart, and advanced, and kind of evil-a sort of economic femme fatale. Lewycka's novels work through the ideological implications of the stereotype of the Ukrainian woman economic migrant as hypersexual and hypermaterialist. These novels show that this stereotype is tightly connected to anxieties not just about immigration, but about contemporary global capitalism in the wake of the financial collapse of 2008.

About the author

Heather Fielding is associate professor of English and director of the Honors Program at the University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire, USA. The author of *Novel Theory and Technology in Modernist Britain* (Cambridge University Press, 2018), she has published articles on topics ranging from digital pedagogy to modern and contemporary fiction in journals including *Modern Fiction Studies, Studies in the Novel, Feminist Modernist Studies, Journal of Modern Literature, Modern Language Quarterly,* and *Computers and Composition*. In 2018-19, she was a Fulbright Scholar in Ukraine. She holds MA and PhD degrees from Brown University and a BA from Tulane University.

Endnotes

1 Bill Hamilton, review of *Short History of Tractors in Ukrainian* by Marina Lewycka, *Publisher's Weekly*, March 7, 2005.

2 Yana Leontiyeva makes an even bigger claim: "apart from the successful Ukrainian-origin British novelist Marina Lewycka, it is hard to name a single Ukrainian author who has articulated migration experience to international acclaim" ("Ukrainian Migration to Europe: Policies, Practices and Perspectives," *Central and Eastern European Migration Review* 3, no. 1 [June 2014], n.p.).

3 Andrey Kurkov, "Human Traffic," review of *Short History of Tractors in Ukrainian* by Marina Lewycka, *The Guardian,* March 19, 2005. Critics who are less interested in her portrayal of Ukrainians have tended, by contrast, to praise Lewycka as a "warm and humane writer" (Sarfaz Manzoor, review of *Various Pets Dead and Alive* by Marina Lewycka, *The Guardian,* March 1, 2012) whose works are defined by "kindness and inclusivity" (Lucy Atkins, review of *The Lubetkin Legacy* by Marina Lewycka, *The Guardian*, May 1, 2016).

4 Anca Parvulescu, *The Traffic in Women's Work: East European Migration and the Making of Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014).

5 Ibid., 2.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid., 39.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid., 9.

10 Marina Lewycka, *A Short History of Tractors in Ukrainian* (New York: Penguin, 2005), 254.

11 Parvulescu, *Traffic*, 12.

12 See Parvulescu, *Traffic,* 2. This rhetoric of Europe as family continues in the era of Brexit, as the title of a recent opinion piece in the *Guardian* shows: "Europe is a dysfunctional family, but divorce is not the answer" (Michael Morpurgo, April 4, 2019).

13 Lewycka, *Short History,* 144.

14 Ibid.

15 See Parvulescu, *Traffic*, 7.

16 Lewycka, *Short History*, 48.

17 Ibid., 136.

18 Ibid., 105.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid., 140.

21 Ibid., 89.

22 Ibid., 105.

23 Ibid., 172.

24 Ibid., 113.

25 Ibid., 275.

26 Ibid., 89.

27 Ibid., 106.

28 Ibid., 173.

29 Ibid., 202. For a fuller exploration of the narrative dynamics of sympathy in this novel,

see Heather Fielding, "Assimilation after Empire: Marina Lewycka, Paul Gilroy, and the Ethnic Bildungsroman in Contemporary Britain," *Studies in the Novel* 43, no. 2 (July 2011), 200-17.

30 Marina Lewycka, *Strawberry Fields* (US edition of *Two Caravans*), (New York: Penguin, 2007), 20.

31 Ibid., 142.

32 Ibid.

33 Lewycka, *Short History,* 233.

34 Ibid., 89.

35 Ibid., 121. A. Nejat Töngür and Yidiray Çevik similarly interpret Valentina's consumer desire as so insatiable that her disappointed, unfulfilled return to Ukraine is inevitable ("Migration to a Consumer Society: *A Short History of Tractors in Ukrainian* by Marina Lewycka," *Journal of International Social Research* 6, no. 28 [Fall 2013], 439-50).

36 Jennifer L. Fleissner, *Women, Compulsion, Modernity: The Moment of American Literary Naturalism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 191.

37 Rita Felski, *The Gender of Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 78.

38 Lewycka, *Short History*, 123.

39 Ibid., 254.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid., 256.

42 Ibid., 257.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid., 2.

45 Marina Lewycka, *Various Pets Dead and Alive* (London: Penguin, 2012), 4, 344.

46 Ibid., 111.

47 Ibid., 260.

48 Lewycka's novel *We Are All Made of Glue* is particularly interested in real estate speculation as a site where the British welfare state is vulnerable. The novel chronicles the downfall of the welfare state through the story of a council estate that is bought by real estate developers, who want to tear it down to build high-priced apartments. The novel imagines the council estate, where different kinds of people lived together, as the site of a welfare-state utopia of "love, friendship and mutuality" (*We Are All Made of Glue* [London: Penguin, 2009], 223). The developers, by contrast, care only about money, and aim to profit on the destruction of these social bonds.

49 Lewycks, *Various Pets*, 61.

50 Lewycks, *Various Pets*, 83.

51 Ibid., 336.

52 Ibid.

53 Oliver Linden has argued that Leywcka's *Two Caravans* uses the figure of the Ukrainian woman to "pinpoint glaring emotional and social defects in twenty-first century capitalist society" in the UK (" 'East is East and West is Best?': The Eastern European Migrant and the British Contact Zone in Rose Tremain's *The Road Home* and Marina Lewycka's *Two Caravans*," *Anglia* 3 [2009], 472). Her other novels go much further: yes, these characters show up problems in the UK, but they also threaten Lewycka's nostalgic vision of what remains of the British welfare state.

Bord(h)ers. Why gender matters in migration and art?

by Iuliia Lashchuk

Feminization has taken an important role in the discourse of migration. The question "If gender matters?" has changed into "Why gender matters?". Such changes of perspective allow us to discuss the role of gender in the migration process in a completely different way. The unique experience of women with migrant backgrounds becomes more visible. Simplified statistical units finally show their faces. Gender-neutral migrant becomes a woman.The migrant woman, as the Other, is excluded from society both for her origin, background and for her gender, but as an artist she can bring into discussion her voice and visualize her experience. The aim of this text is to characterize a big group of Ukrainian migrants living abroad, which is still invisible – artists, with a focus on female artists – and show their personal story of movement and crossing borders, both physical and mental, represented in the artistic works of Ukrainian female artists, who for many reasons moved abroad or were forced to change their dwelling-place. The article analyses the historical reasons for Ukrainian female artistic migration and follows changes of identity by looking at the example of two works of art of two artists with a different experience of migration – both voluntary and forced.

Keywords: migration, gender, art, nomadism.

As a woman, I have no country. (...)

As a woman, my country is the whole world.

Virginia Woolf

A place on the map is also a place in history.

Adrienne Rich

Modern science has reached the point that it is impossible to speak of certain phenomena from the standpoint of exclusively one discipline. Analysis becomes complex, balancing on the boundary of several disciplines and thus enriching the research. Migration is, in fact, an area that needs an integrated approach, given the wide range of issues and peculiarities that must be taken into account when analyzing a particular area. In the media (including Ukrainian media as well), a huge and very diverse group of Ukrainians in Poland are still called "labor migrants", and the economic situation is frequently mentioned as a reason for the Ukrainian migration to the European Union. In fact, such studies and terminology related to it were stuck in the 1990s, when Ukrainian migration to Europe was indeed almost

exclusively economic. Now, although the economic component remains dominant, the range of causes is much wider, and the migrant is no longer a unified, faceless statistical unit, but a person with his or her own face that has to be shown. Moreover, it is important to finally separate male migrants from female migrants, and to study their experiences separately taking into consideration their gender and diversity of problems they face because of that. Working on the crossroads of several disciplines – philosophy (including ethics and aesthetics), art studies, gender studies – and immersing them into a very practical context, while working with Ukrainian artists in Poland, I decided to start with a mapping that would help me to characterize Ukrainian female artistic migration. As the idea of Ukrainian migrants in EU is still very simplistic and reduced mainly to economic migration with a clear division into women (cleaning and care) and men (construction), it is first worth highlighting and naming the phenomenon of artistic migration and characterizing quite a large group of Ukrainian migrants in EU, placing it on a migration map, and second, analyzing the impact of migration on the gender dimension, going far beyond gender roles. In addition, it is important for me to define my place in this whole structure. Therefore, referring to the term of the American feminist philosopher Donna Haraway, "situated knowledge", which describes how gender situates knowing subjects, I claim that it might be postponed and require a (female) researcher to determine her own place in scientific discourse.

The metaphor of vision that is used by Haraway to describe the notion of "situated knowledge" is connected to the notion of "power to see" and is determined by Foucault's knowledge-power relation, "Vision is always a question of the power to see – and perhaps of the violence implicit in our visualizing practices. With whose blood were my eyes crafted?"[1] We are not just seeing; we create our own way of seeing due to the position we take in this relation. Seeing from the (same) point of view means to think with, to be able to understand, situated knowledge in opposition to view from nowhere means to be an active, decisive subject. This is the reason I approach this topic as a researcher, a migrant woman and a curator. The basic concepts that interest me are identity, memory, home, homelessness, and homefulness (feeling of home as something internal, that can be brought to any place of dwelling), as well as borders (both physical and metaphysical). Therefore, this text will be based on the interrelation between these concepts and their significance in migration processes.

Time and space (e) (im)migration

What is migration? First of all, I do not deliberately divide the concepts of "emigration" and "immigration". To be more precise, I do not consider such a division necessary in my research. The categories I speak of (identity, rootedness, etc.), described through the migrant's personal experience, always include both

meanings, since they simultaneously emigrate from somewhere and immigrate to somewhere (although migration is often not limited to this segment "from A" "to B"). Therefore I consider it is more correct to use the terms "migrant" and "migration" as the clarifying concepts of "emigration" and "immigration" are concepts that describe the phenomenon of migration according to the place and prospects of those who are in this place: either the sending or receiving societies. Besides, the reason for the use of the term "migration" as more universal and not attached to a specific place is the transgressive nature of migration.

The moment when a person goes to travel[2] is an "event," the beginning of the situation of transgression. That is, a person is no longer here, but not yet there. Here we have a very moment of loss of rooting, which I call "a point of no return." Unlike tourism, which has a temporary nature and involves rooting, belonging to a particular physical place to which the person returns sooner or later, migration is, first of all, a change of emphasis, the transfer of the center of the world to a new place or eternal search for it. I tend to believe that the transgressive nature of migration is an indicator of the fact that this phenomenon has its measure of time since it is impossible to determine precisely its duration and it is not known when it expires or even ends at all. Cultural theorist and art critic Mike Ball calls migration heterochronous: "Migration is a time experience, its plurality, and heterogeneity. It is a time of haste and waiting, time of movement and without a rudder; time of memory and anxious now, beyond which the expected future is not worth it.

This phenomenon, I call, is multidirectional, and his experience is heterochromatic."[3] The researcher emphasizes that the multiplicity of time existed always, but was not taken seriously because of the parallel existence of linear time, which could be measured and, therefore, understood. The heterochronism has always been something different, uncontrolled, unknown, but today it became, according to Ball, similar to the disease. Today, one can get sick from heterochronism; multiple time is becoming a problem, an obstacle, "paralyzing contradiction." What can be considered as "the end" of migration: arriving at point B, the ability to speak a new language, or speak it without an accent, obtaining citizenship, complete integration (but is it possible?) or assimilation (but are there some criteria?)? However, Ball is convinced that multi-timing can have positive effects, when different time dimensions, overlapping, create a feeling of integrity. Migration is duration, constant here-and-now, but it also is a situation of living at different times at the same moment.

Understanding the multidimensional nature of migration is precisely the non-linear way of thinking that is needed to understand the essence of this phenomenon in general. Since the criteria for time and non-time migration is very controversial, I intentionally leave the question of the "timeliness" of migration unanswered, partly returning to it later when discussing Anna Kosarewska's project *Redirecting through*. With questions about the heterochronous nature of migration, one needs

to be careful, but its physicality is evident and beyond any doubts. Migration is, first of all, a change of place. A migrant leaves his home as a geographical, historical and emotional space, which has always been the center of the universe, shaped his notion of the surrounding world and his own identity, where the most significant events in his life took place. To emigrate means to leave this House, to cross the physical boundary between "before" and "after" (can this boundary ever be crossed?), between one's own and another. However, in my opinion, the issue is not that much a question of the place as such, but rather of someone's belonging to this place. Leaving a physical place means the loss of connection, the interruption of the infinity of the continuation of personal history and personal experience right here, in this very place. Each migration is an event that provokes critical changes that are related not only to space but to the human's dimensions that depend on this place: identity, memory, social status. Migration is an exclusion from the "the meanwhile" of national time.[4] To migrate means to be in a transit situation, somewhere between, to be always in motion, and to some extent get rid of the roots, at least those physical, that over generations determined dwelling of the whole family in a particular place. Interestingly, in many cultures such biological metaphors as rootlessness, tumbleweed person[5], rooted up, and so on, have long been used in describing the situation of migration. The biological notion was used in their theory by French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, while they were speaking of the rhizome as a new form of thinking and existence in the world. It can be said that migration, which is no longer linear, is not limited to a route from point A to point B, it is a rhizome from which alternate realities, worlds, and identities grow.

To go out

The question of rooting arises when we talk about "going on travel" and leaving one's own home. Following cultural ideas about a house, as a woman's sphere, it is precisely in this place that the problem of gender division appears and affects the idea of belonging. A woman who, under pressure of circumstances or voluntarily leaves the House, thereby breaking the cultural codes defined by society, erases the line between private and public. If in Western Europe, starting from the middle of the twentieth century, the structure of binary logic, which involves the normative co-dependence of specific characteristics and gender (male-culture, woman-nature, activity-passivity, public sphere as male and private sphere as female) was questioned by second-wave feminist critique, I tend to believe that in Ukraine such a division of roles is questioned much later by the labor migration of the 1990s, which has a "female face". Of course, we are aware of independent travel by Ukrainian female intellectuals at the beginning of the twentieth century such as Lesya Ukrainka or Sofia Yablonska[6] and others, but one should admit that

that phenomenon was rather an exception and had a clearly expressed social and economic component: women who could allow themselves to travel were women of a particular social and intellectual level. The time from which the mass migration of Ukrainian women begins is a crisis period after independence[7]. Women of the 1990s who went "to make money" reversed the "traditional" male-oriented notion of earning money, becoming the only family breadwinners, unknowingly opened up opportunities for the next generation. Historically, the role of women in migration processes was either the role of Penelope, who was rightly expecting her man or his companion in migration, whose function was often reduced to taking care of her husband and children in a foreign country. Migration of the 1990s, despite all the negative factors of women's labor migration and the phenomenon of so-called "Euro-orphans", which described the generation of children of the 1990s whose mothers went abroad, played a significant, emancipatory role and led to the fact that today Ukrainian women have the right to choose: to leave or to stay. Thus, unknowingly destroying the neo-traditionalist cult of Berehynia[8] – the fertile Mother who whose purpose was to replace a woman by the notion of Mother and Motherland and basically make her a political and nation-representative tool, the wave of labor migration of Ukrainian women opened the way for the migration of modern women – not only labor but also intellectual, artistic, socially and politically active.

The female migrant as a nomad

Private becomes public, which means that the question of female identity, sexuality and freedom goes beyond patriarchal understanding and control. Moreover, access to information, the openness of borders and globalization processes add the aspect of diversity and multidimensionality to the identity of a woman. The same situation happened to the word "migrant" which loses its sedentary connotations.

In order to describe a contemporary Ukrainian migrant, intellectual, artist, social activist, I use the term nomad. In contemporary philosophical discourse, this concept has little to do with its original meaning– tribes-nomads. Furthermore, it has nothing to do with its contemporary very simplified meaning which I call "hipster-in-a-move," which became overused lately and means basically a person who works online and change places of dwelling very often. Nevertheless, the tribe component is metaphorically present in a nomadic theory. The modern meaning of this concept was developed by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in the 2nd half of the 20th century and named the so-called modern stranger. Using their concept in my research, I simultaneously see its weakness which I must underline. This weakness is especially noticeable if we ask: Can migrant be a nomad?

Authors of *Thousand Plateaus* would say: no. Their theory of a nomad was

built on opposition to migrants. Developing their theory on the analysis of the political system of distribution[9], French philosophers divided sedentary and nomadic orders.In spite of migrant's situation of non-belonging to the place and its opposition to a "local", he still, as Deleuze and Guattari claim, stays within the frames of the sedentary system, basically, remains part of the state being organized and territorialized majoritarian, in contrary to a nomad who is a chaotic, deterritorialized minoritarian who goes beyond limits and comes from nowhere. Such opposition is not clear to me as being dependent on the political will both types of power are linked together and in a way are mixing. In that case, it would be logical to put into question the very possibility of the nomad in terms of contemporary political land distribution. If we keep track of the geographical distinction between nomad and migrant and illustrate nomadic order as a desert and sedentary order as a city, we will sooner or later see how chaotic and free nomads transform, and maybe even adapt and settle in order to survive. Later on, they might leave again, but the moment of coexistence is always present. However, if we go farther and add to a geographical dimension a metaphysical one, we can see that both nomads and migrants have in common their Otherness as something that is in opposition to power but also is identified and framed by power. Molar = Majority = Same is opposed by Molecular = Minority = Other.

That is why in terms of migration as nomadism, I would rather speak about migrant's becoming-nomad or becoming-minoritarian as a critique of the majority, developing nomadic consciousness as a process of transformation and going beyond the frames. In this possibility, I see a powerful emancipative component, especially if we speak about female migration. Recently, thanks to the feminist reading of Deleuze's and Guattari's philosophy, which we owe first of all to Rosi Braidotti, the nomadic subject took on its female face and experience. What is "becoming nomadic" then? Braidotti claims: "Becoming nomadic means one learns to re-invent oneself and one desires the self as a process of transformation. It's about the desire for change, for flows and shifts of multiple desires. Nomadic theory rests on a non-unitary, yet politically engaged and ethically accountable vision of the nomadic subject. Nomadic thought stresses the need for a change of conceptual schemes altogether, an overcoming of the Dialectic of Majority/Minority or Master/Slave as the Hegelians propose. Both the majority and the minorities need to untie the knots of envy (negative desire) and domination (dialectics) that binds them together so tightly.

In this process they will necessarily follow asymmetrical lines of becoming, given that their starting positions are so different. For the majority, there is no possible becoming – other than in the undoing of its central position altogether."[10] In which moment does *becoming-nomadic* transform into *becoming-woman*? Braidotti has an answer:

"A nomadic becoming-woman starts from the recognition of the dissymmetry

between sexes..."[11]

So, her nomad is a woman with a complex identity, which consists of many experiences and layers of knowledge. She is conscious of her Otherness, and she is not a silent statistic unit in a place that is alien to her, not an object, but a creative and active subject that expresses the dissymmetry of not-being-a-man. There are no alien places for her, because every place she makes her own, even being in constant motion, searching for new experiences, which is in her nature. Rootedness and homelessness intertwine in her personal experience. Homelessness is no longer a sign of the wanderer which Baumann wrote about,[12] but a sign of constant search of places, experiences, competencies, identity, and purpose. Nomad woman does not fit into statistical data. She does not match to the artificially created unified image, rather defines her limits. She has a gender and a face, and therefore her personal experience is primary, and it is projected onto collective experience and not vice versa. The performance *Redirecting Through* by Ukrainian artist Anna Kosarewska is an illustration of the author's nomadism. Visually this performance is very "local," rooted in the Ukrainian context and tradition, while at the same time it touches on the topics of the transnational female experience. Kosarewska uses very recognizable ethnic images and symbols: her outward appearance resembles the iconic image of the Virgin Mary, crying with bloody tears, an embroidered towel with the inscription "bread-salt" referring to the topic of the House and hospitality.[13] At the same time, the audience is shocked: the artist publicly shows the taboo of the nude body, covered by very tight bandages. Her bleeding body, together with a grimace on her face gives us an impression of sharp physical pain. In order to make her pain both more visible and more absurd, the artist starts to perform, it would seem, the usual (traditional) women's work such as embroidering, but we see that she is embroidering on her own body. The physical pain turns into metaphysical pain; the pain of a particular female body represents the pain of being wounded by the wars and conflicts of the body of the country, which is also a woman. Overcoming physical pain, shame, erasing the line between private and public, transcending mental and physical boundaries, the artist crosses the physical boundaries between Ukraine and the world and transfers her own bodily experience to a borderless plane

> *The bodies, as well as geographical borders, have many unspeakable issues. Changing roles (social, gender, political) in the borderland situation create a crash of identity. Long-standing questions about nation and border issues exist much longer than one human life. These games could also be played on one particular female body. To be a Ukrainian woman means: "to consist of mixed blood and genes of a few nations, to speak the language of the invaders, to be born in a country that no longer exists, to be raised under the pressure of power, and to fight with authorities".*[14]

As we see, Kosarewska goes not only beyond the geographical boundaries but

beyond time limits. Her performance is limited in time, but the experience on which it is based is heterochromatic and combines different historical layers.

Her own body becomes a platform for political games: the artist reflects on the questions of ethnic conflicts, the constant movements of borders, including the one between Ukraine and Poland, political transformations, changes of national identity and its authenticity. An unprotected, vandalized female body symbolizes the fragility of existence, the collapse of identity (at least a geographical or national one), and the need to create a new type of it: hybrid identity beyond borders. She is lost between identities and languages and the only thing she has left is silence during the whole performance. In Julia Kristeva's prominent text *Strangers to Ourselves* one can *find* a chapter perfectly describing the situation Kosarewska is trying to present. She writes:

> *Silence has not only been forced upon you, it is within you: a refusal to speak, a fitful sleep riven to an anguish that wants to remain mute, the private property of your proud and mortified discretion, that silence is a harsh light. Nothing to say, nothingness, no one on the horizon.*[15]

We can however ask: but do we really have nothing to say? Is the opportunity to speak voluntarily rejected? It seems that the silence of the Other is a prolonged state of frustrated numbness, caused by the awareness of its separateness, not having the right to speak. Indeed,

> *it is not the silence of anger that jostled words at the edge of the idea and the mouth; rather, it is the silence that empties the mind and fills the brain with despondency, lik the gaze of sorrowful women coiled up in some nonexistent eternity.*[16]

The artist finally raises her voice. The moment when the nervous silence finally interrupts the scream of the performer is one of the strongest in this work. All the stratification of painful experiences, cultural taboos, both impotence and the unbearable force that finally breaks out from the inside, fill the space of the gallery by a single sound stream of the female voice, bringing back the viewers and the artist to this particular moment, to this particular physical place.

Female migrant as the Other

In contrast to Kosarewska's voluntary migration and conscious nomadism, the art migration of Lia Dostlieva is forced, and her nomadism is a reaction to lose. When dealing with the subject of social alienation and representing thousands of displaced people from occupied territories, Lia chooses as the symbol of her identity, the ancient image of cynocephali, people with dog heads.

Cynocephali were described in many ancient texts, but Lia in her project is referring to the one of Simmias of Rhodes, an ancient Greek philosopher:

A giant race, half-man, half-dog, live there,
Beneath their shoulders grow the heads they wear;
Jaws long and lank, and grizzly tusks they bear;
Much foreign tongues they learn and can indite,
But when they strive to speak they bark outright.[17]

In the description of her project, the artist uses a term *contemporary cynocephali* to name all the displaced people from the Donbas region, who are alienated from the society alike like their ancient prototypes: "Cynocephali can be seen all around the world nowadays. Their disturbed nest spread its sprouts everywhere infiltrating the areas inhabited by the regular humans. They walk the same streets that we do, ride the same buses, and even send their kids to human schools.

They can start talking to humans or even suddenly touch them. But they nevertheless forever remain only half-human themselves. The social alienation of the people who were forced to leave the occupied Ukrainian territories made them contemporary cynocephali expelled from their homes. At this moment they remind the dog-headed people seeking shelter among the regular humans, desperately and fruitlessly trying to dissolve among them, to be like them."[18] To be a "half-person," a non-human, an uninvited guest, a stranger, an Other, means the need to accept a new identity, created by someone else. In order to emphasize the problem of alienation, and at the same time to get rid of her Otherness by publicly accepting it, Lia Dostlieva has started the project *The Cynocephali of Donbas*. She creates personal cynocephali-dolls for each migrant from the Donbas region who feels alienated and declares its will to participate in the project. The strange creatures made by Lia have heads of dogs with big human eyes, more precisely with only one eye, and the other is always some out-of-here, nonsensical, hyperbolized and artificial. Their bodies are always human, but human hands and feet are not given for everyone: sometimes one cynocephali has something similar to a paw, and another one has mites. It is evident that despite their dog heads and social alienation, one of them is still more human, and someone is less human. It depends on the environment, on the social status, on the place, on the happy coincidence, etc., but they are different even between themselves, being at the same time aliens and others. Their heads are disproportionate to bodies, sometimes too large, and sometimes too small, but it seems that this was the intention of the artist - to make her cynocephali as much unattractive, disproportionate and illogical as possible. Sometimes it seems that some of them smile, but it is challenging to identify their very "other" faces. They do not have any sexual characteristics, but for Lia Dotlieva they need to have a gender. She labels each of them with the word *kinotsefal* (he-cynocephale) or *kinotsefalikha (*she-cynocephale), indicating from which city they originate as well. All of them, like the artist herself, are non-humans, they are more

animals than people. Cynocephale is the one who is always "outsider" in opposition to "local," the Stranger, the Alien that does not belong here, the one who brings bad news that "locals" do not want to hear. Voluntarily calling themselves cynocephali, they acknowledge their differentness, but also distinguish themselves from what is human, because, as Zygmunt Bauman wrote:

> *[...]it is a human, all too human habit to blame and punish the messengers for the hateful contents of the message they carry from those baffling, inscrutable, frightening and rightly resented global forces which we suspect as the culprits of the agonizing and humiliating feeling of existential uncertainty which despoils our confidence and plays havoc with our life plans.*[19]

At the beginning of this text, I underlined that I deliberately use more broad term migration because I do not want to be attached to the particular point of view (both geographically and metaphorically) but in this very moment it worth emphasizing the "immigrant" nature of *The Cynocephali of Donbas*. The feeling of alienation in their own country transforms into a feeling of double Otherness and extreme alienation abroad, for example, in Poland, where the project is being implemented. At the same time, the migration art created by Lia Dostlieva embodies the movement and politicization of aesthetics, creating with her project a new system of knowledge and network of links. Creating and showing The Cynocephali of Donbas in Poland, the author goes beyond personal experience by reformulating it and representing the collective experience of a particular region, becoming a politically active nomadic subject, which Rosi Braidotti is writing about.

Bord(h)ers – voices from abroad

In 2016 I started the art research project *Bord(h)ers* – the cartographies of Ukrainian female migration, which aims to discover how the changing of the dwelling place affects the identity of the female artist and how is it represented in her art. I conducted interviews with six Ukrainian artists living in six different countries: Poland, Germany, Italy, France, Spain and Portugal and asked them about their personal experience of movement. I use just their names and cities without surnames, although they can be easily recognized. Why do I do this? Firstly, because no matter who you are in your country, in a new place of dwelling you have to start building yourself from zero and the only two things that remain are the name and the country that puts you into the box:

> *So when they ask me where I am from, I refuse to answer this question. It is often taken as an offense. But, first of all, this question itself is an offense to me and I have the right not to provide any answers. The same concerns the questions if I want to have children or not, if I am married and how old I am. It is only of my own concern. However, this is a very French way to say: hello, how are you? Where are you from? Couldn't you talk to me without knowing the fact*

about the place where I was born? This classification should be put into a small box right away: this girl from Ukraine.[20]

Secondly, because the name is the first to uncover the Other, but also is always the first thing to change:

My real name is Iryna, spelt with a "y" and pronounced as "Irina" in Italian. Are you from Russia? No, I'm not from Russia. But you have a Russian name. I was so tired of explanations that started to use the spelling of my name with an "e". And now I am used to be called "Irena", even at home. So that's how I got rid of Russia. It is a huge task to prove who you are and what you are, forget explaining that you are from Ukraine and not from Russia – I was not happy about it.[21]

Topics that appeared during our conversations varied from the question of stereotypes or experienced "everyday racism" to the discussion about what does it means to be a female migrant artist. Stereotypical images of the Ukrainian woman as a care-worker or cleaning lady still dominate in public opinion. Thus, the geographical ancestry of the women who do not do such work automatically relates her to this stereotypical and simplified image and Irena experienced it as well:

There were stereotypes, of course – most Ukrainians here are working as nurses for the elderly or as cleaning personnel. Even the cleaning lady at our office is from Ukraine. Still now, when I'm presenting my art at exhibitions, I hear: Oh, I also have a Ukrainian working at our home. Ok, I say.[22]

Some of the stereotypes that Ukrainian women face abroad, are so-called "positive stereotypes" that nevertheless deface the reality and create unjustified generalizations: "There still exists a notion of *femme de l'est* – an image of a woman from the Eastern Europe, who cooks well, is tender, sincere and kind and never disagrees even with a word. In short, it is a positive cliché."[23] Another important issue that arose in the project was related to the Ania's experience of motherhood abroad and its influence on her art:

I got pregnant and we moved here to give birth to the baby. At first it was hard to paint again after the pregnancy. The focus shifted entirely to the child. My work changed too. For example, the idea of a series of female portraits came to me after that. I enjoy drawing women and the topic of femininity.[24]

At the end we came to more universal topics such as: where do I belong and who I am here? As already mentioned above, there are many "biological" metaphors used to describe the situation of migration. One of the interviewees, Julia, compared herself moving to another country to the flower of hortensia that changes color:

Depending on the soils, the flowers of hortensia change their color from light blue to white and pink. I wonder, if we also change depending on the soil?

> *Living here. Not in terms of hairstyles or clothing, but in term of our true selves – do WE change? I should ask those who knew me before. But I know for sure that I've changed. Having arrived there, I'm not there anymore. I used to have a picture in my mind that the body is here, but my head and my legs are somewhere. Perhaps everybody goes through such a moment. It is for the first time I feel well where I am. I mean, I feel Hamburg as my city now. But when I come back to Lutsk, I am comfortable there as well.*[25]

But when we completely change color, does it mean that the process of movement has ended? Does the color change forever or do we become a hybrid mixture of colors appearing depending on situation and geographical place? *Bord(h)ers* turned out to be

> *the stories of fear and victory, people and indulgence, cities and countries, memories, plans, dreams, stereotypes, alienation, surprise, disappointment or on the contrary – admiration.Travels of the contemporary Ukrainian nomadesses in time and space are reflected in their creative work and in their original artistic style, represent the search process of their identities and place in the world.*[26]

Conclusions

Feminization has taken an important role in the discourse of migration. The question "If gender matters?" has changed into "Why gender matters?" This perspective changes allow us to discuss the role of gender in the migration process in a completely different way. The unique experience of women with a migrant background becomes more visible. Simplified statistical units finally show their faces. The gender-neutral migrant becomes a woman.

The migrant woman, as the Other, is excluded from society both for her origin, background and for her gender, but as an artist she can bring into discussion her voice and visualize her experience. The article presents two completely different examples of Ukrainian female art migration. Deliberately or not, both artists use their own experience, projecting it on the collective experience of the country from which they originate. Importantly, the origin, belonging to a particular culture, although it does not determine the entire identity of the artists, sets a course in its quest. The new, hybridized (due to migration and the imposition of various cultural codes, languages, contexts) identity of the artists remains essentially very local, situated (coming back again to my interpretation of Donna Haraway's term). I am aware of the fact that the art of the two artists that I have chosen is very diverse and not limited to selected works. Nevertheless, I find them very representative if we talk about collective consciousness and traumatic memory, as well as features of female traumatic (and/or bodily) experience. Nomadic thinking allows both artists to look at their own identity in a translocal context, let us say above the borders. It makes it possible to apply new forms of expression as forms

of communication between the artist and the viewer, regardless of its nationality and knowledge of the Ukrainian context.

At the end of our talk Julia, the Ukrainian artist living in Hamburg, made a brilliant comment that can summarize everything that was said above about personal experience becoming transnational experience:

> *One day in Berlin metro I saw a woman yelling only one word: Neeeeeein! (No!). It was so scary. I often think about her, about the power of one word. It is the same with the arts. It makes a person look back and understand what can happen next. When I was presenting The Woman and the War as a performance, women from different countries came up to me and hugged me. They were sobbing. No explanations needed. Everything is inside us. The question is which means you use to present it: one word Nein or something different.*[27]

About the author:

Iuliia Lashchuk is a Ukrainian curator, cultural manager, researcher and journalist living in Poland. She is interested in contemporary art, female migration and philosophy and works on issues of identity, space, borders, nomadism and migrating art. She currently works in the research project "Cartographies of strangeness, otherness, and (ex)(in)clusion. The perspective of contemporary philosophy and art" (University of Warsaw). She has been the curator of the Gallery of the Ukrainian House in Warsaw since 2016. Being a migrant herself, collaborating with Ukrainian female artists as a curator and doing her research at the Department of Philosophy, she combines theoretical and practical approaches in her work. Since 2016 she has carried out her art research project "Bord(h)ers that explores physical and mental borders women face. In 2018 the book "Bord(h)ers 6X6" was published based on the interviews of 6 Ukrainian female artists living in six different countries.

Endnotes

1 Donna Haraway, "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective*", Feminist Studies*, 14, No. 3., 1998, p. 585.

2 I call a journey here a metaphorical situation of migration that shows its continuity.

3 Mieke Bal, "Migracja: estetyki migracyjne na rzecz nowych sposobów widzenia", in: *Migracyjna pamięć, wspólnota, tożsamość*, red. R. Sendyka, T. Sapota, R. Nycz, IBL, Warsaw, 2016, p. 69

4 See: Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism,* London: Verso. 48., 1983.

5 Refers to Ukrainian expression "liudyna-perekotypole" (людина-перекотиполе).

6 Lesya Ukrayinka was a writer and intellectual of so-called Ukrainian modernism (late XIX-early XX century), who was actively involved in the emancipative movement and travelled over the world mainly because of her disease which required specific climate. Sofia Yablonska was Ukrainian traveller and writer, known for her reportages from different parts of the world (see: "Letters from Paris", "Letters from China" etc.).

7 I refer here to the 24th of August 1991, when the USSR collapsed, and Ukraine became independent.

8 Berehynia is a cultural construct based on the idea that a woman has a sacred duty to protect the house and the family. The name comes from the word "*берегти*" (berehty) - to save, to protect. This concept became the question of critical discussion in contemporary Ukrainian research. See: Marian. J. Rubchak, "Turning oppression into opportunity: An introduction". In M. J. Rubchak (Ed.), *Mapping difference. The many faces of women in contemporary Ukraine,* New York/Oxford, Berghahn, 2011.

9 See: Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, trans. Brian Massumi, London, Athlone Press, 1986, p. 380.

10 Rosi Braidotti, *Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Thought*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1994, p.32

11 Ibid, p. 31

12 Zygmunt Bauman, "Ponowoczesne wzory osobowe", Polska Akademia Nauk, *Studia Socjologiczne,* 2(129), 1993, pp. 7–31

13 In Ukrainian tradition the guest was welcomed to the house with bread and salt presented on the embroidered towel (*rushnyk*), which became a symbol of Slavic hospitality.

14 Anna Kosarewska, "Redirecting Through", https://www.alexanderharbaugh.com/anna-kosarewska-vipaw2016, accessed 25 June 2019.

15 Julia Kristeva, *Strangers to Ourselves,* translated by Leon Roudiez, New York, Columbia University Press,1991, p. 16

16 Ibid, p.16

17 Robert Bland, John Merrivale, *Greek Anthology*, https://archive.org/details/collectionsfromg00blan/page/120, accessed 25 June 2019, p.121

18 Lia Dostlieva, "Cynocephali of Donbas", http://www.liadostlieva.org/the-cynocephali-of-donbass/, accessed 25 June 2019

19 Zygmunt Bauman, "The Migration Panic And Its (Mis)uses", https://www.socialeurope.eu/migration-panic-misuses, accessed 25 June 2019.

20 "Anna. Zaporizhia-Paris" in: Yulia Lashchuk, *Bord(h)ers,* Warsaw, 2018, p.46

21 "Irena. Lviv-Rome" in: Yulia Lashchuk, *Bord(h)ers,* Warsaw, 2018, p.16

22 Ibid., p.15

23 “Anna. Zaporizhia-Paris” in: Yulia Lashchuk, *Bord(h)ers,* Warsaw, 2018, p.46

24 “Ania. Kyiv-Madrid” in: Yulia Lashchuk, *Bord(h)ers,* Warsaw, 2018, p.65

25 “Julia. Lutsk-Hamburg” in: Yulia Lashchuk, *Bord(h)ers,* Warsaw, 2018, p.36

26 Yulia Lashchuk, Bord(h)ers, Warsaw, 2018, p. 9

27 “Julia. Lutsk-Hamburg” in: Yulia Lashchuk, *Bord(h)ers,* Warsaw, 2018, p.37

Ukrainian Canadian B/Orders: Culinary Remembrances and Queer Bordercrossings in Marusya Bociurkiw's *Food Was Her Country*

by Astrid Fellner

This paper discusses narratives by Ukrainian Canadian queer writer Marusya Bociurkiw, showing that culinary remembrances in her texts figure as powerful symbols of ethnicity, crossing various borders of nationality, ethnic belonging, and sexuality. Zooming in on her most recent work Food Was Her Country: The Memoir of a Queer Daughter (2018), I argue that Bociurkiw's ethnic culinary narratives can be read as queer border narratives, which engage the complex narratives of home, belonging, and crossing boundaries. Intervening in debates about displacement, diasporic identity, and national affiliation, Bociurkiw's culinary texts expose the logic of "culinary citizenship" (Mannur 2010: 20), allowing the narrator to position herself vis-à-vis her home countries via her affective encounters with food.

Keywords: Food narratives, Ukrainian Canadian literature, transcultural identities, border crossings, bordertextures

My parents were born in a country whose name means "border." The nationality of their passports and even the names of their birthplaces changed several times in one century, the border shrinking and expanding.

Marusya Bociurkiw[1]

Introduction: Marusya Bociurkiw and Borders

While Canadian literature has always been multicultural and literary critics have embraced ethnic minority writers for some years, Ukrainian Canadian writing is still under-represented in Canadian literary studies. Canadian writers of Ukrainian descent have, however, produced a substantial body of literature written in English that makes a rich contribution to the diversity of Canadian literature. As Lindy Ledohowski has argued, Ukrainian Canadian writings in English experienced a shift in the representation of ethnicity over the years:

> *While early Ukrainian-Canadian literature in English shaped and presented Ukrainianness within a broad, undifferentiated ethnic milieu, by the end of the 1970s, an idea of Ukrainianness in Canada as a distinct ethnic category with specific features and reference points began to become the norm.*[2]

In my paper, I will zoom in on recent writings, which, to a large extent, have begun to question previous traditional assumptions about the inevitability of ethnic assimilation by drawing attention to various kinds of hybrid, diasporic, and transnational identities. Especially in recent years, writers such as Marusya

Bociurkiw have critically examined political allegiances and patriarchal social structures, offering a critique of the heterosexism of their Ukrainian Canadian communities. As Lisa Grekul points out, "Ukrainian-Canadian writers […] have made substantial and relevant contributions to discussions about assimilation, multiculturalism, and transculturalism; about the intersecting issues of ethnicity, 'class,' gender, and sexuality; about nationalism, transnationalism, and diaspora."[3]

This paper discusses narratives by Ukrainian Canadian queer writer Marusya Bociurkiw, analyzing the multivalent meanings of food in her literary texts.[4] Food, in her texts, figures prominently, and as I want to show, Bociurkiw's food memoirs analyze "the importance of viewing food as a discursive space able to critically interrogate the nostalgic and affective rendering of food in relationship to racial and ethnic identity."[5] Culinary remembrances in her texts figure as powerful symbols of ethnicity, crossing various borders of nationality, ethnicity, and sexuality. Bociurkiw is an author, filmmaker and professor who has written six books, including the novel *The Children of Mary* (2006), and the award-winning *Comfort Food for Breakups: The Memoir of a Hungry Girl* (2007), which was also shortlisted for the prestigious Lambda and Kobzar awards. *Food Was Her Country: The Memoir of a Queer Daughter* is her latest book and was published in 2018. As a filmmaker, she has produced ten films, including her famous 2015 documentary *This is Gay Propaganda: LGBT Rights & the War in Ukraine*, a feature documentary about the Euromaidan revolution seen through the eyes of feminist and LGBT+ activists in Ukraine. Dr. Bociurkiw is associate professor of media theory at Ryerson University and Director of The Studio for Media Activism and Critical Thought.[6]

As an artist and critic, Bociurkiw situates herself "at the intersection of queer, feminist and race theory," her artistic practice, as she states, always being "premised on the condition of being a diasporic subject, with all the possibilities and contradictions of living in a psychic borderland."[7] In one of her earliest essays, "Bordercrossings: Skin/Voice/Identity," Bociurkiw has stated: "my positioning of my various subject positions, and therefore of my identity in various artistic or feminist or 'queer' contexts is constantly renegotiated."[8] Bociurkiw's negotiations of her multiple subject positions involve many crossings of borders and queering of orders of Ukrainian Canadian diasporic norms. As Weronika Suchacka has stated, as her career develops, we see more and more categories that become defining for her oeuvre. Thus, apart from the already mentioned subject positions of a writer, film director, academic, and an activist, the role of a daughter, family member, diaspora member, queer community member, feminist, lover, food connoisseur, and traveller (to name but a few categories) become the subject matter of her literary and/or artistic creations.[9]

Looking at the various intersectional forms of diasporic identities in her works, this article looks at Bociurkiw's food narratives, zooming in on her most recent work *Food Was Her Country: The Memoir of a Queer Daughter* (2018).

As I want to show, this author's culinary narratives can be read as queer border narratives, which engage the complex narratives of family, home, belonging, and sexuality. Focusing on instances of queer culinary remembrances in Bociurkiw's *Food Was Her Country*, I want to show how this text intervenes in debates about displacement and diasporic identities. I argue that her most recent food narrative exposes the logic of culinary citizenship, allowing the narrator to seize identitarian positions via her affective encounters with food.[10] Before I look more closely at the different forms of culinary remembrances in Bociurkiw's text, I want to place this Ukrainian Canadian writer within the tradition of ethnic Canadian writings, on the one hand, and transcultural queer writings, on the other.

Ukrainian Canadian Literature and Transcultural Identities

In *Becoming the Hyphen: The Evolution of English-Language Ukrainian-Canadian Literature*, Ledohowski has argued that

> *Canadian writers of Ukrainian descent, writing in English, have transformed themselves and been transformed by critics from being ethnic "strangers" and "foreigners",similar to all other non-English speaking immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries*

to what Wah has referred to as "living in the hyphen"[11] of contemporary Ukrainian-Canadianness.[12] In her *Re-Placing Ethnicity: New Approaches to Ukrainian Canadian Literature,* Grekul, in turn, argues that "[h]yphenated identity […] was-and is-not the only issue addressed by Ukrainian-Canadian writers."[13] In fact, Ukrainian Canadian writers, just like many other ethnic writers, have to negotiate multiple identities, and especially for female Ukrainian-Canadian writers the various intersections between ethnicity, class, sex/gender, and sexuality have become important issues in their writings. Consequently, Weronika Suchacka has studied the construction of identities in recent Ukrainian-Canadian literature from an intersectional perspective. Ethnicity, she argues, only constitutes one aspect of the multiplicity of identities in Ukrainian-Canadian literatures.[14] Writings by Ukrainian-Canadians contribute to a postmodern notion of identity, which is often conceived of in terms of a journey. The construction of identity, she argues

> *appertains to ancestral experiences, for example, ancestors' migration journey, but also the immigrants' lives prior to and after their exodus. These ancestral experiences clearly remain a formative influence for the immigrants' offspring generation later, but at the same time, these are confronted with the offspring's personal experiences in Canada where, due this pluralization of reference, the multiplication and diversification of their identities occur.*[15]

Concomitantly, as part of Canadian literature, Ukrainian Canadian writings also have to be seen within the framework of the official discourse of multiculturalism

in Canada. Many critics have argued that the official policy of multiculturalism, which was introduced in Canada in 1971, has influenced the writing and publishing of Canadian literature.[16] According to Grekul, before 1971 few English-language Ukrainian Canadian authors wrote about their experiences as ethnic writers because they felt they had to assimilate to Anglo-Canadian society. As she explains the change:

> *But as ideologies and practices of assimilation gave way to general public awareness and increasing acceptance of a "mosaic" model of Canadian nationhood-as Anglo-Canadian society began to recognize the value of ethnic minority groups within the new multicultural model of nationhood-second- and third-generation Ukrainian Canadians began to take pride in Ukrainian folk music, dance, and art. […] Ukrainian Canadian writers benefited both directly and indirectly from Anglo-Canadian society's openness to cultural diversity.*[17]

In her 1991 essay entitled *From Mosaic to Kaleidoscope*, the Ukrainian Canadian author and critic Janice Kulyk Keefer famously propagated the paradigm of transculturalism. As Grekul decribes Kulyk Keefer's ideas:

> *Adopting a transcultural vision of Canadian society would, she felt, better describe the unique predicament faced by members of ethnic minority groups in Canada-especially those individuals caught between ethnic and national identity, belonging to both and neither-and would ultimately help them come to terms with their divided sense of self.*[18]

What Canada needs, she says, is a "change in Canadian iconography" from the mosaic, or multicultural, model of nationhood to a kaleidoscope, or transcultural, model.[19] Transculturalism, as Kulyk Keefer has it, allows for communication between various cultures, privileging "interconnection, mobility, and transformation."[20] As a theoretical perspective, it attempts to move beyond binary oppositions, drawing the attention to the inherent hybridization of cultures. Quebec critic Afef Benessaieh also prefers the term transculturality over multiculturality or interculturality as "it is a separate concept that designates specific processes inadequately captured by these other terms."[21] As she puts it, transculturality captures more adequately the sense of movement and the complex mixedness of cultures in close contact, and better describes the *embodied situation of cultural plurality* lived by many individuals and communities of mixed heritage and/or experience, whose multifaceted situation is more visible under globalization.[22]

As I want to suggest, in focusing on various bordercrossings, Bociurkiw's works can be fruitfully studied as within a transcultural paradigm.[23] Bociurkiw's texts open up transcultural spaces, which, in turn, can be described as borderlands. The metaphor of borderlands is actually quite useful in describing Ukrainian American literature, and, as we shall see, particularly so when it comes to Bociurkiw's works. As Bociurkiw describes her in-between status in her most recent memoir *Food Was Her Country*:

> *We were born in Canada, which was solid and bright, but there was this other place, the Ukraine, five thousand miles away, where old babas lined up for bread, and it was sad, and we were supposed to love it. [...] Whether through food or writing or dreams, I have been traversing those five thousand miles, not quite here and never really there, ever since. The journey is illusory, a play with hyphens and hybridity, with desire and disavowal; Rushdie's imaginary homelands: part fiction, part documentary, all story.*[24]

Living in the borderlands, or as Kulyk Keefer puts it, being "permanently lodged in the limbo between home lost and a home, or a substitute for home, found,"[25] Ukrainian diasporic literature can be treated as border literature. Jesús Benito and Ana María Manzanas have defined border literature as "a transgressive discourse whose aim is to render possible, within the fixed cultural, literary or linguistic bounds of what is permitted, an experience of what is not permitted."[26] Like many other Ukrainian-Canadian writings, Bocirukiw's writings are situated at the crossroads, at the meeting points between different cultures and traditions and where different identities intersect, ethnic but also gender and queer identities. As Suchacka states: "Through the exploration of one's personal and ancestral experiences of displacement, and dilemmas it has brought about, the constant exploration of identity/identities is enabled."[27] It is this constant re-negotiation of the multiplicities of identities that is characteristic of Ukrainian Canadian writers in general, who, as Suchacka concludes, find themselves on the border, or, to follow Bociurkiw's phrase, "beyond the border."[28]

Queer Bordercrossings

"I have been travelling through Ukraine for two weeks" writes Bociurkiw in her memoir *Comfort Food for Breakups* and she adds:

> *People stop me and ask me:Why are you here? [...] We only spend two hours with Olena, and it's odd how the time slows down, becomes almost still. It is warm in Olena's tiny house, but I am chilled by the uncanny sense of returning to the past, the dead and the living all present in this moment. We eat eggs, I pass around photographs. We talk about my grandmother, Olena's sister, who died two years earlier. Olena asks timid, halting questions about her sibling, who left for a better life, za hranetsiu, beyond the border, so very long ago. Was she ill? Was she happy?*[29]

Bociurkiw's phrase "*za hranetsiu*, beyond the border"-a translation that reflects her double consciousness-hinges on what Montréal critic and translator Sherry Simon has referred to as "the comma of translation"[30]or what Anglophone Montréal writer Gail Scott has termed "comma of difference."[31]

It is a stylistic device that carries deep cultural meaning. Marking the point of juncture, "drawing differences together and separating them at the same time,"[32] this comma signals that Bociurkiw situates herself at the crossroads of cultures,

in the space of difference "where traffic goes two ways."[33] The comma in this quote appears at the precise moment of translation-linguistic translation-but also translation between the old and the new, the Grandmother and herself, the past and the present, drawing self-reflexively the attention to the process of cultural translation. "*Za hranetsiu*," as Suchacka explains, "placed along with the English translation, 'beyond the border'" refers to the "continuous process of Ukrainian-Canadian border crossing."[34] The combination of these two phrases calls attention to the continuities as well as the discontinuities between her "home" culture and that of the "other".

Bociurkiw's acts of bordercrossing can be said to operate in conversation with transcultural feminist writers. In particular, her works, as I want to suggest, build on a queer transcultural feminist politics, which defies national borders and shows that living "beyond the border" calls for a constant process of cultural translation of various identities. Evoking June Jordan, Adrienne Rich, and Gloria Anzaldúa in her article "Bordercrossings: Skin/Voice/Identity," Bociurkiw builds on a queer sexual politics that pays attention to the multiple ways in which the diverse experiences of living on the different borders of identity-national, cultural, ethnic/racial and sexual-intersect. Crucially, Bociurkiw's queer translational poetics and politics involve debates about home, displacement, and diasporic identity, which are rendered in the forms of culinary remembrances. Her texts open up spaces of cultural exchange that perform acts of culinary citizenship, producing the image of a far-away culinary rich Ukraine in order to reflect back to Canada a fractured and critical image of the many diversities of Canada.

Clearly, the look back eastwards (and often the journey eastwards) serves as an important theme in Ukrainian-Canadian literature. As Suchacka states, "If not the physical return to Ukraine, then it is the emotional, spiritual and/or literary journey back 'home,' back to one's origins, that is still yearned for by the generation of Ukrainian-Canadian writers."[35] The gaze itself is "Janus-faced;"[36] it is "directed two-ways, towards both 'homes': Canada and Ukraine.[37] Suchacka quotes Marusya Bociurkiw, who, she believes has adopted this view when she writes:

So much of where I come from is located in the unspoken history of my parents' immigration, the why and how of taking that journey across the ocean and then across the country to the Prairies, so traumatic in its import that my Baba, still, 60 years later, tells and retells her ocean crossing story in incredible detail, to anyone who'll listen. All of this has never felt more important to me or to my work than it does right now.[38]

For Bociurkiw bordering processes, the re- and de-bordering of states, play an important role in her works, serving as the framework within which other acts of bordercrossings can take place. As she explains in "Bordercrossings":

Both my parents were born in Ukraine, a country with some ten other countries

> *or territories touching its own perimeters, and whose name, literally, translates into English as "border." I have never been to Ukraine, but I learnt the most intimate details of its geography-the names of its rivers, their tributaries, the different regions and their particular characteristics, at the dreaded weekly Ukrainian School. Though I remember none of these names now, I do remember having to memorize and then draw, for an exam, some seven or eight different versions of the border of Ukraine, which changed as quickly as some other country could invade and say "gotcha."*[39]

These borders are also important in symbolic ways. Bociurkiw's memoirs perform various forms of bordercrossings, where the crossings of borders also refers to "the negotiation and pushing of limits and the consequent exploration of a risky territory defined at least as much by history as by memory."[40] As the writer herself admits, "[t]he crossing of borders from the realm of sexual identity to the realm of cultural identity, and of finding a language that works for both, is, I have to say, the biggest challenge I have faced in my work thus far."[41]

The Language of Food: Queer Culinary Remembrances

The language that seems to work for Bociurkiw in order to give voice to these multiple selves is the language of food. This language of culinary remembrances acts as a form of cultural translation that allows her to cross the borders of personal and cultural identities, establishing new orders that break with heteronormative conventions, allowing her to forge new kinship relations. "Home," she states in *Food Was Her Country*, "was all the spoken and unspoken messages of trauma. All through those TV-lit suburban nights, I dreamed of escape.[42] *Food Was Her Country* is a memoir, rendering the story of Marusya and her mother and their tumultuous culinary relationship. Marusya's Ukraine-born mother, who is a great cook, faces the challenge of having to learn how to speak and eat again after she has been diagnosed with cancer of the larynx. The book explores the daughter's journey of grieving after her mother's death and her gradual process of reconciliation with her. In terms of genre, the book also situates itself beyond borders, mixing the genre of the memoir with the female tradition of writing cookbooks. The protagonist's memories are structured by her ambivalent relationship to her family, which is discursively rendered through nostalgic meditations on food. At one moment, for instance, she recalls her difficult times as an adolescent growing up in Ottawa and living through a year of eating desserts. The depiction of this episode of eating fudge ribbon pies is accompanied by the inclusion of the recipe of this dish at the end of the book. This recipe is only one of the many recipes included in the book, but this dessert is especially important as it also serves as a metaphor for the narrator's coming out process: "I had not yet resolved the uncertainties of my libido […] Were the assertive flavours and temperatures of Fudge Ribbon Pie metaphor for my unacknowledged desires?"[43] In her recollection, her food preference is therefore

directly linked to her sexuality, which also introduces comic relief into her story when she, for examples, states: "After my year of extreme desserts ended, I entered into a decade-long dalliance with heterosexuality.

I went on a handful of dates with theatrical boys; boys who read Nietzsche; boys who sang in the church choir. One hundred percent of them turned out to be gay."[44]

Her craving for desserts as a teenager is, however, also linked to her ethnicity, as her preference for sweet things and the "triumphant inventions of the western world"[45] was also a reaction to the alienated relationship she had with her "Mama's homemade dill pickles at every meal, the cold breakfasts, the whitish meals of pirogies and sour cream."[46] Still, the narrator feels a connection with her mother when she states: "Perhaps only my mother understood who I really was: a girl waiting and waiting, with regret and excitement-for subways and rented rooms, for cities and cabarets-for her life to begin."[47] Symbolizing an imaginary journey home to her family, particularly the process of reconciliation with her mother, the narrator's culinary memories help her piece together the different fragments of her life so that she can reconfigure the notion of family to encompass alternative forms of belonging.

By recreating food memories, her story entangles the languages of food, nostalgia and queer desire. It complicates traditional notions of imagining food as authentic manifestation of cultural essence, offering a form of critical nostalgia that flouts conventional narratives of authenticity, queering heteronormative expectations of Ukrainian-Canadian families. The subtitle of *Food Was Her Country*, which reads *The Memoirs of a Queer Daughter* draws attention to the fact that the book disrupts the b/orders of Ukrainian Canadian families, drawing the attention to other forms of family and kinship. In fact, her story focuses on queer desire, refusing to subsume sexuality within the overarching narratives of national identity and racial belonging. In highlighting forms of what David Eng has called "queer diasporas," Bociurkiw's account of the multiple intersections of desire, sexuality, race/ethnicity, and kinship tells a different story, which "highlights the breaks, discontinuities, and differences."[48] As the narrator in *Food Was Her Country*, for instance, explains, "I kept a lot of things from my blood relatives, as most queers do. It wasn't secretiveness, exactly. It was a problem of translation."[49] Citing one of her articles, she writes: For many lesbians […] there is no possibility of return; the rhetoric of community as family displaces blood ties. The bar, the community centre, the political movement, the circle of friends become a copy of a copy of "home."[50]

Queer diaspora, as Eng has it, "emerges as a concept providing new methods of […] reorganizing national and transnational communities based not on origin, filiation, and genetics but on destination, affiliation, and the assumption of a common set of social practices or political commitments."[51] Organizing her kinship feelings around the new structures that she has built for herself, notably her

founding of a feminist video collective,[52] Bociurkiw can finally make sense, living a queer life. The way I see it, affective encounters with food help the narrator in her process of reconnecting with her family.

In both of her food memoirs, *Comfort Food for Breakups* and *Food Was Her Country*, culinary remembrances figure as powerful symbols of ethnicity, cultural identity, and sexuality, becoming significant sites where identity construction, community building and social critique can take place. In the different stories that make up *Comfort Food for Breakups*, Bociurkiw writes:

> *My recipe journals are full of histories long and short: a grilled vegetable couscous with harissa sauce made the night my lover Krys first entered my kitchen; a marinara sauce that healed the wounds of a friend's breakup; my mother's perogy recipe, scrawled on the back of a brown paper Starbucks bag, […].*[53]

Descriptions of culinary practices set in motion thoughts on belonging and national identity, opening debates on what Anita Mannur has termed "culinary citizenship," a form of affective national identity "which grants subjects the ability to claim and inhabit certain subject positions via their relationship to food."[54]

In the following section, I will look at the concept of culinary citizenship more closely, situating Bociurkiw's food narrative within the tradition of ethnic culinary diasporic writings and showing how her memoirs offer a model of queer culinary citizenship. As I have argued elsewhere, there is a large number of culinary-themed ethnic fictional writings in North America, in particular Asian American, Caribbean, and U.S. Latino/a texts.[55] With the growing popularity of multiculturalism in the North American literary marketplace ethnic culinary narratives have burst onto the literary scene in order to "spice up" the market. Clearly, the interest in culinary narratives is also linked to the popularity of ethnic food in restaurants.[56] As bell hooks has argued, "within commodity culture ethnicity becomes spice, seasoning that can liven up the dull dish that is mainstream white culture."[57] Döring et. al. summarize the popularity of ethnic food narratives in the following way: "The discourse of multicultural meals and consumerist variety becomes a means of erasing difference: the other is consumed."[58]

"With a readership hungry to consume delectable representations of otherness, ethnic culinary narratives also contain pre-packaged marketable cultural otherness."[59]

As Mannur has put it,

> *within the framework of popular multiculturalism, ethnic-themed novels became the flavor du jour, satiating America's appetite to consume difference often in what we might conceive of as 'sugar-coated' realism wherein a culinary idiom deliberately and strategically produces narratives of otherness.*[60]

Ethnic culinary narratives may contribute to the commodification of ethnicity

and "the packaging of ethnicity within a palpably 'exotic' framework," but they nevertheless fulfill important cultural work in North American literature. Food tropes in ethnic writings serve as metaphors that construct and reflect relationships to cultural identity, addressing issues of belonging, authenticity, and nostalgia. Food is a visible sign of ethnicity which figures prominently in all immigrant and diasporic literatures, serving as an important instrument in the construction of a "home away from home."[61] Bociurkiw's narratives expose the logic of culinary citizenship, which already becomes clear in the title of the book *Food Was Her Country*, which establishes a discursive link between the categories of food and nation. Crucially, her culinary narratives engage the complex narratives of home and belonging, offering "meta-critiques of what it means to route memory and nostalgic longing for a homeland through one's relationship to seemingly intractable culinary practices which unflinchingly yoke national identity with culinary taste and practices."[62]

As we can see in Bociurkiw's texts, culinary citizenship is intimately tied to sexual identity, and culinary tropes also function as powerful signifiers of sexuality. Depictions of affective encounters with food which are intertwined with remembrances of national origin, family, and sexuality function not only as important markers of the construction of identity but also serve as a powerful form of criticism to both heteronormative investments of diaspora (for instance genealogical filiation), and nationalist stakes of queer liberal formations, such as marriage and citizenship. To be sure, discourses on family, intimacy, and the nation have long been intertwined, and many scholars have pointed to the patriarchal and nationalistic baggage the concept of "family" carries.[63]

By recreating food memories Bociurkiw's *Food Was Her Country*, just like her previous *Comfort Food for Breakups*, however, entangles the languages of food with nation, nostalgia and desire, offering a series of border crossings that queer not only national borders but also social orders and normative understandings of Ukrainian Canadianness. "For a while," the narrator says, "I lived as though I did not have a family. There was no middle ground in those days: a single diasporic narrative on the one hand, a queer undoing of that story on the other."[64] Recollecting moves from Halifax to Vancouver and reflecting on the many locations she and her family lived in, "Bociurkiw also enchants with a host of life experiences that range from dates (many, often bad) to making art (her life's eureka)."[65]

For a long time, Buciurkiw thought that she "could see no possibility of growth within the sheltering yet confining forest of family"[66] but, as her memoirs show, she has gradually managed to re-evaluate her life and re-connect with her family through the language of food. After her mother has passed away, she struggles to find a way to deal with loss. Piecing the fragmented stories of her life together in her narratives allows her to reconnect imaginatively with her family.

As she says,

> *I have found that the only way to survive loss is to integrate it into every part of your life. To, in a sense, refuse loss. To maintain a place for the dead among the living, as Ukrainians with their graveyard visits, their place settings for the dead, and their gossip of death, do. To breathe it in, as the Buddhists would say. And thus, to avoid melancholia. Perhaps, even, to find gratitude.*[67]

It is through culinary remembrance that Bociurkiw's tries to come to terms with the loss of her mother. The very last sentences of the book read: "The food is voluble, expressive in every way. It says: love-steady, serviceable, healthy love-is ordinary and quite splendid. It says: your mother is with you and always will be."[68]Conspicuously, Bociurkiw offers a critical and queer version of a nostalgic project of recovering the past. Her food memoir clearly complicates traditional heteronormative notions of imagining food as manifestation of cultural essence, offering a form of critical nostalgia that flouts conventional narratives of authenticity. By engaging and queering the concept of culinary citizenship, Bociurkiw's memoirs constitute a rich repository of texts that include intersectional voices that trouble Ukrainian Canadian b/orders, giving voice to marginalized diasporic identities. *Food Was Her Country* draws the attention to the notion of cultural citizenship which problematizes narratives of belonging, unyoking it from essentialisms. "Like my mother and my grandmother," the narrator says at the end of the book, "they understand food to be the only country that is truly theirs."[69]

Conclusion

Enoch Padolsky has argued that

> *Food has long been regarded as a useful and important ethnic marker, particularly in terms of identity issues. From an ethnic perspective, the assumption has been that your identity can somehow be connected to, or even induced from, the foods that have significance for you and your group, foods that reflect your ethnic language, culture, history, traditions, religion, and so on. If you are Ukrainian, you eat cabbage rolls; if you are Jewish, you eat matzo ball soup; if you are Chinese, you eat har gow, and so on. In other words, you are what you eat.*[70]

Bociurkiw's food memoirs complicate this traditional view. They engage in critical discussions about the imbricated layers of food, nostalgia, and national identity, and the various forms of bordercrossings performed in the diaspora, establishing food as a language for negotiating cultural belonging. The affective value attached to food is, however, not simply a nostalgic gesture to remember the past. "As a reflexive form of nostalgia, culinary nostalgia has the function of engaging the politics of identity."[71] Bociurkiw's memoirs affectively position her as an ethnic subject critical of nostalgic longing for home.

They complicate a simple logic of culinary identifications within diasporic

memories, using culinary remembrances to structure the narrators' ambivalent relationship to ethnicity.

Food, as I have argued, also "transmits affect, constituting a powerful discursive space in which the affective relationship of the protagonists to food can be critically interrogated."[72] As an affective relation, food, as is shown in Bociurkiw's works, connects to cultural belonging; at the same time it also allows her to reconfigure kinship to encompass alternative, queer forms of belonging. Instead of writing stories in which she attempts to recuperate her past and in which she valorizes dominant notions of cultural belonging, she focuses on queer diasporic identities. Unyoking family and kinship from oppressing models of patriarchy, heteronormativity and capitalism, Bociurkiw crafts a model of kinship and cultural belonging that allows her to accept her many bordercrossings and to re-connect with her family. In her narratives she performs queer culinary citizenship, which allows her to reconnect imaginatively with Ukraine.

About the author

Astrid M. Fellner is Chair of North American Literary and Cultural Studies at Saarland University in Saarbrücken, Germany. She earned her MA, her Ph.D., and her postdoctoral degree from the University of Vienna, where she taught from 1993 to 2008. From 2008-09 she was Distinguished Visiting Austrian Chair at Stanford University and taught in the Department of Comparative Literature. In the U.S., she was also a Visiting Scholar the UMass Amherst from 2003-05, UC Irvine (1998-99), and had a Fulbright Grant to study at UT Austin (1990-91). Currently, she is Co-Speaker in the German Research foundation and Canadian Social Science Foundation-funded interdisciplinary International Graduate Research Training Program "Diversity: Mediating Difference in Transcultural Space" that Saarland University and University of Trier are conducting with the Université de Montréal. She is also Project Leader of the EU-funded INTERREG Großregion VA-Project "University of the Greater Region Center for Border Studies" and is Action Coordinator of a trilingual Border Glossary. She is also the co-founder of a trinational and trilingual MA-program in Border Studies. Her publications include *Articulating Selves: Contemporary Chicana Self-Representation* (Braumüller 2002), *Bodily Sensations: The Female Body in Late-Eighteenth-Century American Culture* (WVT, forthcoming) and several edited volumes and articles in the fields of Border Studies, U.S. Latino/a literature, Post-Revolutionary American Literature, Canadian literature, Indigenous Studies, Gender/Queer Studies, and Cultural Studies.

Endnotes

1 Social Justice Media. n. d. "Marusya Bociurkiw." Biography, Accessed September 7, 2019. https://marusyab.wixsite.com/marusya-bociurkiw/bio.

2 Lisa Grekul, *Leaving Shadows Literature in English by Canada's Ukrainians* (Edmonton: U of Alberta P, 2005) 109.

3 Ibid., 202.

4 I would like to thank Weronika Suchacka, who during the annual conference of the Association for Canadian Studies in German-speaking Countries (GKS) in Grainau in February 2019 drew my attention to the works of Marusya Bociurkiw.

5 Anita Mannur, *Culinary Fictions: Food in South Asian Diasporic Culture* (Philadelphia: Temple UP, 2010) 12.

6 For further details on her biography and on her works, consult her website at: https://marusyab.wixsite.com/marusya-bociurkiw.

7 (Social Justice Media. n. d.)

8 Marusya Bociurkiw, "Bordercrossings: Skin/Voice/Identity." *Canadian Woman Studies/Les Cahiers de la Femme* 14, no. 1 (1993): 8.

9 Weronika Suchacka, ""The [C]rossing of [B]orders" and Intersections: Presenting and Practicing Intersectionality in Marusya Bociurkiw's Works." *TransCanadiana* 10, (2018): 71

10 Cf Mannur, *(*2010), 29.

11 Fred Wah, *Diamond Grill* (Edmonton: NeWest, 1996), 53.

12 Lindy Ledohowski, "Becoming the Hyphen: The Evolution of English-Language Ukrainian-Canadian Literature." *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 39, no. 1–2 (2007): 108.

13 Lisa Grekul, "Re-Placing Ethnicity: New Approaches to Ukrainian Canadian Literature," in *Home-Work: Postcolonialism, Pedagogy, and Canadian Literature*, ed. Cynthia Sugars (Ottawa: U of Ottawa P, 2004), 372.

14 Cf Weronika Suchacka, *"Za Hranetsiu" – "Beyond the Border": From Constructions of Identities in Ukrainian-Canadian Literature* (Augsburg: Wißner-Verlag, 2019) 14.

15 Ibid., 398–99.

16 Cf Mary K. Kirtz, "Old World Traditions, New World Inventions: Bilingualism, Multiculturalism, and the Transformation of Ethnicity," *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 28, no. 1 (1996): 8.

17 Grekul, "Re-Placing Ethnicity," 50.

18 Grekul, *Leaving Shadows, 112*.

19 Ibid.

20 Janice Kulyk Keefer, "From Mosaic to Kaleidoscope: Out of the Multicultural Past to Comes a Vision of a Transcultural Future," *Books in Canada* 20, no. 6 (1991): 16.

21 Afef Benessaieh, "Multiculturalism, Interculturality, Transculturality," in *Transcultural Americas/ Amériques Transculturelles*, ed. Afef Benessaieh (Ottawa: U of Ottawa P, 2010)12. German critic Wolfgang Welsch also favors the term transculturality because the concepts of multiculturality and interculturality are often bound to traditional notions of homogenous cultures. Cf Wolfgang Welsch, "Transculturality: The Changing Form of Cultures Today," in *The Contemporary Study of Culture*. Vienna: Turia + Kant, 1999. 220–221.

22 Afef Benessaieh, "Multiculturalism, Interculturality, Transculturality." 16. Emphasis in the original.

23 According to Sissy Helff, border crossings are an important characteristic of transcultural texts. As she explains:

"I will speak of a 'transcultural novel' if one of the following aspects applies: first, if the narrator and/or the narrative challenge(s) the collective identity of a particular community; second, if experiences of border crossings and transnational identities characterize the narrators' lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*); and third, if traditional notions of 'home' are disputed" (83).

24 *Food Was Her Country*: *The Memoir of a Queer Daughter* (Halfmoon Bay, BC: Caitlin P, 2018). 17–18.

25 Janice Kulyk Keefer, "Home Comings/Border Crossings: Travels Through Imagined and Actual Worlds," in *Dangerous Crossing: Papers on Transgression in Literature and Culture*, eds. Monica Loeb and Gerald Porter (Uppsala: Swedish Science P, 1999), 15–30.

26 Jesús Benito and Ana María Manzanas, *Literature and Ethnicity in the Cultural Borderlands* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002), 13.

27 Suchacka, *"Za Hranetsiu,"* 136.

28 *Comfort Food,* 47.

29 *Comfort Food,* 46–47.

30 Sherry Simon, *Translating Montreal*. *Episodes in the Life of a Divided City* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 2006) 131.

31 Gail Scott, *My Paris* (Urbana/Champain, IL: Dalkey Archive Press, 2003), 91.

32 Ibid., 131.

33 Ibid.

34 Suchacka, *"Za Hranetsiu,"* 15.

35 Suchacka, *"Za Hranetsiu,"* 127.

36 Janice Kulyk Keefer, "Writing, Reading, Teaching Transcultural in Canada," in *Multiculturalism in North America and Europe: Social Practices, Literary Visions*, ed. Hans Braun et al. (Trier: WVT, 1995). 182.

37 Ibid.

38 Bociurkiw, "Bordercrossings," 6.

39 Ibid., 7.

40 Kulyk Keefer, "Home Comings," 19.

41 Bociurkiw, "Bordercrossings," 6–7.

42 *Food Was Her Country*, 35.

43 Ibid., 21.

44 Ibid., 23.

45 Ibid., 20.

46 Ibid., 21.ä

47 Ibid., 24.

48 David L. Eng, *The Feeling of Kinship: Queer Liberalism and the Racialization of Intimacy* (Durham: Duke, 2010), 14.

49 *Food Was Her Country*, 49.

50 *Food Was Her Country*, 49–50.

51 Eng, *The Feeling of Kinship,* 303.

52 Cf *Food Was Her Country*, 49.

53 *Comfort Food,* 16–17.

54 Ibid., 13.

55 See, for instance the South Asian novels *Mistress of Spices* (1997) by Chitra Banerjee Divakaruni, *Monsoon Diary: A Memoir with Recipes* (2003) by Shoba Narayan or *Serving Crazy with Curry* (2004) by Amulya Malladi. There is also Monique Truong's *Book of Salt* (2004) in Vietnamese American literature or Arab American Diana Abu-Jaber's *Crescent* (2003). African American writers Toni Morrison, Gloria Naylor and Audre Lorde have also employed food tropes and images of food consumption as ethnic signifiers. Jamaica Kincaid and Dionne Brand are two important writers from the Caribbean whose works are full of culinary scenes. And in U.S. Latino/a literature Laura Esquivel's *Como Agua Para Chocolate/Like Water for Chocolate* (1989/1992) is probably the best-known culinary narrative. See my article "The Flavors of Multi-Ethnic North American Literatures: Language, Ethnicity and Culinary Nostalgia" for more details.

56 Cf. Astrid M. Fellner, "The Flavors of Multi-Ethnic North American Literatures: Language, Ethnicity and Culinary Nostalgia," in *Culinary Linguistics: The Chef's Special*, ed. Maximiliane Frobenius, Cornelia Gerhardt and Susanne Ley (Festschrift für Neal Norrick. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2013), 244.

57 bell hooks, "Eating the Other: Desire and Resistance," in *Eating Culture*, ed. Ron Scapp and Brian Seitz (Albany: State U of New York P. 1998), 181.

58 Tobias Döring, Markus Heide, and Susanne Mühleisen, "Introduction: Writing/Eating Culture," in *Eating Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Food,* eds. Tobias Döring, Markus Heide and Susanne Mühleisen (Heidelberg: Winter. 2003), 7.

59 Fellner, "Flavors," 245.

60 Mannur, *Culinary Fictions,* 83.

61 Susanne Reichl, "'Like a Beacon Against the Cold': Food and the Construction of Ethnic Identities in Black British Novels," in *Eating Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Food*, ed. Tobias Döring, Markus Heide, and Susanne Mühleisen (Heidelberg: Winter, 2003), 178.

62 Anita Mannur, "Culinary Nostalgia: Authenticity, Nationalism, and Diaspora," *MELUS* 32, no. 4 (2007): 29.

63 In "It's All In the Family: Intersections of Gender, Race, and Nation," Patricia Hill Collins explains how nationalism, race, and gender, linked through the concept of the family, mutually construct one another.

64 *Food Was Her Country*, 49.

65 Brett Josef Grubisic, "Marusya Bociurkiw Produces a Comic Treat with Memoir Food Was Her Country," *Thestar.com*, accessed September 13, 2019, www.thestar.com/entertainment/books/reviews/2018/09/28/guilt-discontentment-and-fudge-ribbon-pie.html.

66 *Food Was Her Country*, 50.

67 Ibid., 138.

68 Ibid., 139.

69 Ibid., 138.

70 Enoch Padolsky, "You Are Where You Eat: Ethnicity, Food and Cross-Cultural Spaces," *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 37, no.2 (2005): n.p, accessed September 13, 2019, http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.bnl.lu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=19471233&site=ehost-live&scope=site.

71 Fellner, "Flavors," 257.

72 Ibid.

Borderlands of Georgian Ukrainians

by Olga Dorokhina

Georgia constitutes a multiethnic state, in which representatives of various ethnic and religious groups live side by side. The need for coexistence creates areas of interaction that, under the influence of various factors (internal and external), either unite people or, on the contrary, divide them, forming both physical and outwardly invisible but perceived lines of separation. In recent years, due to various political events, Georgia and Ukraine are often mentioned together. Besides common post-Soviet legacy and challenges to security and sovereignty, the two countries are connected by people – Ukrainians in Georgia and Georgians in Ukraine. This paper focuses on Ukrainians in Georgia. Through the concepts of borderlands, contact zones and identities, I address how the Ukrainian community of Georgia was formed, what it represents today, and how it is integrated in modern Georgian society. The paper presents an overview of representation of Ukrainians in Georgia and methods applied by them to maintain Ukrainian identity.

Keywords: cultural borderlands, poly-cultural families, identity, Georgian Ukrainians

Concepts of borderlands, cultural borderlands and contact zones

A special place in border studies is occupied by the concept of borderland or the area adjacent to the border, which, depending on the context or direction of research, can be viewed in different dimensions (physical [spatial] and symbolic).

As a rule, dualism is inherent to borderlines, with opposing concepts such as "we" and "they," "here" and "there," "one's own" and "someone else's," "inclusion" and "exclusion". But as soon as we expand our understanding of borders, including here the areas they share, the situation becomes multidimensional and ambiguous. For Soja, borderlands or some kind of "third space" are characterized by "a constant process of creating and blurring the differences," constant shifts and struggles.[1] This is a space where language, cultural traditions and customs create demarcation lines and distances of different lengths.[2] Here the construction of new models of communication occurs, as sharing joint space requires crossing the lines of separation and formation of optimal distances.[3] The result of intensive migration flows is the mixing of different cultures. Moving to an area, becoming part of a new society[4], people bring their borders with them, and in new conditions they engage in processes of conducting ongoing negotiations both within themselves and with host cultures. Over time, multicultural societies are formed, when a specific territory becomes a place for the interaction of two or more cultures for the characteristics of which the concept of "cultural borderland" is introduced.[5]For Gloria Anzaldúa this is a "permanent transitional condition,"

which is characterized by ambiguity"allowing people to adhere to different social and cultural perspectives."[6]Cultural boundaries within individuals become blurred as components from diverse cultures become incorporated into their individual cultural identity, instead of remaining separate from each other. The concept of borderland allows a person to adhere to different identities that are multifaceted and can be changed or transformed throughout life.[7]

Tolkachev points out that in the conditions of the cultural borderland,

> *tolerance towards the "foreign", the ability to appreciate and assimilate the best cultural achievements of the nations entering the dialogue is assisted by the historical traditions of tolerance inherent in different cultures.*[8]

In the process of social and political interaction, cultural contacts, there is a constant process of agreeing on belonging. Considering the borderland as a psychological area, Heewon Chang, notes that their inhabitants decide "how much they want to identify with their cultures of origin or of adoption."[9]

Taking into account that the borderland is a place of meeting and interaction of different cultures, the concept of "contact zone" is sometimes used to describe them. The author of this concept, Mary Louise Pratt, considers the contact zone in a broad sense, as any place of interaction between representatives of different races, ethnic groups, cultures: "Contact zones are understood as places such as trading posts, border regions or metropolitan areas, in which cross-cultural interaction occurs on a regular basis".[10]

The result of intensive migration flows is the mixing of different cultures. In the academic literature we can find the following terms: "mixed families," "mixed couples," "multiethnic families," "mixed-race," "interracial," "intercultural," "cross-cultural" families and so on as definitions of marriages between persons with different ethnic, religious, cultural and other backgrounds. In this paper, I will use the term poly-cultural family.

When working with people from poly-cultural families we often observe that they try to identify themselves using such expressions as "I have half of this ethnicity and half of that ethnicity", or "My blood has 30% of this ethnicity, 30% of this and 40% of that." Therefore, they divide themselves according to number of cultures they belong to (or want to belong to). The term poly-cultural families underlines the richness brought by all cultures.

The term poly-cultural families enriches its members as personalities having multiple identities. It helps to get rid of stereotypes, and understand that belonging to several cultures is not a defect, but an advantage. The phenomenon of poly-cultural families is of particular importance in societies divided by wars and conflicts. Representatives of these families are a natural bridge connecting divided communities. It is impossible to reanimate ties broken by conflicts and wars without the engagement of this community. It is impossible to prevent new

bloodshed and hostilities without the proper and deserved integration of poly-cultural families. Being part of a poly-cultural family means being part of the permanent process of negotiations on different levels:

- Internal, when each participant in such a marriage at his/her own personal level constructs interaction.
- Interpersonal binary, when despite the possible difficulties associated with the language of communication, differing traditions, rituals, both representatives of a poly-cultural family are in search of an optimal balance, which implies the preservation of their own cultural identity, while recognizing and respecting others.[11]
- Intergroup, when representatives of one family need to establish relations in the community surrounding them - parents, relatives, friends, neighbors, co-workers, etc.

Georgia as a borderland and contact zone

The concept of the borderland can be applied to areas of various sizes and characteristics. This can be both the private personal world of the individual and the (internal and external) experience of interaction of large groups of people and/or institutional structures. This also may be the micro-world of a single family, or of any region in a settlement, and the macro-space of a certain trans-region. The concept of borderland can be applied to individual countries as well.[12]

Let us consider Georgia from this point of view, which, being geographically located at the crossroads of leading transport routes connecting the West to the East and the North to the South, is a unique borderland, with many visible and invisible lines of separation and at the same time contact zones in both territorial and symbolic contexts.

In a political and geographical sense, an indicator that Georgia[13] is a country with a high cross-border potential is that seven of the nine regions (mkhare) of Georgia are borderlands. The Autonomous Republic of Adjara is also a borderland region. In total, more than 2,000,000 people live in these regions.[14] These figures are significant taking into consideration that the total population of Georgia according to GEOSTAT (National Statistic office of Georgia) data (for 2017) is 3 million, 713 thousand people.[15]

Since ancient times, Georgia has been a multiethnic and multicultural entity, where representatives of various ethnic and/or religious groups lived and live side by side until today. According to the 2014 General Population Census[16], in addition to ethnic Georgians, there are slightly less than 500,000 people (13.3%) representing other ethnic groups living in the country. Azeris (6.3%), Armenians (4.5%) are among the largest of them having compact settlements.Then come Russians (0.7%), Ossetians (0.4%), Yazidis (0.3%), Ukrainians (0.2%), Kists (0.2%),

Greeks (0.1%), and Assyrians (0.1%). Smaller ethnic groups are Jews, Germans, Avarians, Udins, Poles, Czechs, Bulgarians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians, etc., who constitute 0.4% of the population.

The confessional composition of the population of Georgia is also diverse - 83.4% are Orthodox Christians, 10.7% -Muslims, and 2.9% belong to the Armenian Apostolic Church. The smaller groups include Catholics, Protestants, followers of Judaism, etc. An analysis of the indicators of "inter-ethnicity of marriages (17,793 couples)", based on 2014 census data, shows that Georgian society is relatively closed, with 96.9% of the couples living together belonging to the same ethnic group (between Georgians, Azeris, Armenians, and others).[17]

Over the centuries, a kind of balance was formed that allowed different groups to coexist peacefully when, on the one hand, they interacted and developed contacts with each other, and on the other hand, certain boundaries and distance were preserved, expressed in language, customs, traditions, and religion.[18] The situation peculiar to Georgia as a borderland is very clearly presented in the quotation of the French traveler Chardin. Giving a description of the Georgian population (second half of the 17th century), he wrote:

> *Their manners and customs are a mixture of those of the most of the nations that surround them. This I believe proceeds from the commerce they carry on with many different countries and from the liberty everyone enjoys in Georgia, of living according to his own religion and customs and of freely defending them. Here you see Armenians, Greeks, Turks, Persians, Indians, Tartars and Moscovites...*[19]

Military, political, and sometimes environmental factors influenced changes in the ethnic composition of Georgia in different stages of history. Despite the turbulent historical events since the restoration of independence, as was shown above, Georgia remains a multi-ethnic state, a place where different cultures meet and interact.

Formation of the Ukrainian community of Georgia

Ukrainians are one of the constituent parts of multi-ethnic Georgian society. Considering the fact that there were several waves (and accordingly reasons) of mass migration of Ukrainians to Georgia today, they are represented by several groups characterized by different levels of integration, different types of identities, and self-perceptions. The first waves of mass migration took place in the second part of the 18th and 19th centuries.[20] Some sources indicate that the first contacts between Georgians and Ukrainians took place as early as the 10th and 11th century.

However, the intensity of contacts and mutually beneficial cooperation increased especially in the 17th century, when the Cossacks represented a formidable force in the struggle against Turkey. According to historian Alekberli, "Cossacks greatly

assisted the merchant fleet of Georgia."[21] The Cossacks were frequent guests of the Colchis Valley, where they stopped to rest, prepare for maneuvers, and store trophies, hiding after escapes from captivity.[22]It is probably not by chance that the first small groups of Ukrainians were represented by internally displaced persons -runaway Cossacks of the Zaporozhian Sich, that was eliminated by the Manifesto of Catherine II at the end of the XVIII century.

The next groups of migrants consisting of Cossacks from Poltava and Chernihiv followed in the middle of the XIX century. These groups were deliberately sent to settle on the territory of Georgia. One of them - 200 families (1,800 people) of Ukrainian Cossacks from the Poltava province - was sent to settle in the Borjomi gorge, located on the territory of modern Samtskhe-Javakheti.[23] Among the objectives of the relocation of the Cossacks to Georgia was to protect the frontiers of Russian Empire on the south of Caucasus after the Russian-Turkish war. Even now there are several villages located in the border region of Samtskhe-Javakheti (near the state border of Georgia with Turkey), where many people of a Ukrainian background and with Ukrainian surnames live – e.g. Martynenko, Ustymenko, Shevchenko, Bandura, Gavva etc.[24] It was a very difficult challenge for people who used to live in the steppe to move to high mountainous areas far from "civilized life," but they survived, and contributed significantly to the development of this region of Georgia.

After the abolition of serfdom, some groups of landless peasants found refuge in various regions of Georgia. In the late 1880s, the Poltava Cossacks appeared in Abkhazia (according to one source, they themselves requested permission to resettle,[25] according to other data they were forcibly resettled).[26] More than a thousand people from Ukraine settled in one of the villages, which they called Poltavka.

The Ukrainian community was also replenished at the expense of the imperial Russian military forces and employees of administrative institutions, who remained in Georgia after the end of the service.[27] In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Ukrainians who settled in Georgia were represented by a wide variety of professional groups - peasants, workers, artisans, traders, military, writers, scientists, engineers, actors, and journalists. Moreover, while the first groups of migrants settled mainly in rural areas, the Ukrainians later became concentrated in urban areas of Georgia. Ukrainians played an important role in the settlement and development of the Black Sea coast of Georgia. Qualified Ukrainian specialists were involved in the construction of new ports, railways, resorts, etc.

According to the census of 1917 the number of Ukrainians was about 130,000 people.[28] Representing a large group, the Ukrainians of Georgia at that time were notable in the public and political life, not only of Georgia, but of the Caucasus as a whole. This is evidenced by the creation of the Ukrainian Rada and the Ukrainian Military Rada of the Caucasus in 1917. The process of self-organization

of the Ukrainian communities took place as Ukrainian societies operated in Tbilisi, Batumi, Sukhumi and Poti. Their representatives conducted both cultural-educational and political activities, successfully taking part in the elections of city assemblies and the Parliament of Georgia.[29]

The second wave of migration (labor/intellectual) occurred during the Soviet period and consisted of several components. In the first years of the establishment of the Soviet government, the number of Ukrainians dropped sharply. According to the census of 1926, there were 14,256 Ukrainians. It is noteworthy that most of them were men (10,747 people) and that Ukrainian was the main language for only 6,633 people within this group.[30]

At that time, the history of the Soviet five-year economic plans began, within the framework of which industry, resort-medical institutions, agriculture started to develop at an accelerated pace in Georgia, resulting in the mass movement of people. For example, the Ukrainians played a central role in the development of coal production in Tkvarcheli. Then, there was practically no local qualified personnel, and Ukrainian miners from Donbass helped with the development of coal deposits. According to sources, "several parties of skilled workers were sent from Donbass to Tkvarcheli".[31] The first of them consisting of 50 people arrived in 1929.[32] The settlement of Ukrainian specialists took place in both the capital and the Black Sea port infrastructure, water and mountain health resorts, etc. In 1939, there were already more than 45,000 Ukrainians in Georgia.[33] However, the Soviet community in the Soviet era was formed not only at the expense of labor migration flows, aimed at supporting the industrial development of the country. There were also cases of forced migration of Ukrainians to Georgia. Perhaps these were not large groups in terms of size, and they were mixed with the main flow of labor force heading to Georgia. According to some sources, the dramatic and tragic years of Holodomor in 1932-1933 were one of the reasons. Some people trying to escape famine were forced to leave their homes and moved to other countries, including Georgia. One of the descendants of a family with such a history, Mikhailo Glushchenko, recalls:

> *People were forced to flee their homelands and look for a way to escape famine elsewhere. Many of them came to Georgia then, including us - our father and three young children. The vessel brought us to Poti from Mykolaiv. We, powerless from hunger, could not walk, we were taken aboard from the vessel by a stretcher. The Georgians put us on our feet, shared their last mouthful with us, and provided us an apartment.*[34]

Another component of forced migration was evacuation during the Second World War, when Georgia accepted thousands of Ukrainians mainly from Odessa, Sevastopol and Mykolaiv. Several thousand people were accepted in Poti alone. The settlers could also be found in Tbilisi, Sukhumi, Ozurgeti, Betania, Sachkhere, Sighnaghi, Kojori. The aforementioned Tkvarcheli hosted the families of Donbass

miners.[35]Along with the families, whole orphanages were evacuated, which were located in Gali, Tsalenjikha, Ozurgeti, Tkibuli, Gori, Tetritskaro, Dmanisi, Tbilisi, Gurjaani, Sighnaghi, Lagodekhi. Most of these people likely returned to their homeland, but many stayed. In the postwar years, the influx of Ukrainians continued and consisted mainly of technical intelligentsia.

According to official data, there were 52,443 Ukrainians in Georgia in 1989. Due to collapse of the Soviet Union, civil war and economic crises in Georgia for several years, this number decreased to 6044 persons (2014).[36] Migration in the post-Soviet period mainly affected Ukrainians living in urban settlements and mainly second-wave migrants. One of main destinations for migration (not only for Ukrainians but Georgians as well) in that times was the historical homeland - Ukraine. People believed that they could survive better in Ukraine than in Georgia, which was going through wars, conflicts, and economic disasters.

The third wave of migration started in the first decade of the 21st century and continues until now. According to the Department of Statistics of Georgia, the number of immigrants from Ukraine was 2922 (2016).[37] The number of asylum applications of citizens of Ukraine significantly increased in 2014/2015 due to armed conflict in Ukraine. The modern Ukrainian community of Georgia now mainly consists of Ukrainians from the first/second waves and "newcomers" as well as poly-cultural families (Georgian-Ukrainian, Ukrainian-Armenians, etc.). The majority of them are Ukrainian women married to citizens of Georgia. Regarding gender, unlike the Ukrainian community in 1929, 70% of the modern Ukrainian minority consists of women and elderly people.[38] Looking at this factor, the authors of the policy paper "Ukraine's Soft Power in the Region: The tool for effective foreign policy" explain the "fact that in modern Georgia Ukrainians have not yet risen to the top of political or business pinnacles".

Identities and self-perception of Georgian Ukrainians

Several sources (non-official) estimate that the number of Ukrainians is more than 20,000.[39] An explanation for the inconsistency of official and unofficial data is that sometime until the middle of the 19th century people who spoke Ukrainian were recorded in official documents as Ukrainian Cossacks or Malorussians (Little Russians) (for officials).[40] By the end of the 19th century, Ukrainians were usually already called "Russians." This trend persisted during the Soviet era, when not only Ukrainians, but generally all Slavs in Georgia were called "Russians".[41]In addition, later descendants from poly-cultural families prefer to identify themselves as "Georgians." The situation began to change slowly after the restoration of independence of Georgia.

Some experts underline that clearly expressed identity with Ukraine as a state (apart from ethnic Ukrainian identity) is connected with the dissolution of

the Soviet Union and regaining of independence by both Ukraine and Georgia. A representative of the non-governmental organization Dnipro, Professor Sinyuk says:

> *The collapse of the Soviet Union and the wars that Georgia suffered helped the Ukrainians to realize that they were Ukrainians. Until then, they were Russians."[42] At a minimum, one can say about people of Ukrainian origin that at present they are in the process of reconstructing the content of their self-identification, whereby their hidden, until recently unclaimed identity has increased in significance. More and more people are beginning to attach meaning to their Ukrainian origin, recalling "that someone had a grandmother who had a great-grandmother or grandfather who were Ukrainians. Previously, they did not attach any importance to this, now the genes have made themselves known.[43]*

The Ukrainian community of the first wave is fully integrated into Georgian society. They are represented by poly-cultural families of the fifth or sixth generation. Mostly, they are Georgian-speaking (and generally do not speak Ukrainian or even Russian, especially those living in rural regions). Part of this group has a Georgian or dual identity and they consider themselves both as Ukrainians and Georgians. One of the residents of the village of Atskuri (Samtskhe-Javakheti), Merab Shevchenko, says: "I consider myself both Georgian and Ukrainian, because I have a Ukrainian surname, my ancestors were Ukrainian. But I am also a Georgian, because I was born here, I grew up here, and I live here."[44]

The following quote demonstrates how this group of Georgian Ukrainians[45] is seen and perceived by others: "The only language my friend speaks is Georgian; his typically Caucasian appearance does not even remotely remind him of having Slavic origin, and his surname remains the only evidence of his Ukrainian roots."[46] But after visiting their villages, one can see that family relics are carefully kept in the houses of the descendants of the first settlers - embroidered bench hammers, icons or Cossack sabers or cradles. The history of the families and their resettlement in Georgia is verbally transmitted from fathers to sons.[47] This duality is also visible at dining room tables where both Ukrainian "vareniki" and "borsh" and Georgian "khinkali" and "khachapuri" are served.

Ukrainians were also among IDPs and refugees from Abkhazia. As a result of the conflict, some Ukrainians living in Abkhazia returned to their historic homeland or other countries, some shared the fate of forced migrants (refugees and IDPs), and a small group still lives in Abkhazia. 7The war divided some families with Ukrainian background according ideological preferences.[48] In 1996, the organization of Ukrainians IDPs from Abkhazia "Vidrodzhenia" ("Revival") was created in Tbilisi. Unfortunately, 10 years later (in 2006), this organization ceased its operations.[49]

Representatives of poly-cultural families (having Ukrainian roots in the third, fourth or more generation) who were forced to leave Abkhazia retained fond

memories of their ancestors, although for most of them the self-identification of being a Georgian and a resident of Abkhazia is dominant. This group usually has good knowledge of both Georgian, as well as Russian (to a lesser extent Ukrainian). The famous blogger Giorgi Jakhaia, who is from Sukhumi, recalls his Ukrainian ancestors:

> *My great-grandfather and great-grandmother were from Poltavka, and although I have seen only my great-grandmother, (she was from the first generation born in Abkhazia) I learned a lot from her about Ukraine. It was then that I loved this country, this language as a child.*[50]

Among representatives of the second wave, there are those who are indifferent towards their origins, those who consider themselves as Georgians or representatives of other ethnicities, those who also have dual or multiple identities and those who consider themselves as Ukrainians. The self-perception of children representing poly-cultural families in each particular case depends on many factors, one of which is the sex of the child. Representatives of the Ukrainian Embassy in Georgia, who have constant contacts with members of the Ukrainian community, share the following observations

> *The Georgian society is patriarchal and patriotic in spirit. From childhood, they treat boys like adults and try to foster the mentality of defenders of their own homeland in them. In mixed families where the mother is Ukrainian, and the father - Georgian, mothers may cultivate a Ukrainian identity in daughters; the boys mostly feel like Georgians.*[51]

The need for reconciliation of different identities is particularly pronounced among representatives of families, where more than two cultures merge. Some prefer only one of them, while others accept their belonging to the poly-cultural world. For example, Elizaveta Krasenko from Batumi (Adjara), whose father represents the Ukrainian-Russian family, and the mother - Armenian-Belarus family, would not single out a specific ethnicity: "I cannot say that Ukrainian is more prevalent in me or Russian and Armenian. All of these cultures come into my family at a certain level, and I am naturally part of that diversity as well."[52]

Unlike the older generation, young people are better integrated into society, are fluent in Georgian, and mostly remain less active and involved in the public life of the Ukrainian community. In the group belonging to the second wave of migration, many maintain their knowledge of the Ukrainian language and try to teach Ukrainian their kids or grandkids or other youngsters via language lessons in weekend schools. They also try to maintain ties with relatives in Ukraine and some of the young people study in Ukrainian universities. Over time, ethnic cultural traditions have undergone a transformation and dissolution, absorbing elements of neighboring cultures and at the same time abandoning and losing some of their own, thus constructing new spaces.

The motto for "newcomers" is the following sentence: "It is wonderful to be an eternal guest in Georgia, but it is priceless to become part of Georgian society."[53]

This group includes professionals in the field of art, medicine, IT-technologies,and businessmen. It is also represented by members of poly-cultural families (again, mainly women who married Georgian citizens). The complexity of the process of their integration is represented by the Georgian language[54]. Different strategies are taken here, and more and more people are choosing to gradually learn this language which is difficult for them, while not forgetting their own. The perception of the Ukrainian community with many years of experience of living in Georgia by the "newcomers" is interesting as well:

> *The Ukrainian diaspora in Georgia is special. These are not just people who are united by a new temporary (or permanent) place of residence. This is not a group of people who support each other in a foreign country... These are people who love Georgia. These are people with a similar way of thinking, with similar values, with a similar worldview.*[55]

Representatives of the latter wave play a very important role in strengthening Ukrainian identity in Georgia. They are carriers of the modern Ukrainian language, better understand the events taking place in Ukraine and have more active and intensive contacts with relatives and friends in Ukraine. Historical ties, joint multicultural families, the similarity of the problems of the two countries of Ukraine and Georgia also lead to an increased interest in highlighting and emphasizing their "Ukrainian" identity.

Institutional structures promoting Ukrainian culture in Georgia

The interests of Ukrainian community are advocated by several non-governmental organizations. Since the restoration of independence of Georgia, about 18 organizations[56] have been created, the main purpose of which is to unite the Ukrainians of Georgia.[57] As a rule, the goal of these structures is to revive and preserve Ukrainian cultural traditions, support the process of self-identification of persons of Ukrainian origin, develop and strengthen friendship between the Ukrainian and Georgian people, and protect the social rights of Ukrainians in Georgia. Some of them operate Sunday schools where Ukrainian culture and language are studied and promoted.

The activities of organizations include organizing concerts, exhibitions, festivals, issuing publications. Thanks to their activity, monuments, memorial plates and signs testifying to the achievements of the Ukrainians of Georgia have appeared in various places of Georgia. Particularly noteworthy are the efforts of Boris Sinyuk and Mikhailo Boris (Association of Ukrainians of Georgia) to conduct historical research and collect information on representatives of Ukrainians of Georgia from different generations. Two professional organizations have been created - the Union

of Ukrainian Pedagogues of Georgia and the Union of Journalists - "Association of Georgian-Ukrainian Press and Books."

Unfortunately, Ukrainian community organizations are poorly represented on the internet. The leaders of most of them are representatives of the older generation. The only organization that was created by young Ukrainians in Georgia is the organization Svitanok (Dawn), registered in 2016. In 2018, at the initiative of this organization and with the support of the Ukrainian Embassy in Georgia, a conference "Youth Scientific and Practical Forum "Ukraine-Georgia 100 Years of Diplomatic Relations: The Role of Youth in Strengthening Economic, Cultural and Scientific Relations" was held. At the international level, Ukrainians of Georgia are represented in the Ukrainian World Congress (UWC).

Traditions and language are among the most important elements uniting ethnic groups.[58] The Ukrainian language, literature, history are studied in Georgia in various formats. Sunday schools operate at public organizations of Ukrainians in Georgia where Ukrainian culture and language are studied and promoted. The state program of the government of Ukraine operated until 2014 within the framework of which quotas for students with Ukrainian origin were allocated at Ukrainian universities. In the period of 2006-2014, 174 students from Georgia participated in this program.

Until 2011, Mykhailo Hrushevsky Ukrainian-Georgian School in Tbilisi played the most important role in the in-depth study of the Ukrainian language. The school was established in 1999 with the support of the former Presidents of the two countries, at the initiative of the Association of Ukrainians of Georgia.[59] The school was created in order to help children from the Ukrainian community to fully integrate into Georgian society. A bilingual education program was created where some of the subjects were taught in Ukrainian, using a Ukrainian curriculum, and some of the subjects in Georgian.[60] Thanks to the efforts of the teaching staff, standards for the Ukrainian language as a foreign language for Georgia was developed. In 2011, the school was closed as part of restructuring process. The name and number of the school (School No. 41 named after Mykhailo Hrushevsky) were assigned to the nearby public school. The whole administration, and all teachers and students were also forced to move to this school. The formal standard approach to the restructuring process, which ignored the uniqueness of this institution, unfortunately led to the disappearance of the microcosm of the Ukrainian school, as it was essentially absorbed by and dissolved in another system.

The Embassy of Ukraine in Georgia plays an important role in popularizing the Ukrainian language and culture. Ukrainian language courses are given at the embassy where any youngster who wants to study Ukrainian can participate. At the academic level, the Center of Ukrainian studies at Iv. Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University Faculty of Humanities plays a significant role.The Center maintains

close ties with Ukrainian universities such as Kyiv-Mohyla Academy of Ukrainian Language and Literature and Kyiv Taras Shevchenko National University. Courses in the Ukrainian language are taught at Sukhumi State University.

Despite its contribution strengthening Ukrainian identity, the Ukrainian language has not become wide-spread.

Conclusions

Throughout history, Georgian Ukrainians always have been and are an important part of Georgian Society and a connecting bridge between the two countries despite the turbulent years of wars, conflicts, political and economic crises. The Ukrainian community of Georgia is a unique phenomenon. It was formed mainly by Ukrainians who arrived from the central and eastern parts of Ukraine. The formation of the Ukrainian community of Georgia reflects the main historical and political events and trends, but it also could be characterized by constant refreshing and revitalization.

Ukrainian emigration to Georgia was almost never political. Among the representatives of the Ukrainian community of Georgia, there were practically no political leaders with a pronounced ideological vision of the Ukrainian national idea and the future of Ukraine as a state (such as Ukrainian emigrants in western Europe and Canada whose leaders strengthened the desire to preserve traditions, language and culture). As shown above, the peak of social and political activity of Ukrainians in Georgia was the 1917-1919 period. Even though the Ukrainian Community was formed in a different way than the "western Ukrainian diaspora" for whom the understanding of being Ukrainian and preservation of this identity was always an important issue, Georgian Ukrainians still preserved their identity.

Forced and voluntary migrants from Ukraine were able to form contact zones in their environment where different cultures complement and enrich each other. Representatives of different waves of the Ukrainian community have different identities and are well integrated into Georgian society. Today's Ukrainian community is represented mainly by poly-cultural families and therefore it is useful for researchers to apply the concepts of borderlands and multiple identities.

The continuity and connection of generations plays an important role in the preservation of Ukrainian identity. The modern generation of Ukrainians in Georgia tries to empower their spiritual connection with historical homeland by preserving culture, traditions and developing language skills. There are many works covering historical events, diplomatic relations, translations and artistic works, but among this diversity there is an obvious lack of sources analyzing the specifics of the formation of Ukrainian community in Georgia, the history of settlement of certain territories of Georgia by Ukrainians, and the impact of wars and conflicts on the Ukrainian community.

The level of identification with Ukraine/being Ukrainian in Georgia has increased in recent years, but there is still a lot to do.

About the author:

Olga Dorokhina graduated with honors from the Georgian Polytechnic Institute. Since 2002 she has been Program Manager of the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly Georgian National Committee (hCa GNC)/Tbilisi Institute for International Relations, and since 2012 Deputy Head of the Caucasus Laboratory of Geopolitical Modelling, Caucasus International University. She is author, co-author, and co-editor of several books. She has written numerous research articles including "Archipelago Caucasus: myths and real politics," "Pseudo-conflicts and quasi-peacemaking processes in the Caucasus," and "Civil Society or Civil War?". Olga has extensive experience in theoretical and practical research on topics such as border security and management, border policy, borders aesthetics, cross-border cooperation, cross-cultural communication, migration, inter-municipal cooperation. The topic of her dissertation thesis is "Political aspects of delimitation/demarcation of borders and development of cross-border cooperation in Georgia."

Endnotes

1 Diana Mata-Codesal, "Where We Can Meet" From Borderlands To Contact-Zones," *Final Paper*, Brighton, United Kingdom, April, 2007, p. 9.2 Viktorija L.A Čeginskas, "Exploring Multicultural Belonging, Individuals Across Cultures, Languages and Places," *Article-based Doctoral Dissertation*, Juno Doctoral Programme, January, 2016, p. 36.

3 Diana Mata-Codesal, "Where We Can Meet" From Borderlands To Contact-Zones", *Final Paper,* Brighton, United Kingdom, April, 2007, p. 14.

4 Heewon Chang, "Reexamining the Rhetoric of the "Cultural Border"", *Electronic Magazine of Multicultural Education*. Vol. 1, No. 1, Winter, 1999, p. 5.

5 Gloria Anzaldúa, "Borderlands - La Frontera. The New Mestiza. First Edition", *San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books*, 1987, 203 p., p. vi.

6 Gloria Anzaldúa, "Borderlands - La Frontera. The New Mestiza. First Edition", *San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books*, 1987, 203 p., p. 7.

7 Viktorija L.A Čeginskas, "Exploring Multicultural Belonging, Individuals Across Cultures, Languages and Places," *Article-based Doctoral Dissertation*, Juno Doctoral Programme, January, 2016, p. 37.

8 Sergey Tolkachev, "Problemy Gibridnoy Identichnosti v Sovremennoy Mul'tikul'turnoy Literature," *Problemy Filologii, Kul'turologii i Iskusstvoznaniya,* № 2, 2013, pp. 177-182, p. 177.

9 Heewon Chang, "Reexamining the Rhetoric of the "Cultural Border"", *Electronic Magazine of Multicultural Education*, Vol. 1, No. 1, Winter, 1999, p. 3.

10 Viktorija L.A Čeginskas, "Exploring Multicultural Belonging, Individuals Across Cultures, Languages and Places," *Article-based Doctoral Dissertation*, Juno Doctoral Programme, January, 2016, p. 41.

11 Isabella Crespi, "Identities and Values in Multiethnic Families: Some Evidences From a Qualitative Study on Mixed Couples," *WP n. 1/2011 DiSEF, Università di Macerata*, 2011, p. 4

12 Vladimir Kolossov and James Scott, "Selected Conceptual Issues in Border Studies », *Belgeo [Online], 1/2013*, http:// journals.openedition.org/belgeo/10532; DOI : 10.4000/belgeo.10532. p. 7.

13 This work does not consider the temporarily occupied municipalities of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic and the temporary administrative unit of the former South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast.

14 Olga Dorokhina, "European Experience for Development of Cross-Border Cooperation in Georgia", E*urope in the Caucasus, Caucasus in Europe Perspectives on the Construction of a Region,* ed. Andrey Makarychev and Thomas Kruessmann, 2019, p. 284.

15 Regionuli Statistika, Saqartvelos Statistikis Erovnuli Samsaxuri, Saqartvelos Mosaxleobis Ricxovneba Tvitmartveli Erteulobis Mixedvit, 2017, http://geostat.ge/?action=page&p_id=1183&lang=geo

16 National Statistics of Georgia (GEOSTAT) 28.04.2016 2014 General Population Census Main Results, http://census.ge/files/results/Census_release_ENG.pdf

17 Ralph Hakkert, "Population Dynamics in Georgia. An Overview Based on the 2014 General Population Census Data," *UNFPA-Geostat Project Improving Statistic Data Availability in Georgi*a, VESTA, Ltd, 2017, p. 33.

18 Lia Melikishvili and Natia Jalabadze, "Language and Ethnic Boundaries in Multiethnic Georgia," *Linguistic Construction of Ethnic Borders,* ed. Peter Rosenberg, Konstanze Jungbluth and Dagna Zinkhahn Rhobodes, 2015. 261 pp., p. 83.

19 John Chardin, "The travels of Sir John Chardin through Mingrelia and Georgia into Persia", *Voyages and travels selected from the Writers of all Nations*. vol. VII. J. Christie: Dublin 1815, pp. 321–426 (cited by Melikishvili & Jalabadze (2015) p. 84.

20 Mamuka Komakhia, "Ukrainelebi", *Etnosebi SaqarTveloshi*, Sakartvelos Sakhalkho Damtsvelis Biblioteka, 2008, pp. 209-212, p.209.

21 Mamedkesir Alikber-zade Alekberli, "Borba Ukrainskogo Naroda Protiv Turexko-Tatatrskoi Agressii vo Vtoroi Polvine XVI Veka Pervoi Polovine XVII Veka", Izdatelstvo Saratovskogo Universiteta, 1961, p.162.

22 Svanidze, M.Kh., (1979), Gruzia, Strani Prichernomoria I Vostochnow Evropi v Pervoi Polovine XVII v., *Rossiya, Polsha i Prichernomor'ye XV - XVIII vv*, 1979, pp. 236-237, p. 239.

23 Boris Sinyuk, "Doslidzhenia Faktiv Pereselenia v 1853-2017rr. Ukraincev Borjomi ta Istoria Stanovlenia Ukrainskoi Diaspori v Samtskhe-Javakheti", 2017, p.16.

24 Ibid, p. 19

25 Iz Korrespondencii gaz. "Droeba", 1884, #127, http://www.apsuara.ru/portal/node/85

26 Otkuda v Abkhazii Poiavilis Ukrainci I Estonci, April, 2007, https://cyxymu.livejournal.com/199384.html

27 Mamuka Komakhia, "Ukrainelebi", *Etnosebi SaqarTveloshi*, Sakartvelos Sakhalkho Damtsvelis Biblioteka, 2008, pp. 209-212, p. 209.

28 Ibid., p.210

29 Oleg Panfilov, Ukraina I Gruzia – Pochemu Vmeste? Istoria, December, 2014, https://ru.krymr.com/a/26771131.html; Mamuka Komakhia, "Ukrainelebi", *Etnosebi SaqarTveloshi*, Sakartvelos Sakhalkho Damtsvelis Biblioteka, 2008, pp. 209-212, p. 210;

30 Vyp. 4 : Narodnost' i Rodnoy Yazyk Naseleniya SSSR. - 1928. - XXIX, 138, [1] s.: tabl., diagr., k. Vsesoyuznaya perepis naseleniya 17 dekabrya 1926 g.: kratkiye svodki/ izd. TSSU Soyuza SSR. - M, 1927-1929. - 10 t. - V nadzag. : Tsentr. statist. upr. SSSR. Otd. Perepisi., p.124

31 L. Akaba, "Materiali o Bite Rabochikx-Abkhazov Tkvarcheli", *Trudi Abkhazskogo Instituta Iazika, literature I istorii im. I.D.Gulia, Izdatelstvo Academii Nauk Gruzinskoi SSR*, XXXI, 1960, pp.49-67, p.51.

32 L. Pritsker, "Istoriko-Sociologicheskii Ocherk, *Gorod v Gorax*, Isdatelstvo Alashara, Sukhumi, 1971. pp. 87-109, p. 91.

33 Mikhailo Boris, "Ukrainci v Gruzii", Tbilisi, 2016, pp.127, p.30

34 Shared Food, Migration, *How We Lived Together in the 20th Century in Georgia*, Worksheets for the Interactive History Teaching, p.66

35 Ibid. p.66

36 http://census.ge/ge/results/census1/demo

37 2017 Migration Profile, State Commission on Migration Issues, pp. 52, p.34

38 Alyona Getmanchuk, Iryna Ozymok, Oksana Pyliavets, Kateryna Shynkaruk, Serhiy Solodkyy Evgen Yenin, Kateryna Zarembo, "Ukraine's Soft Power in Georgia", "*Ukraine's Soft Power in the Region: The tool for effective foreign policy*", pp.20-33, p. 26.

39 Pani i Genatsvale: Druzhba Ukrainy i Gruzii Podkreplyayetsya Brachnymi Soyuzami 2008-07-15, https://focus.ua/ukraine/23442

40 Oleg Panfilov, Sudby Ukraintsev v Gruzii, February, 2010, https://www.svoboda.org/a/1957626.html

41 Oleg Panfilov, Ukraina I Gruzia – Pochemu Vmeste? Istoria, December, 2014, https://ru.krymr.com/a/26771131.html

42 Ibid

43 Ibid

44 Kak Zhivetsya v Gruzii Etnicheskim Ukraintsam? May, 2010 po materialam: Podrobnosti-TV, https://podrobnosti.ua/688925-kak-zhivetsja-v-gruzii-etnicheskim-ukraintsam.html

45 This mainly concerns Ukrainians living in Samtskhe-Javakheti

46 Pani i Genatsvale: Druzhba Ukrainy i Gruzii Podkreplyayetsya Brachnymi Soyuzami, July, 2008, https://focus.ua/ukraine/23442

47 Boris Sinyuk, "Doslidzhenia Faktiv Pereselenia v 1853-2017rr. Ukraincev Borjomi ta Istoria Stanovlenia Ukrainskoi Diaspori v Samtskhe-Javakheti", 2017, p. 40.

48 Oleg Panfilov, Ukraina I Gruzia – Pochemu Vmeste? Istoria, December, 2014, https://ru.krymr.com/a/26771131.html

49 Mikhailo Boris, "Ukrainci v Gruzii", Tbilisi, 2016, pp.127, p.30

50 Otkuda v Abkhazii Poiavilis Ukrainci I Estonci, April, 2007, https://cyxymu.livejournal.com/199384.html

51 Alyona Getmanchuk, Iryna Ozymok, Oksana Pyliavets, Kateryna Shynkaruk, Serhiy Solodkyy Evgen Yenin, Kateryna Zarembo, "Ukraine's Soft Power in Georgia", "*Ukraine's Soft Power in the Region: The tool for effective foreign policy*", pp.20-33, p. 27.

52 Lela Dumbadze, Ukrainuli Diaspora Batumshi, May, 2017, https://netgazeti.ge/news/194990/

53 Ukrainka v Tbilisi. Moy god v Gruzii ili Uroki Emigrantki., September, 2012, https://ukrainkavtbi.livejournal.com/3855.html

54 Alyona Getmanchuk, Iryna Ozymok, Oksana Pyliavets, Kateryna Shynkaruk, Serhiy Solodkyy Evgen Yenin, Kateryna Zarembo, "Ukraine's Soft Power in Georgia", "*Ukraine's Soft Power in the Region: The tool for effective foreign policy*", pp.20-33, p. 27

55 Ukrainka v Tbilisi. Moy god v Gruzii ili Uroki Emigrantki., September, 2012, https://ukrainkavtbi.livejournal.com/3855.html

56 Currently there are operating around 12 structures

57 Mamuka Komakhia, "Ukrainelebi", *Etnosebi SaqarTveloshi*, Sakartvelos Sakhalkho Damtsvelis Biblioteka, 2008, pp. 209-212, p. 212.

58 L. Sorochuk, "Social and Cultural Life in Ukrainian Diaspora as a Factor of the Preservation of National Culture in the Western World, *Bulletin of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv Ukrainian studies*, 17/2014, pp.32-33, p.33.

59 Daria Gaidai, "Ukraine's Foreign Policy Audit: Ukraine-Georgia", *Discussion Paper*, Kyiv 2016, p. 40.

60 Alyona Getmanchuk, Iryna Ozymok, Oksana Pyliavets, Kateryna Shynkaruk, Serhiy Solodkyy Evgen Yenin, Kateryna Zarembo, "Ukraine's Soft Power in Georgia", "*Ukraine's Soft Power in the Region: The tool for effective foreign policy*", pp.20-33, p. 27.

Ukrainian emigration to Germany after WWII: Formation and Self-Representation of a Transnational Community (1945–1991)[1]

by Kateryna Kobchenko

The article presents a general overview of Ukrainian emigration in West Germany in its development after WWII during two periods – first as Displaced Persons (1945-early 1950s) and then as an exile group in the Federal Republic of Germany. It focuses on the Ukrainian transnational community's cultural self-representation as well as the peculiarities of Germany as a country of its residence. The community's existence was centered around political activities, and the cultural and intellectual aspects of its life formed the basic precondition for its self-identification as a national group.

Keywords: emigration, Displaced Persons, Transnational Community, Federal Republic of Germany, Political Activities, Self-representation.

Introduction

The post-war wave of Ukrainian emigration holds a special place not only in the Diaspora's past, but also in Ukrainian history of the 20th century as a whole. The activities of the very large transnational community of Ukrainians had an impact on both the "inner" life of the emigrants themselves and the multi-faceted representations of Ukraine and Ukrainians in their countries of residence. The latter task was especially important in the period, when the citizens of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic had few possibilities for such self-representations abroad and Ukraine as a part of the USSR possessed only a limited political and national legitimacy on the international level.

Similarly, to the previous inter-war wave of emigration, which left Ukraine in the early 1920s after the defeat of the national state-building, the emigration in the post-WWII period was distinctly political in its nature and clearly anti-Soviet. Unlike their political predecessors, those of the post-war wave of the Ukrainian emigration had an experience of living under two totalitarian regimes, Soviet and National-Socialist, so they harbored no illusions as to the nature of the Soviet power in Ukraine. This political experience rendered impossible any cooperation or middle ground with the Soviet regime, like "Changing of Signposts" of the interwar time.[2] Thus, the principled anti-Soviet stance and strong public criticism of the USSR mostly within the anticolonial discourse brought competing parties and circles of expatriates to a common political position and influenced their activities. All their differences notwithstanding, all of them shared the same

double aim – Ukraine's independence and liberation from the communist power and ideology. At the same time, the conceptual differences predominantly about the ways and strategies for achieving these key aims turned various parties into irreconcilable opponents. A crucial one was their attitude to the Ukrainian SSR and its interpretation either as a form of incomplete national statehood (by the left or liberal parties[3]) or as a stateless nation occupied by Moscow Bolshevism (by the revolutionary part of the nationalists[4]).

The Ukrainian emigrants' shared double aim was achieved in 1991 with the declaration of the independence of Ukraine and with the fall of the Soviet regime and its ideological and political domination over Ukraine. That is why it makes sense to speak about the whole longue durée period after WWII, from 1945 until 1991, as a time characterized by interconnected political and ideological processes, despite some significant changes including the generational one. It also aligns with the period of the Cold War as an international political framework of the emigrants' activity.

The after-war wave of emigration influenced greatly the political and cultural life of the Ukrainian Diaspora, including the previous groups and generations of emigrants all over the world, first of all, in Europe and in the countries of the American continents. Their ideas and deeds determined the overall nature of activity of the whole transnational Ukrainian community during the second half of the 20th century. One of the main peculiarities of their situation was the fact that under conditions of Western democracy they were able to enjoy all the advantages of political plurality not possible in Soviet Ukraine. Thus, Ukrainians "in the Free World" played the role of an alternative Ukrainianness and a model of pluralistic political life, contributing to the further development of nation state idea.

Not only the political nature and activities of emigrants themselves, but also international political circumstances, above all the Cold War, helped the emigrant groups from the Soviet Union and satellite countries become actors in the global anti-communist movement. As members of both national and international political bodies with different political views, like the State Center of the Ukrainian Peoples' Republic[5] including the Ukrainian National Council (UNRada) as a parliament in exile or the international Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN) initiated by the Ukrainian nationalists, Ukrainian emigrant organizations tried to be independent participants in international politics and aspired to assert Ukrainians' political interests and national self-sufficiency.

In the cultural sphere, Ukrainian intellectuals and artists saw their mission in the preservation of the Ukrainian language, heritage and entire national existence during a time, when Soviet Ukrainians were under the pressure of Russification. They also contributed to the creation of the modern non-Soviet Ukrainian culture – the literary scholar and post-war emigrant Yuri Sheveliov even saw exile as an opportunity for further developing national culture through closer contacts with

world traditions and losing its previous provincial features.[6]

Germany played a special role in the history of post-war Ukrainian emigrants as well as other groups of refugees and expatriates from the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe. Immediately after WWII, the Western Occupied Zones of Germany together with Austria became the refuge for millions of Displaced Persons, who tried to escape returning to their home that was ruled by the Soviets or one of their satellite regimes. Later, during the Cold War, the Federal Republic of Germany also became an important player in the geopolitical system and the international activity of anti-Soviet emigrant communities was a part of it.

DP time: between national consolidation and self-representation

The history of the Ukrainian community in post-war Germany can be divided into two periods of different duration and with the partly different nature and intensity of the cultural and political life taking place within them. The period from 1944 to the early 1950s, when the Western Allies found millions of Displaced Persons under their control, played a significant role in both the internal consolidation of Ukrainians and their external actions for defending the status and rights as a separate national group. This short period was also crucial for the further development of the entire post-war Ukrainian Diaspora all over the world, because the main organizational structures as well as key ideas, which determined the further existence of the transnational Ukrainian community, were (re)-produced during the DP period.

By 1948, the number of Ukrainian Displaced Persons decreased from several million to about 300 thousand persons, who managed to avoid the forced repatriation to the Soviet Union. Two thirds of the Ukrainian DPs in Germany found themselves in the American occupation zone in Bavaria, a smaller part was located in the British zone in North-Western Germany and only the smallest group was in the French zone.

These people formed a heterogeneous community, which included political opponents of the Soviet Regime, refugees and UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) soldiers, who fled Ukraine before the Red Army's counter-offensive, and former forced laborer, prisoners of war and concentration camps, as well as representatives of the "old" emigration, who in the inter-war time resided in different European countries. Still, this community does not lend itself to being a "miniature Ukraine" abroad, mostly because of the non-proportional representation of different regions: Western Ukrainians from previously Polish territory constituted two-thirds of all post-war emigrants, which was reflected in the numbers of supporters of nationalist parties, first of all the Bandera wing (OUNr) and parishioners of the Greek-Catholic Church compared to the Orthodox Church.

A considerable share of intellectuals (scientists, teachers, writers, and

journalists) among Ukrainian emigrants[7] turned the community into a source of cultural products alternative to those created in the Ukrainian SSR and, since they were opponents of the Soviet regime, into an important actor in the ideological anti-communist resistance. Already at the DP stage, significant numbers of intellectuals made it possible to (re)establish many national scientific, educational and cultural institutions, among them the Ukrainian Free University (which moved from the Czech Republic to Munich) and the Ukrainian Technical and Husbandry Institute (in Regensburg, later in Munich) as well as to establish other higher and secondary schools, scientific societies, publishing houses and editorial offices of influential media.

The politically and culturally diverse national press played an important communicative role. By the number of national DP groups' periodicals, the Ukrainians with about 300 newspapers were among the leaders. Although most of these printed media outlets existed only for a short time, "there was a small group of newspapers in the proper sense of the word that appeared weekly or biweekly for free of five years (a few of them even longer) and were read not only in all Western zones, but also in other European countries and even overseas."[8]

Ukrainian emigrants paid significant attention to the national education of youth, not only by opening schools of different levels, but also by founding other youth and sport institutions modeled mostly after their pre-WWII prototypes in Western Ukraine, first of all the national Scout organization (Plast). Both traditional denominations – Greek-Catholic and Orthodox – showed positive examples of cooperation primarily through the establishment of the tradition of joint religious services along important political or cultural events.

Many Ukrainians, who went through the DP camps in their preschool or school years, despite all disadvantages of their life of those days, later remembered this period as mostly positive in the sense of cultural practices offered by the community to the young generation. One of such schoolboys was Taras Hunczak, later a historian in the USA, who attended Ukrainian upper-secondary schools in the DP camps in Bavarian towns Füssen and Landshut. In his memoirs, he noted: "Life in the camps was diverse and very interesting. In them the Ukrainians proved capable of developing and perfecting themselves, not just surviving, in the most complex of situations."[9] Outstanding examples of such small national communities were DP camps, which were organized after the national principle and consisted mostly of Ukrainians like those in the Bavarian towns Mittenwald, Berchtesgaden and in the city of Regensburg, as later described in published memoirs of their former inhabitants. The Ukrainian "model" DP camp in the Ganghofersiedlung in Regensburg, which in December 1947 was the refuge for about 4.5 thousand Ukrainians, now draws strong interest of German researchers and publicists.[10]

At the same time, despite some successful actions, the community's life was full of troubles and conflicts. Decades and even centuries of living in different

countries and particularly different experiences of political life in the pre-war and war times often led to a lack of understanding between the former "Soviet" and "Polish" Ukrainians and their mutual distrust. To some of the outnumbered Western Ukrainians, their compatriots from "Big Ukraine" looked susceptible or even were accused of being "Soviet spies". By contrast, most Ukrainians coming from the Ukrainian SSR did not accept the nationalist ideology because of its dictatorial nature similar to the Soviet totalitarian regime's principles.

This situation complicated both the political cooperation and attempts to bring together cultural and scientific societies. It also led to the parallel re-establishment of duplicate institutions with similar aims such as the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences and the Taras Shevchenko Scientific Society, which followed the scholarly traditions of the Big (Soviet) and Western Ukraine, correspondingly,[11] or two journalists' societies.[12] These regional and ideological factors prevented deeper cooperation, especially because of active political positions of many emigrants. Among Ukrainians, the anti-communist refugees constituted 30 to 40 %,[13] and in the first post-war years, most of them hoped to return to the homeland soon because of the expected war between the Western Allies and the USSR.

The internal consolidation of different representatives of the heterogeneous society was not the only challenge it had to confront. Another challenge was the non-recognition of the Ukrainian emigrants as an independent national group[14] by the Western authorities, which first classified Displaced Persons by their citizenship, not nationality. Due to this attitude and based on the Yalta Agreement, they undertook to assist the USSR in the repatriation of its citizens. In this situation, only "Polish Ukrainians" were in a somewhat better position. Meanwhile, the Soviet Ukrainians faced the danger of forced repatriation, especially during the first months and years after World War II. Only their strong protests led to the Western alliance's gradual revision of this attitude, and these changes became a part of the overall growing antagonism between them and the USSR at the initial stage of the Cold War.

As a part of ideological resistance to the Soviet policy of forced repatriation, the Ukrainian writer and politician Ivan Bahrianyj published his brochure "Why I don't want to return to the USSR?," which made a big impression and, according to Bohdan Osadczuk, became a "catechism" for those Ukrainian *Ostarbeiter*, who hesitated whether to return home or not.[15] At the same time, the Ukrainians endeavored to make a good impression on the occupation authorities as highly disciplined, lawful people and good workers. Ukrainians also actively used cultural events organized in the DP camps like the exhibition of folk art in Regensburg in 1947 as an important act of their national self-representation.

The Ukrainian identity of the non-returners brought them no advantages, but rather difficulties; that is why being part of the Ukrainian community was in many cases the result of a conscious personal choice. An alternative possibility for some

Western Ukrainians was to call themselves Poles to escape repatriation for sure. Meanwhile, some refugees from Soviet Ukraine opted to join the bulk of Russian emigration by sharing their federalist political positions and adopting the "Little Russians'" identity.[16] The use of the Ukrainian language along with the idea of the national independence from Russia served as the key markers of belonging to the Ukrainian exile community, which renounced all forms of double-identity or compromise in the question of Ukraine's political future. That is why the Ukrainian emigrants saw the shared position of different groups of Russian emigration, the liberation from Bolshevism without the division of the USSR along the national boundaries, as unacceptable and this made their contacts with the Russian exile circles impossible or strongly limited.

Although the Ukrainian refugees shared the general conditions and style of life with other national DP groups, they still needed to assert their national sovereignty: in the first after-war years, this was a precondition for survival as a national unit. At this point, the Ukrainians' achievements were "rather the result of their persistent struggle for it"; the vibrant process of the Ukrainian nation-building was taking place in DP camps.[17]That is why the stage of being Displaced Persons became a "melting pot" of sorts, in which diverse ideas and structures met, interacted and received new impetuses for further development in the countries of residence of the Ukrainian emigrants on different continents.

The Ukrainian emigrant community in Federal Republic of Germany

The mass resettlement to other countries, mostly overseas, had considerably reduced the number of Ukrainian emigrants in Germany – down to about 20 thousand persons, who since 1951 received the official status of stateless foreigners (Ger. heimatlose Ausländer).. Even after the huge decrease compared to the DP period, the Ukrainian exile community in Western Germany remained one of the largest and most significant in Europe: "Despite the relatively low number of Ukrainian emigrants in Germany, their role and the role of Munich as the center of political and cultural life of the whole Ukrainian emigration is very big", noted the members of one of the German-Ukrainian partnerships in the mid-1950s[18]. Not all of its members stayed in Germany voluntarily, and some were unable to leave for the USA, Canada or other countries due to health or political reasons. At the same time, some political activists intentionally preferred to stay in Germany in hopes of better contacts with Ukraine.

The Bavarian metropolis Munich was the "capital" of political emigration from the countries of the entire Eastern Bloc, including Ukraine: about half of the Ukrainian community members settled in Bavaria, mostly in Munich or nearby. At the same time, West Germany, as any other Western country, was a Cold War battlefield in both the ideological and literal sense and that is why Munich itself turned into a

"powder keg" due to activities of the hostile secret services.The official German policy towards stateless foreigners included financial support for the emigrants' organizations and social help to their members, both under the mandate of the Federal Ministry of Displaced Persons, Refugees and War Victims, which existed until 1969. However, this policy of guardianship did not provide for integration into the German society. Unlike the USA or Canada, post-war West Germany did not have yet its own tradition of mass immigration and faced enough problems as to overcoming the consequences of National-Socialism. Hence, the problems of the various groups of emigrants, especially of such less-known as Ukrainians remained at the margins of the society's interests. At the same time, most representatives of the older generation of former Displaced Persons did not aspire for integration themselves: some of them never gave up their official "stateless" status and their hope of returning to Ukraine. Meanwhile, their children's generation (who came to Germany as infants or were born there) by preserving their Ukrainian identity usually were able to receive education, successfully integrate into Germany's social and economic life and obtain citizenship.

In Germany, the nationalist pool of political parties was represented by two wings of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists – the Revolutionary OUN under Bandera's rule and OUNz (OUN abroad), which split from it in 1954 and was also known as *Dvijkari*. Another important political actor was the parliament in exile, UNRada, an association of several more or less small democratic parties. One of the most influential of them was the left URDP founded in 1946 by Ivan Bahrianyj, a writer. After the long and complicated processes of political negotiations and crises, UNRada managed to bring together most parties, including Dvijkari and OUN-M (Melnyk-led wing of OUN), but not the Revolutionary OUN and Hetmanists (supporters of the Hetmanate). Up to the end of the 1970s, UNRada's sessions took place in Munich (except for the sixth one of 1972 in London).

The non-political coordinating center of the Ukrainian community was the Central representative of Ukrainian emigration in Germany (TsPUEN). Founded in 1945, this organization was not only an important form of national representation, but also a necessary intermediary between Ukrainian DPs and the occupation authorities. After the end of the Displacement period, this national representative continued coordinating community life, organizing cultural and social events and publishing a news bulletin. Other forms of public activity included youth and students' unions, a women's association, Plast as a Ukrainian version of Scouting and the school society *Ridna Schkola* (Native School). Nowadays, almost all of them continue working more or less actively.

As mentioned above, a substantial part of the emigration community were intellectuals, including those, whose activities went beyond the national boundaries, like political analyst and journalist Bohdan Osadczuk (German pen-name Alexander Korab) or the specialist on East-Central Europe and Sovietologist

Borys Lewytzkyj. Both of them contributed significantly to the study of the USSR and satellite countries in the German-speaking area.

The tradition of printed media beginning in the DP period continued, although the number of the titles went down to several dozen. Some of the media outlets published under the aegis of different parties like the newspapers *Ukrainski visti* (Ukrainian news) of URDP, *Shliakh peremohy* (Way to the victory) of OUNr or the magazine *Suchasnist* (Modernity) of OUNz existed at least until 1980-90s or moved to the independent Ukraine. The periodical of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic church *Khrystyjanskyj holos* (Christian voice) is still published in Munich.

The national periodicals' success and influence can be attributed to their journalists and publishers, such as Zenon Pelenskyj, Roman Ilnytskyj (until his departure to the USA in 1957) and later Bohdan Kordiuk, who significantly contributed to the development of the Ukrainian exile periodicals and their content. The Ukrainian community's publishing capacities even served some other emigrant groups, as in 1950s

> *in the Federal Republic of Germany there are about 20 newspapers and journals, they are published in three Ukrainian print shops in Munich, in one in Neu-Ulm or in one in Augsburg. The emigrants of many other nations have no printers of their own in Germany and print their newspapers in Ukrainian print shops.*[19]

Therefore, cultural, intellectual and public activities of the Ukrainian emigration took various forms with different goals and target groups. They can be also roughly divided into three levels – (trans)national or "internal", German, and international, although their main actors could be the same. Scientific and research institutions were responsible for the further development of the Ukrainian humanities abroad. Interaction between Ukrainian and German intellectuals as well as the spread of popular historical and cultural information about Ukraine was under the mandate of several bilateral organizations, most notably the German-Ukrainian Society. An important part of the emigrants' intellectual activities consisted of their participation in the international anti-Soviet projects, one of them was Radio Liberty broadcast from Munich. Each of these cases can be illustrated in more detail.

House of Ukrainian Sciences

After the departure of most Displaced Persons overseas, educational institutions like the Ukrainian Free University and the Ukrainian Technical and Husbandry Institute lost most of their students and a significant share of their faculty. The scientists that stayed in Germany searched for opportunities to continue their research, above all, in Ukrainian studies, and together with the German authorities tried to find a suitable model for the further existence of the Ukrainian scientific institutions.

Unlike the USA and Canada, which incorporated Ukrainian scientific institutions into their general research-and-educational structures, in Germany such institutions kept their private character: with all the official recognition and support of these organizations, the German authorities had no intention to integrate them into the state's educational and research system. This attitude, however, coincided with the vision of Ukrainian intellectuals, who wanted to retain its structural autonomy.

For Germans, the support of the emigrants' institutions and their "free science" served as a kind of moral compensation for the crimes of the Nazis and, at the same time, their contribution to the ideological competition with the Soviet system. The Professor of Slavic philology Dr. Erwin Koschmieder convinced the Bavarian authorities of the necessity to maintain the Ukrainian Free University. He argued that UFU possessed a very special character and although it was incompatible with any of about 20 major German state universities, its meaning for Ukrainians, and not only emigrants, was huge, because it was the only scientific institution free from the Bolsheviks' influence. At the same time, he called the exile scientists Germany's "natural allies" who help to inform their Western partners about the real situation in their country and generally in the Slavic world.[20]

The German-Ukrainian Society suggested one of the projects to restructure the Ukrainian scientific organizations. Accordingly, all Ukrainian research, educational, cultural, youth and religious institutions in Munich were to be united in one structure and place named the Shevchenko House.[21] However, during conversations with two Bavarian Miniseries – for Education and Culture and for Work and Social Care – this idea was deemed unrealistic because of the very different nature and goals of all these organizations. Thus, the idea was finally reduced to a more attainable form of the House of Ukrainian Sciences, which gathered under its roof (in all senses) three scientific institutions – the Ukrainian Free University, the Ukrainian Technical and Husbandry Institute and the Taras Shevchenko Scientific Society (its German branch). This new structure received financial support from the Bavarian government and was directed by the joined managing and controlling body with a rather complicated name – the Working and Promotion Community of the Ukrainian Sciences,[22] which consisted of Ukrainian and German scientists as well as representatives of the Bavarian officials and published its own periodicals.[23]

The House of Ukrainian Sciences held its official opening in the rented building on La Place Str. 24 in Munich on May 24, 1963. The official ceremony continued in the Inauguration Hall of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences and ended with a reception at the Munich residence.[24] The House of Ukrainian Sciences used the above-mentioned building until 1974, when UFU and its satellite institutions moved into its own premises on Pienzenauer Str. 15 in Munich.[25]

The Ukrainian Free University was the only one of the three members united in the House of Ukrainian Sciences which managed to re-establish its teaching activities in 1965, while the two other institutions worked as research entities

with significant publishing activity. While officially accepting UFU, the German authorities repeatedly emphasized its private nature. Therefore, its doctoral degrees were not equivalent to those from German universities. Despite its limited possibilities, the Ukrainian Free University for decades successfully fulfilled its mission to carry on the tradition of Ukrainian studies, enabling many outstanding scientists to make an impact on the development of national humanities and making them known in the West through publications in foreign languages. The Ukrainian scholarly institutions in Germany at different times were a place of work for such prominent "old school" scholars as historians Dmytro Dorорshenko, Ivan Mirchuk, Natalia Polonska-Vasylenko, Vadym Scherbakivskyj, Borys Krupnytskyj, philosopher and psychologist Olexandr Kultchytskyj, literary scholars Yurij Sheveliov and Yurij Boiko-Blokhyn. Most of them cooperated with the Ukrainian scientific institutions all over the world as well as with German and international scientific organizations.

Most of their studies and publications have retained their scientific significance until now and even made an impact on the intellectual sphere of independent Ukraine, especially during the first years after the collapse of the USSR, by compensating for the absence of non-Soviet literature. Natalia Polonska-Vasylenko's "History of Ukraine" published in Ukraine in 1992 became one of the first national textbooks in the independent state. The Taras Shevchenko Scientific Society prepared and published a fundamental project – "Encyclopedia of Ukrainian Studies" - edited by Volodymyr Kubijovysh and written by Ukrainian scientists worldwide, including those in Germany, and it still enjoys its role as an important lexicon in Ukrainian humanities.

German-Ukrainian Society

Probably the most prominent example of German-Ukrainian cooperation was the activity of the German-Ukrainian Society (Ger. *Deutsch-Ukrainische Gesellschaft* – *DUG*) re-founded in 1948. First established in 1918 in Berlin by two researchers and publishers of Baltic-German origin Paul Rohrbach and Alex Schmidt, this society stood for Ukraine's separation from Russia, as this coincided with the then political and economic interests of Germany, and supported Ukrainian politicians from the circles of the Ukrainians Peoples Republic (UNR).[26]

German solicitor Dr. Friedrich Roeder helmed the re-established German-Ukrainian Society as President, Ukrainian art historian Dr. Gregor Prokoptchuk served as Secretary, and Paul Rohrbach remained the Honorary President until his death in 1956. In November 1960, DUG united with the German-Ukrainian Herder Society (DUHG),[27] which was founded in 1954 with a similar purpose. The renewed DUG formed the joint executive board with the representative of both organizations and the member of DUHG Prof. Dr. Ivan Mirchuk was elected as an

Honorary President of the united society.[28]

DUG's declared aim was to unite the democratic-oriented supporters of German-Ukrainian cooperation by distancing itself from any political parties or movements.[29] The society's founders also saw as their purpose in strengthening the economic and cultural relations between the two nations represented from the Ukrainian side by the emigration circles. This activity encompassed publications, lectures, other public events[30] as well as exhibitions and concerts. As the organization, whose members, both German and Ukrainian, mostly belonged to the pre-war generations, the German-Ukrainian Society, which was very fruitful in the two postwar decades, wound down its activity after the 1960s.

Despite the Society's declared apolitical nature, its leaders did not shy away from political points either in publications or in public discussions; one of the examples of this was the report by Mykoka Livytskyj, a member of the UNRada and later UNR's President in Exile, titled "Coexistence or Liberation policy."[31] The emigrants' activity was unavoidably political, as even cultural actions were understood as political, especially under conditions of the Cold War and ideological confrontation with the Soviet regime. In this case, the mere promotion of the Ukrainian culture was used as a form of protest against the Soviet politics of Russification. In the brochure devoted to DUG's 50th anniversary, its leaders made a political statement emphasizing historical and national differences between Ukrainians and Russians, declaring the rule of the Soviet regime over the Ukrainian SSR to be imperialistic and committing to the democratic state tradition of Ukraine in the form of the Ukrainian Peoples' Republic (UNR).[32]

In 1952–1968, one of the Society's key activities was the publication of the quarterly almanac *Ukraine in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart* (Ukraine in the Past and the Present). It contained materials about Ukrainian history and culture and political articles like criticism of the Soviet politics against the Ukrainian Churches or biographies of Ukrainian politicians like Evhen Konovalets. Among the Ukrainian exile politicians the Society honored for achievements in cooperation between Germans and Ukrainians, there were activists from both camps – democratic and nationalistic, Mykola Livytskyj and Yaroslav Stetsko.[33] DUG also undertook several fundamental publishing projects like "Ukrainian Painter in Germany," which became possible due to the editorial work of its Secretary – art historian Gregor Prokoptchuk.[34]

One of the Society's main objectives was to inform Germans about the Ukrainian cultural and historical heritage. However, its achievements in this sphere should not be overestimated, as they reached relatively narrow circles of the educated public. The main reason was the lack of general knowledge about Ukraine in Germany and its perception as a part of Russia. The members of the German-Ukrainian Herder Society, who later joined DUG, found for this the following explanation:

> *The fact that Ukrainians and Russians are two different nations and that the Ukrainians have their own history, culture and language is not understood by most people in the West. The reason of this is that in the entire world false information about Ukrainians has spread and scientific mistakes can be found in almost all Western historical books about the so called "Russian history."*[35]

On top of all these reasons, Ukrainians remained just one among the diverse emigration communities in Germany, and thus their life and activities in most cases stayed a "thing in itself".

One of the most successful cultural actions organized by DUG was the exhibition of modern Ukrainian artists from Europe and the USA named "Ukrainian Christian Art (Painting and Plastic)" which took place in July and August 1960. As the organizers carried out the exhibition simultaneously to the World Eucharistic Congress and organized it under the honorable patronage of Apostolic Exarch and Bishop of Greek-Catholic Ukrainians Dr. Palton Kornyliak, it attracted a lot of visitors, who were impressed by the continuation of the "old Russian icon tradition" in the paintings of Svjatoslav Hordynskyj from New York or mosaics and paintings by Severyn Boraczek and sculptures by Gregor Kruk.[36] Both artists, Severyn Boraczek and Gregor Kruk, lived in Munich, where they "found their spiritual motherland" and German newspapers also registered in their creative works the combination of old and new, Eastern and Western artistic traditions.[37]

Another occasion to bring Ukrainian topics to the fore was the 100th anniversary of Taras Shevchenko's death in March 1961. The Society organized the celebration's program with events like a public lecture about Taras Shevchenko by art scholar Prof. Volodymyr Zalozetskyj from Vienna, and concerts with the participation of a prominent opera singer of Ukrainian origin Iryna Malaniuk.[38] These cultural actions evoked some public interest and became for a short time a publication topic in local and regional press, but could not form a long-term cultural narrative.

This manifested itself, among other things, in the case of the publication of the art book "Taras Shevchenko as a painter"[39] in 1964, namely in an attempt to procure state funding for it. The Bavarian State Ministry for Education and Culture inquired an expert opinion of the main director of the Bavarian State Painting Collections, art historian Dr. Kurt Martin, whose answer caused the Ministry to decline the request for funding. Neither the Director himself nor his colleagues knew of the painter Taras Shevchenko and his works, but based on the brief information about him from art lexicons, the expert assumed the painter was not known outside the emigrants' circles. This opinion was in no way a prejudice towards emigrants: the review stated, "as German painter, he would be probably just as unknown as he is as a Ukrainian painter in Germany."[40] The head of one of the biggest world art collections evaluated the painter unknown to him in the dimension of world art, not from the point of view of a stateless nation or its little exile community standing for its cultural sovereignty.

Thus he was unable to be a "advocate" of Ukrainians as Prof. Koschminder was towards UFU. The little circle of Germans interested in Ukraine consisted mostly of persons, who either had their own experience with it or were working with it due to scholarly interest or political reasons.

Ukrainian emigrants in international anti-Soviet actions

The international dimension was central for Ukrainian emigrants. Their activism in this sphere was multifaceted and consisted mostly of participating in the international anti-communist movements as well as in the attempts to inform the world community about the Soviet regime's crimes against Ukrainians. The most successful examples of such international cooperation were the activity of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations initiated by the Ukrainian nationalists from Bandera-led wing and helmed by Yaroslav Stetsko or participation in organizations like the League of the Liberation of the Peoples of the USSR (Paris Bloc) founded by the exile Governments of non-Russian Peoples of the USSR and represented from the Ukrainian side by the Executive Committee of the Ukrainian National Council (UNRada). These activities merit a separate study, but here we consider other examples, when the Ukrainians were not the initiators, but joined the actions and organizations working in Germany under American rule. These projects offered Ukrainians a place next to other emigrant groups in the joint anti-Soviet campaign. At the same time, such activities caused additional strife between different political camps of the Ukrainian emigrants.

The most important opportunity for such cooperation came with Radio Liberty (RL) working in Munich, but the idea of broadcasting in Ukrainian from the very beginning encountered certain problems due to the differences in political positions of the Ukrainians and the American organizers.

Radio Liberty (initially, Radio Liberation) was founded by the private American organization and initially called the American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (which, as it became known later, at its initial stage was connected to CIA). This interpretation of all nations gathered in the USSR as "Russians", as reflected in the American organization's name, was unacceptable for Ukrainian exiled politicians of all political circles as well as for convinced independents. Furthermore, as to the future status of the Soviet Republics, the Americans held a position known as non-predetermination, which meant that the decision about the republic's political future as an independent state or as a part of a federation was up to its citizens in due course and with uncertain prospects. On the contrary, the Ukrainians expected of their potential partners a more consistent declaration of their support not only to the anti-Soviet, but also to the national-liberation struggle. Discussions between the American Committee and the Ukrainian representatives from the democratic camp were complicated and postponed the

launch of Radio Liberty's Ukrainian broadcasting until August 1954(whereas the programs in Russian and some other national languages began in March 1953).[41] It became possible after finding a common ground, including the renaming of the spearheading organization into the American Committee for the Liberation from Bolshevism (AMCOMLIB).

The participation in Ukrainian broadcasting became an important part of activities of the Ukrainian community, involving exile intellectuals and actors as speech writers, editors or announcers. There were some prominent figures among them, like poet and painter Emma Andijewska, who was the Ukrainian "voice" of RL for a long time, or poet Ihor Kachurovsky, who in 1969 moved from Argentina to Germany to become the literary observer for the Ukrainian broadcast.

For decades, Ukrainian history and culture including the protection of the national language, religious and church issues, and later – the dissident movement, human rights and samizdat (dissident underground press) were the main topics of Radio Liberty's Ukrainian programs. However, as it targeted the Ukrainians in the USSR and caused significant troubles for the Soviet authorities, due to technical reasons it was not accessible for the Ukrainians in Germany or other countries "on this side of the Iron Curtain". Thus, the authors were not sure whether their programs reached the listeners and if their work had any impact.

AMCOMLIB's other project was the Institute for Study of the USSR,[42] which existed in Munich from the mid-1950s until 1972, and unlike Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, it targeted the Western public. Like RL, it was also divided into national Departments specializing in the analysis of different aspects of the Soviet realia, including national ones. The institute's researchers were supposed to contribute to Sovietology, which emerged during the Cold War as the interdisciplinary analysis of the Soviet realities. Similarly to the situation with RL, the Ukrainian exile intellectuals and politicians held different attitudes towards this institution. For the liberally-oriented of them, cooperation with the institute meant an opportunity for scientific publications, which were very important in their situation of economic indigence. Due to the cooperation with the Institute, some important publications appeared, among them Natalia Polonska-Vasylenko's two-volume study "The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (A historical outline)."[43]

The motivation for participants to cooperate with the Institute were not only pragmatic, but also conceptual: they found in it a timely opportunity to win the support of democratic anti-communist circles and to bring the Ukrainian question to the agenda of the international anti-communist struggle.Following this logic, the rejection of such work as well as self-ghettoization seemed unwise. Mykhaylo Dobrianskyj, Head of the Ukrainian office Radio Liberty, argued that every opportunity offered by the anti-communist and democratic forces should be used[44] to make Ukrainian voices heard; he also meant that as long as the interests of Western anti-communist powers and Ukrainian emigrants are

similar, the cooperation is expedient.However, some of nationalistically oriented emigrants abstained from cooperation with the Institute because of its American organizers' "Russophilia", that is, because their position was similar to that of the Russian emigrants: anti-communist resistance without a certain declaration of the independence of the non-Russian Nations of the USSR. The Institute's opponents Professors Jurij Boiko, Vasyl Orletskyj and Petro Savytzkyj organized an alternative Independent Association of Sovietologists,[45] which had very limited opportunities and influence compared to the Institute.

In the course of cooperation with American institutions, the Ukrainian scientists and activists of Ukrainian organizations continued cooperating with the Kersten Committee,[46] which aimed to collect testimonies of Soviet crimes in Ukraine[47], first of all, statements and memoirs about the Holodomor, Collectivization and political repressions against national intellectuals. Published as a separate issue, this report became a public act of both historical and political meaning. The Committee's report translated into German was published as a separate book[48] and one of the statements as a separate Ukrainian edition.[49]

Conclusions

In the article, I briefly discussed the diverse directions and general tendencies of the activities of Ukrainian post-war emigrants. The content, nature and scope of these activities, on the one hand, reflected the emigrants' attempts to find their place on the global "chessboard" of the Cold War among its big political players and to include the Ukrainian question to the international policy agenda.

On the other hand, these activities reflected the complicated internal processes of establishing a transnational community influenced by the opposing tendencies of consolidation and separation. It was characterized by the concurrence between persons, ideologies and parties in their search for ways to achieve the national liberation in the changing political landscape. The destructive tendencies and internal concurrence of different groups were typical for most emigrant communities from the Eastern Bloc, but in the case of Ukrainians, they sometimes took dramatic forms, which to a significant degree came as a result of their previous political experience.Unlike the political sphere, the cultural sphere was less controversial and, in many cases, served as a kind of basic common ground in the elaboration of the common identity including the forms of cultural memory, which managed to overcome regional, religious or political differences. The post-war Ukrainian Diaspora is thus a complicated phenomenon; in its concentrated form, it accumulated the previous political experiences of the first half of the 20th century represented by different persons, ideas or institutions, and this, figuratively speaking, national "time-and-space continuum" underwent the "tectonic" process of elaborating new concepts and structures for national existence suitable for the

post-war reality. A very important stage of this process was a relatively short age of the Displacement, because most processes of the national life, which continued later in different places of the residence of the Ukrainian emigrants, originate from the DP period. This observation emphasizes both the similarity of the cultural and political processes taking place in different Ukrainian communities worldwide and their interconnectedness. As the same time, each of the emigrant communities in different countries, in our case, the German one, had its own peculiarities linked above all to the situation in the country itself. This is why a proper study of such communities should take into consideration both the national and local conditions as well as the global context.

About the author:

Kateryna Kobchenko holds a PhD in History and works as a Research Associate at the Center of Ukrainian Studies of the Department of Philosophy, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Ukraine. Her research interests include the political and intellectual history of Ukraine in the 20th – early 21st century in the European context, the history of migration, women's and gender history and biographical studies. She authored the monograph "St. Olga Women's University: History of the Kyiv Higher Women's Courses" (Kyiv, 2007) and co-edited the collection of works "Central and East European Women and the Second World War: Gendered Experiences in a Time of Extreme Violence" (Kyiv, 2015).Her current research is devoted to the political activities of Ukrainian emigrants in Germany after WWII. Kateryna Kobchenko is a member of the Austrian-Ukrainian Historians' Commission and the Ukrainian Association of Researchers in Women's History (http://www.womenhistory.org.ua/).

Endnotes

1 This article was prepared thanks to a scholarship of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, Germany, which enabled the author's research work in German archives and libraries.

2 As was the case with Mykhailo Hruschevsky, who reconciled with the Soviet regime and returned from abroad to Soviet Ukraine.

3 This opinion was typical for Ivan Bahriany's Ukrainian Revolutionary-Democratic Party (URDP) and the liberal wing of the nationalists represented by "Dvijkari", or OUNz (Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists abroad) founded by Lev Rebet and Zenon Matla.

4 The revolutionary OUN (Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists revolutionary) also known as ŽČ OUN (Foreign Parts of the OUN) under the leadership of Stepan Bandera.

5 The Ukrainian People's Republic existed in Ukraine in 1917-1921; afterwards, its political leaders and structures acted as the exile government until 1992.

6 Yurij Sheveliov, "Nad ozerom. Bavaria", in Yurij Sheveliov, Z istoriji nezakinchenoji vijny (Kyiv: Vydavnychyj Dim "Kyjevo-Mohylianska akademia"2009): 71-134

7 According to Lyubomyr Vynar, there were more than 200 scientists among Ukrainian DPs: Liubomyr Vynar, "Vidrodžennia ukrainskogo naukovogo žyttia pislia Drugoji svitovoji vijny: 1945–1952," Naukowi zapysky Natsionalnogo universytetu "Ostrozka Akademija". Istoryčni nauky Vol. 9 (Ostroh 2007): 60-71.

8 See: Volodymyr Kulyk, "The role of Discourse in the Construction of an Emigré Community: Ukrainian displaced Persons in Germany and Austria after the Second World War," in European Encounters. Migrants, Migration and European Societies Since 1945 ed. Rainer Ohliger (a.o.) (Farnham [u.a.]: Ashgate, 2003): 218.

9 See: Taras Hunczak, My Memoirs: Life Journey through WWII and Various Historical Events of the 21st Century (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Books 2016): 24-25.

10 Walter Koschmal, „Die kleine Ukraine in Regensburg (1945–1949). Therapie und Utopie," Regensburger Almanach (2015): 42-51; Joseph Berlinger, „"Kleine Ukraine": Die Regensburger Ganghofersiedlung 1945–1949", https://www.br.de/radio/ bayern2/regensburger-ganghofersiedlung-1945-1949-berlinger102.html?fbclid=IwAR00_4HfQi-VSMxsv0qvAg2OSYm5CWDVmAbnN5hgChOcmb_eelJSMc2QTEk

11 Although most Ukrainian exile scientists cooperated with both of these scientific academies, this duplicated structure of the Ukrainian exile science exists until now, and in the USA, as well.

12 The Union of the Ukrainian Journalists, which remained with the UNRada positions, and the National Democratic Organization of the Ukrainian Journalists, whose members belonged to the nationalist circles. See: Volodymyr Maruniak, Ukrajinska Emigratsija v Nimeččyni i Avstriji po druhij svitovij vijni Tom I. Roky 1945-1951 (München: Fremdsprachendruckerei Dr. Peter Belej 1985): 207-209.

13 See: Marta Dyczok, The Grand Alliance and Ukrainian Refugees (Basingstoke, Houndmills: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's Press, in association with St. Antony's College, Oxford 2000): 77.

14 This issue was especially urgent in the period of mass repatriations in 1945 and 1946, as the majority of Ukrainians had to return to the USSR. At the same time, most of them, first of all former "Ostarbeiter", returned home voluntarily.

15 See: Ein ukrainischer Kosmopolit mit Berliner Adresse. Gespräche mit Bohdan Osadczuk (Alexander Korab), ed. Basil Kerski, Andrzej S. Kowalczyk (Osnabrück: fibre 2004): 118.

16 One of the most prominent representatives of this group was Fedor Bohatyrtschuk who was born in Kyiv, joined General Vlasov's Russian Liberation Army and after WWII became one the leaders of the Ukrainian federalist movement deeply connected to the Russian emigration. See: F.P. Bohatyrchuk, Moj žyznennyj put' k Vlasovu i Pražskomu manifestu (San Francisco: Globus Publishers 1978).

17 Jan-Hinnerk Antons, „Ukrainische Displaced Persons und ihr Kampf um nationale Identität," in Freilegungen: displaced persons; Leben im Transit: Überlebende zwischen Repatriierung,

Rehabilitation und Neuanfang, eds. Rebecca Boehling et al. (Göttingen: Wallstein 2014): 228.

18 „Was will die Deutsch-Ukrainische Herdergesellschaft?", BayHStA, MK_17577.

19 ibid.

20 Dr. Erwin Kochschmieder [sic – K.K.], former University Professor, „Die Freie Ukrainische Universität in München und wir", BayHStA, MK_68754.

21 „Schewtschenko-Haus in München". (Schreiben von der Deutsch-Ukrainischer Gesellschaft e.V. an das Bayerische Staatsministerium für Unterricht und Kultus vom 17. Juli 1962), BayHStA, MK_68759.

22 Ger.: Arbeits- und Förderungsgemeinschaft der Ukrainischen Wissenschaften e.V.

23 Mitteilungen. Arbeits- und Förderungsgemeinschaft der Ukrainischen Wissenschaften. München, 1965–1981 und „Jahrbuch der Ukrainekunde", 1982-1991.

24 Rostyslaw Jendyk, „Entstehung, Eröffnung und Tätigkeit des Hauses der Ukrainischen Wissenschaften," Mitteilungen. Arbeits- und Förderungsgemeinschaft der Ukrainischen Wissenschaften, 1, 1965, 9-12.

25 Hryhorij Waskowycz, „Bericht des Vorsitzenden der Arbeits- und Förderungsgemeinschaft der Ukrainischen Wissenschaften," Mitteilungen. Arbeits- und Förderungsgemeinschaft der Ukrainischen Wissenschaften, 12, 1975, 101-102.

26 Frank Golczewski, Deutsche und Ukrainer 1914-1939 (Paderborn; München [u.a.]: Schöningh 2010): 377-383.

27 The German-Ukrainian Herder Society was founded in 1949 as the German-Ukrainian Herder Association (Ger.: Deutsch-Ukrainischer Herderbund) and in 1954, it was reorganized into the German-Ukrainian Herder Society (Ger.: Deutsch-Ukrainische Herdrgesellschaft e.V.) under the Honorary President – the Director of the Eastern Europe Institute Prof. Hans Koch, the President – the Deputy of the Bavarian State Parliament Erwin Mittich and Vice-President – the Rector of the Ukrainian Free University Prof. Ivan Mirczuk. See: BayHStA, MK_71577, Bd. 1; Stadtarchiv München, ZA-2537.

28 Gregor Prokoptschuk, Deutsch-Ukrainische Gesellschaft 1918-1963 (München 1963): 70.

29 ibid., 30.

30 ibid.

31 ibid., 51-52.

32 „Ukraine – der Europäische Stadt" (Vorwort), in Gregor Prokoptschuk, Deutsch-Ukrainische Gesellschaft 1918-1968 (München: Ukraine 1968): 5-6.

33 Prokoptschuk, Deutsch-Ukrainische Gesellschaft 1918-1963 (München 1963): 84.

34 Gregor Prokoptschuk, Ukrainische Künstler in Deutschland: ein Bilderband mit Reproduktionen von 27 Künstlern (München: Verl. Ukraine 1960): 110.

35 „Was will die Deutsch-Ukrainische Herdergesellschaft?", in: BayHStA, MK_17577.

36 Deutsch-Ukrainische Gesellschaft. Pressestimmen, in: Stadtarchiv München, Kulturamt_1519.

37 ibid..

38 „Schewtschenko-Feier". (Schreiben von der Deutsch-Ukainischen Gesellschaft e.V. an das Kulturreferat der Stadt München), Stadtarchiv München, Kulturamt_1519.

39 Gregor Prokoptschuk, Damian Horniatkewytsch (ill.), Taras Schewtschenko als Maler (München 1964).

40 [Referenz des Generaldirektors der Bayerischen Staatsgemäldesammlungen Dr. Kurt Martin über Taras Schewtschenko als Maler vom 18.2.64], in: BaHStA, MK_71577.

41 Olena Removska, Hovoryt' Radio Svododa. Istorija ukrajinskoji redaktsiji (Kyiv: Vydavnychyj Dim "Kyjevo-Mohylianska akademia" 2014): 10.

42 First name: The Institute for Study of History and Culture of the USSR. See more: E.V. Kodin, Miunchenskij institut po izucheniju SSSR, 1950–1972 gg.: Evropejskij tsents sovetologiji? (Smolensk: SmolGU 2016).

43 N.D. Polonska-Vasylenko The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (A historical outline), Part I and II. (München: Institut zur Erforschung der UdSSR e.V. 1955,1958), in Ukrainian.

44 Mykhajlo Dobrianskyj, Assotsiatsija proty Instytutu. Shcho oznachaje vystup nezalezjnych sovjetoznavtsiv proty ukrajinskoji spivpratsi z Instytutom dlia vyvchennia SSSR (München: Dr. Peter Bejej 1956): 30-31.

45 Full name: The Independent Association for Study of Soviet Theory and Praxis in National Questions.

46 Created as "Select Committee to Investigate Communist Aggression and the Forced Incorporation of the Baltic States into the USSR", in 1954 it was renamed "Select Committee on Communist Aggression" and included the Ukrainian ad hoc Committee under the supervision of the Ukrainian journalist Zenon Pelenskyj.

47 [Documents and Testimonies for the Ukrainian part of the Kersten Committee], in: Archive of the Ukrainian Free University. Personal Fund of Zenon Pelenskyj, Folder 2.

48 Sowjetrussische Okkupation der Ukraine. Bericht der Kersten-Kommission (München: Cicero 1962).

49 N. Polonska-Vasylenko, Prozess «Tsentra dij» 1924 r. (Munich: LOGOS 1956)

Overcoming the boundaries: strategies of cooperation among Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian diaspora groups in response to the Ukrainian crisis. The comparison of Canada and Turkey

by Milana Nikolko and Fethi Kurtiy Şahin

This article analyzes the dynamics of diasporas' boundaries with a focus on the cooperation between Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diaspora groups in Canada and Turkey. The comparison draws on representative examples of diaspora groups' reactions and collective actions during the unfolding of the Ukrainian Crisis 2014-2016. Starting with the study of the diaspora groups' history in Turkey and Canada during the 20th -21st centuries, we argue that the complicated ornament of ethnic collective traumas, both caused by Tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union, and the recent crisis compel diasporas to recalculate their separate goals and to proceed with a common agenda.

Keywords: Diaspora, identities, Ukrainian diaspora groups, Crimean Tatar diaspora groups, positionality, cooperation, Canada, Turkey, Ukraine, Ukrainian Crisis.

The state of the problem

Crises are devastating. They have ruined familiar orders, spilled over borders, and spread chaos, devastation, and trauma. Yet when crises end and bring revolutionary changes, they create new prospects for mobilization, engaging novel ideas and pursuing new alliances established on a new structure.

The Euromaidan (November 2013 – February 2014), the Revolution of Dignity and the Ukraine crisis (February 2014–February 2016) vibrated throughout Ukrainian communities all over the world. A crisis occurred after Ukraine's President Yanukovych reversed his initiatives for deeper Ukrainian integration with the European Union at the end of November 2013. This act provoked the pro-European part of Ukrainian society to launch a broad wave of protests. The confrontation reached its apex in February 2014 with mass killings of protesters in Kyiv. The full-blown crisis started when President Yanukovych fled Ukraine in late February 2014, while the following occupation and annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in March 2014 were accompanied by insurgencies in different regions of Ukraine. It resulted in severe military conflict in Donbas.[1] During the conflict, more than 13,000 people lost their lives and over 1.6 million fled their homes.

From the very beginning of the crisis, diaspora mobilization was a significant

factor in developing an international agenda for Ukraine and an effective mechanism for rapid response to the changing situation on the ground. Along with Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars have remained united in their response to Russian aggression. Today, Crimean Tatars, the indigenous people of Crimea (Ukraine), are in the position of a minority in their motherland. This is the result of hundreds of years of migration from their homeland, caused by bloody wars in the region and the demographic policies of the Russian Empire after the collapse of their historical state – the Crimean Khanate.[2] The annexation of Crimea resulted in the unembellished persecution of Crimean Tatar activists in Crimea and triggered activism of Crimean Tatar diaspora groups all over the world.[3]

In this article, we address the question when and why Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diaspora groups in Canada and Turkey started to collaborate and coordinate common activities. How do these different groups synchronize their activism by bridging their resources? In order to reveal our findings on the proposed questions, we must first provide a description of major terms. To do so, we used Vertovec's ideas of multidimensional specifics of diaspora groups: "diaspora combines the characteristics of structural, conscious, and non-conscious factors in reconstructing and reproducing identities and socio-cultural institutions among groups outside some place of origin."[4] Following these considerations, we can identify connections between individual and collective identities, personal choices of individuals to join the diaspora group and institutional collective forms of diasporas.

Dealing with diasporas, which have existed for hundreds of years far from their country of origin, we evidence the convolution of personal choices: a condition of subjectivity as a reason for becoming a part of diaspora is a very common discussion among second and third generations of diaspora.[5] This specific condition of subjectivity is often triggered by the strong emotional reconnection with the country of ancestry. Yet we also observe the sustainability of diaspora institutions, carrying out collective actions and constant work to preserve and reproduce their group identity. The following definition by Adamson and Demetriou supports our research, because it emphasizes social collectivity existing across state borders that has succeeded over time to:

> 1) sustain a collective national, cultural, or religious identity through a sense of internal cohesion and sustained ties with a real or imagined homeland and
>
> 2) display an ability to address the collective interests of members of the social collectivity through a developed internal organizational framework and transnational links.[6]

As argued by Koinova, if a country's foreign policy is closed towards the sovereignty goal, but diaspora perceive themselves as having relatively strong positionality vis-à-vis the host-state, they are likely to pursue homeland-oriented

claims through state-based channels. If the foreign policy stance is closed towards the sovereignty goal and entrepreneurs consider their positionality relatively weak towards the host state, they will engage predominantly through transnational channels.[7] The term diaspora positionality refers to diaspora networks with different social weight and influence to affect host state and homeland politics.

The contrasting and varying levels of knowledge and interests of diaspora regarding the home state situation raise the likelihood that diaspora has a far greater advantage than positionality alone would suggest. Strategically there may be an incentive for the diaspora to operate outside institutionalized forms of cooperation, by concealing or distorting information for personal or group gain. The fungibility of remittances directed towards the informal economy is a case in point.[8] Indeed, diaspora bargaining power is contingent on exploiting the advantages of informational asymmetries. In conventional institutional arrangements, rules and guidelines are in place regarding how NGOs, aid agencies and diplomats engage in conflicts abroad. But a diaspora does not typically face the same kind of institutional limitations and oversight, except in extreme instances such as support for listed terrorist organizations, large financial flows, and carefully orchestrated state-driven migrant labour initiatives and refugee programs.

Diaspora strategies are designed to take full advantage of information asymmetries through unwritten and sometimes imprecise ground rules, which guide behaviour outside institutional frameworks and cover everything from mechanisms to tactics and fundraising. Thus, Ukraine's Canadian diaspora enjoys solid positionality.[9] Its diaspora efforts are wide-ranging and comprehensive, including political (for example lobbying), economic (remittances, investment or money circulation), humanitarian (such as the promotion of human and other rights of the transnational groups within divided societies) and cultural (media production, the creation of subcultures)[10] and even legal activities, such as transitional justice and memory-oriented work.

From our perspective, an effective and sustainable diaspora structure, which secures the efficiency of the group in the host country and its relations with the international community and country of origin, includes the following three substantial levels:



Figure 1. Milana Nikolko and Fethi Kurtiy Şahin©, 2020.

History of Diaspora groups in Canada and Turkey

Canada: Ukrainians

The study of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada has involved different types of texts: personal memoirs, diaspora literature, folklore, government statistics, archive materials and a broad spectrum of academic publications.[11] Academic reflection on Ukrainians in Canada can be systemized by a few categories, among them are detailed historical analyses of diaspora organizations and development[12], comparisons with other ethnic groups within Canadian society[13], the influence of diaspora agents[14], the study of culture and education in the broader spectrum of Canadian multiculturalism and most recently the new dynamics in the community in response to ongoing turbulence in the home country.[15]

For over 120 years, Ukrainians coming to Canada have included different segments of society: peasants, wage labourers, members of the clergy, intellectuals, professionals, government officials, soldiers, and dissidents. The majority of researchers argue that Canada's Ukrainian diaspora is comprised of four 'waves of migration,' each a mixture of labour migrants and political refugees. The first migrants from the Ukrainian region[16] (the modern part of Western Ukraine before it was an independent state) landed in Canada at the end of the 19th century. That first wave, which took place roughly between 1891 and 1914, consisted mainly

of labour migrants. They were a classic labour diaspora trying to escape poor economic conditions and almost exclusively in search of affordable land and wage labour. Many of the people who left Ukrainian territory at the turn of the century did not have a clear sense of distinct Ukrainian identity when they moved abroad, in fact many first-wave migrants became "Ukrainian" in the diaspora.[17]

The second wave occurred between 1914 and 1930 and included a combination of labour migrants and political refugees. Around seventy thousand new Ukrainian migrants landed in Canada. During this period most fraternities and business associations and cultural societies of Ukrainian origin were founded.[18]

The third wave occurred between 1940 and 1954 and consisted of political refugees, displaced persons and war veterans. Between 1945 and 1955, about a quarter of a million eastern and western Ukrainians emigrated to North and South America, Australia and various parts of Europe. The arrival of approximately thirty-four thousand Ukrainians to Canada brought a much more diverse population than before, consisting of people of different age and gender. The new emigres settled primarily in Ontario; most of them were driven to the West by fear of the Soviets. For years, information regarding the life of Ukrainians in the Soviet Union was contentious, but debates about Soviet Ukraine continued and remained central to diaspora identity. With this post-war wave of Ukrainians, diaspora gained new educated, ambitious and driven migrants, who brought "firsthand" pieces of evidence of the untold tragic story of Soviet life. Above all, new migrants brought evidence of the Holodomor (Famine in Ukrainian) of 1932-33. After WWII, Ukrainians in Canada introduced a powerful political agenda to its diasporic discourse consisting of eyewitnesses accounts of a "Great Terror" and oral evidence of famine committed against the Ukrainian peoples. Indeed, since the beginning of the 1930s, Ukrainians in the West focused on gathering information about Stalin's Ukraine, in particular, manmade episodes of starvation. Although some information could be found in ethnic Ukrainian media during the interwar period, more reliable and detailed evidence only came out during post-war emigration. These migrants of the third wave brought with them details of massive repression and numerous episodes of famine. We argue that this collective trauma of mass starvation in Soviet Ukraine in 1932-33 became a symbolic center and moral compass for the diaspora.

Diaspora institutions play a vital role in the sustainability of Ukrainian communities in Canada. Mokrushina[19] emphasizes that the Ukrainian diaspora's success in Canada is due to its deep-rooted and geographically distributed organizations. The most notable among these institutions is the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (CUC/UCC). Established in 1940, the Congress serves as an umbrella organization for all Ukrainian organizations in Canada and represents many different organizations. Ukrainians played a significant role in designing the Canadian model of multiculturalism. During the open debates in the 1960s Senator

Paul Yuzyk was a primary advocate of the Canadian model of multiculturalism and called for equal opportunities, security and rights of different minorities in Canada. De facto, Canadian multiculturalism was designed and promoted by prominent activists of the Ukrainian Canadian community.

The 1980s was a turning point for Canada's Ukrainian diaspora. Group solidarity manifested itself through the search of truths about the Holodomor, putting the Ukrainian diaspora on the same path as the Jewish diaspora in recognition of the Holocaust. The centralization of diaspora organizations in Canada was completed close to the end of the 1980s when the collapse of the Socialist block and late dissolution of the USSR caused the moral degradation of communist ideas among left-wing migrants. Nowadays, the Ukrainian Canadian Congress includes more than 1000 organizations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ukraine) and has becomes a significant patron for the Ukrainian World Congress (UWC).[20]

The fourth wave began in the late 1980s with the collapse of the Soviet Union and continues to this day. Most fourth-wave emigrants are high-skilled migrants, although some refugees can also be found within this wave. So far, it is a smaller migration wave, consisting of approximately forty thousand people. These new migrants brought to Canada a mix of Soviet internationalism, Soviet nostalgia, and sense of liminality and the bitter taste of the personal experience and economic hardship during the break-up of the Soviet Union.[21] Ivan Kozatchenko's research[22] on democratic ideals and revision of the image of Ukraine, brought by new migrants are useful here. Within the first, second and third-generation Ukrainian diaspora there is unity around the basic ethnolinguistic characteristics of nationalism in response to Soviet "occupation" with less emphasis on cosmopolitan and global values. For the newer migrants from the post-Soviet period, there is a more multicultural and multilinguistic understanding of Ukraine as an independent nation free of Soviet rule. Canada hosts the second largest Ukrainian diaspora communities with more than 1.3 million people of Ukrainian descent.[23]

We argue that Canada's Ukrainian diaspora developed a strong network of institutions and a unique mentality whereby dominant narratives of Holodomor (famine, orchestrated by Soviets in 1932-33 in Soviet Ukraine) were keeping diaspora active and united for generations. Enjoying (and creating) a favorable climate of multiculturalism, Ukrainians secure their positions in all spheres of society and politics, both Liberal and Conservative camps, from the municipal to the federal level[24]. The recent tragic events in Ukraine re-actualized, reinforced and articulated these connections, and engaged more migrants in existing diaspora institutions. This process of re-actualization of the trauma is what binds different generations of diaspora together.

Crimean Tatars

Canada is a relatively new center for Crimean Tatar migration. Some of the persons displaced by WWII went to Western Europe and the United States[25], where few well-organized communities were established, but in general, the population is very small in comparison with the diaspora in Turkey. For Canada, migration mostly happened after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and was sustained by people migrating to find jobs or proceeding the educational purposes and settled in Canada. Today we have two Crimean Tatar associations in Canada named "Canadian Association of Crimean Tatars" and "Canada Crimea Cultural Committee". The president of the Canadian Association of Crimean Tatars, Mr. Rustem Irsay, underlines that a few hundred (maximum of 300) Crimean Tatars have connections with these institutions. This group has strong human capital thanks to the migration motivations; yet, a comparison with Ukrainian organizations in Canada would be unjust considering the long history and large population of the Ukrainian diaspora in the country. However, the increasing collaboration with Ukrainian diaspora provides a good platform for common activism. Additionally, the importance of Canada in international politics gives the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Canada greater influence compared to its size.

Turkey: Crimean Tatars

Nowadays, Crimean Tatars have significant diaspora communities in sixteen different countries - Turkey, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Russia, Uzbekistan, Poland, Lithuania, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the USA, Canada, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Turkey hosts the largest Crimean Tatar community in the world. There is no official data from the Turkish authorities related to the Crimean Tatar population living in Turkey; yet, it is estimated that 1.8 million Crimeans migrated to the Ottoman territories between 1783 and 1922.[26] Kırımlı's research[27] on the Crimean Tatar and Noghai settlements in Turkey recorded 299 village settlements (excluding neighborhoods in the city centers) in Turkey established by the émigrés coming from the lands of the Crimean Khanate.[28]

It is known that even before 1783, Crimea and the other lands of the Crimean Khanate had deep relationships with Anatolia and mutual migration movements occurred at different times. These migration movements can be traced back to the 14th century.[29] However, the first mass migration movement from Crimea happened in 1792-1793. This was followed by many other uninterrupted migration movements in 1802-1803, 1812-1813, 1828-1829, the 1830s, 1860-1861, 1874, 1890 and 1902. The most significant migration wave was seen during and after the Crimean War (1853-1856). It is estimated that almost 300,000 Crimean Tatars left their homeland and migrated to the Ottoman lands between 1859 and 1865. After this date, Crimean Tatars became a minority in Crimea for the first time in

their history.[30]

During the Russian Revolution, Crimean Tatars aimed to establish their independence in the Crimean Peninsula. However, it was terminated with the bloody Bolshevik intervention and the chaos of the civil war. Between 1917 and 1920, many Crimean Tatars fled from the peninsula and the violence of the war. Between 1921 and 1922, Crimean Tatars faced the devastating effect of the hunger occurring in the region. Approximately three thousand Crimean Tatars took refuge in Turkey where the Turkish War of Independence was still going on.[31] The last Crimean Tatar migration to Turkey happened after the WWII in the last days of the 1940s, as Crimean Tatars left Crimea to escape from the Soviet regime. Those captured as prisoners of war while serving in the Soviet Army and/or in the partisan groups ended up in German camps sought refugee as displaced persons. Approximately one thousand Crimean Tatars were accepted by Turkey.[32] This group was the last wave reaching Turkey directly from Crimea before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As a result of these uninterrupted waves of migration, Turkey became the most important center for the Crimean Tatar diaspora.

At this point, it is important to underline the pushing factors for the Crimean Tatars. Years of devastating wars and Russian policies aiming to redesign the demography of the region together were the most important factors for all migration movements from the peninsula. Crimean Tatars living under Muslim law in the Crimean Khanate became landless and secondary under the Russian Empire, which was ruled by Christian law. Moreover, Russian authorities came to the point that this strategic region must be a true part of the motherland[33], and as an important step for this policy, the peninsula was attached to the newly established Tavrida Oblast. The other parts of this oblast did not have a good ethnic and economic relationship with the peninsula, and Moscow tried to change this condition through forced migration to Crimea. This situation created an oppressive atmosphere for Crimean Tatars. The period between 1783 and 1883[34] is accepted as the "dark age" for Crimean Tatars, because there was no literary production in the Crimean Tatar language for a century. Under these circumstances, Crimean Tatar migration to Ottoman lands aimed at protecting Turkic-Tatar and Muslim culture, together with their way of life in a friendly and welcoming country.

The most important turning point for the nationalism of Crimean Tatars in Crimea and in the diaspora is the *Yaş Tatar* (Young Tatar) movement.[35] Leaders of this movement formulated the Crimean Tatar nationalist arguments and the motherland concept was reshaped with discourse on political modernization. Prominent figures of this movement like Abdürreşid Mehdi, Noman Çelebicihan, Cafer Seydahmet Kırımer and others founded the first Crimean Tatar nationalist organizations in Istanbul and Crimea. They led the 1st Kurultai (*Qurultay*) of the Crimean Tatar People of 1917 and attempted to establish an independent state.

The *Qurultay* tradition is important for many different reasons. First, today,

the demands of the Crimean Tatars related to their autonomous state are put forward by the *Qurultay*. The self-governmental institutions of Crimean Tatars established after their return to Crimea accepted all decisions of the 1st *Qurultay* and declared itself as the follower of first one.[36] Photographs of the 1917 *Qurultay* are kept in the homes of émigré Crimean Tatars, who fled the peninsula in the years that followed, as relics of their homeland and adored state. The charismatic leadership of Noman Çelebicihan, the poet and the author of the national anthem of Crimean Tatars, is still present in collective memories of the people. He and other leaders are addressed with respect by the people, and their movement and methods influenced the formation of the Crimean Tatar National Movement.[37] Moreover, Cafer Seydahmet Kırımer, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and War of the 1st *Qurultay*, came to Turkey after the Bolshevik intervention to the *Qurultay* and brought the emerging discourse of the Crimean Tatar nationalism in Crimea to the diaspora. Today, Crimean Tatar diaspora leaders in Turkey proudly underline their direct connection to the 1st *Qurultay* thanks to Kırımer. Relations with the new wave of migrants who left Crimea after 1917 were an important turning point for the Crimean Tatar diaspora and shaped the future of activism.[38]

We know that before the 1980s, Crimean Tatar activism in Turkey was sustained by a closed and an elite group.[39] For long years, the masses agreed to leave Crimean Tatar politics to a small group of émigré leaders.[40] It is related to the political structure in Turkey and the balances of the Cold War. Yet, after the 1980s we monitored a significant change. The 1980s were a period in which the diaspora elite living in Turkey decided to enlarge their scope and aimed to strengthen their grassroot-level activism. The following breaking point was post-1990s and due to the increased level of education, mobility, and urbanization Crimean Tatars saw a danger of assimilation and pre-conditions for nationalism.[41] This was a period when many Crimean Tatar diaspora associations and foundations popped up in Turkey. These diaspora institutions worked very actively for the return of the Crimean Tatars from their deportation lands to their motherland Crimea. The leaders in Turkey exchanged letters with the leaders in the deportation lands and tried to sound their demands in the international arena[42] and the communication between Crimean Tatar leaders in Crimea and diaspora activists expanded.[43] Yet at the same time Tatar leadership in the Crimea realized that "Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey lacked both the resources and the stomach" to proceed with the radical demand for national Crimean Tatar sovereignty.[44] It is very important to note that after the return[45], Crimean Tatar diaspora institutions accepted the authority of the 2nd Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar People, which was established in 1991 as a self-governmental institution in Crimea, the only institution representing the will of all Crimean Tatar people. As a result, decisions of the Qurultay constituted a framework for the activities of the diaspora institutions. When the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People was established as the executive body of the Qurultay,

diaspora institutions and activists offered their political and financial aid for the activities of the Mejlis. Moreover, they tried to work as a lobby for the activists in Crimea. However, internal debates and institutional inabilities posed an obstacle to the coordination of these efforts for years.

Crimean Tatar discourse on Soviet Trauma: in Ukraine and abroad

Despite the apparent complexity of the issue within the Ukrainian-Crimean political discourse between 1991 and 2014, deportation narratives were always present in the Crimean political agenda as one of the dominant themes. During this period, we evidenced the mobilization of Crimean Tatars around this shared trauma, particularly around the commemoration of the deportation of May 18. Starting in 1993, this day was marked in the calendar not only as a commemoration date of the deportation, but also as an event to exchange political ideas and express economic concerns. On May 18, thousands of Crimean Tatars marched to Simferopol (Aqmescit in Crimean Tatar), the administrative capital of Crimea, to express their political and economic demands, and to e-unite with people from different parts of Crimea. The memory of physical and emotional injury gave a powerful impetus to the consolidation. Although the Crimean Tatar diaspora was excluded from the massive international awareness campaign on the genocidal nature of forced deportation in 1994, they share trauma narratives and commemorated this traumatic event as a symbol of the sufferings of the Crimean Tatar transnational community. It was underlined as a point of reference of the Russian oppression of Crimean Tatars and the last hit from the "enemy" to erase Crimean Tatar identity from the peninsula where the Crimean Tatars were a minority in 1944 as a result of the migration waves underlined above. Moreover, the diaspora elite believed that their migration from the peninsula and the deportation are the results of Moscow's policies targeting a single aim.

The shared trauma memories could be observed in political activism as well. In the early 2000s, the regional political elite of Crimea was constituted by parties with a strong pro-Russian stance, communists (also affiliated with the pro-Russian agenda), situational pro-Ukrainian parties and the ethnic bloc of Mejlis. The latter, being an informal assembly representing Crimean Tatar interests, has never been registered as a political party in Ukraine. Although Mejlis' formal position was not clear, its influence on the Crimean Tatar community was tremendous. Based on the ethnic principle, Mejlis sustain the executive mechanism of Qurultay (all people assembly of Crimean Tatar) and projected the decisions of Qurultay in political activism. Mustafa Dzhemilev, who headed the organization from the very beginning until 2013, played a special role in the strong political mobilisation of Mejlis . Dzhemilev is a veteran of the democratic movement from the late USSR; he was an open critic of the Soviet system and a political prisoner for his efforts

to persuade Crimean Tatars to return to Crimea. Even after Russian authorities declined his entry to Crimea (2014), he continued to be the principal figure in the ongoing discussion regarding the restoration of justice regarding deportation. His charisma and reputation as a non-compromising Soviet dissident continue to be well respected among diaspora communities.

His support of Revolution of Dignity and the post-Euromaidan reform process is an important factor in the good perception of Ukraine and Ukrainian diaspora in the eyes of the Crimean Tatar diaspora. The established relations between Mejlis and Ukrainian authorities gave way to a new framework for the relationship among the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian diaspora communities in Turkey.

Ukrainians in Turkey

According to Aybak and Antonova-Ünl, Sağin-Şimşek, Ateşman, Lozovska[46], the Black Sea region become a new transport, trade and migration hub with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The business partnership, transborder trade, and cross-border investments became significant factors in the 90s, the period of post-Soviet transition for Ukraine, Russia and Georgia. People, money and goods were circulating in the region, but among new migrants from the former Soviet Union, one group stood out. It was "exotic" and visually dominated - young women who married Turkish men. Coming from different parts of the former USSR, these women were not accommodated by existing diaspora groups. Tunc Aybak characterised their attitude as liminality, disorientation, thus a specific stage, where personal goals are not clear, and the only obtainable reality is a situation of transition. Using generic "Russian women" as characteristic of women from different countries and of different ethnic origin, Aybak recreated the romantic situation of the Russian émigré wave of the early 1920s, triggered by the Russian revolution and civil war. That previous wave brought to Istanbul Russian chic, extravaganza and soon was gone, because most of the émigrés continued their journey to Europe.

The reality of new migrants was much different, because for many of these female migrants Turkey become a new home. This group can be characterized in terms of post-Soviet diasporas: Russian speaking, with some nostalgic feelings towards the USSR and consuming information about their home country from Russian media. It can be argued that the ones who migrated to Turkey in the early years of the independence (1990s and 2000s) had weak connections and little interest in the process of nation-building at home. They did not carry the heritage of the years that brought about the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan. The graphic below summarizes the power distribution and inter-diaspora connections before 2014 in Canada and Turkey. We can conclude that prior to 2013 Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian diasporas were moving separately following their trajectories.



Figure 2. Milana Nikolko and Fethi Kurtiy Şahin©, 2020.

Post-Euromaidan change, alliances and common projects

Ukraine's struggle for nationhood and sovereignty accelerated in 2014 during the Euromaidan and following that the annexation of Crimea and violent conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Following Koinova[47], the Ukrainian crisis has all the reasons to be characterized as a critical juncture for Ukraine and Ukrainian diaspora. The critical juncture is an event of high amplitude that changes social practices and creates new meanings, but often comes with devastating consequences, such as changing state structures and influencing regional and international order.[48]The critical event affected diaspora as much as the homeland and produced long lasting effects.

In Canada, with the start of Euromaidan, Ukrainian diaspora mobilized quickly and effectively: from November 2013 to February 20, peaceful protests in support of Euromaidan rippled through Canada.[49] The Ukrainian Canadian Congress organized political demonstrations across the country to raise money and bring even more attention to the dramatic events in Ukraine, the money transfers, remittances and aid to the home country grew by 30 to 50%. Between 2014 and April 2015 more than a half of all respondents spent at least one day volunteering for Ukraine in their host state while 20% indicated they did volunteer work in Ukraine.[50] About 30% of interviewees supported Ukrainian Canadian organizations and participated in events, relating to the crisis in Ukraine. Many respondents also

mentioned a changing pattern in their financial support to the families back in Ukraine. For example, they spent more money on remitting to Ukraine than before and the destination of these remittances also changed. Diaspora of the fourth generation are now sending more money to help those relatives, who hadn't receive support before, but needed it during the crisis. For all Ukrainian diaspora, regardless of generational differences, social networks became a major arena for healthy debate, discussions, fundraising and information exchange. Emerging from that was sporadic collaboration, and new models of support were converted into sustainable projects, including support for the Ukrainian army in 2014, multiple humanitarian projects and support with online research and investigation on Russian aggression and common human rights initiatives. For the very first time we observe active diaspora collaboration with Ukrainian embassies, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other governmental organizations.[51]

Diaspora participation included a considerably wide spectrum of support to Ukraine and institutional support to Crimean Tatar organizations. Starting in 2016 a few attempts were made in the Canadian Parliament to pass Bill 306 "An Act to establish Crimean Tatar Deportation (*Sürgünlük*) Memorial Day and to recognize the mass deportation of the Crimea Tatars in 1944 as an act of genocide". This common project of "Ukrainian parliament group", political activists and Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar diasporas is still ongoing and is one of many common initiatives. In Turkey, February 2014 was a breaking point in the history of the Crimean Tatars and caused deviations in the diaspora. Before the Russian annexation, the diaspora concentrated on strengthening ties with the Mejlis and Kurultai, while solving the problems of the returnees from the deportation lands. As mentioned before, decisions and activities of the institutions in Crimea and Ukraine constituted a political framework for the diaspora communities. However, because of the oppression of self-government institutions in Crimea, the Russian annexation enforced the diaspora institutions to be more engaged in the Crimean Tatar politics on the peninsula.

As a result, they have started to work on improving relations with the Ukrainian authorities and Ukrainian diaspora.[52] On the very day of February 26, 2014, we witnessed incidents that changed the relations between Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians, which also reflected on the diasporas. On that day, Crimean Tatar self-government institutions invited Crimean Tatars and all Crimeans to resist any kind of separatist movement. Thousands of people gathered in front of the parliament of the autonomous republic with the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian flags. While the groups supporting a secession and unification with Russia shouted "Russia!", Crimean Tatars shouted "Ukraine!" in response.

At the beginning of March 2014, the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People's headquarters was the last building on which the Ukrainian flag was flying in Crimea. During and after the annexation, Crimean Tatar leaders called on all their people in

Crimea, Ukraine and all over the world to back the Ukrainian state and support the territorial integrity of Ukraine. This position of the Crimean Tatar leaders became a crucial factor in the new relations between both sides. In return, Ukraine granted a special status for Crimean Tatars and the Poroshenko administration worked to improve relations with Crimean Tatars and well-being of the people. Although many people criticized Ukraine for being very late and slow to rehabilitate the rights of Crimean Tatars, this situation created a very important chance for improving cooperation and common projects. Under these circumstances, observers argue that there is a change in the framing of Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians towards each other and as a result of the traumatic event and they started to perceive each other differently.[53]

One of the most important reactions in the diaspora was the founding of the organization of "The Platform of Crimean Tatar Organizations" in Turkey on February 8, 2015.[54] 42 Crimean Tatar diaspora institutions in Turkey gathered and established this de facto platform to declare their support to the *Mejlis* and the *Qurultay*[55].They declared that all Crimean Tatar institutions recognizing the authority of the *Qurultay* and the *Mejlis* are welcomed in this platform and they aim to work to free Crimea from the occupation of the Russian Federation and to protect the rights of the Crimean Tatar people. Naturally, these arguments go parallel with the protection of the territorial integrity of Ukraine. This umbrella institution representing the overwhelming majority of the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey, which is the largest in the world, worked with the leaders of the *Mejlis* and called the 2nd World Congress of Crimean Tatars. During the meeting, perhaps for the first time in Crimean Tatar history, the diaspora willingly took on significant responsibility for the political side of the movement by establishing a trans-national institution defending the rights of the Crimean Tatar people in the international arena and backing the leaders of the Kurultai and the *Mejlis*. The occupation facilitated the unification of the diaspora organizations.[56]

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine – Pavlo Klimkin – participated the event in the name of the President of Ukraine – Petro Poroshenko, and read the letter of President Poroshenko asking for an apology from the Crimean Tatar people for not trusting them before the occupation and officially promising for the establishment of a Crimean Tatar autonomous state in Ukraine by linking Crimean autonomy with Crimean Tatar indigeneity.

An important marker of a change in the relations between Ukraine and the Crimean Diaspora is the usage of Ukrainian in official and everyday practices. Most of the members of the Crimean Tatar diaspora living in Canada were citizens of Ukraine when they arrived in Canada, and they often used the Ukrainian flag. However, for the Crimean Tatars living in Turkey, it was a new and uneasy move.

For years, leaders of the Crimean Tatar Diaspora had conflictive relations with Ukrainian authorities due to Ukraine's inability to prevent the suffering of

Crimean Tatars after the return and because of the oppressive policies of Crimean authorities towards new Crimean Tatar communities. On May 18 (Commemoration of Deportation 1944), ceremonies organized in Turkey were addressed by Ukrainian authorities and the officials. They were underlined as the causes of the sufferings of Crimean Tatars. It can be argued that as a result of the post-Soviet atmosphere and the lack of knowledge about Ukrainian politics, Crimean Tatars targeted Ukraine as the source of the problems. The very first attempt (2013) to combine the Ukrainian flag with the Turkish and Crimean Tatar flag was the concert of a Crimean Tatar ensemble. It caused serious debates among the leaders of the organizations. As a result, it took a long time, approximately until the second half of the 2010s when the co-occurrence of two flags become a normal practice. Appeals by Mustafa Jemilev, Mejlis and the stance of the leaders of the Crimean Associations changed the traditional practice. In addition to this significant change, Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian diaspora organizations started to attend each other's organizations and demonstrations. Events devoted to May 18, or Holodomor, Vyshyvanka Day (celebration of Ukrainian ethnic embroidered top), the tragic day of the Crimean occupation became unified practices for all organizations. Crimean Tatar organizations now include the Ukrainian anthem in their ceremonies and the Crimean Tatar anthem is also used at versa events sponsored by the Ukrainian Embassy. Nowadays, the Ukrainian community in Turkey is engaged in Crimean Tatar activism 'the 100th anniversary of the 1st Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar People was celebrated by an event organized by the Crimean Associations with the participation of the Ukrainian ambassador and Ukrainian community,' where Ukrainian, Crimean Tatar and Turkish flags were hoisted together. The very source of the Crimean Tatar demands and the justification of their political activism was recently unified with the Ukrainian symbols in the diaspora following the changes in the homeland.

Another example of collaborative legitimate procedures is granting the Ukrainian diaspora ID cards (*Posvidchennya zokordonnohya Ukrayintsya*) for Crimean Tatars.[57] With this act, Crimean Tatars are officially accepted as a part of the Ukrainian diaspora, although there is no constitutional or legal framework regarding the indigeneity of Crimean Tatars apart from a Ukrainian Parliamentary resolution. This inclusion was implemented in another symbolic and institutional move, on April 8, 2017, with the support of the Ukrainian Embassy in Turkey, Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar associations established a coordination platform by signing a common declaration.[58] This is the first official institution covering Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian diasporas and that is why it can be accepted as a start of a new term in the diaspora histories.

It must be understood that this kind of political preferences is mostly expressed by the elite and leaders of the diaspora communities. In the daily lives of the diaspora members, cultural and daily activities are still shaped by old habits.

Moreover, religion and language differences are important factors that cannot be excluded from the picture. Yet, there is an increasing tendency to invite the other to the organizations and share the events among the diaspora associations in Turkey.

Ukrainians in Turkey

The Ukrainian activists and heads of Ukrainian diaspora organizations whom we interviewed characterized the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 as a situation of "awakeness", when the ethnic origin and the destiny of the motherland obtain the new value for Ukrainian migrants. They consider that migration from Ukraine at the end of the twentieth century was accompanied by some troublesome stories about exploitation and ethnic tension (for example the import sex trafficking channels). The home country crisis responded in a new wave of volunteering, mobilization and pushed Ukrainians to seek institutional and legitimate recognition of their identity. Most of the Ukrainian diaspora groups in Turkey were established after 2014.

With about 40,000 Ukrainian migrants living in Turkey, there are about 10-12 diaspora organizations, which mostly operate in the sphere of culture and education. According to our interviews, Ukrainian diasporas very much relied on help from the Ukrainian embassy, including consulting, coordination of activities and grant support. During the serios of interviews, conducted with Ukrainian organisations in Turkey, all of the respondents expressed deep appreciation for the lasting support of Turkish officials, local municipalities and communities. With their main focus on education, promotion of culture and restoration and preservation of the history of the country, Ukrainian diaspora groups are reluctant to engage in political activism and prefer to stay in a safe zone of cultural diplomacy. At the same time, we evidenced multiple episodes of continued collaboration between Crimean Tatar activists and Ukrainians.

By 2016 we observed "the exodus" of Ukrainian migrants from the liminality of post- Soviet Diaspora and the formation and institutionalization of Ukrainian diaspora groups in Turkey, which plan their activity with consideration of Crimean Tatar groups and with the strong support of the Ukrainian embassy.

In Canada, the crisis stimulated the formation of the Crimean Tatar diaspora and strong engagement of the last wave of Ukrainian migrants with long existing diaspora organizations. The critical reflection and reconsideration of the Soviet past could be observed in all groups of research. We can conclude that the critical juncture in the home country affected diaspora groups by eliminating post-Soviet nostalgia, facilitating critical reflection on Soviet history, re-actualizing trauma narratives and creating new inter-diaspora alliances. The findings are graphically illustrated below:



Figure 3. Milana Nikolko and Fethi Kurtiy Şahin©, 2020.

Conclusions: overcoming the differences

The comparison between Ukrainian diaspora in Canada and Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey showed that both played a significant role in nation-building in their host countries. In Canada, Ukrainian diaspora intellectuals and politicians brought and legitimized the idea of multiculturalism as a new model for Canadian Identity and in Turkey Crimean Tatar activists played a crucial role in shaping modern Turkish society from the beginning of Ataturk's era of modernization. The recent conflict in Ukraine fits neatly into this pre-existing environment of achievements by Crimean Tatar and Canadian diasporas: the pursuit of freedom from Russia, where long standing memories of trauma and victimhood have become a trans-regional and transnational idea, that unites all members of ethnic group in their response to ongoing oppression. Our findings suggest an intergenerational and interethnic juxtaposition of different diaspora groups in the framing of the home state crisis. Recent challenges in their home country pushed diaspora groups to unite their front and to bridge their institutions with the uprising communities. Ukrainian diaspora in Canadian Crimean Tatar diaspora synchronized their political agendas. The Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey helps Ukrainian diaspora to influence Turkish public opinion. We found evidence that regardless of the differences, all diaspora representatives were motivated to switch their modes of engagement with the homeland and pursue new models of cooperation with other

ethnic groups in a desire to achieve common goals. In our interviews in Canada and Turkey, we identified mass mobilization by means of volunteering initiatives, multiple examples of synchronized activities between different diaspora groups and the joint promotion of Ukraine via transnational networks. The Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey is working synchronically with newly established Ukrainian groups to preserve the national history of the country of origin and to attract international attention to the situation in occupied Crimea. Ukrainians in Canada strongly supported the parliament's discussion on the genocidal nature of the Crimean Tatar Deportation 1944 (*Sürgünlük*).

The complicated ornament of ethnic collective traumas, both caused by Tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union, and modern Russia, are compelling the diasporas to reassess their separate goals and proceed with the common agenda.

About the authors

Milana Nikolko, PhD, is an adjunct professor at the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Carleton University (Canada). From 2005 to 2014 Nikolko was associate Professor of Political Science at V. Vernadsky Taurida National University (Ukraine). She was a visiting professor at the Political Science Department of Valdosta State University (USA) in 2008, and at the Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa from 2009 to 2010 (Canada).Her main publications include the co-edited volume Post-Soviet Migration and Diasporas. From Global Perspectives to Everyday Practices. Editors: Nikolko, Milana, Carment, David (Eds.). Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. Diaspora Mobilisation and the Ukraine Crisis: Old Traumas and New Strategies, 2019, Ethnic and Racial Studies (DOI: 10.1080/01419870.2019.1569703. Her current research focuses on nation-building processes, political narratives of victimization, migration and diaspora groups in Europe and Canada.

Fethi Kurtiy Şahin is a PhD Candidate in Area Studies and a research assistant at Middle East Technical University (ODTÜ), Turkey. Şahin received an award from the Mustafa N. Parlar Foundation in 2016 for his master thesis entitled "Crimean Tatar Factor and Euromaidan in Ukraine's Nation Building Efforts: Novelties and Changes after 2014." His latest article with Filiz Tutku Aydin "The Politics of Recognition of Crimean Tatar Collective Rights: With Special Attention to Annexation of Crimea" is published in Communist and Post-Communist Studies (Vol. 52, Issue 1) in March 2019. His recent research focuses on the post-Soviet space, nationalism, Ukraine and Crimean Tatars. He has also volunteered in Crimean associations in Turkey.

Endnotes

1 Bild. 2016. "How Russia finances the Ukrainian rebel territories." Accessed September 4, 2019. http://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/ukraine-konflikt/russia-finances-donbass-44151166.bild.html

2 Approximately in the 6th century, Turkic peoples started to populate the vast Kipchak Steppe including southern Ukraine and Crimea. Kipchaks settled in this area in the 11th Century and soon became subjects of the Golden Horde, mixed together with Turkic and Muslim groups coming from Anatolia and southern Balkans and created an authentic identity, which resulted in the establishment of the Crimean Khanate in the first half of the 15th century after the collapse of the Golden Horde. Turkic speaking and Muslim people bearing this identity are called Crimean Tatars. The Crimean Khanate ruled most of the southern Ukraine, the northern Caucasus, today's Moldova and the Crimean Peninsula. It was one of the most important regional powers until its collapse in 1783. Details can be found in Hakan Kırımlı, Türkiye'deki Kırım Tatar ve Nogay Köy Yerleşimleri.Ankara: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2012.

3 UHHRU. 2019. Recommendations to Russia to ensure observance of civil and political rights in occupied Crimea (Accessed August 28, 2019) https://helsinki.org.ua/en/articles/recommendations-to-russia-to-ensure-observance-of-civil-and-political-rights-in-occupied-crimea/

4 Vertovec, Steven. 1997. "Three Meanings of "Diaspora," exemplified among South Asian Religions in Diaspora." Journal of Transnational Studies 6 (3). P. 277.

5 Cho, Lily. 2007. "The Turn to Diaspora". TOPIA: The Canadian Journal of Cultural Studies, 17, 11-30.

6 Adamson Fiona and M. Demetriou. 2007. "Remapping the Boundaries of the 'State' and 'National Identity': Incorporating Diasporas into IR Theorizing." European Journal of International Relations, 13(4), 497.

7 Koinova, Maria. 2014. "Why Do Conflict-generated Diasporas Pursue Sovereignty-based Claims through State-based or Transnational Channels? Armenian, Albanian, and Palestinian Diasporas in the UK Compared." European Journal of International Relations, vol 20 no. 4, 1043-1071.

8 Adamson, Fiona B. 2005. "Globalization, Transnational Political Mobilization, and Networks of Violence." Cambridge Review of International Affairs, (18) 1, 35-53.

9 Nikolko, Milana. 2016. Political narratives of victimisation among Canadian Ukrainian Diaspora in Diaspora as Cultures of Cooperation: Global and Local Perspectives. Edited by Ariane Sajed and David Carment. Palgrave Macmillan, 131-149.

10 Carment, David & Calleja, Rachael. 2017. "Diasporas and Fragile states – beyond remittances assessing the theoretical and policy linkages." Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. 44, 1-19. 10.1080/1369183X.2017.1354157.

11 Lupul, Manoly R. 2005. The politics of multiculturalism: a Ukrainian-Canadian memoir. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Study press; Yuzyk, Paul Jan.1967. Ukrainian Canadians: Their Place and Role in Canadian Life. Toronto: Ukrainian Canadian Business and Professional Federation.

12 V. Satzewich. 2002. The Ukrainian Diaspora. London: Routledge; Himka, John-Paul. 2016. "A Central European Diaspora under the Shadow of World War II: The Galician Ukrainians in North America." In Austrian History Yearbook 37, 17-31; Frank Sysyn.1997. "The Ukrainian Famine of 1932-33: The Role of Ukrainian Diaspora in Research and Public Discussion" in Problems of Genocide: Proceedings of the International Conference on "Problems of Genocide". Cambridge, MA; Toronto: Zoryan Institute, 74–117.

13 Fujiwara, Aya. 2012. Ethnic Elites and Canadian Identity: Japanese, Ukrainians, and Scots, 1919–1971. Edmonton: University of Manitoba press; Carment, David. 2015. "Diaspora Politics: When domestic votes trump foreign policy" in Open Canada (Accessed February 28, 2018) https://www.opencanada.org/features/diaspora-politics-when-domestic-votes-trump-foreign-policy/;Kozachuk,

Oleh. 2017. “Ukraine in Canadian Foreign Policy After 2014.” TransCanadiana. Polish Journal of Canadian Studies, 305-21.

14 Udovyk, Oksana. 2017. “Beyond the Conflict and Weak Civil Society; Stories from Ukraine: Cases of Grassroots Initiatives for Sustainable Development.” East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies Vol 4, No 2, 187-210; Mokrushyna, Halyna. 2013. “Is the classic diaspora transnational and hybrid? The case of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress.” Nations and Nationalism 19 (4): 799–818; Nikolko, Milana. 2016; Marples, David. 2007. Heroes and Villains: Constructing National History in Contemporary Ukraine. Budapest, Hungary and New York: Central European University Press. 383pp

15 Kozatchenko, Ivan. 2017a. “Retelling Old Stories with New Media: National Identity and Transnationalism in the “Russian Spring” Popular Uprisings.” East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies Vol 4, No 1: 137-158.

16 Most of the Ukrainians who emigrated westward during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries came from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in particular, the provinces of Bukovyna and Galicia, along with Carpatho-Ukraine.

17 Isajiw, Wsevolod. 2010. “The Ukrainian Diaspora.” In The Call of the Homeland: Diaspora Nationalisms, Past and Present, edited by A. Gal, A.S. Leoussi, and A.D. Smith. Leiden and Boston: Brill.

18 A large part of political and business organizations of Ukrainian Canadians were established in that period, among them: the Ukrainian War Veterans’ Association, deeply associated with the Ukrainian nationalist movement (OUN -UWVA), Sich (a youth movement), and Ukrainian leftists (ULFTO).

19 Mokrushyna, Halyna. 2013. Is the classic diaspora transnational and hybrid? The case of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress. Nations and Nationalism. 19. 10.1111/nana.12032.

20 The recent structure of UWC leadership shows the dominance of Ukrainian Canadians, where 50 % of the executive committee was occupied by Canadians.

21 Aybak, Tunc. 2017. “Russian speaking diaspora in Turkey: the geopolitics of migration in the Black Sea region”. In: Post-Soviet Migration and Diasporas: From Global Perspectives to Everyday Practices. Nikolko, Milana and Carment, David , eds. Migration, Diaspora and Citizenship . Palgrave Macmillan, UK, pp. 127-142.

22 Kozatchenko, Ivan. 2017b. “Homeland from afar: the Ukrainian diaspora after Euromaidan.” Open lecture at Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, Edmonton. May 1, 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HyF6eIhdzQI

23 Census profile, Census 2016. (Accessed February 28, 2018) http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/dp-pd/prof/details/page .cfm?Lang=E&Geo1=PR&Code1=01&Geo2=PR&Code2=01&Data=Count&SearchText=Canada&SearchType=Begins&SearchPR=01&B1=Language&TABID=1

24 See details in Nikolko, 2016

25 Williams, Brian. G. 2001.The Crimean Tatars: the diaspora experience and the forging of a nation. Leiden; Boston; Koln: Brill. P. 257.

26 Karpat, Kemal. 1985. Ottoman Population, 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics. Madison-Wisconsin, P. 66.

27 Kırımlı, Hakan. 2012. Türkiye’deki Kırım Tatar ve Nogay Köy Yerleşimleri. Ankara: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, v-xiii.

28 Ibid. The author underlines that many other settlements are lost or could not be found because of the re-settlements, urbanization, name changes and some other reasons.

29 Ibid. P 5-10.

30 Ibid. P11-12.

31 Ibid p.923.

32 Geray, Cevat. 1962. Türkiye'den ve Türkiye'ye Göçler ve Göçmenlerin İskânı (1923-1961). Ankara. (cited in Kırımlı, Türkiye'deki Kırım Tatar ve Nogay Köy Yerleşimleri, 13). 9.

33 Kırımlı 2010, 7.

34 Gaspıralı İsmail Bey (Ismail Gasprinskii) published his famous newspaper Tercüman.

35 See Hakan Kirimli. 1993. "The Young "Tatar" movement in the Crimea, 1905-1909", Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique, 34(4), (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales), 529-560.

36 This is why the 1991 Qurultay was named as the 2nd Qurultay.

37 Şahin, Fethi Kurtiy. 2016. "Crimean Tatar Factor and Euromaidan in Ukraine's Nation Building Efforts: Novelties and Changes after 2014." MA. Thesis. Middle East Technical University, 62.

38 For a detailed discussion on this process, see; Filiz Tutku Aydin, "Comparative Cases in Long-Distance Nationalism: Explaining the Émigré, Exile, Diaspora and Transnational Movements of the Crimean Tatars" (PhD Dissertation, University of Toronto, 2012), 237-262.

39 Şahin, Fethi Kurtiy. 2018. "A Bridge Between Ukraine And Turkey: Crimean Tatar Diaspora" in 25 Years of Turkey-Ukraine Diplomatic Relations: Regional Developments and Prospects for Enhanced Cooperation (AVİM (Center for Eurasian Studies) Conference Book No: 22), edited by Turgut Kerem Tuncel & Ayşegül Aydıngün. Ankara, 64-65.

40 Aydin, Filiz Tutku. 2012. "Comparative Cases in Long-Distance Nationalism: Explaining the Émigré, Exile, Diaspora and Transnational Movements of the Crimean Tatars." PhD Dissertation. University of Toronto, 371-72.

41 Aydin. 2012, 372.

42 One can see the campaigns organized in the late 1980s in the Emel Journal archives. Emel Journal is the most important publication for the diaspora, it served as a platform for intellectuals and a school for the younger generations for a long time.

43 Williams. 2001, 263.

44 Williams. 2001, 268.

45 The mass return of Crimean Tatars deported in 1944 back to Crimea was rather chaotic and badly managed by new Ukrainian government.

46 See detailed analysis in Aybak 2016; Antonova-Ünlü, Elena; Sağin-Şimşek, Çiğdem; Ateşman, Ender; Lozovska, Anna. 2015. "Russian Immigrant Diaspora in Turkey: Language Use, Preference and Attitudes" Turkish Studies, Volume 16, Issue 3, 391-410.

47 Koinova, Maria. 2018. "Critical junctures and transformative events in diaspora mobilization for Kosovo and Palestinian statehood". Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 44:8, 1289-1308, DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2017.1354158

48 Koinova. 2018, 7.

49 Hopkins, Andrea and Rod Nickel. 2014. Ukrainians in Canada send money, shed tears for Kiev. February 20, 2014. (Accessed February 28, 2018) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-diaspora/ukrainians-in-canada-send-money-shed-tears-for-kiev-idUSBREA1J28H20140220

50 Ukrainian diaspora investment studies. 2015. 20.

51 Ukrainian Canadian aid went through the UCC channels, as well as the Friends of Ukrainian Defense Forces Fund (FUDF), Patriot Defense, Ambulances for Ukraine and the Canadian Ukrainian Surgical mission.

52 Because of the conflictive character of the relations between Crimean Tatar self-government

institutions and the Ukrainian and Crimean authorities, the image of 'Ukraine' was a not an image of an 'ally' in the minds of Crimean Tatar diaspora. Moreover, security concerns of Ukraine related to the Peninsula with the demands of the Crimean Tatar national movement caused frictions between both sides. As a result, we did not observe cooperation until 2014. See; Fethi Kurtiy Şahin, "A Bridge Between Ukraine And Turkey: Crimean Tatar Diaspora" in 25 Years of Turkey-Ukraine Diplomatic Relations: Regional Developments and Prospects for Enhanced Cooperation (AVİM (Center for Eurasian Studies) Conference Book No: 22), edited by Turgut Kerem Tuncel & Ayşegül Aydıngün, (Ankara, July 2018), 66.

53 Aydin, Filiz Tutku & Sahin, Fethi Kurtiy. 2019. "The Politics of Recognition of Crimean Tatar Collective Rights in the Post-Soviet Period: With Special Attention to the Russian Annexation of Crimea." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 52, 39-50.

54 Kırım Haber. 2015. "Türkiye'de bulunan 42 Kırım Tatar teşkilatından tarihi karar." Accessed September 12, 2019 http://www.vatankirim.net/kirimhaber/haber/haber_detay.asp?HaberID=102.

55 Kırım Derneği. 2015. "Kırım Tatar Teşkiları Platformu'ndan Tarihî Karar." Accessed September 12, 2019. http://www.kirimdernegi.org.tr/haberler/462-kirim-tatar-teskilatlari-platformu-ndan-tarihi-karar

56 Şahin. 2018.

57 The first two people obtained their documents on February 4, 2017.

58 QHA. 2017. "Ukrayna ve Kırım Tatar Derneklerinin Koordinasyon Grubu Kuruldu." Accessed September 12, 2019. http://old.qha.com.ua/tr/toplum/ukrayna-ve-kirim-tatar-derneklerinin-koordinasyon-grubu-kuruldu/154462/

Publishing Information

The Online Open Access Journal **Euxeinos. Governance and Culture in the Black Sea Region** is published by the **Center for Governance and Culture in Europe** (GCE-HSG), University of St.Gallen, Switzerland with the financial support of **Landys & Gyr Stiftung**.

Contact
Center for Governance and Culture in Europe (GCE-HSG)
University of St.Gallen
Müller-Friedberg-Str. 6/8
CH-9000 St.Gallen
Switzerland
Phone: +41 (0) 71 224 25 61

Email: euxeinos@unisg.ch

URL: www.euxeinos.ch, www.gce.unisg.ch/euxeinos
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/euxeinos1

Cover image: Lviv Handmade Chocolate, Lviv, Ukraine. Photopraph by Elena Kuchko©

ISSN 2296-0708