Euxeinos

Governance and Culture in the Black Sea Region

14 / 2014

Nations, Nation-States, Trade and Politics in the Black Sea

Guest Editor
Constantin Ardeleanu
"The Lower Danube" University of Galaţi



Map of the Black Sea from the Portolan Atlas Dedicated to Hieronymus Ruffault, Abbot of St. Vaast (circa 1544) Author: Battista Agnese

Online Journal of the Center for Governance and Culture in Europe
University of St. Gallen
URL: www.gce.unisg.ch, www.euxeinos.ch
ISSN 2296-0708

Last Update 15 September 2014

LANDIS & GYR STIFTUNG

Center for Governance and Culture in Europe

University of St.Gallen

Contents

Nations, Nation-States, Trade and Politics in the Black Sea
Editorial by Constantin Ardeleanu, "The Lower Danube" University of Galaţi 3

The Black Sea Area in the Trade System of the Roman Empire
by Octavian Bounegru, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iaşi 8

The Black Sea, the "plaque tournante" of the Euro-Asian Trade during the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries
by Şerban Papacostea and Virgil Ciocîltan, "Nicolae Iorga" History Institute of the Romanian Academy, Bucharest 17

The Opening and Development of the Black Sea for International Trade and Shipping (1774–1853)
by Constantin Ardeleanu, The Lower Danube" University of Galaţi 30

List of illustrations 53

Publishing Information/Contact 54

Nations, Nation-States, Trade and Politics in the Black Sea

Editorial

Nations and nation-states in the divided Black Sea area

Recent political and military developments in Ukraine have nourished an unprecedented international awareness regarding the significance of the Black Sea area in the economic and political relations between Russia and the West. Specialists in international relations and socio-humanities researchers are analysing the implications of this new collision in the post-Soviet bloc, and in trying to understand the deep roots of these contemporary events the appeal to history is compulsory. The Black Sea area has thus turned into a veritable laboratory for also analysing contemporary nationalism.

The national boom of the 19th century favoured the creation of the Balkan nations and nation-states, but it also planted on the eastern coast of the Euxine seeds that slowly germinated into the vigorous nations of the Caucasian area. The First World War unleashed new national energies with the implosion of the Russian Empire and the explosion of Ottoman Turkey. With its pretended internationalist ideology, the Soviet Union tried to close Pandora's Box and keep inside the national evils that could have threatened the stability of the new empire. On the opposite shore of the Black Sea, the Turkish nation state was being forged with ample use of nationalism in order to crush the power of tribal or religious leaders. The Cold War revived national mutants in the area, with for instance the rebirth of Romanian nationalism during Nicolae Ceauşescu's dictatorship, a national phoenix that lived more in spirit than in form. Finally, the fall of communism freed the national genie from Aladdin's lamp. Frozen nationalism rose from under the Soviet icecap and the national map of the Black Sea area was completely reshaped, with several national continents and islands emerging after this last glaciation.

If we imagine the Black Sea as a table, and all riparian nation-states as guests invited to a feast, the seating plan would look like in the picture below. These merged triangles would suggest that the nations around the Euxine have been rather ignorant of and distant from their messmates across the table, and generally interacted only with their direct table neighbours. Regarded from within, the Black Sea area seems to have no geographical or cultural unity. The plains, steppes, highlands or deserts around it are as various as the peoples, cultures or religions bordering the Euxine. Imperial powers, coming from the mainland, managed to gather all these territories and peoples under a single political umbrella, but they all remained extremely distinct and difficult to homogenise.



Source: Constantin Ardeleanu

Maritime history and the Black Sea

In trying to explain this reality, the appeal to maritime economic history can be useful. The Black Sea has always been part of a larger economic system, being the pivot of a complimentary mechanism and a contact

area between the maritime civilisations of the Mediterranean world and the terrestrial nations of the Eastern steppe lands. It served as a prolongation of the Mediterranean towards the rich Eastern regions and vice versa, as a straightforward corridor towards European and global commercial routes. Apparently, the Black Sea had little existence in itself and mainly acted as a bridge between two different economic worlds.

The communities living on its coasts have generally flourished in connection with the merchants coming from beyond the Straits: the same in the ancient world, when a string of Greek trading emporia connected all corners of this sea into a single commercial network linked with the Mediterranean world, or in the Middle Ages, when the Black Sea was revived by the entrepreneurial spirit of Genoese and Venetian merchants. During the modern period, the binding agent of the Black Sea was represented by Greek, Italian, French or English seafarers, who discovered or rediscovered the agro-pastoral resources of the Eastern plains.

Fernand Braudel insisted in his influential works that the sea unites, not divides. This is a theory which he masterfully demonstrated for the Mediterranean Sea, but it still remains only a theorem, not an axiom, being only valid for those seas navigated by maritime peoples. The Black Sea coasts are inhabited by what can be termed "seasick peoples", lacking seafaring skills and a mercantile calling. The nations around the Black Sea do not chant, cherish or worship the sea, they have few sea gods (if at all), no great maritime ballads, no Ulysses and no Captain Ahab. We have a sea, but we lack the skills to tame it. Without such binding agents as the merchants and ship owners, it is only a geographical sea, not a functional economic one. It becomes a futile expanse of water, separating those territories along its coasts more profoundly than the highest and steepest of mountains. When analysing the relations between different peoples and the sea, I distinguish between thalasso-phile and thalasso-phobic nations. Black Sea farmers and animal breeders have no time for embarking on maritime enterprises when dealing with their time-consuming agricultural and pastoral obligations. A Polish author wrote what can be valid for most Black Sea peoples: "A Pole does not need the sea when busy with his plough"[1]. In a hopefully clearer comparison, there are peoples who for their prosperity rely on a ship and those who rely on sheep.

Phases of Black Sea history

This destiny as a bridge between two complimentary worlds has completely shaped the history of the Black Sea. It fulfilled, during the past centuries, several functions, which shall be briefly explained in terms of space layout. All powers that controlled the Straits encircling the Sea of Marmara, the antechamber of the Black Sea (such as the Byzantine and the Ottoman Empires), aimed to keep the Euxine closed and used it as a pantry or cellar, so as to have exclusive control of its resources. For the terrestrial powers of Central and Eastern Europe, it served as a mere vestibule towards the veritable dining room represented by the Mediterranean. During the 19th century, the Black Sea became a dining room or rather a mess hall in itself, in which the opposing forces carefully scrutinised the table manners of their dinner companions.

The most careful guards of the Straits were the Ottoman Turks, who, since late 15th

[1] Quoted in Henryk Klimesz, Poland's Trade through the Black Sea in the Eighteenth Century, in *The Polish Review*, vol. 15, no. 2, 1970, p. 55.

century, conquered the entire Black Sea area and closed the sea to foreign trade and shipping. For two and a half centuries the access of foreigners into this sea was limited, to the effect that its peoples stopped being part of the historical changes that rapidly transformed Mediterranean and Western Europe. Waterways have been accessible means of conveying not only physical commodities, but also ideas, ideologies, cultural values, and as an "Ottoman Lake" Karadeniz was not only deprived of its earlier economic connections with the Mediterranean, but it was also completely peripheral to the cultural or political values that were shaping and reshaping Europe at the beginning of the modern age.

Starting with late 18th century, the Black Sea gradually reconnected its trunk to the Mediterranean economic body and re-linked its nerves to the European cultural brain. It shortly became a bridge not only between two different geographical realms, but also between two historically opposing worlds. As it opened its resources to western tradesmen, the Black Sea grew into the battlefield of the mythical combat between maritime and continental powers, the elemental opposition between sea and land. In Britain, the tensions between Russia and England were given the popular image of a scuffle between a bear and a whale, translated by several researchers into the biblical fight between the behemoth and the leviathan. Stepping down from celestial spheres, it should be mentioned that the area has remained ever since in a continuous cold war. It has been not only a dispute between two political systems, western democracy and Russian autocracy or totalitarianism, but also the battle between pure capitalism and a prohibitive and state controlled economic market.

Since the 19th century, the Black Sea area has been in a constant change. There are many variables, but except for a short interstice in early 20th century the region has been on the frontline of this battle between Russia and the West. During its initial phase, in the context of the complicated Eastern Question, the Black Sea turned from a thermometer into a thermostat of European diplomacy. In the genesis of this great interest for the area, economic and political factors intermingle closely and inseparably. In economic terms, the Black Sea area is famous for three products it generously supplied to international markets. Firstly, it provided men, large amounts of slaves fished in the demographic basins of the Euro-Asian steppe lands or of the Caucasus. Secondly, when the population in Mediterranean and Western Europe increased, it supplied grain from the rich plains of the western and northern Black Sea coasts. From a closed lake, peripheral to the emerging global market, the Black Sea became the largest supplier of grain in the world. Thirdly, oil, gas and energy have fuelled the new phases of technological development, just as grain fed the transition that followed the first industrial revolution. Men, grain and energy are the terms of the historical equation that kept alive the mercantile interest for the Black Sea area.

During this perennial opposition against Russia's natural expansionism, the Western Powers tried to win to their side the smaller Black Sea nations, which commonly shared the same anti-Russian views. During the 19th century, British statesmen greatly encouraged the rise of Black Sea nations as long as they kept an anti-Russian character and did not contest the lawful Ottoman subjection. Promoting free trade and investing in mutual joined ventures were convenient solutions to checking Russia's advance towards the Straits. British economic involvement in the Romanian Principalities or in Circassia in the 1830s

was directly intended to increase the internal political and economic stability of these territories, an extremely able modality to create and strengthen the anti–Russian national opposition in areas bordering the Ottoman Empire.

During the 20th century, the significance of the maritime factor decreased substantially following the development of land and airborne communications, but these long established historical divisions in the Black Sea area have been well preserved. The region remained on the frontline of the political conflict separating the Soviet Union and democratic Europe after World War One. A couple of decades later, the outcome of World War Two gave Russia the upper hand in the area, but with Turkey on the side of NATO, the Straits could not be used to export totalitarianism to the Mediterranean Sea. The Black Sea was sacrificed once more, allowing me to use the same sentence as before: as a Russian lake, the Chornoye Morye was not only deprived of its earlier economic connections with the Mediterranean, but it was also completely peripheral to all the cultural or political values that we coin as democratic and European.

With the end of the Cold War, the constellation of the Black Sea changed beyond recognition. The fall of communism brought about the collapse of a superpower, the birth of six new sovereign states and several secessionist movements. We have seen, only in the past six–seven years, quick developments that prove that historical tensions are still ripe. We have witnessed the war between Russia and Georgia, the impact of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement, developments regarding the conflict in Transnistria, the changing nature of Russian-Turkish relations, Russia's annexation of the Crimea and the complicated situation of Ukraine during the strained months of political turmoil in the spring and summer of 2014.

Strategically located between the oil and gas reserves of the Caspian basin and energy hungry Europe, the Black Sea seems to be in a profitable economic position. But while the opportunity to supply these resources to European markets raises hopes for economic development, competition to control pipelines, shipping lanes and transport routes raises the risks of confrontation. We thus again witness the same interest to invest economically in the new Black Sea nation states, although the crisis of these past years have hindered these plans. The Black Sea remains in the same situation as in the 19th century, a border between the major global powers: Russia, on the one side, the United States and the EU, on the other.

The recourse to maritime economic history

If seen from its coasts the Black Sea seems to be a story of fragmentation and discontinuity, it gains a more unitary character when regarded from a ship anchored beyond the Straits, somewhere in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Euxine has always been part of this larger economic system, the relay of a complimentary mechanism and a contact area between the maritime civilisations of the Mediterranean world and the terrestrial nations of the Eastern steppe lands. Romanian historians, from Vasile Pârvan and Nicolae Iorga to Gheorghe Brătianu and Andrei Oţetea, were among the first to insist upon this reality, which is so important for the historical destiny of the area. This issue of "Euxeinos" is a continuation of such an approach, with three papers written by Romanian historians, covering three of the most important phases in which the Black Sea

was open and in close economic relations with the Mediterranean world.

The first essay, by Professor Octavian Bounegru, depicts the Black Sea in the trading system of the Roman Empire as seen from the western coast of the Pontos Euxeinos. A string of Greek-Roman emporia scattered throughout its coasts were the centres of a profitable trade between themselves and with their hinterland, making the Black Sea a well integrated component part of the Roman civilisation. The second chapter, by two reputed medievalists, Şerban Papacostea and Virgil Ciocîltan, is a beautifully written presentation of the history of the Black Sea between 1204 and 1453, when the area served, according to the famous phrase of Romanian historian Gheorghe Brătianu, as the "plaque tournante" of the Euro-Asian trade, a commerce controlled by the two large Italian maritime republics, Venice and Genoa. The third part, by myself, shows how the Black Sea was re-opened to international trade and shipping after centuries of Ottoman closure and how trade transformed everything in an area that became the main supplier of grain to the world markets.

Read together, the three essays contain the common features of trade and politics in the Black Sea, the four veritable historical constants of this region (actors and factors, goods and routes): in terms of actors, the same competition between the maritime powers coming from the Mediterranean, the empire that controlled the Straits and the terrestrial hegemons of the vast lands stretching along the Black Sea coasts; similar factors related to the relation between trading outlets and their hinterland, economic privileges granted by the central governments in order to encourage commerce, etc.; the same abundant offer of raw materials, mainly agro-pastoral goods, and the same commercial routes that connected the sea to the Balkans and South-Eastern Europe, to the Ukrainian and Russian steppe lands, to the Caucasus, Anatolia and the Middle East. Regarded as such, not only geographically, but also historically the Black Sea takes on a surprising unity.

About the editor

Constantin Ardeleanu is associate professor of modern Romanian history at "The Lower Danube" University of Galaţi, where he teaches courses on the economic development of the Danubian and Black Sea areas during the 19th and 20th centuries. He defended his PhD at the "Nicolae Iorga" History Institute of the Romanian Academy (2006), and has been a postdoctoral fellow of the same institution (2010–2012) and the New Europe College, Institute of Advanced Study, Bucharest (2012–2013). In the past years he has been involved in several international research projects, most notably "The Black Sea and its port-cities, 1774–1914. Development, convergence and linkages with the global economy", coordinated by Professor Gelina Harlaftis from the Ionian University in Greece. Professor Ardeleanu's most relevant publications include the books *Evoluţia intereselor economice şi politice britanice la gurile Dunării, 1829–1914,* Brăila, 2008 and *International Trade and Diplomacy at the Lower Danube: the Sulina Question and the Economic Premises of the Crimean War (1829–1853)*, Brăila, 2014.

E-mail: constantin.ardeleanu@ugal.ro

The Black Sea Area in the Trade System of the Roman Empire

by Octavian Bounegru, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iaşi

Abstract

This paper analyses, with epigraphic and archaeological references, the features of trade and shipping on the western coast of the Black Sea during the ancient period. It starts with the political and military context of Rome's involvement in the area since the late second century BC, before dealing with the Mithridatic crisis, when the focus of Roman policy moved to the Aegean and the Black Sea. This tense political constellation triggered the development of regional trade, analysed on the basis of relevant sources, with a special attention devoted to Tomis, the largest outlet in the area of the mouths of the Danube. The author contends that excellent relations existed with the commercial centres of Asia Minor, more precisely Bithynia. A veritable maritime line from Nicomedia to Tomis acted as a major route between Asia Minor and the Black Sea – Danubian region. During the Roman age, the commercial and transport patterns established from Hellenistic times were preserved, and they continued to co-exist with those specific to the Roman world.

The Black Sea area is rarely (if ever) mentioned in scientific papers devoted to the ancient economy. Even in a recent book concerning the Roman economic system[1] the contribution of the Black Sea in the ensemble of the Empire's trade relations is practically neglected. This issue is only partially analysed in an older monograph, which is valuable for its ideas, but obsolete in terms of epigraphic[2] and archaeological references.[3] An extensive historical documentation that insists upon the local elements of trade in the larger context of the Roman world's economic system is thus ignored. If the Roman economy and administration appear in a different light when regarded from a provincial perspective, as it has been already proven,[4] it may be reasonably argued that the western district of the Black Sea represents an interesting case study.

In terms of economic history, the Black Sea should be analysed as a complex organism functioning in close connection with its adjacent areas. Located at the junction of the Eastern and European worlds, it seems to be a closed space. However, it opens into two directions towards the Mediterranean basin: through Dalmatia towards the central Mediterranean Sea, and through the Aegean Sea towards the Eastern Mediterranean. In this geographical ensemble, the Propontis played an essential role by securing a land connection between the Balkans and Anatolia (thus between East and West).[5] Such remarks are confirmed by the configuration of the land, fluvial and maritime routes which allowed the linkage of the Black Sea to the Greek-Roman world.

Three sections can be distinguished on the commercial axis between Asia and the Italian Peninsula: the Black Sea section, the Anterior Asia section (which expanded to the cities on the western coast of Anatolia), and the Asia Minor section (together with Cyprus); on this

1 H. Wolf, V. Velkov, Moesia Inferior und Trakien, in Fr. Vittinghoff (ed.), *Handbuch der europäischen Wirtschafts-und Sozialgeschichte 1. Europäische Wirtschafts-und Sozialgeschichte in der römischen Kaiserzeit*, Stuttgart, 1990, pp. 608–610.

2 Epigraphy refers to the study of epigraphs or inscriptions, especially to those dating from the ancient period.

3 E. Gren, *Kleinasien und der Ostbalkan in der Wirtschafts-und Entwicklung der römischen Kaiserzeit*, Uppsala, 1941.

4 J. Andreau, Introduction, in M. I. Rostovtzeff, *Histoire économique et social de l'Empire romain*, Paris, 1988, p. X.

5 M. Cary, *The Geographic Background of Greek and Roman History*, Oxford, 1950, p. 204.

last segment, the junction was made through Rhodes, the "plaque tournante" of trade in the Eastern Mediterranean.[6] The western Black Sea coast was thus included in the system of maritime trading in the Greek-Roman world.

The rivers that were navigable in the ancient period, such as the Danube (Istros), Maritsa (Hebrus) and Vardar (Axios), were also significant commercial routes for the distribution of goods in their areas. Equally important were the Balkan terrestrial commercial routes, generally oriented from the north to south or from the north-east to south-west: Histria – Odessos – Byzantium, Viminacium – Naissus – Thessaloniki, Novae – Philippopolis – Byzantium, Singidunum – Naissus – Hadrianopolis – Byzantium. It is interesting to note that these routes (in fact northern ramifications of the famous *Via Egnatia*[7]) suggest the direction of commercial routes from the Balkans and the mouths of the Danube towards the ports of the Thracian Sea and especially towards the *Via Egnatia*, which secured, via Byzantium, the linkage with Asia Minor and farther with the Syrian-Palestinian region.

The western, eastern and southern extremities of this area were marked by commercial centres that facilitated the distribution of goods to the mainland, towards the Balkans and the Danubian basin: Aquileia, Tomis and Thessaloniki. Whilst we have only limited knowledge regarding the last mentioned centre, available data concerning the commercial role of Aquileia are highly relevant. Described as the "plaque tournante" of the trade between Italy and the Danubian areas, Aquileia connected the central Mediterranean basin with that of the Lower Danube and the western Black Sea coast[8] through the commercial routes that followed the courses of the rivers Sava and Drava. Aquileia had consistent commercial exchanges with important centres such as Corinth,[9] Alexandria[10] or Nicomedia.[11] Numerous epigraphic sources referring to merchants and ship-owners grouped in veritable commercial "houses" (in fact professional associations whose juridical status cannot be clearly defined[12]) confirm Aquileia's role as a commercial hub securing the distribution of goods towards the Balkans and the Danubian area.[13]

Rome's early interest in the western Black Sea coast was motivated, to a great extent, by these geographical factors. The beginnings of the process of integrating the Balkans and the western Black Sea area into the Roman administrative system, which had serious consequences for the regional trade, are concurrent with several events that shaped the economic history of the Mediterranean: firstly, the demolition of Carthage, which brought Rome

6 J. Rougé, *Recherches sur l'organisation du commerce maritime en Méditerranée sous l'Empire romain*, Paris, 1966, p. 86.

7 The Via Egnatia was a road constructed by the Romans in the 2nd century BC, crossing the Roman provinces of Illyricum, Macedonia, and Thrace. It started at Dyrrachium (Durrës) on the Adriatic Sea, reached the Aegean Sea at Thessalonica and then continued to Byzantium.

8 S. Panciera, *Vita economica di Aquileia in étà romana*, Aquileia, 1957.

9 J. B. Brusin, *Inscriptiones Aquileia*, vol. I, Udine, 1991, p. 604.

10 S. Panciera, op. cit., pp. 88–89.

11 J. B. Brusin, op. cit., p. 879; cf. G. Brusin, *Orientali in Aquileia romana, "Aquileia Nostra"*, 24–25, 1953–1954, col. 56.

12 F. M. Robertis, *Storia delle corporazioni e del regimo associativo nel mondo Romano,* Bari, 1972, pp. 103–105; L. de Salvo, *Economia privata e publici servizi nell'Impero romano I Corpora navicolariorum,* Messina, 1992, 238 ff; O Schlippschuh, *Die Händler in römischen Kaiserreich in Gallien, Germanien und der Donauprovinzen Rätien, Noricum und Pannonien*, Amsterdam, 1987, 107 et seq.

13 J. B. Brusin, op. cit., p. 14; CIL (Corpus inscriptionum Latinarum) V 1598.

great economic advantages by the re-routing of the Syrian commercial roads, and secondly the suppression of the most important emporion in the Aegean Sea (Corinth) and the foundation of the province of Asia, which revived commercial exchanges in this area.[14] From this perspective and against the background of the increasing competition between the East and the western part of the Empire,[15] several stages in the integration of the western Black Sea area into the Roman trade system can be distinguished. These phases roughly correspond to the stages of Rome's Eastern policy.

The first military actions which also involved the western Black Sea coast took place in the last years of the second century BC. According to a vague note of Jordanes and an inscription in Cnidus,[16] a military expedition was led by T. Didius around 101 BC with the probable aim of establishing Roman control in the Thracian Chersoneses.[17] Unfortunately, no further information reveals to what extent the western Black Sea coast was militarily affected in this given historical context. According to a recent hypothesis, the famous treaty (*foedus*) between Rome and Callatis could have been concluded following a possible prolongation of Didius' expedition towards the shores of the Black Sea. A Latin version has been preserved on a well-known and frequently commented inscription found in Callatis.[18]

The Mithridatic crisis represents the decisive historical moment in the orientation of Roman policy towards the Black Sea basin, a process with great political and economic consequences. It is well-known that after Mithridates VI Eupator's conquest of the Crimea, which provided him with an important supply base,[19] the king of the Pontus established a vast system of alliances with the port-cities on the western Black Sea coast staring in the early first century BC. These alliances were concluded individually, as reflected in the texts of two inscriptions found in Apollonia[20] and Histria, both attesting the presence of troops in these cities, who were sent by Mithridates to maintaining their support. During the Mithridatic Wars, as well as on their eve, the Greek cities on the western Black Sea coast were successively allied either with the Romans or with Mithridates, and this fluctuation in their political relations also had marked economic effects.

Between the first two Mithridatic Wars (more precisely between 84 and 74 BC), the focus of Rome's foreign policy moved to the Aegean and western Black Sea areas. The Mithridatic crisis, far from impeding trade in the Black Sea basin, actually triggered a revival of commerce in the Straits area, a fact that can be explained by the increasing demand for Eastern goods.[21] The development of trade in the Aegean and Black Sea is evidenced by

14 J. Hatzfeld, *Les trafiquants Italiens dans l'Orient hellénistique*, Paris, 1919, pp. 30–32.

15 A. Grummerus, Industrie und Handel, in *RE (Real-Encyclopädia der klasischen Altertumswissendschaft) IX*, col. 1472–1475.

16 W. Blümel, *Die Inschriften von Knidos* (=IK 41), Bonn, 1992, p. 33.

17 L. D. Locopulou, Provinciae Macedoniae finis orientalis: The Establishement of the Eastern Frontier, in *Two Establishments of the Ancient Macedonian Topograph*, Athens, 1987, pp. 75–78.

18 Al. Avram, Der Vertrag zwischen und Kallatis (CIL I.2, 276), in B. Funk (ed.), *Hellenismus. Beiträge zur Erforschung von Akkulturation und politischer Ordung in den Staaten des hellenistischen Zeitalters*, Tübingen, 1996, pp. 491–511.

19 B. M. McGing, *The Foreign Policy of Mithridates VI Eupator King of Pontus*, Leiden, 1985, p. 43; Y. Vinogradov, Der Pontos Euxeinos als politische, ökonomische und kulturelle Einheit und Epigraphic, in "*Acta Centri Historiae Terra antiqua Balcanica*", 2, 1987, p. 65.

20 *IGB (Inscripiones Graecae in Bulgaria repertae)*, I 2 392.

21 J. Hatzfeld, op. cit., pp. 52–53.

the contents of a customs regulation of the province of Asia (*nomos télous Asias*), which was preserved on an inscription found in Ephesus;[22] this regulation, issued right before the outbreak of the second Mithridatic War in 74 BC, clearly defines the fiscal provisions of this commercial traffic. Not accidentally, the headquarters of Asia's customs district were located in Chalcedon. To illustrate Rome's interest in the Black Sea area, it should be mentioned that one of the first paragraphs of this customs regulation[23] imposed additional taxes for the re-exportation and re-importation of goods coming from or going to the Black Sea, which shows that the Romans were tightening their control over the trade of Black Sea commodities in the context of the predictable conflict against Mithridates. These fiscal measures demonstrate Rome's attempts to neutralise Mithridates' supplies through a customs policy aiming to suffocate the Pontic cities allied with the king and to economically isolate the Kingdom of Pontus.

These economic impositions were followed by the military expedition led by M. Terentius Varro Lucullus on the western Black Sea coast in 72–71 BC, which resulted in the conquest of the Greek cities.[24] In some of them, such as in Messambria, the Romans garrisoned their troops. However, despite such military efforts, the area was hardly controlled by the Roman administration for a while. Only after M. Licinius Crassus' expedition in the Balkans (29–28 BC) did the western Black Sea area effectively come under Roman dependence.[25]

The events that took place after Tiberius's reign are closely connected with Rome's Black Sea policy during the middle of the first century AD. After the Bosporan kingdom had entered the Roman sphere of influence during the reign of Augustus,[26] which allowed Claudius to intervene in the succession conflict between Cotys and Mithridates (44–45 AD),[27] Nero's reign marked an important stage during Rome's expansion towards the northern Black Sea area.[28] Nero's main objective was to impose Roman control in the entire Black Sea area and the Darial pass in the Caucasus (Caspiae portae)[29], which constituted the most important commercial route connecting the Black Sea to India and China.[30] This project was only accomplished with great efforts by Vespasian.[31] In all these activities the Black Sea component of Rome's Eastern policy is clearly recognisable.

An analysis of epigraphic sources is important for identifying the main components of trade in the western Black Sea basin. Among local cities, Tomis has the richest collection of such evidence regarding the activity of merchants and ship-owners. A first category of inscriptions mentions local merchants and seafarers. Two ship-owners from Tomis be-

22 H. Engelmann, D. Knibbe, *Das Zollgesetz der Provinz Asia. Eine neue Inschrift aus Ephesos*, EA, 14, 1989; cf. C. Nicolet, *Le Monumentum Ephesenum et la délimitation du portorium d'Asie, "Mélanges d'École Française de Rome. Antiquité"*, 105, 1993, pp. 929–959; M. Dreher, *Die lex portorii Asie und der Zollbezirk Asia, "Epigraphica Anatolica"*, 26, 1996, pp. 11–127; idem, *Das Monumentum Ephesenum und das römische Zollwesen, "Münstersche Beiträge zur antiken Handelsgeschichte"*, XVI/2, 1997, pp. 79–98.

23 H. Engelman, D. Knibbe, op. cit., pp. 46–47.

24 Appian, Illyr. 30, 85.

25 A. v. Premerstein, *Die Anfänge der Provinz Moesien, "Jahreshefte des österreichischen archäologischen Institutes"*, 1898, col 192.

26 V. T. Gajdukevic, *Das Bosporanische Reich*, Berlin, 1971, p. 331.

27 Tacitus, Ann., 12, 15; cf. V. M. Scramuzza, *The Emperor Claudius*, London, 1940, pp. 149–180.

28 W. Schurr, *Die Orientpolitik des Kaisers Nero*, Klio Beih., 1923, pp. 85–89.

29 Suet., Nero., 19, 2; Tacit., Hist., 1, 6.

30 E. Gren, op. cit., p. 86.

31 H. Halfmann, *Die Alanen und die römische Ostpolitik unter Vespasian, "Epigraphica Anatolica"*, 8, 1986, pp. 39–50.

long to this category, one whose name remains unknown[32] and another one, Theokrites, son of Theokritos,[33] whose profession as naukleros (ship-owner and captain in the same time) is also suggested by the representation on his tombstone of a commercial ship common for the entire Eastern Mediterranean.[34] The trading of goods carried by ship-owners from these centres was organised according to a pattern specific to the western Black Sea area and the Aegean Sea, namely the existence of associations of Tomitan ship-owners. There are two relevant epigraphic sources regarding this matter, one association named *Oikos ton naukleron* which is mentioned in two inscriptions.[35] This system of association of the great Tomitan ship-owners in the form of *Oikos*, which is only attested in a few cities in the western Black Sea and in Bithynia, indicates the existence of a common commercial space that included these two geographical areas. The great local merchants are represented at Tomis by Herakleidos of Asclepiades[36] and by another *emporos* (merchant) whose name is unknown.[37]

The second category of sources is that of epigraphic evidence referring to foreign merchants and ship-owners in Tomis. The profitable commercial exchanges between Tomis and Alexandria are evidenced both by the "house of Alexandrines"[38] which was built in Tomis as a temple dedicated to Serapis, and by reference to an Alexandrine wine merchant[39] who seems to have been the representative at Tomis of a wine merchants association from Alexandria. Another interesting case is that of Hermogenes, a great ship-owner[40] whose intense trading activity in the western Black Sea and in Asia Minor brought him the double citizenship of Tomis and of Fabia Ankyria. There is also mention of two *emporoi* (merchants) in Tomis, one named Stratokles, and the other Metrodos of Gaius,[41] both from the Bithynian city of Prusias ad Hypium.[42] Trade between the western Black Sea ports and large economic centres in Bithynia are also confirmed by the presence at Histria of a great family of Bithynian merchants.[43]

Available sources generally point to a particular orientation of western Black Sea ports towards the commercial centres of Asia Minor, more precisely of Bithynia. This specificity of regional mercantile dynamics deserves special consideration. Firstly, the inscriptions mentioning Bithynian merchants and ship-owners in the western Black Sea ports are not the only sources attesting the presence of Bithynians in this area. The list of foreigners – in this case Bithynians – historically attested at Tomis[44], Histria[45], Callatis[46], Odessos[47] , but also in other cities of the mainland, like Nicop-

32 ISM (Inscriptiones Schythiae Minor: graecae et latinae) II 291.
33 ISM II 186.
34 L Foucher, Quelques remarques sur la navigation antique: interprétations de documents figurés provenant de la région de Sousse (Tunisie), in *Atti del III Congresso di Archeologia Sottomarina, Barcelona*, 1961, 20, fig. 10–11; T. Gerasimov, *Antičin sarkofahi ot Odessos, "Izvestija Varna"*, 5, 1969, p. 66; I. Pekáry, Cheniskus. *Zu einem Tongefäß mit Schiffsdarstellung, "Boreas"*, 5, 1982, 273 et seq.
35 ISM II 132; ISM II 60.
36 ISM II 403.
37 ISM II 320.
38 ISM II 153.
39 ISM II 463.
40 ISM II 375.
41 ISM II 248.
42 L. Robert, *A travers l'Asie Mineure. Poètes et prosateurs, monnaies grecques, voyages et géographie, Paris*, 1980, pp. 76–80.
43 ISM I 82.
44 ISM II 281, 369.
45 ISM I 310.
46 ISM III 177.
47 IGB I 112, 139.

olis ad Istrum[48], Philippopolis[49], and Serdica[50], suggests the continuous presence in this area of the agents of Bithynian commercial centres.

At times, the commonality of interests of Bithynian merchants required their grouping in ethnic-professional associations, as it seems to have been the case with a community mentioned on a Tomitan inscription. It comprises a list of foreigners settled there originating from Bithynian cities such as Tius, Nicomedia, Heraclea and Caesarea, but also from cities in the close proximity of that province, as was the case with Abounoteichos from Galatia, or Tiana and Mazaca from Cappadocia.[51] Although the purpose of their association was religious (they devoted a stele to the Thracian Knight), one can also see in the list links to Asian Minor merchants, who settled in Tomis for business and probably organised according to the associational pattern known as *consistentes*.

This information shows the bi-univocal character of the trade established between the western Black Sea port-cities, especially Tomis, and their Bithynian associates. Their main trade partners were Prusias ad Hypium, Nicaea and Nicomedia. The first one, located near the mouths of Sakarya River with the important harbour Dia[52], carried out intense commercial activity in the Aegean Sea[53] and mainly in the Pontus.[54]

Nicaea was an important commercial centre with tight connections both with the western Black Sea coast and the great cities of Thrace, such as Philippopolis and Serdica. As for Nicomedia, whose importance for the economy of the Roman world has been repeatedly emphasised[55], one may assert that this centre represented the relay of the trade between Asia Minor and the western Black Sea outlets. Epigraphic sources attest a surprising mobility of Nicomedian merchants and ship-owners to Tomis. Such evidence points to what may be termed the Nicomedia – Tomis maritime line, which undoubtedly was the main commercial route between Asia Minor and the Black Sea – Danubian area. According to an interpretation[56], this maritime route seems to have been actually mentioned in Diocletian's Edict.

A new hypothesis has been recently formulated with regard to the character of the economic relations in the Black Sea basin, which equally stresses the centrifuge and the centripetal tendencies of the Euxine trade.[57] The commercial relations between the western Black Sea cities and Bithynia, so suggestively depicted by available sources, represent a good example for these tendencies. This observation may be further pursued starting from the analysis of the factors specific to the organisational structures of trade in this area. Thus, it is not accidental that the local ship-owners had an associational pattern, *Oikos ton naukleron*, which did not exist in other areas. This *Oikos* is epigraphically mentioned only at Tomis, Nicomedia and Amastris. This associational system determined by the large amplitude of the ship-owners' activity could be eventually assimilated to those *corpora navicu-*

[48] IGB II 638, 674, 668; cf. L. Robert, *Documents d'Asie Mineure*, Paris, 1987, pp. 112–113.
[49] IGB III.1 998, 1008.
[50] IGB IV 1952, 1958.
[51] ISM II 129.
[52] W. Ameling, *Die Inschriften von Prousias ad Hypium (= IK 27)*, Bonn, 1985, pp. 8–9.
[53] J. G. Vinogradov, Olbia und Prusias ad Hypios zur Severerzeit, in *Sodalitas. Scritti in onore di Antonio Guarino,* Genova, 1984, 460 et seq.
[54] R. Robert, op. cit., p. 112; T. R. S. Broughton, Roman Asia, in T. Frank (ed.), *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome IV*, New York, 1975, p. 773.
[55] L. Robert, op. cit., p. 120.
[56] Edictum *Diocletiani et collegarum de pretiis rerum venalium*, ed. M. Giacchero, Genova, 1974, 35, 1, p. 48.
[57] J. G. Vinogradov, *Pontische Studien. Kleine Schriften zur Geschichte und Epigraphik des Schwarzmeerraumes*, Mainz, 1997, 4 ff.

lariorum attested in the Western Mediterranean area. The presence of several *presbyteroi* and one *prostates* of these associations on the inscriptions from Nicomedia[58] and Amastris[59] mentioning *Oikos ton naukleron* is yet additional proof of the internal organisation of these associations according to the corporate system specific to the Hellenistic world.

Map of the Black Sea and environs from the 1624 Latin edition of the Theatrum Orbis Terrarum of Abraham Ortelius

The preservation of these associations during Roman times may indicate their assimilation in the Roman associative system; this confirms the interest of the Roman administration for protecting and encouraging maritime transportation enterprises in the eastern provinces of the empire. Inasmuch as these Oikos ton naukleron were assimilated with the *corpora navicullariorum*, it can be assumed that they might have also benefited from the fiscal immunity of the latter[60], as was the case with the ship-owners associations in Egypt.[61] However, it is certain that the associations attested in Tomis, Nicomedia and Amastris represented a characteristic feature of the trade relations in the western Black Sea area and in Bithynia.[62]

The commonality of commercial interests of the outlets on the western Black Sea coast and in Bithynia should be analysed from a broader perspective, that of the Black Sea trade in general. The centripetal tendency of Pontic trade is obvious from historical sources which reveal a veritable commercial *koiné* in this area. In this respect, particularly significant is the text of a decree issued in honour of a certain Theokles of Olbia by the *parepidhmoûnteß cénoi* from several cities, most of them from the Black Sea area: Panticapaeum, Chersoneses, Tyras, Istros, Tomis, Callatis, Odessos, Byzantium, Heraclea, Tium, Amastris, Sinope, Prusias ad Hypium, Nicomedia, Nicaea, Apamea, Prusias-Olympia, Cyzicus and Miletus. These *parepidhmoûnteß cénoi* listed as dedicators of this decree represent a community of merchants from the most important Pontic and Propontis cities, which were founded in unclear circumstances, but with the obvious aim of protecting their mutual commercial interests.

The internal structure of the ship-owners associations on the western Black Sea coast and the north-western area of Asia Minor and the mechanism of the regional maritime trade point to both the aforesaid centripetal tendencies and to a certain centrifugal trend of Black Sea trade, which should be construed as an extension of the commercial routes towards the

58 TAM (Tituli Asiae Minoris) IV.1 22.

59 L. Robert, *Inscriptions d'Athènes et de la Grèce centrale*, Aeph, 18, 1969, 9.

60 J. Rougé, op. cit., p. 324.

61 M. I. Rostovtzeff, *A Large Estate in Egypt in the Third Century B.C.*, Madison, 1922, p. 123; Cl. Preaux, *L'économie royale des Lagides*, Bruxelles, 1937, p. 143; H. Hauben, *Les propriétaires de navires privés engagés dans le transport de blé d'état ptolémaïque, in Akten des 21. Internationalen Papyrologenkongress*. Berlin, 1995, Archiv für Papyrusforschung, Beih. 3, 1997, 431 et seq.

62 J. Vélissaropoulos, *Les nauklères grecs. Recherches sur les institutions maritimes en Grèce et dans l'Orient hellénisé*, Paris, 1980, 104 et seq..

mainland, within the Balkan and the Danubian provinces, as well as towards the eastern provinces. This must have been the role of the maritime routes established between Nicomedia or Prusias ad Hypium and Tomis, routes that shaped trade between the eastern areas and the western Black Sea and Danubian cities. Tomis was the main commercial regional entrepot which, through its direct connections with the great commercial centres in Bithynia, secured the transit trade from Asia Minor and the Near East to the mouths of the Danube and even to inner Moesia.

Although the Hellenistic commercial structures present in the western Black Sea area prevailed, they functioned concurrently with the *cives Romani consistentes* merchants associations. Their role in the transit of goods is more significant in civil settlements near the military centres on the limes, and also in rural settlements inside the province[63], but they are also present on the western coast of the Black Sea. Such is the casewith the c*ives Romani consistentes Callatis* community attested since the age of Trajan[64] and which must have been an important element of the maritime trade of Callatis. This is yet another argument which supports the hypothesis that the Hellenistic commercial structures functioned concurrently with the Roman ones.

In this respect, it is also worth mentioning that the Roman age represented for the western Black Sea area an extension of the Hellenistic economic pattern, which presupposes the co-existence of the two commercial structures (Hellenistic and Roman). It is necessary to emphasise the significance of the text of an inscription from Sardica, which mentions an association of small manufacturers and merchants, part of the so-called category of *Produzentenhändler* (producers –dealers).[65] It is easy to recognise the Hellenistic economic tradition in this association which gathered small manufacturers and food suppliers. This economic tradition had the same component parts and functioned according to the same rules from Roman Egypt to Thrace.

A fundamental question which is difficult to answer at the present stage of research is that of the way in which the western Black Sea regions were connected to the economic system of the Roman world. In fact, the question to be answered is to what extent the western Black Sea can be regarded as a peripheral space or as a transit area of Roman trade. In the previously mentioned case, it seems that the western Black Sea trade actually had a bivalent character, gathering components specific to both the peripheral and transit commercial relations.

The western Black Sea trade may be described as peripheral inasmuch as this area sooner represented a district of goods consumption, when compared with the western and eastern Roman world as well as with other goods production areas. This is to say that most of the western Black Sea trade was directed towards supplying the local population with necessary goods, and only to a lesser extent towards exporting them. This fact could possibly be explained by the belated political and administrative integration of the area into the Roman Empire, in a period when the main characteristics of the two large economic areas (East and West) had already been completed.

Contrarily, the situation of the western Black Sea area at the crossroads between

[63] F. Bérard, Vikani, kanabenses, consistentes: Remarques sur l'organisation des agglomérations militaires romaines, in *L'epigrafia del Villagio*, Faenza, 1993, pp. 66–67.

[64] A. Rădulescu, *Inscripţie de la Callatis, "Studii Clasice"*, 4, 1962, p. 275.

[65] IGB IV 1922.

Rome's provinces and the Greek-Eastern world determined its status as a transit trade area. The maritime lines going from Tomis and perhaps other outlets towards the commercial centres in Bithynia provided the permanent commercial connection with the Greek-Oriental provinces. Thus it may be easily noticed that although the western Black Sea area was peripheral for Roman trade, it was, nonetheless, connected with the entire economic system of the Roman world through its commercial relations with Asia Minor and, farther, with the eastern provinces of the empire. In this system, Tomis had a central position, as the main actor of the transit trade and was, just like Aquileia in the western quarter of the Balkan Peninsula, the relay for the transportation of goods towards the inland provinces of Moesia and Thrace.

About the author

Octavian Bounegru is professor of archaeology and ancient history at the Faculty of History, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iaşi, Romania. He is specialised in classical archaeology, Greek and Roman epigraphy, the economic and social history of the classical Greek and Roman age, ancient trade and shipping in the Black Sea and at the mouths of the Danube. Professor Bounegru is the director of the Centre of Aegean-Mediterranean Studies of the "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University, and he teaches several courses on the economy and society of the Greek and Roman world and the Black Sea area during the Antiquity. He has extensive archaeological experience, having been involved in research on the sites of the most important Black Sea colonies on the territory of present day Romania: Histria, Tomis and Callatis. He was a fellow of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and he has conducted research in universities and academic institutes in Germany, Belgium, Turkey, Great Britain, USA, Israel, etc. Some of his major publications are: *Les forces navales du Bas Danube et de la Mer Noire aux Ier – VIe siècles*, Oxford – Oakville, 1996 (co-author); *Trafiquants et navigateurs sur le Bas Danube et dans le Pont gauche à l'époque romaine*, Wiesbaden, 2006; *Studies on the Pontic and Aegean Economy*, Iași, 2009; *Mercator: Studien zur antiken Wirtschaft im Pontosgebiet und in der Ägäis*, Kaiserslautern, 2013.
E-mail: octavian_bounegru@hotmail.com

The Black Sea, the "plaque tournante" of the Euro-Asian Trade during the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries

by Şerban Papacostea & Virgil Ciocîltan,
"Nicolae Iorga" History Institute of the Romanian Academy, Bucharest

Abstract

This paper is a synthetic approach to the history of the Black Sea between 1204 and 1453, when the area served, according to the famous phrase of Romanian historian Gheorghe Brătianu, as the "plaque tournante" of the Euro-Asian trade. After centuries of Byzantine control over its trade and shipping, the prospects of this sea completely and rapidly changed after two historic events that occurred in the thirteenth century: the conquering of the Straits by the Italian maritime republics after 1204, and the territorial expansion of the Mongol Empire. The authors present the international context that allowed the transformation of the Black Sea into the contact area between Mediterranean merchants and Eastern goods that came along the Silk Road, the veritable backbone of this commerce, as well as the continuous conflicts between the regional powers interested to take control of these profitable exchanges: Venice, Genoa, the Golden Horde, the Byzantine Empire, other local rulers, etc. After the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottoman Turks in 1453, the Black Sea eventually became once again the economic appendix of the empire that controlled the Bosporus and the Dardanelles.

Two powerful expansions that took place in the Euro-Asian area during the thirteenth century created momentum for intercontinental trade and, subsequently, for the world economy. The first one came from the Italian maritime republics which, after having acquired in the previous century significant positions in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea in the favourable context of the crusades, succeeded in the early thirteenth century in conquering the Straits of the Black Sea, which were jealously guarded by the Byzantine Empire. Venice and Genoa were the main actors of this vigorous consolidation of the Italian republics' trade. The second great expansion with major consequences was that of the Mongol Empire founded by Genghis Khan, which spanned across a vast area from the Pacific Ocean to the Middle East and Eastern Europe. The encounter of these two forces in the Black Sea – the Italian merchants (creators of commercial colonies) and the Mongol nomads (creators of empires) – and their cooperation for exploiting the great commercial routes which connected Asia and Europe resulted in the considerable development of Euro-Asian trade, with crucial economic and political repercussions.

The Mongol expansion, as envisioned by the founder of the empire and pursued by his successor, aimed at conquering the entire territory between China and the Near East, up to the Mediterranean Sea. The accomplishment of this aim would have granted the imperial leadership complete control over the Silk Road, the main route not only for carrying this precious textile merchandise, but also for other goods – spices, medicines, pearls, etc. – highly demanded in Europe. The evolution of the political and military situation in the Near East – which the Mongol forces in Iran were getting ready to incorporate and thus open their way to the Mediterranean – did not allow the completion of this plan. Defeated in

the battle of Ain Jalut in September 1260, the Mongols permanently lost the direct connection with the Mediterranean Sea, an event that granted to the Black Sea a prime position in the Euro-Asian trade.

For many centuries, the Black Sea was a reserved area of the Byzantine Empire, which imposed rigorous control over the Straits of Dardanelles and Bosporus, and secured its exclusive right to exploit for its own interests, its rich human (i.e., slaves) and material resources, including the goods brought from the East. The trade between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean was unavoidably conducted by Byzantine middlemen (both state officials and merchants) who derived significant profits from this position. But the gradual decline of the imperial power during the twelfth century and its accentuated dependence on foreign merchants (mainly Venetians), exposed Byzantium to the increasing pressure of foreign powers. In 1204, after events not sufficiently clarified yet by historians, a strong squad of crusaders supported by the Venetian fleet besieged Constantinople, which eventually became the capital of a Latin empire. Venice reserved for itself a prevalent role in the commerce of the new empire; after centuries of exclusive Byzantine domination, the Black Sea was now available to Mediterranean traders (Venetians in this early stage). The road for direct contact between the Mediterranean Sea and Asia was thus open.

For more than half a century, as long as the Venetians controlled the Straits (1204–1261), the Black Sea and its resources were gradually discovered by entrepreneurs from the Italian maritime republics and, on their footsteps, by Catholic missionaries. Their memoirs confirm the presence of a great colony of Italian merchants (Giovanni da Plano Carpini) in Kiev in 1246–1247 and in Soldaia (Crimea) in 1253 (Guillaume de Rubrouck). A Venetian trading contract concluded in Constantinople in 1232 refers to businesses carried out "across the whole large sea" (*per totam marem majorem*); by this date, the commercial horizon of the Black Sea had been thoroughly explored by the Venetians. Not long before the dissolution of the Latin Empire from Constantinople in 1261, two Italian merchants, Niccolo and Matteo Polo, whose names were to become famous thanks to Marco, son to one of them, sailed from Constantinople to Soldaia (today Sudak), in the "Greeks' Sea" (*Mer Greignor*) or the "Large Sea" (*Mer Majour*) "in order to earn money and make profit".

The Black Sea was now evolving towards its most significant function in its existence. The full acknowledgement of this role was determined by two historic events which took place in the Near East in a short period of time: the fall of Acre in 1258 which was followed by the end of Genoese hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean; the defeat of the Mongols at Ain Jalut in September 1260 and their complete failure in controlling the Silk Road up to its Mediterranean end. The Black Sea was the main beneficiary, as it was the convergence area after the reorientation of the main commercial routes of the two powers defeated in the Eastern Mediterranean. For two centuries the Black Sea was to remain the "plaque tournante" of the Euro-Asian trade.

The preliminary step in the new direction of Genoa's commercial expansion was to conclude an alliance with the Byzantine Empire, exiled in Nicaea, but striving to return to Constantinople. To achieve this goal a naval force able to face the Venetian fleet was absolutely necessary, Emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos concluded this alliance with Genoa, Venice's main rival. The agreement was signed on 13 March 1261 at Nymphaion and included in a

treaty that modified "the entire political and commercial map of the Levant" (Roberto Sabbatino Lopez). By this act, Genoa gained full commercial freedom in the Byzantine Empire and ousted all their Italian competitors (except for the merchants of Pisa) and even the Greek merchants from the Black Sea; only imperial ships and their cargoes were allowed to sail in the Black Sea. With these provisions in the treaty concluded with Byzantium, Genoa laid the foundation of their merchants' privileged commercial status in the Black Sea.

Backed by this treaty, the Genoese traders started to massively exploit the great commercial resources provided by the Black Sea and its intercontinental connections. A decisive step was to set up their own commercial centres in strategic coastal points, autonomous settlements that later gained full sovereignty. The most important centre was Pera (Galata), a borough of Constantinople on the Bosporus, and excellent outlook point for the passage of ships from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean. On the western Black Sea coast, the Genoese settled in the main centres regained by the Byzantines; in the Lower Danube, they conducted important trade in the Byzantine metropolitan centre of Vicina, wherefrom the documents instrumented in 1281 by a Genoese notary have survived.

The Mongols, who after the great invasion of 1240–1241 dominated vast portions of Eastern and Central Europe, also controlled the territories stretching northwards and eastwards of the mouths of the Danube. Separated from the great empire created by Genghis Khan, this Mongol branch established its own political entity, the Golden Horde, with the capital in Sarai on the Volga River. One of its most significant sources of power derived from exploiting the customs operations of Euro-Asian trade, which the Mongols constantly strived to redirect towards their own territories. Genoese merchants were granted the right to settle in some of its key positions, where they established their own autonomous centres. This helped to secure the interests of the new Mongol state. Among the most important Genoese autonomies were Chilia on the Danube, Cetatea Albă at the mouth of the Dniester River, Caffa (in the Crimea) and Tana at the confluence of the Don River with the Sea of Azov. On the southern shore of the Black Sea, the Genoese settled in Trabzon, the capital city of one of the states that survived after the fall of the Byzantine Empire in 1204 and a junction point for the Indian Ocean, Central Asia and the Black Sea. The Genoese had also been settled for a long time along the southern coast at Amastris and Heraclea Pontica. In all their settlements of vital commercial significance, the Genoese succeeded in becoming autonomous from the local authorities and even establishing their own communes, some of the settlements being fortified. This network of autonomous or even sovereign commercial centres allowed the Genoese to defeat the resistance of their competitors and enemies (Venetians, Byzantines, Tartars, Trabzonites) and to instate in the Black Sea the mercantile status that was most convenient for their own interests.

The main goal of the Genoese was to control as much as possible of the Black Sea trade and exchanges with the Mediterranean. Thus, they strived to concentrate the regional trade into their autonomous and sovereign settlements, an action beneficial both for their merchants and for the customs taxes they received. These intentions inevitably triggered reactions from neighbouring powers – the Golden Horde, the Byzantine Empire and the Trabzon Empire, but also from their main Italian rivals, the Venetians. On several occasions

such commercial rivalries turned into armed conflicts aimed at eliminating competition and constraining it either to leave the area or to move their commercial activities towards the centres dominated by the opposing power. When the Genoese considered the Venetians' autonomous activity on the road that linked the Golden Horde to China as unacceptable, they tried to compel their competitors to purchase Chinese silk from Caffa, a colony under their control, and not from Tana, a port dominated by the Golden Horde. The *quod non iretur ad Tanam* provision, which the Genoese eventually succeeded to enforce, aimed at concentrating the whole trade of this valuable commodity – Chinese and Caucasian silk – in their settlement from Caffa. Similar commercial policies were manifest in all the Black Sea centres where the Genoese had established their own fortified colonies. The most famous case is that of Pera, which eventually surpassed Constantinople in the trade between the Mediterranean and Black Sea in both directions. The outcome of this shift was that the taxes collected by the Genoese from Pera were considerably greater than those collected by the imperial customs in Constantinople. The Black Sea was on its way to becoming a commercial appendix of Genoa.



Ancient map of Black Sea (circa 1559) by Diogo Homem

In the Black Sea, the Genoese traded both local products supplied by the neighbouring areas and luxury goods from the Caucasus or from deeper into Asia. At a local level, especially around the mouths of the Danube and in the Crimea, the Ligurian merchants purchased grains (exported towards Byzantine territories and to various ports of the Mediterranean), honey, fishery products, but also slaves, highly valuable goods sold either in Egypt for the Mamluke army or as domestic slaves for wealthy families from Italian cities. From the Far East, especially from China, the Genoese brought silk, which was not the highest quality, but cheap (*seta catuya*). High quality silk was brought from Gilan, a region near the Caspian Sea, while from Trabzon they purchased various spices, pepper, precious gems brought in large quantities from Central Asia or the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. From Asia Minor, the Genoese purchased alum, a valuable material highly demanded for the textile industry which was developing at that time in Italy.

The Genoese merchants usually made all these acquisitions in the Black Sea port cities. However, some traders willing to increase their profit margins ventured towards inner Asia, in order to acquire the valuable goods demanded in the Mediterranean world at smaller prices from their original markets. After the first explorations of the land routes towards the Far East, they identified the most suitable itineraries and drafted travel guides. In the first decades of the fourteenth century, against the background of an advanced stage of discovering Asia by European explorers (most of them merchants), Francesco Balducci Pegolotti published a manual, *La practica della mercatura*, an excellent guide for the merchants who wanted to establish direct trading relations with China. The guide mi-

nutely indicates all the stages of this itinerary through the territories of the Golden Horde and farther to China, the means and costs of transportation, the possibilities to engage in trade on the road, the possible dangers and necessary precautions. It is relevant that the author of this guide, although a Florentine, makes use of Genoese units of measurement, which suggests that his main target readers were Ligurians. The safe travelling conditions provided by this route indicate that the rulers of the Golden Horde were interested in supporting the transit of goods and of merchants through their lands, as this was a great source of income for the khans in Sarai.

Equally significant is the fact that during the same period, Italian entrepreneurs, especially Genoese, but also Venetians, settled in China, some for a long time. This enabled them to manage the purchase and delivery of good towards the Black Sea ports. Recently, Latin inscriptions on the graves of Genoese deceased in China have been identified not far from Nanking.

In search for the precious Oriental goods, the Genoese also headed to inner Asia from the southern coast of the Black Sea. From Trabzon they entered the Ilkhanate territories, to the great commercial centre of Tabriz, where the presence of a large Genoese colony governed by a consul is attested in early fourteenth century. In the following years, the Genoese in this important crossroads of Euro-Asian commercial routes issued a statute, *Ordinatio Taurisii*, aimed at reserving to their co-nationals the privileges they had previously obtained from the local authorities. The Genoese merchants headed from Iran via the Persian Gulf to India and China in search for the precious Oriental goods and greater profits by their sale. A contract concluded in 1343 between an Italian merchant and a commoner who was to accompany him in his voyages specifically specified that the latter was bound to serve the former "in every corner of the world" (*in quibuscumque mundi partibus*).

The Genoese tendency to concentrate their regional and intercontinental trading activities in their numerous Black Sea autonomous settlements faced the resistance of the other powers involved in the commerce of this market. Byzantium was the first actor that strived to oppose the Genoese hegemony in the Black Sea, which they had acknowledged by signing the Treaty of Nymphaeon. Aware of the wide concessions made in favour of the Genoese in 1261, Emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos tried in 1268 to attenuate their effects by allowing Venetian merchants in imperial trading activities, especially in the Black Sea basin. Assuming the role of mediator between the two Italian thalassocracies, the emperor considered himself redeemed from the complete dependency on Genoa that had been accepted seven years before. Also pursued by Andronikos II Palaiologos, son and successor of Emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos, Byzantium's anti-Genoese resistance fell to pieces at the end of the thirteenth century in the great vortex of events produced by the ousting of the Venetians from Acre, the reorientation of their main commercial interests towards the Black Sea and their successive conflicts against Genoa for dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The signposts of Venice's presence and activity in the Black Sea multiplied in the last decade of the thirteenth century, concurrently with the increasing difficulties encountered by the republic in the Eastern Mediterranean. At the beginning of 1292, the Venetian Senate authorised the free purchase of Oriental goods from the Byzantine Empire and the Black Sea. Simultaneously, diplomatic demarches meant to ensure that the Venetian merchants' access

to the Asian trade was pursued at the court of the Tartar khan from Sarai and at Trabzon. The Genoese, whose interests were thus jeopardised, engaged their military forces to defend their privileged commercial positions established in the previous decades. The outcome was a vast armed conflict. Beginning in the Mediterranean Sea, where the Venetian fleet suffered great damage and multiple defeats, the confrontation between the two maritime powers then moved to the Black Sea, at Bosporus and the Crimea, at Caffa, where there were "all the goods and all the wealth of the Genoese", according to a Venetian history. The decisive battle took place in 1298 in the Adriatic Sea, at Curzola, and ended with the victory of Genoa. The peace treaty of Milan concluded on 25 May 1299 drastically limited Venetian trade in the Black Sea: for almost two decades, Venice did not even try to establish any settlements in the area.

Genoa took full advantage of the elimination of the Venetian competition after the Peace of Milan and consolidated its position in the Black Sea. This prestige was most visible in the three main Genoese commercial centres in the area: Pera, Caffa and Trabzon. At Bosporus and in the remains of the Byzantine Empire, the Genoese succeeded in exploiting the increasingly obvious weakness of the imperial power: a new privilege was granted by Emperor Andronikos II Palaiologus, allowing them to expand their settlement from Pera (an indication of demographic growth and prosperity of the Genoese colony) and, what is more, to fortify their dwellings, which eventually led, despite a legal interdiction, to the fortification of the entire colony. Under these circumstances, the Genoese managed to gradually transfer from Constantinople to Pera the customs control and exploitation of ships and goods passage through the Black Sea Straits.

Their great success at the Straits encouraged the Genoese to extend the regime settled at Pera over the entire trade of the Black Sea. This became particularly obvious in 1300, when they appointed a "representative of the commune of Genoa in the entire Byzantine Empire and in the Black Sea". The Genoese from Caffa soon followed the example of their co-nationals from Pera and built a wall around the city, thus turning it into a stronghold. Aware of the danger which this fortified settlement represented for his empire, the khan in Sarai, Tokta, initiated a large military campaign and put the walls of the Genoese city to the ground. The danger was thus removed, but only for a short while. By instating a commercial boycott (*devetum*) on the territories of the Golden Horde, the Genoese leadership forced its ruler to give in and accept its conditions. The power of trade proved stronger than the armed one. Caffa became once again a stronghold meant to control the entire trade in the northern Black Sea area. The new status Genoa drafted in 1316 for Caffa compelled all ships sailing in the northern Black Sea region to stay at least a day in Caffa harbour. Following the pattern applied at Pera and Caffa, the Ligurian merchants tried to impose similar conditions in Trabzon. After repeated unfruitful negotiations and several armed conflicts, the imperial leadership conceded to allow the Genoese to settle in a borough of the city and to carry goods towards the Ilkhanate, but did not grant them the much required tax exemptions.

Through the increasingly severe regime imposed in their favour on trade and shipping in the Black Sea, which was now more than ever the "plaque tournante" of the international trade, Genoa openly aimed to effectively include this sea in its commercial empire. Venice's refusal to accept this programme led

to the outburst of the second Venetian-Genoese War.

Starting with the end of the second decade of the fourteenth century, the Venetians reappeared in some of the main trading centres of the Black Sea, thus openly impinging on the Genoese interdictions. This tendency increased thereafter. However, as the Tartars of the Golden Horde were trying to remove the Genoese from Caffa in 1343 and the following years, an assault which gradually acquired an anti-Latin character, the Genoese-Venetian antagonism remained latent for a while. As soon as this onset failed, the Genoese, more determined than ever, decided to oust their competitors who had obtained in 1347 the right to settle again in Tana. The peace concluded in 1355, after a five-year war, re-established Genoa's trading hegemony in the Black Sea.

The Golden Horde's attempt to remove the Genoese from Caffa, a city besieged for a long time and on which they directed a 'bacteriological warfare' (they catapulted corpses of plagued people into the city, an ineffective action for the odds of the siege, but which determined the spread of the bubonic plague in Western Europe, with catastrophic demographic outcomes), ended in complete failure. Moreover, a large coalition of Central European powers, organised between 1343 and 1344, probably at Genoa's initiative, gradually pushed the Golden Horde's dependencies eastwards, from the area of the Eastern Carpathians and of the western Russian knyazates, which they had controlled since the previous century, to Dnieper and Dniester Rivers. Simultaneously, the Genoese seized the main strategic points in the Crimea, thus consolidating their control over the trade in an area still dominated (yet only by name) by the Golden Horde.

The double offensive against the khanate of the Golden Horde – on the one hand that of the Kingdom of Hungary allied with Poland, Wallachia (*Valachia Major*) and Moldavia (*Valachia Minor*), the emerging Romanian states expanding towards the mouths of the Danube and the Black Sea and on the other hand that of the Genoese at sea – had important commercial consequences in the region. Two trade routes to Central Europe were established in the territories freed from Mongol dominance, routes which played a vital role in the economic and political evolution of the region. The Genoese settled at the maritime end of these routes: at Chilia-Likostomo, at the mouth of the Danube, a centre which they had controlled since 1359, and at Cetatea Albă (*Albicastrum, Maurocastrum, Moncastro*), at the mouth of the Dniester, thus establishing connections with Moldavia and indirectly with Poland in 1386. The first route transited Wallachia and Transylvania, leading to Hungary and Central Europe, the second crossed Moldavia towards Poland and farther to the Baltic Sea or Bohemia or Germany. The main junctions of these roads between the Black Sea and Central Europe were the cities of Braşov, in Transylvania, and Lwów (Lemberg) in Poland. In time, a flow of goods was secured from the Black Sea – where the Genoese were the suppliers of Oriental goods – towards Central Europe and in return from Central Europe towards the Black Sea basin, with the main commercial agents being represented, on the final segment, by the merchants of Braşov and Lwów. On the route from the Black Sea through Moldavia and Poland, the Genoese merchants took an active part in the exchange of goods, while on the road through Wallachia the main trading agents were the merchants of Braşov.

The importance of these two highly efficient commercial routes in the second half of the fourteenth century and throughout a

great part of the next century is obvious from the political rivalries they triggered. All this time, the issue of controlling these routes, their maritime ends and their customs policy represented an important topic in conventions and treaties and a source of conflicts in the political relations between the four continental states that profited from their proper functioning: Hungary, Poland, Wallachia and Moldavia.

The consolidation of its position in the Black Sea after its success in the confrontations against Venice and the Golden Horde and the expansion of its trading market towards Central Europe by means of an important commercial route prompted Genoa to attempt the complete removal of Venice from the international trade. A natural ally for Genoa in this endeavour was the Kingdom of Hungary, an old enemy of Venice in the Adriatic Sea, which it had permanently tried to subject to its commercial interests and policy. Gradually expunged from the Black Sea trade by Genoa's restrictive provisions and facing the risk of losing its Central European market because of the infiltration of Genoese merchants in the region through the new routes, Venice decided to attempt a decisive strike to counterbalance the deadly threat. The best solution to attain this objective was to take over a strategic position, which could paralyse the Genoese-Hungarian plans. The entrance to the Dardanelles, in Tenedos Island, "the mouth and key of the Black Sea", was the key point chosen. The settlement of the Venetians in this strategic point, which had been ceded to them by the Byzantine emperor, threatened to paralyse the entire Genoese trading system based on the control of the Black Sea. Genoa's response managed to annul the concession made by Byzantium, but not to prevent the armed confrontation between the two maritime powers. The third Venetian-Genoese War, known as the Tenedos War, began after a decisive naval battle took place at the starting point of the conflict in Chioggia, an island off Venice. While the conflict was in full force, Venice was attacked at sea by the Genoese fleet and on land by the Hungarian troops. The Venetians avoided heroically the fate which their enemies had prepared for them – their complete annihilation as a trading power – but they were forced to accept several severe terms in the Treaty of Peace concluded in Turin in 1381. Venice obtained the rights to trade in Tana for only two years after the conclusion of the peace, a period which Genoa was to take advantage of in order to consolidate its position in the region. Genoa remained the dominant trading force in the Black Sea up to the beginning of the Ottoman rule in Constantinople.

By mid fourteenth century, the Turkish population living in the north-western quarter of Asia Minor organised as a state under the rule of the Ottoman dynasty, succeeded to pass beyond the Straits and settled on European ground. This first step gradually led to a vast expansion on the Balkan Peninsula, with the major aim of conquering Constantinople and of taking over control over the Black Sea Straits. Unable to fight the Ottoman assaults alone, the Byzantine rulers repeatedly asked for help from the Latin West, offering them what they still had as an exchange value: their spiritual identity. The last Western armed action targeted at the Ottoman power and aimed at saving Byzantium was crushed in 1396 in the Battle of Nicopolis. A similar attempt of regional powers (Hungary, Poland, and Wallachia) ended in rout in the Battle of Varna in 1444. The road to Constantinople was now open for the Ottoman Turks who, in May 1453, conquered the city and put an end to the millennial existence of the Byzantine Empire. With this event, the free passage between the

Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea was also interrupted. The Black Sea was destined to re-become an economic appendix of the new imperial power that dominated the Straits.

Subjecting the Black Sea to the new power was one of the primary goals of the new masters of the Straits. Starting in June 1454, Sultan Mehmed II, the conqueror of Constantinople, sent emissaries to the states around the Black Sea, requesting them to acknowledge the new power and to subject to it. In order to break their resistance, he sent the following year naval squadrons with an ultimatum addressed to the main Black Sea states. Moldavia and Caffa obeyed the Ottoman request and paid tribute to and acknowledged the Turkish power. Sinope, Mangop, Trabzon and other settlements soon followed suit. In 1461, Mahmud conquered the key points on the southern coast of the Black Sea, Trabzon included. The attempt of Stephen the Great, the Moldavian ruler, to overthrow the Ottoman power with the support of a great coalition failed. In 1475, the Ottoman fleet besieged and conquered Caffa, putting an end to the Genoese presence in the Black Sea. Nine years later, a new sultan, Bayezid II, conquered the important Moldavian ports of Chilia and Cetatea Albă and thus completed his father's work.

From its former status as "plaque tournante of Euro-Asian trade", the Black Sea became once again an economic appendix of an empire that controlled the Bosporus and the Dardanelles.

Bibliography

Ahrweiler, Hélène, *Byzance et la mer. La marine de guerre, la politique et les institutions maritimes de Byzance aux VII^e–XV^e siècles*, Paris, 1966.

Allsen, Th., *Mongol Imperialism. The Policies of the Grand Qan Möngke in China, Russia, and the Islamic Lands, 1251–1259*, Berkeley – Los Angeles – London, 1987.

Amitai-Preiss, R., *Mongols and Mamluks. The Mamluk-Ilkhanid War 1260–1281*, Cambridge, 1995.

Ashtor, E., *A Social and Economic History of the Near East in the Middle Ages*, London, 1976.

Ayalon, D., *The Mamluks and Naval Power. A Phase of the Struggle between Islam and Christian Europe*, "Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities", 1, 1965.

Balard, M., *La Romanie génoise (XII^e – début du XV^e siècle)*, I–II, Rome, 1978.

Barkan, Ö. L., *Notes sur les routes de commerce orientales*, "Revue de la Faculté des Sciences économiques de l'Université d'Istanbul", 1, 1940, pp. 322–328.

Bautier, H.-R., *Les relations économiques des Occidentaux avec les pays d'Orient au Moyen Âge. Points de vue et documents*, in *Sociétés et compagnies de commerce en Orient et dans l'océan Indien*, in *Actes du huitième colloque international d'histoire maritime (Beyrouth – 5–10 septembre 1966)* présentés par M. Mollat, Paris, 1970, pp. 263–331.

Berindei, M. & G. Veinstein, *La Tana-Azaq de la présence italienne à l'emprise ottomane (fin XIII^e – milieu XVI^e siècle)*, "Turcica", 8, 1976, 2, pp. 110–201.

Boyle, J. A., *Dynastic and political History of the Il-Khans*, in *The Cambridge History of Iran*, V: *The Saljuq and Mongol periods*, Cambridge, 1968, pp. 303–421.

Brătianu, G., *La mer Noire. Des origines à la conquête ottomane*, München, 1969.

Brătianu, G., *Recherches sur le commerce génois dans la mer Noire au XIII^e siècle*, Paris, 1929.

Bryer, A., *The Fate of George Komnenos,*

Ruler of Trebizond (1266–1280), "Byzantinische Zeitschrift", 66, 1973, pp. 332–350.

Cahen, C., *Pre-Ottoman Turkey. A General Survey of the Material and Spiritual Culture and History c. 1071–1330*, London, 1968.

Canard, M., *Un traité entre Byzance et l'Égypte au XIII^e siècle et les relations diplomatiques de Michel VIII Paléologue avec les sultans mamlūks Baybars et Qalā'ūn*, in *Mélanges Gaudefroy-Demombynes*, Le Caire, 1934–1935, pp. 197–224.

Caro, G., *Genua und die Mächte am Mittelmeer, 1257–1311. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des XIII. Jahrhunderts*, I–II, Halle, 1895–1899.

The Cambridge History of Inner Asia. The Chinggisid Age, eds. N. di Cosmo, A. J. Frank, P. B. Golden, Cambridge, 2004.

Chapman, C., *Michel Paléologue, restaurateur de l'empire byzantin (1261–1282)*, Paris, 1926.

Ciocîltan, V., *The Mongols and the Black Sea Trade in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries*, translated by Samuel Willcocks, Leiden – Boston, 2012.

Ciocîltan, V., *Der genuesische Bürgerkrieg (1317–1331) und seine Auswirkungen im Schwarzmeerraum*, *Il Mar Nero* , 7, 2007/2008, pp. 195–215.

D'Ohsson, A. C. M., *Histoire des Mongoles depuis Tchinguiz-Khan jusqu'à Timour Bey ou Tamerlan*, I–IV, Amsterdam, 1892.

Decei, A., *La Horde d'Or et les pays roumains aux XIII^e et XIV^e siècles selon les historiens arabes contemporains*, "Romano-arabica", 2, 1976, pp. 61–63.

Dölger, F., *Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des Oströmischen Reiches*, III: *(1204–1282)*, München, 1977; IV: *(1282–1341)*, Berlin – München, 1960; V: *(1341–1453)*, München – Berlin, 1965.

Ehrenkreutz, A. S., *Strategic Implications of the Slave Trade between Genoa and Mamluc Egypt in the Second Half of the Thirteenth Century*, in *The Islamic Middle East, 700–1900: Studies in Economic and Social History*, ed. A. L. Udovitch, Princeton (New Jersey), 1981, pp. 335–345.

Eliseeff, V., *Approaches Old and New to the Silk Roads*, in *The Silk Roads: Highways of Culture and Commerce*, Paris, 1998.

Geanakoplos, D. J., *Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West 1258–1282. A Study in Byzantine-Latin Relations*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1959.

Grekov, B. D. & Yu. Yakubovskiy, *Zolotaya Orda i eë padenie*, Moskva – Leningrad, 1950.

Grousset, R., *L'Empire des steppes. Attila. Gengis-Khan. Tamerlan*, Paris, 1939.

Haussig, H. W., *Die Geschichte Zentralasiens und der Seidenstraße in islamischer Zeit*, Darmstadt, 1988.

Heers, J., *Il commercio nel Mediterraneo alla fine del sec. XIV e nei primi anni del XV*, "Archivio storico italiano", 113, 1955, 2, pp. 157–209.

Heyd, W., *Histoire du commerce du Levant au Moyen Âge*, I–II, Leipzig, 1936.

Höllmann, Th. O., *Die Seidenstrasse*, München, 2004.

Holt, P. M., *Qalāwūn's Treaty with Genoa in 1290*, "Der Islam", 57, 1980, pp. 101–108.

Howorth, H. H., *History of the Mongols from the 9^th to the 19^th Century*, pt. I: *The Mongols Proper and the Kalmuks*, London, 1876; pt. II: *The So-Called Tartars of Russia and Central Asia*, Division I–II, London, 1880; pt. III: *The Mongols of Persia*, London, 1888; pt. IV: *Supplement*, London, 1927.

İnalcık, H., *The Question of the Closing of the Black Sea under the Ottomans*, "Archeion Pontou", 35, 1979, pp. 74–110.

Iorga, N., *Veneţia in Marea Neagră*, I:

Dobrotici; II: *Legături cu Turcii şi cu creştinismul din Balcani de la lupta de la Cosovo la cea de la Nicopole (1386–96)*; III: *Originea legăturilor cu Ştefan-cel-Mare şi mediul desvoltării lor*, Bucureşti, 1914.

Jackson, P., *The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire*, "Central Asiatic Journal", 22, 1978, pp. 186–243.

Karpov, S. P., *L'Impero di Trebizonda, Venezia, Genova e Roma 1204–1461. Rapporti politici, diplomatici e commerciali*, Roma, 1986.

Kedar, B. Z., *Segurano-Sakran: un mercante genovese al servitio dei sultani mamaluchi c. 1303–1322*, in *Fatti e idee di storia economica nei secoli XII–XX. Studi dedicati a Franco Borlandi*, Bologna, 1977, pp. 75–91.

Klimkeit, H. J., *Die Seidenstraße, Handelsweg und Kulturbrücke zwischen Morgen- und Abendland*, Köln, 1988.

Labib, S. Y., *Handelsgeschichte Ägyptens im Spätmittelalter (1171–1517)*, Wiesbaden, 1965.

Laiou, A., *Constantinople and the Latins. The Foreign Policy of Andronicus II, 1282–1328*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1972.

Laurent, V., *La croisade et la question d'Orient sous le pontificat de Grégoire X (1272–1276)*, RHSEE, 22, 1945, pp. 105–137.

Liu, X., *The Silk Road in the World History*, Oxford, 2010.

Lopez, R. S., *L'importance de la mer Noire dans l'histoire de Gênes*, in *Colloquio romeno-italiano. I Genovesi nel Mar Nero durante i secoli XIII e XIV, Bucarest 27–28 marzo 1975*, Bucureşti, 1977, pp. 131–154.

Lopez, R. S., *Nuove luci sugli italiani in Estremo Oriente prima di Colombo*, in idem, *Su e giù per la storia di Genova*, Genova, 1975, pp. 83–136.

Lopez, R. S., *In quibusqumque mondi partibus*, in *Miscellanea di storia italiana e mediterranea per Nino Lamboglia*, Genova, 1978, pp. 347–354.

Lopez, R. S., *Venise et Gênes: deux styles, une réussite*, in idem, *Su e giù per la storia di Genova*, Genova, 1975, pp. 35–42.

Lopez, R. S., *Genova marinara nel Duecento. Benedetto Zaccaria, ammiraglio e mercante*, Milano, 1933.

Lupprian, K.-E., *Die Beziehungen der Päpste zu islamischen und mongolischen Herrschern im 13. Jahrhundert*, Città del Vaticano, 1981.

Manfroni, C., *Storia della marina italiana dal trattato di Ninfeo alla caduta di Constantinopoli, 1261–1453*, Livorno, 1902.

Martinez, A. P., *Institutional Development, Revenues and Trade*, in *The Cambridge History of Inner Asia. The Chinggisid Age*, eds. N. di Cosmo, A. J. Frank, P. B. Golden, Cambridge, 2004, pp. 89–108.

Morozzo della Rocca, R., *Notizie da Caffa*, in *Studi in onore di Amintore Fanfani*, III, Milano, 1962, pp. 266–295.

Mostaert, A. & F. W. Cleaves, *Les lettres de 1289 et 1305 des ilkhan Arghun et Ölgeitü à Philippe le Bel*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1962.

Musso, G. G., *Note d'archivio sulla «Massaria» di Caffa*, "Studi genuensi", 5, 1968, pp. 62–98.

Nikov, P., *Tatarobulgarski otnošeniya prez srednite vekove s ogled kum caruvaneto na Smileca*, Sofia, 1921.

Nystazopoulou-–Pélékidis, Maria G., *Venise et la mer Noire du XI^e^ au XV^e^*, Venezia, 1970.

Ostrogorsky, G., *Geschichte des byzantinischen Staates*, München, 1963.

Otten-Froux, C., *L'Aïas dans le dernier tiers du XIII^e^ siècle d'après les notaires génois*, in *The Medieval Levant. Studies in Memory of Elyahu Ashtor (1914–1984)*, ed. B. Z. Kedar and A. L. Udovitch, Haifa, 1988 (= "Asian and

African Studies. Journal of the Israel Oriental Society", 22, 1988, 1–3, pp. 147–171).

Papacostea, Ș., *La première crise des rapports byzantino-génois après Nymphaion. Le complot de Guglielmo Guercio (1264)*, "Revue roumaine d'histoire", 27, 1988, 4, pp. 211–236.

Papacostea, Ș., *La fin de la domination génoise à Lykostomo*, "Anuarul Institutului de Istorie şi Arheologie «A. D. Xenopol»", 22, 1985, 1, pp. 29–42.

Papacostea, Ș., *Gênes, Venise et la mer Noire à la fin du XIII^e siècle*, "Revue roumaine d'histoire", 29, 1990, 3–4, pp. 211–236.

Papacostea, Ș., *Une révolte antigénoise en mer Noire et la riposte de Gênes (1433–1434)*, in *État et civilisation au Moyen Âge*, Paris, 1989, pp. 441–442.

Papacostea, Ș., *«Quod non iretur ad Tanam». Un aspect fondamental de la politique génoise dans la mer Noire au XIV^e siècle*, "Revue des études sud-est européennes", 17, 1979, 2, pp. 201–217.

Papacostea, Ș., V. Ciocîltan, *Marea Neagră, răspântie a drumurilor intercontinentale (1204–1453)*, Constanţa, 2007.

Pegolotti, Francesco Balducci, *La pratica della mercatura*, ed. A. Evans, Cambridge (Mass.), 1936.

Petech, L., *Les marchands italiens dans l'Empire mongol*, "Journal asiatic", 250, 1962, 2, pp. 549–574.

Petrushevsky, I. P., *The Socio-Economic Condition of Iran under the Īl-Khāns*, in *The Cambridge History of Iran*, V: *The Saljuq and Mongol Periods*, Cambridge, 1968, pp. 483–537.

Pistarino, G., *Genova e il Vicino Oriente nell'epoca del Regno latino di Gerusalemme*, in *I Comuni italiani nel Regno crociato di Gerusalemme. Atti del colloquio "The Italian Communes in the Crusading Kingdom of Jerusalem", Jerusalem, May 24 – May 28, 1984*, Genova, 1986 (reprint Pistarino, *Genovesi*, pp. 57–141).

Poliak, A. N., *Le caractère colonial de l'État mamelouk dans ses rapports avec la Horde d'Or*, "Revue des études islamiques", 9, 1935, pp. 231–248.

Power, Eileen, *The Opening of the Land Routes to Cathay*, in *Travel and Travellers of the Middle Ages*, ed. A. P. Newton, London, 1926, pp. 124–158.

Richard, J., *Les navigations des occidentaux sur l'océan Indien et la mer Caspienne (XII^e – XV^e siècle)*, in *Sociétés et compagnies de commerce en Orient et dans l'océan Indien. Actes du huitième Colloque international d'histoire maritime (Beyrouth – 5–10 septembre 1966)* présentés par M. Mollat, Paris, 1970, pp. 353–369.

Sinor, D., *The Mongols and Western Europe*, in *A History of the Crusades*, III: *The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries*, ed. H. W. Hazard, Wisconsin, 1975.

Skržinskaja, Elena, *Storia della Tana*, "Studi Veneziani", 10, 1968, pp. 1–33.

Smirnov, V. D., *Krïmskoe khanstvo pod verkhovenstvom Otomanskoy Portï do načala XVIII veka*, St. Petersburg, 1887.

Spinei, V., *Moldova în secolele XI–XIV*, Bucureşti, 1982.

Spuler, B., *Die Goldene Horde. Die Mongolen in Rußland 1223–1502*, Wiesbaden, 1965.

Spuler, B., *Die Mongolen in Iran. Politik, Verwaltung und Kultur der der Ilchanzeit 1220–1350*, Leiden, 1985.

Strässle, P. M., *Der internationale Schwarzmeerhandel und Konstantinopel 1261–1484 im Spiegel der sowjetischen Forschung*, Bern – Frankfurt/M. – New York – Paris, 1990.

Thiriet, F., *Les Vénitiens en mer Noire. Organisations et trafics (XIII^e – XV^e siècles)*, "Archeion Pontou", 35, 1979, pp. 38–53.

Todorova, Elisaveta, *The Black Sea Interest of the Italians and the Bulgarian Ports*

(13th –15th Centuries), "Byzantino-bulgarica", 7, 1981, pp. 229–237.

Verlinden, Ch., *Esclavage et ethnographie sur les bords de la mer Noire (XIIIe – XIVe)*, in *Miscellanea historica in honorem Leonis van der Essen*, Brussels – Paris, 1947, pp. 1–12.

Vernadsky, G., *The Mongols and Russia*, New Haven – London, 1953 (idem, *A History of Russia*, III).

Veselovskiy, N. I., *Khan iz temnikov Zolotoy Ordï. Nogay i ego vremya*, Petrograd, 1922.

Vladimirtsov, B., *Le régime social des Mongols*, Paris, 1948.

Waugh, D., *Richthofen's 'Silk Roads': Toward the Archaeology of a Concept*, "The Silk Road", 5, 2007, 1.

Yule, H., *Cathay and the Way Thither*, II, London, 1844.

Zakirov, S., *Diplomatičeskie otnošeniya Zolotoy Ordï s Egiptom (XIII–XIV vv.)*, Moskva, 1966.

Ždan, M. B., *The Dependence of Halych-Volyn' Rus' on the Golden Horde*, "The Slavonic and East European Review", 35, 1956–57, pp. 505–522.

About the authors

Şerban Papacostea is a Romanian scholar specialised in medieval and pre-modern history. He graduated from the University of Bucharest in the late 1940s, during the transition phase from democracy to communism, and was thereafter detained as a political prisoner in Romania's communist penitentiaries. After his discharge, he followed the footsteps of great Romanian historians such as Nicolae Iorga, Gheorghe Brătianu and Andrei Oţetea and devoted his scientific interest to the study of the origins of the Romanian medieval states, the economic and social history of the Romanian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, and the importance of the Lower Danube and the Black Sea in Romanian and European history. After the fall of communism he was the director of the "Nicolae Iorga" History Institute of the Romanian Academy (1990–2001) and was also allowed to teach at the University of Bucharest. Since 1990 he has been a Correspondent Fellow of the Romanian Academy. He has published extensively, and among his main monographs are: *Oltenia sub stăpânirea austriacă (1718–1739)*, Bucharest, 1971; *Geneza statului în evul mediu românesc,* Bucharest, 1988; *Românii în secolul al XIII-lea între Cruciată şi Imperiul Mongol,* Bucharest, 1993; L*a Mer Noire, carrefour des civilisations,* Bucharest, 2006. E-mail: serbanpapacostea@gmail.com

Virgil Ciocîltan graduated in Arabic philology at the University of Bucharest and has worked thereafter at the "Nicolae Iorga" History Institute in Bucharest. He is interested in the medieval history of the Romanian Principalities and their relations with the East. He has taught graduate and postgraduate courses at the Universities of Freiburg, Bucharest, Constanţa and Galaţi. He has been a Fellow of Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and the New Europe College, Institute of Advanced Study (Bucharest) and has completed several research visits in Western Europe. His main publications are: *Mongolii şi Marea Neagră. Contribuţia cinghizhanizilor la transformarea bazinului pontic în placă turnantă a comerţului euro-asiatic*, Bucharest, 1998 (with an English version recently published – *The Mongols and the Black Sea Trade in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries*, translated by Samuel Willcocks, Leiden – Boston, 2012); Marea Neagră, *răspântie a drumurilor intercontinentale (1204–1453)*, Constanţa, 2007 (co-author). E-mail: virgil.ciociltan@gmail.com

The Opening and Development of the Black Sea for International Trade and Shipping (1774–1853)

by Constantin Ardeleanu, "The Lower Danube" University of Galaţi

Abstract

The paper presents the development of the Black Sea trade after the peace of Küçük Kaynarca (1774), when the Ottomans were forced to allow the trade of Russian flagged ships beyond the Straits of Bosporus and the Dardanelles. During the next two decades, in a strained international context, Russia gradually developed a string of trading centres along the northern coast of the Euxine and encouraged foreign merchants to make full use of this new commercial route. European powers were quick in trying to take advantage of the rich agro-pastoral resources of the Black Sea area, but fruitful exchanges were often interrupted by military issues or the Porte's reluctance to completely open the Black Sea to international trade and shipping. During a second phase, between the beginnings of the French revolutionary wars and the Peace of Adrianople (1829), Black Sea trade faced similar discontinuities and hindrances and was often interrupted by political and diplomatic problems. But the quasi-permanent war on the continent and the disruption of normal agricultural cycles made Russian grain an important and desired alimentary resource, which Mediterranean and western merchants employed to replenish their exhausted warehouses. After the complete opening of the Black Sea to foreign merchants and ship-owners in 1829, the Black Sea witnessed tremendous growth due to several factors. On the one side, with the Straits turned into an indicator of European balance of power, the Western powers supported a more active presence of their merchants on the Ottoman market, which was completely opened to foreign investments by the commercial treaties concluded with the Porte in 1838. Vast areas of Ottoman territories on the eastern and western coasts of the Black Sea became profitable destinations for European merchants, while the Romanian Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia grew to become rivals of Southern Russia in exporting agro-pastoral goods. At the same time, the grain trade of the Russian Empire was oriented towards supplying its southern outlets with the rich harvests of the hinterland, turning the Black Sea into one of the largest grain markets in the world before the Crimean War.

Introduction

After the fall of Constantinople in 1453 and the subsequent conquest of all trading centres along the Black Sea coasts the Ottoman Empire imposed an almost complete prohibition of foreign shipping in what became a Turkish lake by the annexation of Southern Bessarabia and the Budjak in 1538. The area was gradually integrated into a regional economy, whose main function was to supply foodstuffs and raw materials to the increasing market of the Ottoman capital.

During the following three centuries, the Mediterranean and western maritime powers attempted to gain direct access to these cheap resources, but their requests to have the Black Sea opened to international navigation fell on deaf ears. Passage rights through the Bosporus remained until 1774 a privilege which the Porte reserved for its own subjects, merchants or ship-owners who provisioned Istanbul with strategic goods such as grain or slaves. Although this closure was not completely hermetic, shipping in the Black Sea was confined to vessels under Ottoman flag, and Istanbul played the role of a staple port in relation to the territories beyond the Bosporus. As a consequence of this navigational monopoly, the Euxine remained completely peripheral to those economic developments that were shaping the modern world-system since late 15th

century. Few foreigners ventured to an area which came to be less known on 18th century western maps than the distant seas and oceans of the southern hemisphere.

This static picture of a closed sea, ploughed by ships of Greek or Ottoman seafarers settled in Istanbul or in the commercial emporia scattered around the Pontos Euxeinos, completely, irreversibly and rapidly changed after 1774. It took a breach in the jealously guarded status of the Straits of Bosporus and the Dardanelles to feed a veritable revolution in the European interest for the Black Sea. Political and economic factors intermingled in this new episode of the Eastern Question. Apparently not only the fate of the Ottoman Empire was at stake, but also its very impressive economic heritage – a fresh route eastwards, with ramifications for the Balkans, Central Europe, Poland, Russia, the Caucasus, and Persia. The golden wool of the Argonauts had now more palpable shapes: naval stores, grain and agro-pastoral goods.

The classical story of restricted and regional trade caught in the vortex of the great global commercial exchanges was clearly visible here and now. Old and new, state and private, East and West met in the Black Sea, with state actors regulating the macro level of political economy and with bold private enterprisers acting as the bacteria that generated change at the micro level of society itself. However, it took long and systematic diplomatic, administrative and economic efforts to turn a marginal sea into one of the largest grain supplying areas of the world. This narrative will briefly focus on the profound political and economic transformations that marked the "rediscovery" of the Black Sea by the western world.

Phase I – Unlocking the Black Sea from within (1774–1798)

With the maritime powers disallowed from entering the Black Sea, it took a terrestrial empire that mastered the eastern steppe lands to force the Bosporus from within the Euxine. Russia seemed fated to this destiny. She steadily approached the warm seas starting with the 17th century, and with a coherent and persevering policy secured the navigation of Russian commercial ships in the Sea of Azov, the antechamber of the Black Sea. The able Catherine II, following in the political footsteps of her predecessors, was conscious that Russia's future as a European power greatly depended on militarily and economically gaining a firm hold of the Black Sea. After imposing her control in the two buffer areas that stood in Russia's way (Poland and the Crimean Khanate), Catherine defeated the Porte in the war of 1768–1774 and by the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (21 July 1774) Russia gained a strategic foothold on the northern Black Sea coast, annexing the Kuban and Terek areas, the ports of Azov and Taganrog, at the mouth of the Don, the fortresses of Kerch and Yenikale, and a small region between the lower courses of the rivers Bug and Dnieper, together with the mouth of the latter and the fortress of Kinburn, a territory securing a crucial connection with the core provinces of the Empire. Yet the greatest success of tsarist diplomacy was the right granted to Russian ships to sail in the Black Sea and pass through the Straits, a provision with momentous political and economic consequences for the entire area.

The annexation of the Crimea in April 1783 seemed to make a new Russo-Turkish war imminent, but it only broke out in 1787, and Austria joined it in February 1788, following the Christian empires' plans to parti-

tion Ottoman territories. The treaty of Jassy (9 January 1792) confirmed Russia's possession of the Crimea and of the strategic fortress of Ochakiv, so that in less than two decades Russia secured her control over the entire northern coastline of the Euxine, a territorial development that was to reshape not only the political and military balance of the Pontic basin, but combined with the granting of passage right through the Turkish Straits for Russian ships also greatly augmented the commercial significance of the area. However, the integration of these territories into the rapidly growing Tsarist Empire and their linkage to the regional and international commercial routes required the imposition of several administrative, economic and social reforms.

Russia's military conquests were soon followed by explicit policies of economic integration within the structure of the empire, of demographic growth and of social reform. Several administrative decrees organised the territory of New Russia, culminating with the foundation of the Ekaterinoslav Viceroyalty in 1784. Large estates were donated to the nobiliary elite, and ample colonisation programs were enforced, in order to populate and economically exploit these extensive and fertile steppe lands. Domestic and foreign colonists were settled in the province, so that the population of the territories making up the Viceroyalty increased during these decades from about 263,000 to almost 820,000 inhabitants.

These measures profoundly transformed the internal economic structure of New Russia, gradually providing to the markets a greater surplus of agricultural goods and products that lay at the foundation of Russia's economic growth in the 19th century. In order to supply this merchandise to the foreign markets, imperial authorities followed a coherent policy of constructing an entire trading infrastructure. The creation of a string of commercial emporia along the northern coastline of the Black Sea provided the area with veritable economic lungs, capable of adapting the area to a capitalist economy. The port of Taganrog in the Sea of Azov, which was strategically placed close to the mouth of the Don River, was rebuilt in 1769 and shortly became the centre of considerable trade and shipping. The population increased from a few hundred inhabitants in 1774 to about 6,000 in 1793. Mariupol, founded by Greek settlers from the Crimea, was developed by several imperial privileges. Kerch, a very small village in 1774, reached a population of over 3,000 inhabitants by 1787 and survived by the lighterage operations carried for the ships crossing the homonymous strait. Equally promising was the Dnieper region, whose prospects increased after the foundation of Kherson in 1778 as a commercial and naval base, the intended "St. Petersburg of the South." Greatly supported by local and central authorities, it slowly became an important commercial gateway binding European maritime routes to the continental roads leading deep into Russia and Poland. After the acquisition of the Crimea, Sevastopol was established on the site of a natural harbour and became the operational base of Russia's Black Sea navy. Theodosia, the prosperous medieval Caffa, was re-established, but, similarly to all Crimean outlets, it suffered due to its bad connections with the rest of the empire.

At the same time, the authorities in St. Petersburg tried to encourage commercial relations with the Mediterranean and Western powers. In 1782 Catherine II issued an edict providing a reduction of 25 percent of export and import duties payable in the southern ports for all Russian subjects or traders from privileged countries. Two years later, the ports of the Black Sea were formally opened

to the merchants and ship-owners of all nations. Another ukase provided additional preferential tariffs and allowed the export of Polish goods through Russia's southern ports.

Several European courts promptly responded to these commercial overtures. Austria, which was also allowed free navigation in the Black Sea, signed a commercial agreement with Russia in 1785. Already aware of the economic value of the Euxine, France developed direct trading relations with Russia's southern ports, and the commercial treaty of 1787 stipulated further fiscal and customs reductions for direct economic exchanges. Similar treaties were soon concluded with other states. The commercial treaty with the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, signed on 17 January 1787, provided for mutual reductions by one fourth of tariff charges on goods exported or imported via the Black Sea. Another agreement with Portugal referred to the mutual reduction of duties by one half when several listed goods were imported directly.

Russia's regional position depended on her capacity to maintain a strong navy in the Black Sea. This consisted of the main fleet based at Sevastopol and a smaller squadron stationed at Kherson. The power of these warships was demonstrated during the conflict that broke out in 1787, when the fortress of Ochakiv became the key to a larger strategic zone. The Ottoman fleet was destroyed in 1788 by the navy in Sevastopol and the citadel fell, thus experiencing a similar fate to all major Ottoman strongholds in the area (Akkerman and Bender on the Dniester, Kilia and Ismail on the Danube). These vessels and their crews managed to chart the Black Sea, a significant effort for improving navigational safety on a sea that was little known to Russian and foreign seafarers alike.

Other local powers were also interested in the increasing prospects of the Black Sea trade. The First Partition of Poland in 1772 was a great economic blow to the kingdom's commercial interests in the Baltic area, as the port of Gdańsk (Danzig) was suffocated by Prussia's customs policy. Faced with an acute economic crisis, authorities in Warsaw attempted to redirect the country's trade towards the Black Sea. The network of internal rivers (the Dniester, the Dnieper and the Bug) could be profitably used to ship Polish goods to Russian or Turkish outlets, while the same routes were seen as advantageous solutions for encouraging foreign imports into Poland. Prince August Sulkowski presented these plans during a visit to Paris in 1779, when he advertised the possibility of exporting Polish grain, liquors, salted meat, flax, hemp, hides, and furs, cheap and qualitative resources for France's growing market.

In 1782 a "Polish Company for Oriental Trade" was founded in Warsaw, and by French mediation the Russian port of Kherson was chosen as the hub of Polish Black Sea trade. The economic development of Poland's south-eastern provinces was greatly encouraged by the central and regional authorities, which invested in the modernisation of land routes and inland waterways capable of carrying bulky goods to the Black Sea outlets. Russia granted further privileges to the Polish merchants involved in this commerce. Polish goods were allowed free transit through New Russia, a reduction of 25 percent in customs duties was applied to Polish exports to Russia, and the import of goods destined for Poland enjoyed further fiscal benefits.

During the peaceful interval of 1784–1787, exports from Poland through Kherson increased exponentially. The Dniester was a favourite waterway for shipping goods from Podolia, while other rivers (the Pripet, the

Slucz, the Horyn and the Berezina) were used for supplying timber from the rich inland forests. Wheat also became profitable merchandise for Polish landlords and was in high demand in Mediterranean ports such as Alexandria, Marseille or Barcelona. In 1785, for example, the wheat sent from Poland to Kherson amounted to 3 million Zlotys, or 60 percent of the 4,900,780 Zlotys that accounted for the port's trade. By this liberal policy, Russia was desired to increase the commerce of her newly founded ports, but she also aimed to prevent direct contacts between the Polish and the foreign merchants (mainly French) involved in Black Sea trade. However, the Ottomans applied a completely different policy and only allowed the transit of Polish goods with the payment of rather large customs duties. In 1792, a Polish envoy, Piotr Potocki, was sent to Constantinople to discuss the conclusion of a trade agreement with the Porte, but the political situation in Poland had already become critical; the war between Poland and Russia and the subsequent partitions of Poland put an end to the flourishing independent Polish trade through the Black Sea and completed its integration into the growing commerce of Southern Russia.

Austria was also accelerating her march towards the Black Sea along the Danube route, a development facilitated by the provisions of the treaties of Passarowitz (1718) and Belgrade (1739), but the Habsburgs` efforts were frustrated due to several factors, geographical and technical, as the barrier of the Iron Gates was hardly passable by commercial ships. The first enterpriser to venture beyond this perilous gorge was Nicolaus Ernst Kleeman, who left in the autumn of 1768 for the Lower Danube and headed to the khan's residence in the Crimea and then to Constantinople. Although the tradesman had many mishaps, his manufactures (ironware, gallantry, cotton textiles and general wares) were sold for a huge profit – 87 ¾ percent, proving the high productivity of developing the Danubian commercial route.

The increasing commerce of the Black Sea after 1774 was equally closely scrutinised by several private investors and the imperial authorities in Vienna. The German company of Willeshoffen & Co., active in the Levant, sensed the profitability of trading Austrian merchandise in the Euxine. His overtures were favourably received by Emperor Joseph II, who supported a commercial expedition to the markets of the Principalities, of the Crimea and of Constantinople, with the view of turning the Danube into a permanent and lucrative artery for exporting Austrian manufactures. In 1782 Joseph offered an imperial ship, mastered by Captain Georg Lauterer, a good connoisseur of the Lower Danube (instructed with additional cartographical tasks), to convey down the Danube a large variety of Austrian goods (textiles, porcelain, glassware, mirrors, fashion goods, metal works, common wares, wine), mostly getting to Kherson. Willeshoffen organised a second expedition in 1783, and more Austrian investors soon followed suit and took advantage of these regional commercial opportunities, but all efforts suffered from the same hindrance – the passage of the Iron Gates was not only perilous in itself, but it was also financially burdening.

Diplomatic support for developing this trade led to the conclusion of a commercial agreement between Austria and the Ottoman Empire on 24 February 1784. The convention regulated the imports of Austrian merchandise into Turkey (metalwork, mining, china, mirrors, fabrics, glass and glassware, etc.), and Austrian navigation was allowed down to Vidin or Ruse, where goods were transhipped on Ottoman vessels. Customs rates were fixed

at 3 percent, and Austrian shipping into the Black Sea, through the Straits, was also allowed. The commercial treaty of 1784 opened another direct route of Austrian initiative into the Black Sea, encouraging entrepreneurs in Trieste to trade in the area, both in Russian and Danubian ports. However, the outbreak of war in 1787 and Austria's involvement in the conflict in 1788 put a quick end to these developments.

Besides the products supplied by Russian ports, in the last quarter of the 18th century foreign merchants also became interested in the commercial resources of the Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, autonomous states under Turkish domination. A "relative" monopoly over their foreign trade meant that they were compelled to supply large quantities of grain (mainly wheat and barley), livestock (sheep), animal fat, butter, pressed cheese, honey, wax, timber, saltpeter, etc. for the Porte's needs either free or at fixed prices much under the real value of the merchandise. In the context of Russia's anti-Turkish offensive, the treaty of 1774 and a series of subsequent documents restricted the Porte's interferences in the Principalities' domestic life, limiting its requirements to a fixed amount of money and compelling it to purchase the products at local market prices.

Besides the restrictive trade in the products requisitioned by the Porte, Moldavia and Wallachia were also engaged in continuously increasing free commercial exchanges with the Ottoman Empire and other partners (Austria in the first place). The main categories of freely exported merchandise were live animals and animal products, technical plants, worked textiles, raw and worked hides, salt, etc., whereas the main imports were represented by textiles, fruit and luxury goods. When Istanbul was abundantly supplied, as in was the case in 1775, the export of wheat was freely allowed from the Principalities.

The profitability of the new Black Sea market was rapidly sensed by the Mediterranean traders, who were already powerful in Constantinople. Trading in the Black Sea had always been an important objective for French merchants, taking into account their privileged position in the Levant and the fact that the northern route to Russia was dominated by English, Dutch and Hanseatic middlemen. The first direct French interests in the Euxine were related to the Crimean Khanate, a valuable relay between the rich resources of the Russian provinces and the Constantinopolitan and Mediterranean markets. The Russian-Turkish conflict of 1768–1774 completely changed France's attitude regarding the Black Sea. On the one hand the diplomats in Versailles tried to support the Porte and preserve the privileges French traders enjoyed on the Ottoman markets; on the other hand, they wanted to benefit from the advantages resulting from opening a direct commercial route between Marseilles and New Russia. Mercantile circles in southern French ports were equally interested in encouraging trade exchanges with Poland, forced to redirect its agro-pastoral goods and raw materials southwards. The foundation of Kherson in 1778 and Russia's policy to boost the export trade of her new provinces nourished great economic expectations among French merchants.

This new phase in French commercial involvement in the Black Sea was initiated by the activity of an enterprising merchant, Antoine Anthoine, who was well accustomed to the trading conditions of the Near East. In 1781, commissioned by the French and Russian ambassadors in Constantinople, he inspected several Russian Black Sea ports, including the emerging outlet of Kherson, where he es-

tablished a commercial house. Thanks to his mediation, Polish and Russian officials agreed to cooperate and turn Kherson into the commercial gate of a larger region, linked to the markets of Russia, Poland, Austria, the Danubian Principalities and the Mediterranean Sea. During the 1780s, 15 commercial houses traded with Kherson, the most important being owned by French, German or Swiss merchants (Anthoine, Veuve Councler, Folsch et Hornbostel, Rolland, Straforello, etc.). Ships under Russian colours usually loaded at Marseille alcoholic beverages (wine), textiles (Lyon fabrics, velvet, fine linen) and colonial goods and returned laden with hemp, wax, honey and timber; but wheat started to become the most traded product and waswell received on the Mediterranean markets.

Geography placed the Italian states in a good position to benefit from the opening of the Black Sea to international shipping. The Venetian Republic was excellently situated in this context due to the large fleet it had in the Eastern Mediterranean and the skill of its Greek subjects, the most numerous and active seafarers in the Euxine. Hoisting the Russian flag, a privilege rather easily acquired, these Greek seafarers became well implanted in the international trade of New Russia and the Danubian Principalities. According to statistical information from 1786, 56 Venetian ships sailed under Russian flag (most of them belonging to Greek and Slavic Dalmatian shipowners and merchants) in the Black Sea, making Venice a serious actor of this growing trade.

As for Britain, its involvement in the Black Sea during this period had more to do with political than with commercial reasons, as it found itself in a great colonial rivalry against France. After 1774 British diplomats reported to the Foreign Office about the acquisition of naval supplies (masts and timber) at Kherson by French traders and about the commercial opportunities of the Balkans and Black Sea coasts, but direct British participation in this commerce was still absent. However, Russia's conquest and maintenance of Ochakiv, the last Ottoman stronghold on the northern shore of the Black Sea, made English statesmen pay more attention to the political and commercial developments that shaped the political geography of the area in the early 1790s.

Phase II – The Black Sea trade in times of war (1798–1829)

This second phase in the opening of the Black Sea to international trade and shipping was greatly affected by the military developments that had started in Western Europe and which had also spread to their vortex the Near East, turning the Turkish Straits into the crux of the continental balance of power.

During the first years of the French revolutionary wars, the political attitude of the Ottoman leadership remained reserved, until naval and military events in the Eastern Mediterranean seemed to completely alter the regional status quo. The annexation of the Ionian Islands by France in 1797 was seen as a further step towards a dangerous expansion in the Levant, so that the Porte requested the Ionian archipelago in return for concessions to French trade in the Levant and free entrance into the Black Sea. Napoleon's campaign in Egypt in 1798 prompted Sultan Selim III to declare war on France and to seek an alliance with Britain and Russia. Agreements were concluded in January 1799, with the signatory parties guaranteeing Ottoman integrity, but also with Russian warships being granted the right of passage through the Straits for the

duration of that war. These perilous circumstances allowed British diplomats to also draw from the Porte the right for British commercial ships to sail into the Black Sea, a privilege that became operational only several years later (1803), after the usual protractions of Ottoman diplomats. However, access for French merchants to the Black Sea was also agreed upon in the French-Turkish peace treaty of Amiens (1802), stimulating the hopes for a quick recovery of Marseille's commercial connections in the Black Sea.

But it was not the best time for exploiting the resources of this area, as the Straits were deeply caught in the avatars of Napoleonic policy. In 1805 the Porte renewed the 1799 alliance, but the French emperor's overwhelming victories and an able propaganda in Constantinople (with promises of returning the Crimea to its former suzerain) gave France the upper hand. In 1806, a new Russian-Ottoman war broke out, and the Danubian Principalities were readily occupied by tsarist troops. Britain's diplomatic response was to disclose the ripe plans designed after the imperial meetings of Tilsit and Erfurt to divide the Ottoman Empire between France and Russia. In 1809 the peace of the Dardanelles provided Britain with large concessions for trading in the Ottoman dominions, the Black Sea included, but with war still raging the Euxine remained a peripheral destination for the Mediterranean and western traders and shippers.

During this period, Russia continued her slow yet effective march on the eastern coast of the Black Sea. When Tiflis was captured by the Persians in September 1795, Russia readily intervened apparently to defend Georgian independence, but then she gradually annexed several territories (Imretia, Mingrelia, Abkhazia) that raised great concerns equally in Persia and the Ottoman Empire. Concurrently, by controlling the important ports of Sukhum and Redut Kale she virtually mastered about 120 miles of the eastern coastline of the Black Sea.

After the conclusion of the 1815 Vienna peace treaty, the Black Sea basin remained in an unstable political situation. When the Greek independence war broke out in 1821, the Porte attempted to hurt the insurgents by checking the flourishing trade carried in Southern Russia by Greek merchants and ship-owners. On several occasions Sultan Mahmud II claimed his right to pre-empt foreign cargoes of foodstuffs passing through the Straits to feed Istanbul and tried to prohibit Greek-owned ships sailing under Russian flag from passing beyond the Straits. The Greek-Ottoman conflict eventually prompted the involvement of European powers, and following the 1826 Anglo-Russian protocol tsarist diplomats forced the conclusion of the Russian-Ottoman convention of Akkerman. It recognised Russia's possessions in the Caucasus, the Ottomans accepted Sukhum and other points on the Abkhazian coast as Russian territories, and merchants under Russian flag were free to trade on all domestic Ottoman waterways. The subsequent crisis in the Near East, the defeat of the Ottoman fleet at Navarino (1827) and the Russian-Ottoman war of 1828–1829 were further challenges for the Straits, virtually closed to international shipping during these conflicts. Finally, by the peace of Adrianople (14 September 1829) Russia annexed the mouths of the Danube down to the St. George branch, and in Asia the Porte recognised the cessation of Georgia and Eastern Armenia, but Russia also claimed suzerainty over Circassia. However, the most important provision for this narrative was the right of free passage through the Turkish Straits for all Russian and foreign merchants.

It was a great success for tsarist diploma-

cy which opened a new phase in the history of the Black Sea. By mid 1820s most European powers had secured commercial agreements with the Porte, allowing them access into the Black Sea, but this free passage still largely depended upon Turkish caprices and was often interrupted. As the trade between Southern Russian ports and Western Europe was carried aboard foreign ships, it was extremely important for Russia to secure such an advantageous stipulation, which greatly developed the commercial prospects of the entire Black Sea area.

The changing constellation of the Near East before the Adrianople Treaty allowed discontinuous but great opportunities for increasing the commercial significance of the Black Sea basin. Russia continued to invest in her southern provinces, and Catherine's policy was closely followed by Tsars Paul and Alexander I. Commercial treaties were signed with England (1797), Portugal (1798), Sweden (1801) and Prussia (1806), with the same liberal attitude shown in relation to Mediterranean and western merchants. New Russia, divided into the provinces of Ekaterinoslav, Nikolayev (later Kherson), Taurida (the Crimea) and the oblast of Bessarabia (ruptured in 1812 from the province of Moldavia), was placed under a single Governor-General, a position occupied during the first half of the 19th century by able officials, who greatly contributed to the modernisation of the area: the Duke of Richelieu, Count Langeron, M. S. Vorontsov and P. I. Fyodorov.

Economic reforms were encouraged throughout this vast hinterland. Domestic and foreign immigration was made attractive by extensive political, religious and juridical privileges granted to the colonists, but also by enormous estates of free land given to landlords. The population increased to 1.6 million by 1813 and more than 2 million by the mid 1820s, a demographic growth that meant a similar upsurge of the agricultural output. Cereal cultivation was naturally the main economic branch, but sheep breeding, vine culture and planting of fruit trees also greatly developed, diversifying the variety of goods supplied by New Russia to the foreign markets.

The string of Black Sea outlets continued to be encouraged, with the greatest attention paid to the port-city of Odessa, founded in 1794 on the site of a small Ottoman fort. Situated in an excellent geographical position, on a high terrace overlooking the sea, at almost equal distance between the mouths of the rivers Dniester and Bug, and also close to the mouths of the Danube, Odessa received several privileges and concessions which stimulated its rapid growth. With the influx of foreign and Russian colonists, the population grew rapidly, from about 8,000 in 1803 to 50,000 by 1835 and 100,000 by the end of the Crimean War. Catherine's initial concessions were extended and renewed by Alexander I. In 1803 the customs duties of all Russian Black Sea ports were lowered by 25 percent, and in 1804 Odessite merchants were allowed to store goods in local warehouses up to five years, without paying duty until the commodities were sold or reshipped, a privilege also granted to Taganrog in 1806. But the greatest advantage was the establishment of the free port, effective between 1819 and 1857, which turned Odessa into the most convenient outlet for large grain growing districts of the Russian Empire, such as south-eastern Poland, western Ukraine and Bessarabia. Endowed with such advantages, Odessa became the symbol of Russia's interest in encouraging its foreign trade. The city continuously thrived and was endowed with all institutions necessary for supporting its commercial activity (banks,

commercial courts, chamber of commerce, insurance offices, etc.). Its evolution during this period, as visible in Table 1 below, was largely influenced by the situation of the Turkish Straits, with free passage often hindered by the conflicts the Porte was involved in.

Table I
The trade of Odessa

Years	Exports	Imports
	Average value (1,000 metal rubles)	
1795	68	–
1796	172	–
1802–1805	2,508	1,452
1806–1810	1,611	1,852
1811–1815	5,081	2,646
1816–1820	6,790	944
1821–1825	4,467	1,970
1826–1829	2,918	1,944

Source: Harvey 1938: 76

Other port-cities were also encouraged, but their fortune was less favourable. Crimean harbours lacked proper connections to the productive hinterlands, and Sevastopol only served as the base of the Russian navy. Kherson and Nikolayev were handicapped by their placement in marshy areas and the lack of investments for developing inland shipping on the Dniester and Bug rivers. The ports of the Sea of Azov were much better interconnected with the agricultural districts of eastern Ukraine, the southern Urals, and southwestern Siberia, so that Rostov, Taganrog and Mariupol gradually increased and exported a large variety of goods, ranging from cereals to iron, butter, tallow, rope, cordage, sailcloth, hemp, caviar, leather, skins and furs. But their further expansion was still hindered by the shallowness of the Sea of Azov, which only allowed the shipping of flat-bottomed ships, increasing the freight due to the necessity of transhipping goods aboard lighters.

During these decades, despite the still difficult access through the Straits, the most powerful stimulus for Russian grain exports came from Mediterranean and Western Europe, a demand related to the almost continuous war on the continent and the disruption of normal agricultural production cycles. The Black Sea was an excellent grain growing area, and when the Straits were open merchants invaded it. Nine-hundred ships entered the Black Sea in 1803, and most of them loaded wheat at Odessa and Taganrog, replenishing the warehouses of European deposit ports. The end of the Napoleonic wars allowed a new upsurge of Russia's grain exports, and in 1815 about 1,500 ships entered the Black Sea, mainly in

search of grain. The demand remained high in the following years due to widespread crop failures in Western Europe between 1816 and 1818. Naturally enough, the organisation of Russian agriculture followed these new commercial imperatives, and cultivated estates grew proportionately, with a similar increase in quality. The production of other agro-pastoral goods, such as linseed, wool or tallow, was also encouraged, and natural conditions, with extremely fertile lands, and the social system, with cheap labour services of dependent peasants, allowed their production at competitive market prices.

This period of almost continuous conflict throughout Europe decisively shaped the economic structure of southern Russia. Grain was not the main commodity in Russia's Black Sea ports in late 18th century, as the area lacked the appropriate production, transport and marketing infrastructure necessary to offer to foreign merchants the surplus of inland districts. But the area had several great opportunities: the huge expanse of extremely fertile land, excellent climatic conditions for cereal growing, estate owners ready to invest in agriculture and able managers who convinced the central government to support these economic activities. Thus by the early 19th century South Russia emerged as a favourite destination for the grain hungry nations of Europe, and the only barrier for a continuous upsurge of grain exports was the still complicated question of passage through the Turkish Straits.

Throughout this second phase, most of the significant Black Sea trade was limited to the Russian ports on its northern coast. The commerce of the Danubian outlets continued to increase, but the monopolistic provisions of the Porte regarding the free trade of several agro-pastoral products did not encourage large investments in local agriculture and trade. However, the sales of many freely exported commodities multiplied both at the Danube and in other Ottoman Black Sea ports, such as the Balkan outlet of Varna or the ports of Trabzon and Samsun, well linked to Persia, the Caspian Sea and Asia Minor.

Phase III – Free trade in an open sea (1829–1853)

As mentioned above, the Russian-Ottoman peace treaty of Adrianople radically altered the balance of power and the economic significance of the Black Sea basin. The beneficial consequences of the treaty, securing free access to Mediterranean and western merchants and ship-owners to markets still little exploited commercially were soon overshadowed by Russia's apparent plans in the area, especially in the two buffer zones where the Ottoman and Russian empires collided – in the Danubian Principalities and in the Caucasus. In 1833, following the acute crisis in the Near East related to the ambitions of the powerful Pasha of Egypt, Mehmet Ali, Russia scored a huge diplomatic success by signing with the Porte the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. By this, the Ottomans were to close the Straits to foreign warships, but to keep them open for the Russian navy in case the latter was involved in a conflict. Considering that Russia endangered the continental balance of power by turning the Ottoman Empire into a sort of protectorate or vassal state, Britain, France and Austria paid increasing attention to the Black Sea area, as the growth of Russia's fleet was an additional threat to the Ottoman capital and to the preservation of the Porte's territorial integrity. Western interest in the fate of the Danubian Principalities and of Circassia consequently increased, making European policymakers (the English in the first place) keen on sup-

porting the national movements of Romanians and Circassians, as long as they preserved an anti-Russian character and did not contest the lawful Ottoman domination.

Politics and economy went hand in hand, and the English diplomatic representatives at Constantinople encouraged an active commercial presence of British tradesmen and ship-owners on the eastern and western shores of the Euxine. Moreover, as a direct menace to British interests in Persia and further east, towards India, Russia's impositions in Circassia were grievously felt in London. Unable to legally contest this domination, the Foreign Office was at least desirous not to officially recognise it. This rivalry nourished a spectacular diplomatic incident in the mid 1830s, when an inflamed Russophobe, David Urquhart, carefully planned a Russo-British conflict in the area. The schooner "Vixen" was hired by several of his associates to carry salt from Wallachia to the Caucasus, to a region where the Russian government had already restricted trade to posts possessing quarantine stations and customs houses. As envisioned by Urquhart, the adventure of "Vixen" ended quickly in November 1836, when the vessel was intercepted by a Russian warship in the bay of Sudzhuk-Kale. The confiscation of the vessel caused public uproar in Britain, but the two governments resolved the issue, a conciliatory solution that meant a *de facto* acceptance of Russia's possession of the Circassian coast. Both the Lower Danube and Circassia had been rather marginal regions for direct British economic involvement in the context of the Ottoman monopolistic policy in the Black Sea basin, but British manufactures brought via Leipzig or Constantinople started to enjoy large popularity among local consumers. Starting with the 1830s, the Danubian Principalities and the Caucasus became an increasingly frequent destination for British and European entrepreneurs who had discovered their great commercial prospects.

Finally to conclude with the political component of this phase the renewed Near Eastern crisis of the late 1830s led to the signing of the Straits Convention of July 1841. European Powers convened that "the passage of the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosporus was always to be closed to foreign ships of war, so long as the Porte is at peace". It put an end to Russia`s dominant position at the Straits, but it also showed the huge strategic importance of the Black Sea area. And not only from a political perspective, but also economically as the industrialising European nations turned their interest towards the resources of the Black Sea, where Russia was now closely followed by a free trading Ottoman Empire.

Grain trade in the Black Sea was greatly encouraged by the varying tariff policies of European cabinets regarding the importation of cereals. The Mediterranean and Western Powers, who were experiencing increasing industrial development, needed larger crops to feed their growing urban population. Britain was the largest market and its grain imports were regulated by several Corn Laws. In 1828, British authorities introduced a new system of taxing grain imports, the so called "sliding scale," designed to only admit enough foreign grain so as to stabilise local prices. This pattern, which in fact favoured huge grain speculations, was followed throughout most of Western and Northern Europe. When these Corn Laws were abolished in the mid 1840s, the British model was quickly followed throughout Europe and the new grain frenzy of the late 1840s and early 1850s was mainly nourished by the Black Sea.

Another factor that largely favoured the commercial relevance of the area was the es-

tablishment of steamship services in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. In 1836–1837 several lines were inaugurated and they accelerated the market integration of the area. On the one hand the Donau Dampfschiffahrts Gesellschaft, with political and financial support from the Austrian government, linked her fluvial and maritime steamers, securing an uninterrupted, safe and quick voyage between Vienna and Constantinople, with the Danubian outlets of Brăila and Galați acting as relay ports for the transit of passengers and cargo. At the same time, two steamship lines started to ply from the Ottoman capital to Samsun and Trabzon. By the next decade, competition sharpened, with British, Austrian, and Ottoman vessels joining the Golden Horn to the Ottoman districts west and east of the Bosporus, but also with Russian steamers plying between Odessa, the Danube, the Azov and Constantinople. The Black Sea was now fully integrated into the economic rhythms of the Eastern Mediterranean and the transports of goods from this area started to enter an age of predictability.

Not least of all, the success of Black Sea trade was related to the activity of a vast network of merchants with excellent relations in the largest European deposit ports. The first traders who took advantage of these economic prospects were Greek and Italian middlemen active in the Near East, who became agents for some of the largest entrepreneurial family companies of the age: Argenti, Negroponte, Ralli, Sechiari, Pana, etc. These examples of Danubian ports are relevant for the entire Black Sea basin. The Argentis had representatives in Britain and at Marseille, but they had close relatives in the families of Ionides, Ralli, Radocanachi and Schilizzi, whereas the Negropontes, present at Marseille, Alexandria and Odessa, were related to many other families from this mercantile network. Common kinship secured all these ethnic-regional commercial houses reliable connections, a decisive fact taking into account the short interval in which the best transactions were concluded, the perishable character of the goods, the long journey from the Black Sea to the destination ports, all entailing quick decisions and the guaranty that, at the other end of the commercial route, a serious and reliable economic partner was waiting. The Italian merchants were the most notable competitors of the Greeks. One of the largest commercial houses was that of the Genoese brothers Filippo, Antonio and Francesco Pedemonte. Founded in 1831, it was active under different names (Pedemonte e Peretti, Fratelli Pedemonte, Pedemonte e Bottaro or Francesco Pedemonte). It owned many immovable properties (houses, storehouses) in Galați and Brăila, it had branches in Brăila and Calafat, and intended to open other agencies in remote areas of the Principalities, where grain price was much lower. In 1839–1840 the house had its own small fleet, enjoying profitable commercial connections with Genoa, Constantinople, Naples, Leghorn, Trieste, Messina, Marseille, Nyssa, Toulon, Algiers, Calais, Malta and London. In the early 1840s, it had a turnover of 14 million lei (about 450,000 ducats) and a capital of 2.4 million lei (77,500 ducats), a huge amount for that time. These tradesmen, most of them foreigners, were the most diligent promoters of modernisation in Russia and the Ottoman territories not only in economic terms, but also from a cultural perspective. Without alluding to their role as members in commissions for the embellishment of these cities, as supporters for the establishment of public and private schools, as sponsors of cultural or religious institutions (theatres and churches), reference should be made to some of the fields related

to trade itself: credit institutions, the establishment of commodity exchanges, the creation of insurance companies or the publication of commercial journals. As competition sharpened, western merchants started to invest directly in the resources of the Black Sea area, whose resources also attracted significant Jewish capital.

During this quarter century the Black Sea trade was divided between the two empires that mastered its coasts: Russia and Turkey. In the Tsarist Empire, the central government in St. Petersburg and the regional authorities in New Russia continued the same policy of stimulating population growth and of increasing the quantity and quality of its agricultural output. After 1829 more districts (Podolia, Volhynia, Kiev, Kharkov, Voronezh, etc.) directed their harvests through this southern route, as market prices made land transport costs worthwhile. This huge demand for grain transformed everything, from production to transport, and the Black Sea gradually imposed itself as the main corridor for the export of Russia's agricultural surplus, with about two thirds of Russian grain exported via her southern outlets (Table 2). Most of these cereals were based on by wheat, whose increasing quality made it well received on European markets (Table 3). Other cereals exported from New Russia included rye, barley, oats, buckwheat, etc.

Table 2
Exports of all Russian grain

Years	European Russia	Black and Azov Seas	Percent of Black Sea and Azov
	1,000 chetverts		%
1831–1835	1,919	868	45.23
1836–1840	2,941	2,101	71.43
1841–1845	2,791	2,132	76.38
1846–1850	5,718	3,409	59.61
1851–1853	7,569	4,894	64.65

Source: Harvey 1938: 105

Table 3
Exports of all Russian wheat

Years	European Russia	Black and Azov Seas	Percent of Black Sea and Azov
	1,000 chetverts		%
1831–1835	1,056	820	77.65
1836–1840	2,069	1,952	94.34
1841–1845	2,133	2,022	94.79
1846–1850	3,481	3,133	90.00
1851–1853	4,745	4,176	88.00

Source: Harvey 1938: 105

Odessa was by far the largest port of the Black Sea. It continued to expand in these decades (Table 4), and it had all the institutions needed for modern commercial exchanges: banking houses, foreign and domestic trading firms, consulates, warehouses. The outlet of an ever expanding hinterland, stretching across the broad belt of black soil steppe, Odessa received its wheat via cart and barge and exported it in large ships well received in its deep harbour. This was an important privilege in relation to the other Russian ports, as Nikolayev, situated 22 miles from the mouth of the river Bug, and Kherson, located on the Dnieper, were inaccessible to large ships owing to the silting of the channel and the Ochakiv bar, while the Azov ports of Mariupol, Rostov on Don, and Taganrog suffered from the shallowness of the sea and the dangerous passage through the Yenikale Channel. Taganrog was the only port that enjoyed an important upsurge during this period, but it still was about five times smaller than Odessa (Table 5).

After 1829, the Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia witnessed a veritable commercial revolution. The abolishment of the Porte's relative commercial "monopoly" and the almost simultaneous introduction of steam navigation on the Danube (1830) turned the Danubian ports of Brăila and Galaţi into important suppliers of grains on the European markets, but also into large importers of industrial goods from western countries. The

Table 4
Trade of Odessa

Years	Exports	Imports	Tonnage of ships
	Value (1,000 gold rubles)		1,000 tons
1831–1835	5,392	3,539	123
1836–1840	10,073	4,687	202
1841–1845	12,002	4,684	212
1846–1850	18,092	6,975	322
1851–1853	18,862	7,070	344

Source: Harvey 1938: 114

Table 5
Trade of Taganrog

Years	Exports	Imports	Tonnage of ships
	1,000 gold rubles		1,000 tons
1831–1835	2,296	1,091	51
1836–1840	2,518	1,443	64
1841–1845	2,446	1,479	70
1846–1850	2,795	1,389	96
1851–1853	3,355	1,431	87

Source: Harvey 1938: 115

establishment of a regular service of Austrian steamers on the Danube nourished great expectations for turning the river into one of "the most important lines of communication in Europe" or "the natural artery of Europe". Favoured by this profitable grain trade and endowed with a free port status, the outlets of Brăila and Galați witnessed a rapid upsurge, so as to apparently endanger the leading position of Odessa. The incrimination that Russia was willingly neglecting to take the necessary measures for clearing the Sulina bar and channel of the Danube, the only navigable route towards inland ports, stood at the basis of a diplomatic conflict between Russia and the western cabinets, which was eventually solved after the Crimean War by the establishment of the European Commission of the Danube.

The Anglo-Ottoman convention of August 1838 and similar subsequent agreements concluded between the Porte and most European powers provided a new impetus to trade at Ottoman ports on the western and eastern coast of the Black Sea. The whole of the Ottoman Empire was given a virtually free trade status, and all monopolies were abolished, while low customs rates for the import and export of goods were fixed. The growth of Ottoman trade after 1838 was remarkable, with several goods (among them grain) finding profitable sale to the Mediterranean and Western Europe.

The trade conducted by Bulgarian territories also multiplied after 1838, and Varna became an important commercial outlet of the province. According to a report from the early

Table 6
Grain exports from Odessa and the Danubian ports

Product	**Wheat**		**Maize**		**Shipping**	
Year	**Danube**	**Odessa**	**Danube**	**Odessa**	**Danube**	**Odessa**
	Quantity (1,000 quarters)				**Annual average**	
1843	430	843	262	0	1,099	745
1844	514	909	302	29	1,384	919
1845	495	1,280	282	21	1,296	1,192
1846	438	1,408	500	26	1,555	1,467
1847	572	2,017	938	27	2,215	1,518
1848	273	1,410	436	3	1,123	1,063
1849	291	1,127	591	31	1,175	878
1850	424	980	273	33	896	783
1851	418	719	997	98	1,668	698
1852	531	1,362	1,055	226	1,756	1,251
Average	**439**	**1,205**	**564**	**49**	**1,417**	**1,058**

Source: Ardeleanu 2014: 271

1840s, it exported about 100,000 quarters of wheat and as much maize to Constantinople, but other agro-pastoral goods of the western Balkans were also pouring in towards this outlet. On the other coast of the Black Sea, similar conditions stimulated the increase of trade. From late 18th century, but especially after the opening of the Straits for international shipping, western merchants started to look for a shorter route towards the Persian market. For a while, considerable trade with Persia was carried by way of Redout Kale, due to the customs privileges granted by the Russian government to the provinces south of the Caucasus. The port was a veritable relay in relation to the inland trading centres of Tiflis and Erevan, wherefrom European merchandise was distributed to Armenia, northern Persia and the eastern Ottoman provinces. However, this commerce, largely controlled by Armenian merchants who used the Leipzig – Odessa route to bring goods to the Black Sea area was greatly affected by Russia's new protectionist policy meant to encourage native manufactures and limit foreign imports.

This stimulated merchants to turn their business to another rapidly growing commercial route from Trabzon to Erzurum and to Tabriz. This southern variant towards Persia was initially used in the early 19th century, but its prospects increased after the signing of the peace of Adrianople and the 1838 convention (Table 7). In 1830, as compared to 1828, Trabzon's exports more than tripled (up to 752,000 rubles), while imports increased almost fivefold (to 5,270,000 rubles). Imports consisted of textiles, colonial goods (sugar and coffee), metal and luxury goods, and exports included shawls from Kashmir, carpets from Persia, gum, and copperware. Along this route, Trabzon became the main gateway for Persian trade, with the biggest part of European merchandise being of British origin. Other ports were also favoured by these agreements, such as Samsun, whose hinterland was more suitable for agriculture, Sinope and Batumi, the centres of the Asia Minor trade.

Table 7
Trade of Trabzon

Year	Imports	Exports
	Value (million of francs)	
1816	12	11
1827	23.2	13.9
1835	38.7	35.0
1841	49.6	49.7
1846	46.0	42.1
1850	71.0	66.5
1852	62.7	53.3

Source: Issawi 1970: 25

Conclusions

This narrative has told the classical story of a sea gradually attracted into the vortex of world trade. The first episode (1774–1798) in the history of the rediscovery of the Black Sea is remarkable from several perspectives. Firstly, it shows European diplomacy in action, gradually integrating the Black Sea into the international scene and turning the question of the Straits into a significant issue of the continental balance of power. Russia's privileged position in the area was followed by Austria and the Western Powers requesting similar advantages from the Porte so as to avoid the imposition of a renewed hegemony over the Euxine. Secondly, it proves how important strategic commodities such as naval stores had become in the political and commercial contest of the great maritime powers. Trying to secure reliable connections with a promising market, European cabinets hurried to conclude trade and navigation agreements with Russia, the new actor of the southern Mediterranean commercial route. Thirdly, at a micro level, it shows how merchants along this route ventured into the Black Sea and widened the breach in the jealously guarded status of the Turkish Straits. However, during this early phase the trading infrastructure of the Black Sea area was too weak to allow for continuous and secure trading relations. The Ottomans were still reluctant to completely open the Bosporus to international shipping and mercantile fluxes remained insecure, resisting only with the support of the governmental privileges meant to encourage the development of trade.

The second phase (1798–1829) brought about a completely different situation, with passage rights through the Straits traded by the Porte in exchange for political advantages. But with a continuous war raging on the continent, it was not a good period to cash in on the advantages of the new right obtained by the western merchants and ship-owners. Military conflicts and the disruption of normal agricultural production cycles increased the demand for grain, and the Black Sea area was destined to supply it, due to the abundance of black earth on its northern and western coasts and its favourable climate. During the 19th century, an exponential expansion of cultivated lands, accompanied by the amelioration of agricultural techniques, the use of higher quality seeds and of modern machines resulted in a significant quantitative and qualitative increase of the agricultural output. Moreover, local and central authorities were interested in encouraging agriculture, as trading agro-pastoral goods was Russia's main source of prosperity, and hence the interest in developing the string of ports along the Black Sea northern coast, with Odessa their new queen. But as continuous political problems hindered the growth of this trade, Russia had to force the complete opening of the Black Sea, a provision included in the Treaty of Adrianople.

After 1829 the economic structure of New Russia adapted to feed this grain frenzy. Nourished by the grain trade, the area gradually emerged from the periphery of the economic world market. Ottoman territories gradually followed in the footsteps of this commercial revolution. In Moldavia and Wallachia, the Treaty of Adrianople abolished all former obligations to supply the Porte with grain and other commodities, and Danubian products could be sold freely, according to free market rules. In the next decades, the two states imposed a coherent policy meant to favour production and encourage foreign trade by means of a low tariff, and Danubian grain

started to compete against the Russian cereals. In 1838, when the whole of the Ottoman Empire was granted a virtually free trade status, all provinces bordering the Black Sea were quickly integrated into the rhythms of world trade. In less than three quarters of a century, the Black Sea trade was transformed beyond recognition, making the area one of the most dynamic commercial areas of the world.

Bibliography

Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru, Maria Matilda, *Contribution au problème de l'approvisionnement en blé de Constantinople dans la seconde moitié du XVIIIe siècle*, "Studia et acta orientalia", Bucharest, t. I, 1958, pp. 13–37.

Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru, Maria Matilda, *L'approvisionement d'Istanbul par les Principautés Roumaines au XVIIIe siècle. Commerce ou requisition*, "Revue du monde musulman et de la Méditerranée", no. 66, 1992, *Les Balkans à l'époque ottoman*, pp. 73–78.

An Account of Odessa. Translated from the French with Some Reflections Showing the Benefits of the Trade of the Black Sea to the United States of America and the Advantages of a Commercial Treaty with Turkey, by an American, Newport, 1819.

Anderson, Matthew Smith, *The Eastern Question, 1774–1923: A Study in International Relations*, London, 1966.

Ardeleanu, Constantin, *Evoluţia intereselor economice şi politice britanice la gurile Dunării (1829–1914)*, Brăila, 2008.

Ardeleanu, Constantin, *From Vienna to Constantinople on Board the Vessels of the Austrian Danube Steam-Navigation Company (1834–1842)*, "Historical Yearbook", Bucharest, t. VI, 2009, pp. 187–202.

Ardeleanu, Constantin, *International Trade and Diplomacy at the Lower Danube. The Sulina Question and the Economic Premises of the Crimean War (1829–1853)*, Brăila, 2014.

Ardeleanu, Constantin, *Russian-British Rivalry Regarding Danube Navigation and the Origins of the Crimean War (1846–1853)*, "Journal of Mediterranean Studies", t. XIX, no. 2, 2010, pp. 165–186.

Ardeleanu, Constantin, *The Discovery of the Black Sea by the Western World. The Opening of the Euxine to International Trade and Shipping (1774–1792)*, "New Europe College. Ştefan Odobleja Program: Yearbook 2012–2013", Bucharest, 2014, pp. 21–46.

Ardeleanu, Constantin, *The Navigation of the Lower Danube (1829–1853)*, "Transylvanian Review", vol. 22, supplement 2, 2013 (*Economic and Social Evolutions at the Crossroads of the World-Systems*, edited by Iosif Marin Balog, Rudolf Graf, Cristian Luca), pp. 230–241.

Bilici, Faruk, *La politique française en mer Noire, Vicissitudes d'une implantation, 1747–1789*, Istanbul, 1992.

Buşe, Constantin, *Comerţul exterior prin Galaţi sub regim de port-franc (1837–1883)*, Bucharest, 1976.

Căzan, Ileana, *Interese austriece la Dunărea de Jos. Strategie. Navigaţie. Comerţ*, Bucharest, 2007.

Cernovodeanu, Paul, *British Economic Interests in the Lower Danube and the Balkan Shore of the Black Sea between 1803 and 1829*, "Journal of European Economic History", vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 105–120.

Cernovodeanu, Paul, *L'activité des maisons de commerce et de négociants ioniens du Bas-Danube durant l'intervalle 1829–1853*, in *Actes de IIe Colloque International d'Histoire*, vol. I, Athens, 1985, pp. 91–105.

Cernovodeanu, Paul, Marinescu, Beatrice, *British Trade in the Danubian Ports of Galatz and Braila between 1837 and 1853*, "Journal of European Economic History", t. VIII, no. 3, 1979, pp. 707–741.

Cernovodeanu, Paul, *Relaţiile comerciale romano-engleze în contextul poticii orientale a Marii Britanii (1803–1878)*, Cluj-Napoca, 1986.

Cernovodeanu, Paul, *Un Unpublished British Source Concerning the International Trade through Galatz and Brăila, between 1837–1848*, "Revue Roumaine d'Histoire", t. XVI, no. 3, 1977, pp. 517–531.

Clapham, J. H., *The Last Years of the Navigation Acts*, "The English Historical Review", t. XXV, no. 99, 1910, pp. 480–501.

Crawley, C. W., *Anglo-Russian Relations 1815–40*, "Cambridge Historical Journal", t. III, no. 1, 1928, pp. 47–73.

Dearborn, Henry A. S., *A Memoir on the Commerce and Navigation of the Black Sea and the Trade and Maritime Geography of Turkey and Egypt*, vol. I–II, Boston, 1819.

Docan, Nicolae, *Explorațiuni austriece pe Dunăre la sfârşitul secolului al XVIII-lea*, "Analele Academiei Române – Memoriile secţiunii istorice", series II, vol. 36, 1914, pp. 541–709.

Emilciuc, Andrei, *Rolul portului Odesa în sistemul comerţului european cu cereale (1794–1853)*, Ph.D. Dissertation Thesis, The State University of Chişinău, 2011.

Fairlie, Susan, Elizabeth, *The Anglo Russian Grain Trade 1815–1861*, PhD Dissertation Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 1959.

Florescu, Radu R., *The Struggle against Russia in the Romanian Principalities: a Problem in Anglo-Turkish Diplomacy 1821–1854*, 2nd edition, Iaşi, 1997.

Gogeanu, Paul, *Strâmtorile Mării Negre de-a lungul istoriei*, Bucharest, 1966.

Hagemeister, Jules de, *Mémoire sur le commerce des ports de la Nouvelle Russie, de la Moldavie et de la Valachie*, Odessa, Simferopol, 1835.

Hajnal, Henry, *The Danube. Its Historical, Political and Economic Importance*, The Hague, 1920.

Halm, Hans, *Wegbereiter des Grosshandels: auf der Donau bis zur Zäsur des Krieges 1787*, "Jahrbuch für Geschichte Osteuropas", no. 2, 3, 1954, pp. 258–303.

Halm, Hans, *Donauhandel und Donauschiffahrt von den österreichischen Erblanden, nach Neurussland (1783)*, "Jahrbuch für Geschichte Osteuropas", no. 2, 1, 1954, pp. 1–52.

Halm, Hans, *Ein Kapitel habsburgischen Osthandels. Die erste Reise des Willeshoveschen Compagnie (1782)*, "Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas", vol. 1, no. 2, 1953, pp. 180–240.

Harlaftis G., *Mapping the Greek Maritime Diaspora from the Early Eighteenth to the Late Twentieth Centuries*, in vol. *Diaspora Entrepreneurial Networks. Four Centuries of History*, Oxford, 2005, pp. 147–172.

Harlaftis G., *A History of Greek Owned Shipping: the Making of an International Tramp Fleet, 1830 to Present Day*, London – New York, 1996.

Harlaftis G., *The Role of Greeks in the Black Sea Trade, 1830–1900*, in vol. *Shipping and Trade, 1750–1950: Essays in International Maritime Economic History*, edited by Lewis Fischer and H. W. Nordvik, Rotterdam, 1990, pp. 63–95.

Harvey, Mose Lofley, *The Development of Russian Commerce on the Black Sea and Its Significance*, PhD Dissertation Thesis,

University of California, Berkeley, 1938.

Herlihy, Patricia, *Odessa: A History, 1794–1914*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1986.

Herlihy, Patricia, *Russian Grain and Mediterranean Markets, 1774–1861*, PhD Dissertation Thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1963.

Herlihy, Patricia, *Ukrainian Cities in the Nineteenth Century*, in vol. *Rethinking Ukrainian History*, edited by Ivan L. Rudnytsky, Edmonton, 1981. pp. 135–155.

Hope, Trevor J. *Britain and the Black Sea Trade in the Late Eighteenth Century*, "Revue roumaine d'études internationals", vol. 8, no. 2, 1974, pp. 159–174.

Ingle, Harold N., *Nesselrode and the Russian Rapprochement with Britain, 1836–1844*, Berkeley, 1976.

Ismail, Nilghiun, *Relații economice anglo-otomane în Marea Neagră între 1774–1840*, Cluj-Napoca, 2011.

Issawi, Charles, *Iranian Trade, 1800–1914*, "Iranian Studies", vol. 16, no. 3/4, 1983, *Studies on the Economic and Social History of Iran in the Nineteenth Century*, 1983, pp. 229–241.

Issawi, Charles, *The Tabriz-Trabzon Trade, 1830–1900: Rise and Decline of a Route*, "International Journal of Middle East Studies", t. I, no. 1, 1970, pp. 18–27.

Jones, Robert E., *The Dnieper Trade Route in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries: a Note*, "The International History Review", vol. 11, no. 2, 1989, pp. 303–312.

Kahan, Arcadius, *The Plow, the Hammer and the Knout: an Economic History of Eighteenth-Century Russia*, Chicago, 1985.

Kardassis, Vassilis, *Diaspora Merchants in the Black Sea. The Greeks in Southern Russia, 1775–1861*, Lanham – Boulder – New York – Oxford, 2001.

King, Charles, *The Black Sea. A History*, Oxford, 2004.

Klimesz, Henryk, *Poland's Trade through the Black Sea in the Eighteenth Century*, "The Polish Review", vol. 15, no. 2, 1970, pp. 55–80.

LeDonne, John P., *Geopolitics, Logistics, and Grain: Russia's Ambitions in the Black Sea Basin, 1737–1834*, "International History Review", vol. 28, no. 1, 2006, pp. 1–41.

Luca, Cristian, *Negustori venețieni și triestini în porturile de la gurile Dunării în ultimul sfert al secolului al XVIII-lea*, "Revista istorică", t. XXIII, no. 1–2, 2012, pp. 95–105.

Macgregor, John, *Commercial Statistics. A Digest of the Productive Resources, Commercial Legislation, Customs Tariffs, Navigation, Port, Quarantine Law, and Charges, Shipping, Imports, Exports, and the Monies, Weights, and Measures of All Nations*, vol. I–II, London, 1843–1844 (second edition, London, 1850).

Marinescu, Florin, *The Trade of Wallachia with the Ottoman Empire between 1791 and 1821*, "Balkan Studies", t. XII, no. 2, 1981, pp. 289–319.

Mediterraneo e/è Mar Nero. Due mari tra età moderna e contemporanea, edited by Luigi Mascilli Miglorini and Mirella Mafrici, Naples, 2012.

Mironov, B. N., *Le mouvement des prix des céréales en Russie du XVIIIe siècle au début du XXe siècle*, "Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations", vol. 41, no. 1, 1986, pp. 217–251.

Mitchell, Donald W., *A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power*, New York, 1974.

Murgescu, Bogdan, *Avatarurile unui concept: monopolul comercial otoman asupra Țărilor Române*, "Revista istorică", new series, vol. I, no. 9–10, 1990, pp. 819–845.

Murgescu, Bogdan, *Tratatul de la Adrianopol (1829) şi limitele impactului său asupra exporturilor româneşti de cereale*, in vol. *Economie, instituţii şi integrare europeană*, edited by Maria Mureşan, Bucharest, 2007, pp. 61–72.

Oţetea, Andrei, *Pătrunderea comerţului românesc în circuit internaţional (în perioada de trecere de la feudalism la capitalism)*, Bucharest, 1977.

Ozveren Eyup, *Black Sea and the Grain Provisioning of Istanbul in the Long Durée*, in vol. *Nourrir les cites de Méditerranée: Antiquité – Temps modernes*, edited by B. Marin & C. Virlouvet, Paris, 2003, pp. 223–249.

Ozveren Eyup, *A Framework for the* Study *of the Black Sea World, 1789–1915*, "Review (Fernand Braudel Center)", vol. 20, no. 1, 1997, pp. 77–113.

Paskaleva, Virginia, *Le rôle de la navigation à vapeur sur le bas Danube dans rétablissement de liens entre l'Europe Centrale et Constantinople jusqu'à la guerre de Crimée*, "Bulgarian Historical Review", t. IV, no. 1, 1976, pp. 64–74.

Paskaleva, Virginia, *Shipping and Trade on the Lower Danube in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, in vol. *Southeast European Maritime Commerce and Naval Policies from the Mid-Eighteenth Century to 1914*, edited by Apostolos E. Vacalopoulos, Constantinos D. Svolopoulos and Béla K. Király, Boulder & Highland Lakes, 1988, pp. 131–151.

Prousis T. C., *Risky Business: Russian Trade in the Ottoman Empire in the Early Nineteenth Century*, "Mediterranean Historical Review", vol. 20, no. 2, 2005, pp. 201–226.

Puryear, Vernon John, *England, Russia, and the Straits Question, 1844–1856*, Berkeley, 1931.

Puryear, Vernon John, *International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near East. A Study of British Commercial Policy in the Levant 1834–1853*, Stanford – London, 1935.

Puryear, Vernon John, *Odessa: Its Rise and International Importance, 1815–50*, "Pacific Historical Review", t. III, 1934, pp. 192–215.

Regemorter, Jean Louis van, *Légende ou réalité: Antoine Anthoine, pionnier du commerce marseillais en mer Noire*, in vol. *Hommes, idées, journaux. Mélanges en l'honneur de Pierre Guiral*, edited by Jean-Antoine Gili and Ralph Schor, Paris, 1988, pp. 319–326.

Regemorter, Jean Louis van, *Commerce et politique: préparation et négociation du traité franco-russe de 1787*, "Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique", vol. 4, no. 3, 1963, pp. 230–257.

Regemorter, Jean Louis van, *Le mythe génois en mer Noire: la France, la Russie et le commerce d'Asie par la route de Géorgie (1821–1881)*, "Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations", vol. 19, no. 3, 1964, pp. 492–521.

Regemorter, Jean Louis van, *La Russie Méridionale, la Mer Noire et le commerce international de 1774 à 1861*, Ph.D. Dissertation Thesis, Université de Paris 1, Panthéon – Sorbonne, Paris, 1984.

Reuilly, Jean, baron de, *Voyage en Crimée et sur les bords de la Mer Noire, pendant l'année 1803; suivi d'un mémoire sur le commerce de cette mer, et de notes sur les principaux ports commerçants*, Paris, 1806.

Reychman, Jan, *Le commerce polonais en mer Noire au XVIIIe siècle par le port de Kherson*, "Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique", vol. VII, no. 2, 1966, pp. 234–248.

Richmond, Walter, *The Northwest Caucasus: Past, Present, Future*, Oxon, 2008.

Sauer, Manfred, *Ősterreich und die Sulina Frage, 1829–1854*, I–II, "Miteillungen des Ostereichichen Staatarchivs", t. XL, 1987, pp. 185–236 and t. XLI, 1990, pp. 72–137.

Schnakenbourg, Eric, *Genèse d'un nouveau commerce: la France et l'ouverture du marché russe par la mer Noire dans la seconde moitié du XVIIIe siècle*, "Cahiers de la Méditerranée", vol. 83, 2011, pp. 309–325.

Stevens, Robert, *An Account of Odessa*, New Port, 1819.

Suny, Ronald Grigor, *Russian Rule*

and Caucasian Society in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century: The Georgian Nobility and the Armenian Bourgeoisie, 1801–1856, "The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity", vol. 7, issue 1, 1979, pp. 53–78.

Todorov, Nicolai, *La genèse du capitalisme dans les provinces bulgares de l'Empire ottoman au cours de la première moitié du XIXe siècle*, Sofia, 1960.

Todorova, Maria, *The Establishment of British Consulates in the Bulgarian Lands and British Commercial Interests*, "Études Balkaniques", no. 4, 1973, pp. 80–88.

Tomi, Raluca, *L'histoire de la Maison de Commerce Pedemonte et Fils*, "Historical Yearbook", t. III, 2006, pp. 111–122.

Treaties and Other Documents Relating to the Black Sea, the Dardanelles, and the Bosphorus, 1535–1877 (Turkey, No. 16), London, 1878.

Uner Turgay, A., *Ottoman-British Trade Through Southeastern Black Sea Ports During the Nineteenth Century*, in vol. *Économie et sociétés dans l'Empire Ottoman (Fin du XVIII^e – Début du XX^e siècle). Actes du colloque de Strasbourg (1^er – 5 juillet 1980)*, edited by Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont et Paul Dumont, pp. 297–315.

Uner Turgay, A., *Trade and Merchants in Nineteenth-Century Trabzon: Elements of Ethnic Conflict*, in vol. *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, I: *The Central Lands*, edited by B. Braude & B. Lewis,. New York, 1982, pp. 287–318.

Urquhart, David, *Progress of Russia in the West, North and South, by Opening the Sources of Opinion and Appropriating the Channels of Wealth and Power*, London, 1853.

Urquhart, David, *The Mystery of the Danube. Showing How through Secret Diplomacy That River Has Been Closed, Exportation from Turkey Arrested, and the Re-Opening of the Isthmus of Suez Prevented*, London, 1851.

Urquhart, David, *Turkey and Its Resources: Its Municipal Organization and Free Trade; the State and Prospects of English Commerce in the East, the New Administration of Greece, Its Revenue and National Possessions*, London, 1833.

Wilkinson, Charles, *An Account of the Navigation and Commerce of the Black Sea*, London, 1807.

List of illustrations

Cover photo:
Map of the Black Sea from the Portolan Atlas Dedicated to Hieronymus
Ruffault, Abbot of St. Vaast (circa 1544)
Author: Battista Agnese
Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:1544_Battista_Agnese_map_of_the_Black_Sea.jpg

p. 4 Black Sea as a Table
Author: Constantin Ardeleanu
Source: Constantin Ardeleanu

p. 16 Map of the Black Sea and environs from the 1624 Latin edition of the
Theatrum Orbis Terrarum of Abraham Ortelius
Author: Abraham Ortelius
Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:1624_ORTELIUS_Map_BLACK_SEA_Roman_Era_Pontus_Euxinus.jpg

p. 22 Ancient map of Black Sea (circa 1559)
Author: Diego Homem
Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Diego-homem-black-sea-ancient-map-1559.jpg

Publishing Information / Contact

The Online Journal **Euxeinos. Culture and Governance in the Black Sea Region** is published by the Center for Governance and Culture in Europe (GCE-HSG), University of St.Gallen, Switzerland with the financial support of Landys & Gyr Stiftung.

Contact
Center for Governance and Culture in Europe (GCE-HSG)
University of St.Gallen
Gatterstrasse 1
CH-9010 St.Gallen
Switzerland

Phone: +41 (0) 71 224 25 61

e-mail: euxeinos@unisg.ch
URL: www.euxeinos.ch, www.euxeinos.info
http://www.gce.unisg.ch/euxeinos
Facebook https://www.facebook.com/euxeinos1
ISSN 2296-0708