

Knowledge, Sentiment, and the Fantasy of Empire: Some Thoughts on Russia and its Encounters with Crimea

by Edward J. Lazzerini

After takeover of Crimea by the Russian Empire, rapid territorial and administrative reorganization and integration into the Russian imperial system followed. The colonization of the peninsula led to significant alteration of practices keyed to the exploitation of natural resources, in particular the plants of the Crimean landscape. Crimea served as a showcase of Russian colonial and imperial measures and was to become part of an imperial network across which plants and animals could be moved, a laboratory to which flora and fauna could be transferred with the goal of opening up new industrial enterprise.

Keywords: Crimea, Russian empire, colonization, science.

In the Old World, nations and the distinctions of their civilization form the principal points in the picture; in the New World, man and his productions almost disappear amidst the stupendous display of wild and gigantic nature. The human race in the New World presents only a few remnants of indigenous borders, slightly advanced in civilization; or it exhibits merely the uniformity of manners and institutions transplanted by European colonists to foreign shores.

Alexander von Humboldt¹

This essay grows out of many years investigating the emergence among Crimean Tatars of a modernist movement, the life-long endeavors of the social activist, pedagogue, and publisher Ismail Bey Gasprinskii (Gasprah), and the initial stages of nationalist ideology formation during the second half of the nineteenth and first two decades of the twentieth centuries. Spending more than forty years on those themes has prompted me to delve into the preceding hundred years going back roughly to the 1750s in search of the manner by which Crimea was altered under conditions of Russian colonial rule and the local population was gradually moved to respond in novel ways. Inspired by the naturalist von Humboldt's perspective enunciated in the epigram above, distinguishing as it does between the "Old" and "New" worlds in much nineteenth-century European thought, the increased contact between the expanding Russian Empire and Crimea provides an opportunity to test that relationship with an eye toward Humboldtian perceptions.

Comprising a territory of 9,750 square miles and connected to the Russian imperial mainland by the narrow Isthmus of Perekop, the Crimean Peninsula had

until 1783 formed the heart of a Turkic khanate that long held a preeminent position among eastern European and steppe states. By the end of the seventeenth century, however, the Crimean Khanate would see its pivotal role diminished considerably. Changes to the region's geopolitical balance occasioned by the simultaneous enhancement of Muscovy's status along with deterioration of the Ottoman Empire's, have been cited often as reason enough to explain the rather sudden turn of Crimean fortune. But to this consideration must be added the certain if poorly documented evidence of internal decline. Of particular significance domestically was the reduction of financial resources available to the Khans, resources traditionally sustained by plunder from yearly raids against the Khanate's neighbors, by captives either sold into slavery or ransomed, by tribute money from Poland and Muscovy, and by donations from the Turkish Sultan as payment for the Khanate's protection of the Ottoman Empire's northern marches. Without these substantial annual revenues, not only did the fragile compromise between the Khans and the preeminent Tatar clans collapse, thereby throwing Crimean politics into turmoil, but the end to the slave trade undermined perhaps the most important sector of Crimean economic life, with as yet poorly analyzed but clearly profound social consequences.²

Thus, what Peter the Great's Russia faced along its expanding southern frontier on the eve of the eighteenth century was the shadow of a once mighty foe, still able to defend its home base, but no longer the uncontrollable terror stalking the steppes or visiting destruction deep into the territory of the Russian Empire. The ability of the Khanate to stave off final defeat at Russian hands until 1783 had less to do with Crimean strengths than St. Petersburg's preoccupation with its own domestic problems and its western neighbors, as well as the short-term success of Tatar diplomacy.

The long series of events that culminated in the loss of Crimean independence still awaits its historian, but the final stages that were played out during the reign of Catherine II (1764-1796) have been amply described and analyzed.³ While the complex and fluid relationship between Russia and the Khanate need not detain us here, we ought to note that four invasions of the peninsula by Russian troops were required between 1771 and 1782 before the Empress reluctantly consented to the region's annexation and ended her years of hopeful experimentation with alternative solutions to this border problem.⁴ Not surprisingly, once made, this decision led to Crimea's rapid territorial and administrative reorganization followed by integration into the Russian imperial system. In the process, however, the Tatar people were promised that their traditional economic, social, and religious/cultural life would be little disturbed.

By 1850, Crimea and its people had been part of the Russian Empire for sixty-seven years. The nearly seven decades of imperial rule had wrought major changes in the administrative, social, economic, and cultural patterns that the majority of

inhabitants, Crimean Tatars of Muslim faith, had once woven into a communal tapestry. Some of these changes resulted from deliberate policies inaugurated by colonial administrators; others were the by-product of increasing native dependence upon the colonials and the diminished autonomy inevitably experienced by the losers in the game of power politics. It would be impossible to weigh the fate of the Crimean Tatars meaningfully on the scales of comparative history, yet few peoples have likely suffered more tragically than have they. On the eve of Gasprinskii's birth in 1851, Crimea was no longer an alluring tapestry to which could be woven new but familiar designs consonant with earlier ones. Instead it had become a "crazy" quilt of disconnected patterns: some native, others alien; some traditional, others modern. And the whole was no longer the sum of its parts. Transformed, Crimea represented a land as unobliging to its native inhabitants as it was rewarding for its conquerors. A paradise, both lost and gained.

What were the signs of this transformation? Let me list and only briefly describe the main ones:

Demographic trends: The most striking was the depletion of the native population and the subsequent relegation of the Tatars to minority status within their own homeland. While the size of the pre-annexation population is estimated at roughly 300,000, a survey ordered by Baron Osip Andreevich Igel'strom in 1784 produced an estimate of 150,000 Tatar inhabitants,⁵ followed in 1805-1806 by a second survey counting slightly more than 129,000.⁶ By all accounts, massive migration, mostly to the Ottoman Empire, must provide the most significant explanation for the apparent population decline. At the same time that Tatars fled, others, especially Russian and Ukrainians, but Central Europeans as well, took their places;

Economic trends: The demographic disruption of the Peninsula noted above had the greatest impact on developments affecting the economic life of its inhabitants. Most significantly it contributed to a dramatic labor shortage among Tatar agriculturalists and the flight of tens of thousands abroad, thereby leading them to abandon their long-held land and village communities. The opportunities for those left behind or who subsequently returned, some claiming land, others unable to do so even as so much land lay unclaimed and unused, affected production of basic commodities. At the same time, the number of large landowners, most from outside the Peninsula, grew significantly as a result of generous grants (*dachas*) from the Throne that included abandoned land or land seized from others who could not immediately prove their historic ownership. Within Russia proper, where serfdom was the agricultural norm and provided basic labor, dacha owners were not much different from *pomeshchiki*. In Crimea, because enserfment of Tatars was prohibited by royal decree and the importation of serfs from outside costly and time consuming, the impact on dacha owners was such that they were led increasingly to commercialize their holdings by focusing on wheat farming, sheep-breeding, and viticulture, all promising generous profits via national and international

marketing;⁷

Cultural trends: The most negative impact on local culture resulted largely from the Tatars' general powerlessness and lack of autonomy. They were not only conquered subjects but were dramatically shrinking in numbers. Moreover, despite their working relationship with the State, both secular and religious elites proved limited in their ability to protect and maintain society's physical antiquities. Whatever successes were achieved over the long century following 1783 relied significantly on tenuous links between local leaders of both communities collectively working to "save" something or other of real significance, e.g., the palace compound of the former Khans in Bakhchisarai. Such episodes, however, were few in number. More common was a widely held lack of sympathy, even antipathy, for things Tatar on the part of Russian administrators, as witnessed in 1821 when the Ministry of Internal Affairs organized a small expedition to Crimea with the purpose of surveying its many antiquities. When faced with the report of the expedition seeking funds for site restoration, the Ministry decided that it would gladly support work on Greek and Italian monuments, but not Tatar or Turkish ones. The latter were "less valuable" and should rely on the beneficence of local *indigènes* for their survival;⁸

Educational and intellectual trends: Although the institutions of education were well developed under the Khanate following the traditions of Islamic practice, their maintenance suffered extensively after 1783. Revenue for this purpose diminished along with the decline of local production, the end to the slave trade, the transferal of peninsular wealth to Russians and others, and the decrease in support for religious endowments (*wakuf*) followed by imperial efforts to undermine this traditional expression of communal charity. What little Russian-sponsored education ensued stressed instruction of and in the Russian language and involved a more aggressive role for the Russian Orthodox Church. These policies were expected to foster accommodation (*sblizhenie*) of the locals while simultaneously dissipating the political threat that ethnic/religious consciousness posed ultimately to the territorial integrity of the Empire. History showed that Russian efforts accomplished very little for their own interests, and even less for the education of the Tatars.⁹

Thus were circumstances and conditions in Crimea by the centennial of the Russian conquest. Was it meant to be that way? Perhaps not.

In her book on Russian imperial country estates,¹⁰ in a chapter entitled "Tatya-na's Garden: The Paradox of Estate Park Design," Priscilla Roosevelt makes some telling remarks in response to the vogue for English gardens that swept across Europe and Russia in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. "On one level of realization," she writes,

the English garden seems to have expressed the desire of Russian aristocrats for an immediate and natural relationship with their surroundings; on another it was an emphatic reminder of their ambivalence toward rural Russian reality.

Her focus, to be sure, is on those magnificent aristocratic dwellings, such as Akhtyrka, Kuskovo, Kachanovka, and Neskuchnoe; on their origins, design and decoration, the social, family, and cultural life within their walls, and, as with “Tatya-na’s garden,” their exterior grounds. Roosevelt’s treatment of those grounds naturally sustains the basic thrust of her larger tale that begins: “All old houses have stories to tell. Of these sagas, few are as rich and dramatic as those embedded within the walls of Russia’s country estates.”

The passion for gardens, especially English ones, meant that by the late eighteenth century, Roosevelt adds *en passant*,

Russia was a player in the international trade of exotic plants. The aristocrat’s park might contain Lebanese cedars, Siberian pines, and American elms, and his hothouses rare tropical flowers. Russian aristocrats competed in collecting specimens from abroad, whereas foreigners wanted Russian rarities.

The international trade of exotic plants certainly made possible some of the most extraordinary gardens not just in Russia but anywhere in Europe, yet that commerce reflected much more, it would seem, than the fancy of wealthy and pampered elites. It was part of a much larger phenomenon linked to scientific curiosity, entrepreneurial ingenuity, political economy, and empire building. And it is those linkages that I would like to pursue with regard to Crimea.

During the eighteenth century, across Europe and including Russia, the exploration of new worlds intensified in ways which were to have tremendous scientific, cultural, economic, and political significance. Much of the accumulating new knowledge consisted of representations of previously unknown human societies at once strange and distant, but a substantial part of the attention turned toward those new worlds was to extra-human natural riches (landscapes, flora, fauna, and the like). Unlike contact with new peoples, most of whom were perceived to be burdened by still primitive socio-economic conditions and who, thereby, were unlikely to add much to either the capabilities or the profit of the typical imperial enterprise, the discovery of rare botanical specimens, and, particularly, the transplantation of horticulturally and agriculturally useful plants from one region to another, was a different matter. These were conceived within a mercantilist framework that saw empire as a source of raw materials (import substitutes and colonial transplants) for the benefit of the mother country. In sum, plant exchange became part of an imperial strategy that frequently integrated scientific curiosity with entrepreneurship; new knowledge could mean new economic and imperial opportunities, and the widespread urge to detail, inventory, classify, organize, and represent must be seen in that context.

To the eighteenth-century European mind, the vogue for natural history and the utility of botany is revealed in many ways: in the volume of voyages (overseas and overland) of exploration and investigation, the devising of endless taxonomies, the

popularity of botanical gardens (private and public), and even the linking of botany with ethnographic understanding of human sexuality, yielding a sort of eroticized scientific literature. (Love of plants and animals as analogous to love of humans is more than coincidental for the time and the conditions).¹¹ The traveling botanist may not have been a traveling salesman, but he was quite often a businessman nevertheless, negotiating with varying degrees of success the purchase of the economically and politically useful and rendering the natural order—out there—stable, mobile, and combinable so that it (the flora and fauna) could be viewed and represented back in Europe in libraries, studies, museums, and gardens and then remobilized to guide further exploits.

For the Russian Empire, busy enough with imperial opportunities along the Eurasian landmass since the mid-sixteenth century, though not totally immune over the long haul to overseas adventures (witness the exploration and settlement along North America's west coast), the eighteenth century offered a territorial prize in the South that, once incorporated into Russia's imperial fabric, was appropriately named "New Russia" (Novorossiia). Perhaps its most attractive portion was situated at its extreme southern end, within a peninsula barely tethered to the mainland, that reached into the heart of the Black Sea and possessed an inviting shoreline, fertile valleys and hillsides, a moderate climate, already active ports, and a vantage point from which to access Istanbul and the Mediterranean directly. The naval value of Crimea's southern shore was immediately apparent (and long assumed), making the placement of a fleet and development of a suitable maintenance-and-repair facility (ultimately at Aktiar, renamed Sevastopol') an unquestioned priority.

After its conquest in 1783, the region would become many things to Russians apart from the site of a warm-water port of major military and heroic significance. It would become the ultimate setting for *dachas*, the Russian version of the Riviera and locus for spas and health resorts, a playground for some of the empire's nobility and for its royal family, and later, for many subjects of more modest means. Crimea would also become a seductress for poets and painters, drawn to its "sunny clime," genuine and deeply historic ethnic diversity, dramatic and sharply contrasting topography, and storms that can build up in an instant, churn the sea to its bottom, then retreat, leaving clouds to race across the sky while altering the mood of the shore with remarkable rapidity. But first it would become, perhaps more than any other part of the empire, a lure for traveling naturalists hoping not just to garner useful knowledge, but to serve as part of the vanguard, in some cases among the instruments, of Russian-imposed order, the agents of empire in a deeper sense. Out of their work came a special attitude toward Crimea that represented the peninsula as a place where the ambitious could develop economic, social, and national technologies.

Although some naturalist observation of Crimea had been undertaken and re-

corded in the decades prior to 1783, it was only subsequently that any systematic examination of the region's physical geography and natural resources was pursued. Among naturalists studying the region were Karl Ivanovich Gablits (1752-1821), a former participant in the Astrakhan expedition of 1760-1770, who produced a study of the flora, fauna, and minerals of Crimea in 1785 (*Kriticheskoe opisanie Tavricheskoi oblasti po ee mestonakhozheniyu i po vsem trem tsarstvam prirody*), and then remained to serve as director of the region's economy; and Friedrich August von Biberstein (1768-1826), who examined the local plant life between 1793 and 1796, completed a marvelously illustrated work entitled *Flora Taurico-Caucasica*, and then stayed to become chief inspector of wool production. But the man who occupies the preeminent position among such early investigators of Crimea was Petr Semenovich Pallas (1741-1811), who first toured Crimea in 1793-1794, wrote a number of studies of the region, some published, others only for official eyes, and then remained to continue his work and become director of a school for viticulture and wine-making in port-town of Sudak. A closer look at his views and activities can serve as an indicator of the range of linkages between natural history and empire.

Pallas was born in Berlin, the son of a German regimental surgeon and then professor of anatomy at the Berlin Medical Academy; his mother was French. Until 1754 he was educated at home together with his siblings, but then studied medical and other natural sciences at institutions in his native city, in Halle, and in Göttingen. By the mid-1760s his reputation was such as to garner an invitation from the Russian Academy of Sciences to join it as a professor of natural history. After some dispute over salary, he accepted and entered Russia in June 1767. He was twenty-six years old.

By the following year, the Academy of Sciences was laying plans for a major scientific expedition to large parts of the empire in a wide-ranging effort to enhance knowledge in the natural sciences, ethnography, archeology, and other fields. The chief participants—Johann Gottlieb Georgi (1729-1802), Johan Peter Fal'k (1732-1774), Johan Anton Güldenstädt (1745-1781), Samuel Gottlieb Gmelin (1745-1774), Ivan Ivanovich Lepekhin (1740-1802), and Georg Morits Lovits (1722-1774)—made up a stellar collection of scholars, but as one later chronicler of Russian ethnographic research noted, it was Pallas who may have contributed the most to these ventures. For six years between 1768 and 1774 he journeyed throughout eastern Russia and Siberia, collecting data that would become the basis for a classic three-volume work entitled *Reise durch verschiedene Provinzen des Russischen Reichs*, published in St. Petersburg between 1772 and 1776. As remarkable as that work was, it represented only the first use of what Pallas had collected, and would be followed over the next twenty-five years by a series of studies whose contributions were unparalleled: *Sammlungen historischer Nachrichten über die Mongolischen Völkerschaften*, in four volumes (1776-1801); *Zoographia rosso-asi-*

atica, in three volumes (1811); and *Flora Rossica: Observations sur la formation des montagnes et sur les changements, arrivés au Globe, particulièrement à l'égard de l'Empire de Russie*, in two parts (1774-1788).

In 1793, seeking some respite from his scholarly writing, Pallas obtained permission to travel to Russia's South, the "new" South not long a part of the empire. At his own expense, accompanied by his wife and daughter as well as a sketch artist, he would spend seven and one-half months in Crimea, gathering plants and seeds and taking notes on everything from topographical wonders to linguistic, geological, zoological, ethnographical, and archeological data. He would later describe the region as the most remarkable land on earth in terms of physical geography and mineralogy, and would be so enraptured of the place that he quickly determined to return permanently.¹² His enthusiasm for this latest addition to Russia, in fact, exceeded anything he might have felt for any other region, and not just owing to its natural beauty: for him, Crimea was both an Arcadia—a setting of simple pleasures and quiet, pastoralism and harmony—and a site for new economic and imperial opportunities. Contrary to Grigorii Aleksandrovich Potemkin (1739-1791), the architect of the region's conquest in Catherine's name, who declaimed "the acquisition of Crimea can neither make us stronger nor richer," Pallas was convinced that it could do both. Becoming stronger and richer required the naturalist's wizardry, his knowledge of natural history and his skill at transplanting flora and fauna at will, thereby using nature more rationally, more calculatingly, and more fruitfully. Not by chance was the wide-ranging report he first provided of his Crimean experiences entitled *Remarques générales sur la Tauride et les moyens de la rendre florissante* (1794).

All of this was as if Russia were an expanding puzzle, the mystery of whose solution was not simply how to add new pieces but how to make new pieces fit in a manner that would bring profit to the heartland. Crimea was to become part of an imperial network across which plants and animals could be moved, a laboratory to which flora and fauna could be transferred with the goal of opening up new industrial enterprise. Transferences of these kinds were already leading or would soon lead to the establishment of such industries elsewhere: tea in India (from China), breadfruit in the West Indies (from Tahiti), cotton in the West Indies (from Persia), cochineal insects in India (from South America). Pallas had in mind similar projects for Russia: grapes for wine from Europe to Crimea; mulberry and silkworm from China to Crimea; and Merino sheep from Europe to Crimea. His special interest in viticulture and winemaking is telling in its anticipation that someday Russia would be able to dispense with French imports!

Though cloaked with the mantle of science and curiosity, all of this smacks of mercantilism and the notion of commerce as a form of warfare by other means. But it also reflects a belief that moving and mixing renders the strange more familiar and less threatening, and therefore more controllable. In this way - by classifying, naming,

collecting, inventorying, archiving - the interests of empire were furthered.

But there was another way for those same interests to be served: by establishing botanical gardens. The Royal Botanical Gardens in Kew, London was only one of many such enterprises that dotted the capitals of Europe, standing as focal points for systematic imperial collecting, the place to which all nature was brought.¹³ They provided a scaled-down and manageable map of nature far and near, and stood as metaphors for an imperial might that could collect at will from the new worlds it would control. Few, however, know that Crimea has its own illustrious and fruitful botanical garden, created by imperial decree in 1811 in one of those new worlds: Nikita Botanical Garden (Nikitskiy Botanicheskiy Sad), not founded by Pallas but by a near contemporary botanist, Khristian Khristianovich Steven (1781-1863). Few also know of the remarkable efforts in the second quarter of the nineteenth century by Prince Mikhail Vorontsov to use Crimea as a site for Russia's renewal. His own extraordinary palace complex at Alupka, with its enchanting English garden set below the region's most sacred mountain (Ay-Petri), became a model for the territory, filtering its influence back to the center of the empire to provide the impetus among Russia's nobility for the construction of palaces and parks all along the southern coast of Crimea.

Between the Nikita Botanical Garden and Vorontsov's Anglophilic estate, model forms of economic activity were forged that owed much to the natural historians emerging in the eighteenth century, who combined love of nature with love of empire, but were ultimately ignored and betrayed. As any visitor to Crimea today will attest, the images of Paradise for which it was known down to the end of the empire are now untenable, and the terrible irony of a "Paradise Lost" (*poteranny ray*) engulfs the peninsula. Following his 2014 seizure of the region from Ukraine, Vladimir Putin has sought to reclaim it for Moscow by justifying the historical role that Russia played prior to 1917. His focus and favor, however, are not on Catherine II but on the physically imposing figure of Tsar Alexander III (reigned 1881-1894), even more of a nemesis to the legacy of his great-great-great-grandmother than was Nicholas I (reigned 1825-1855), her great-grandson. Arguably Putin's choice of a model is ill-conceived for its appeal to autocratic rule from afar rather than the vision of enlightened minds and empathetic hearts as encouraged by Catherine.

That the region will thrive and its indigenous people regain their historic role in the near future are not likely. Few speak any longer in the vein of von Humboldt, nor have many since the late 1920s held forth with even a modicum of the combined perspective of knowledge and fantasy so characteristic of Pallas, Gablitz, and their naturalist colleagues. Planned future research will expand the tentative and speculative assessment of their ideas, contributions, and reverie with regard to Crimea that I have offered herein. Humboldt and his Russian colleagues are owed this much.

About the author

Lazzerini, Edward J. earned the doctorate from the University of Washington in Russian history. His most recent academic position was with Indiana University, from which he retired in 2018 having served with the Department of Central Eurasian Studies and directing both the Sinor Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies and the Inner Asian and Uralic National Resource Center. Much of his research continues to focus on the relationship between belief and knowledge in Eurasian commentary traditions—principally within the framework of the Russian Empire—and the impact of modernity on those traditions. Of particular interest is the fate of Islam as adhered to by Turkic peoples in the Volga-Kama, Black Sea, and Caucasus regions between the mid-eighteenth and early twentieth centuries. Two specific projects that focus on the latter theme and its associated concerns with questions of social authority are: (1) An intellectual biography of Ismail Bey Gasprinskii, the Crimean Tatar social commentator and activist generally recognized as the most influential early advocate of modern thought within Islamic Central Eurasia; and (2) A monograph that seeks to unravel the myriad forces at work in Tatar society between the mid-18th century and the 1880s that collectively established the foundation for the most critical assault on Islamic authority in its long history—Jadidism.

Endnotes

- 1 Humboldt, Alexander von, *Personal Narrative of Travels to the Equinoctial Regions of the New Continent* (London, 1814).
- 2 On the enslavement of Russian and other Slavic people captured by the Crimean Tatars, see Kizilov, Mikhail, "Slave Trade in the Early Modern Crimea from the Perspective of Christian, Muslim, and Jewish Sources," *Journal of Early Modern History*, no. 11:1-2 (2007): 1-31; Baranowski, Bohdan *Chlop polka w wale z tatarami*, (Warsaw, 1952); Kolodziejczyk, Dariusz, "Slave Hunting and Slave Redemption as a Business Enterprise: the Northern Black Sea Region in the Sixteenth to Seventeenth Centuries," *Oriente Moderno*, no. 25:1 (2006): 149-159; Fisher, Alan W., "Muscovy and the Black Sea Slave Trade," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies*, 6:4 (1972): 575-594.
- 3 See Fisher, Alan W., *The Russian Annexation of the Crimea, 1772-1783*, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1970).
- 4 On this subject, once again, Fisher, Alan W. has added substantially to our knowledge with two studies: "Enlightened Despotism and Islam under Catherine II," *Slavic Review*, XXVII, no. 4 (December, 1968): 542-553, and "Sahin Girey, the Reformer Khan, and the Russian Annexation of the Crimea," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, XV, no. 3 (September, 1967): 341-364.
- 5 Lashkov, F.F., "Sbornik dokumentov po istorii Krymsko-tatarskago zemlevladieniia," *Izvestiia Tavricheskago uchenago arkhivnago komissii*, XXVI (1897), 84-154.
- 6 On this subject see: Markevich, A.I., "Pereseleniia Krymskikh tatar v Turtsiiu v sviazi s dvizheniem naseleniia v Krymu," *Izvestiia Akademii Nauk SSSR, otdelenie humanitarnykh nauk*, 7th series (Moscow, 1928): 375-405 and 7th series (Moscow, 1929): 1-16; and Pinson, M., "Russian Policy and the Emigration of the Crimean Tatars to the Ottoman Empire, 1854-1862," *Güney-Dogu Avrupa Arastirmalar Dergisi*, I (1972): 37-56.
- 7 Maksimenko, M, *Krest'ianskoe dvizhenie v Tavricheskoi gubernii nakanune i posle otmeny krepostnogo prava*. (Simferopol, 1957), 14-21.
- 8 This episode is recounted in Steven, A. "Dela archiva Tavricheskogo gubernskago pravleniia, otnosiaschiiasia do razyskaniia, opisaniia i sokhraneniia pamiatnikov stariny v predelakh Tavricheskoi gubernii," *Izvestiia Tavricheskoi uchenoi arkhivnoi komissii*, XIII (1891): 37-41.
- 9 *Sbornik dokumentov*, 97-156.
- 10 Roosevelt, Priscilla, *Life in the Russian Country Estate*. (New Haven: Yale UP, 1995).
- 11 Karl Linnaeus and his disciples were often called "sexualists" for their particular delight in drawing attention to the sexuality of plants, classifying them according to the number, situation, and proportion of the parts of fructification, naming them after human sexual organs (*Phallus impudicus* [the stinkhorn] and *Clitoria* [the butterfly pea], for example), and enlarging upon the analogies between the anatomy of flowers and the reproductive organs of animals. Thus, in Linnaeus's own *Elements of Botany*, London 1775, p. 151), he asserts: "The calyx... is the marriage bed, the corolla the curtains, the filaments the spermatc vessels, the antherae the testicles, the dust the male sperm, the stigma the extremity of the female organ, the style the vagina, the germane the ovary, the pericarpium the overy impregnated, the seeds the ovula or eggs."
- 12 Catherine II would grant him a small estate with arable land, a garden, and mill "in perpetuity" along the southern coast of Crimea at Alushta, as well as a vineyard covering ten *desiatin* in the valley of Sudak. Over time, Pallas would add other properties to these original holdings, ending up with land measuring thousands of *desiatin*.
- 13 Others included Österreichischer Botanischer Garten, Vienna; Botanischer Garten Berlin; I Giardini di Castel Truttmanskorf, Merano, Italy; Hortius Botanicus, Amsterdam; Jardin des plantes, Paris, France; and Orto Botanico di Padova.